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Global custody is a service whereby a single custodian holds its client's international portfolio 
through a network of local sub-custodians, clearing systems and depositaries. Modern custodial 
practice is electronic and cross border. The lack of a tangible and allocated subject matter cuts 
across the traditional characterisation of custody as bailment. Ambiguities as to the location of 
custody assets raises novel questions of conflict of laws. 
It is argued that computerised debt securities are not negotiable instruments, but that the benefits 
of negotiability are available by other means, in particular the rules of equity and of private 
international law. It is argued that the impact of computerisation of registered securities is more 
limited, due to the historically intangible and unallocated nature of company shares. 
Traditionally, the custodian is a bailee in resect of securities, and a bank debtor in respect of 
cash. It is argued that because computerised custody securities are intangible and fungible, the 
custodian is not a bailee but a trustee. 
Where the securities of different clients are conuningled, the difficulty in showing certainty of 
subject matter for a valid trust is discussed. It is suggested that commingled clients should be 
treated as equitable tenants in common. 
Principles of private international law are discussed in relation to global custody generally, 
negotiability, taking security and custodian insolvency. 
The fiduciary duties of the custodian are considered in the light of recent case law. 
It is concluded that the uncertainties raised by the electronic and cross-border nature of global 
custody may largely be addressed by greater use of the principles of the law of trusts, and 
careful drafting in customer documentation. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
"Knowledge of these things would be much easier learnt in the City than in the courts. "' 
1. The Global Network2 
Global custody is a service whereby a single custodian assumes responsibility for the 
safekeeping of its client's portfolio of international securities and cash. In respect of 
overseas assets, it may perform its obligations either directly through overseas branches, 
or through sub-custodians. 3 The global custodian, its overseas branches and sub- 
custodians may in turn use nominees, clearing and settlement systems and common 
depositaries. The client's contractual relationship and dealings are only with the 
custodian, who keeps the global network behind the scenes. 
The Service 
The traditional custody product comprises the core services of safekeeping and 
settlement. 4 Customarily associated with this core product are basic portfolio 
administration5 together with foreign exchange services. 6 These core and associated 
Blackstone, quoted in Fifoot, The Develooment of the Law of Negotiable Instruments and the Law of Trusts, 
Journal of the Institute of Bankers, lix 433-456. 
2 "A global custodian provides its customers with access to settlement and custody services in multiple markets 
through a single gateway by integrating services performed by a network of sub-custodians, including the global 
custodian's own local branches and other local agents. The primary advantage to institutional investors of using 
a global custodian rather than a network of local custodians appears to be lower costs made possible by the 
global custodian's realisation of economies of scale and scope. The provision of custody and settlement services 
requires significant investments in information technology, communications systems and local agent networks. 
A global custodian, through economies of scale and scope, is able to spread its fixed costs over more 
transactions and to offer a variety of reporting, information, accounting and credit services to the investor at 
lower cost than if these services were purchased separately from a variety of service providers and local agents. 
By using a global custodian, an investor also avoids the burdens imposed by the need to maintain multiple 
communications links, conform to multiple formats for inputting settlement instructions, and receive and 
interpret reports from local agents in each local market in which it trades. " Bank for International Settlements, 
Cross-Border Securities Settlements, March 1995, p. 15. 
3 "Sub-custodians play a large role in cross-border settlements. Participation in domestic settlement systems is 
typically restricted to local entities. In other cases, the custodian may be unwilling to take on the risks or 
obligations of direct participation. " Bank for International Settlements, Cross-Border Securities Settlements, 
March 1995, p. 15 
4 (i.. e. the receipt and delivery of securities and cash to settle client trades. ) 
(i. e. income and dividend collection and withholding tax reclamation, proxy voting, handling corporate actions 
and trade portfolio reporting. ) 
functions are increasingly supplemented by value-added services, whereby the custodian 
cross-sells front office financial products to its custody clients. 7 
3. The Participants 
Global custody was first developed in the United States, in response to the regulatory 
needs of pension funds, including the obligation to have an independent custodian. The 
service was developed in London in the 1980s, and today many of the leading global 
custodians operating in London are the UK branches of US banks. Custodians have 
traditionally been banks. Certainly, non-bank entities play a role. For example some 
fund managers and brokers provide custody "in-house" for their clients, and clearing 
systems with international depository networks are upgrading their ser-vices to approach 
the role of the global custodian. Global custody requires an enormous investment in 
electronic and other systems. It is in some respects a distressed industry, with the over- 
provision of custody services pushing fees downward, while the measure of systemic risk 
associated with cross-border safekeeping and settlement is a source of increasing concern. 
Recent years have seen some significant withdrawals from the industry, while a number 
of mergers and business transfers has further reduced the number of global custodians. 
The major clients of global custody have always been private pension funds. Fo r 
demographic reasons, private pension funds will continue to grow in the decades ahead. 
With an increasing trend towards cross border investment (together with continuing 
settlement inefficiencies in local markets) the need for global custody will remain. Non- 
pension managed funds also constitute a growth industry requiring custodial services. 
Clients of the global custodian also include other entities having large international 
securities portfolios, such as insurance companies, and some building societies, corporate 
treasury operations and central banks. 
(e. g. converting sale proceeds from one currency into another in order to finance a purchase). 
7 These include cash management, cash lending, stocklending, repos (repurchase agreements) and derivatives. 
With the master trust pLoduct, custodians offer enhanced administrative services such as consolidated reporting, 
valuation and portfolio analysis including performance measurement. Some custodians offer index tracking and 
even investment recommendations. 
The profits derived by custodians from value-added services are so great that certain custodians provide the core 
functions for free; it has even been predicted that (in view of this profitability and in response to commercial 
pressures from fund managers) custodians will pay their clients to place their assets with them. 
-I- 
Uncertainty 
At the date of writing, there is a lack of consensus as to the correct legal analysis of 
global custody under English law. The principal reason for this is that English law has 
failed to keep pace with modern global custodial practice. Many of the relevant cases 
date from an era when banker's custody meant promissory notes in strong boxes. The 
ideas judicially developed in those cases (relating to the ownership and safekeeping of 
securities) rested on the assumption that documentation, and therefore physical 
possession, were involved. With trends towards dernaterialisation in the securities 
markets, securities are increasingly intangible in the hands of the global custodian. 8 In 
the absence of legislative clarification, therefore, the position has become uncertain. The 
traditional characteris at ions of bearer debt securities as negotiable9, and of the custodian 
as a baileelo, are no longer appropriate where no paper is involved. If the legal status 
of the portfolio and of the custodian is unclear, the rights and liabilities of the custodian 
and its client cannot be established with certainty. Risk analysis and risk management 
is frustrated. 
Another source of legal uncertainty is the international aspect of global custody. This 
raises complex issues of private international law, on which there is a dearth of directly 
relevant case law. 11 The following analysis of global custody under English domestic and 
private international law is an attempt to reduce this uncertainty 12 
5. Analytic Context 
This work is submitted in the context of a body of analysis relating directly and indirectly 
to custody The SIB custody review is nearing completion and Treasury proposals for 
the regulation of custody have been published. International settlement risk has been 
See chapter 3 for a full discussion of the computerisation of securities. 
9 See chapter 3 section B 
10 See chapter 4. 
II See chapters 6 and 7. 
The context of this is a wider uncertainty affecting many aspects of financial practice. Colin Bamford of the 
Financial Law Panel comments, "At the end of the 1980s, and into the beginning of the 1990s, there was a 
growing feeling in the financial markets that the pace of development of concepts and products was much 
greater than that of development in the legal system. " Editorial, (1995) 9 J. I. B. F. L. 
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addressed in a number of reports13 while the role of the clearing systems has been 
analysed in recent articles. 14 
6. Scope 
In view of the applicable word limit, a number of completed chapters have been omitted 
from this work. 15 Tax and derivatives are dealt with only incidentally. Both English 
domestic and private international law are considered. It is assumed throughout that the 
global custodian operates in London and that English law governs the global custody 
contract. 
13 These include Group of Thirty Securities Clearance and Settlement (1989); Group of Ten Delivery v Payment 
in Securities Systems, (1992); and Morgan Guaranty, Cross-Border Clearance, Settlement and Custody: Beyond 
the G30 Recommendations (1993). 
14 C. W. Mooney, Beyond Negotiability (1990); Randall Guynn, I. B. A., Modernising Securities Ownership 
Transfer and Pledging Laws; (1996); and R. M. Goode, The Nature and Transfer of Rights in -DernaterIalised 
and Immobilised Securities, (1996) 11 J. I. B. F. L. 162 -167. 
15 These are: stocklending and repos, depositary receipts, principles of settlement, the CGO. the CMO, CREST 
and regulation. They will be published in a forthcoming book based on this work. 
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Chapter 2. English domestic law principles 16 
This chapter will discuss the legal principles that have historically determined proprietary and 
other rights in custody assets under English domestic law. The following chapters will consider 
the impact on these traditional principles of the computerisation of securities. 
1. Assets, Possession and Property 
This section will begin with the respective differences between assets, possession and 
property 
a. Assets 17 
A person's assets are those of its resources which are legally available for the 
payment of its debtsI8 (for example its money but not its body19). 
Possession 
Possession is the control of an asset. When physical control of an asset is 
combined with awareness of the situation by the controller2O, possession 
ariseS21. I possess the pen with which I write this. 
16 The discussion in this chapter of possession and property is necessarily brief, and does not address the 
complexities surrounding these terms. "The essence of 'property' is indeed elusive. ", Kevin Gray, C. L. J., 
Proverty in Thin Air, (1991) 50,252 at 292; "... in truth, English law has never worked out a completely 
logical and exhaustive definition of 'possession"', per Viscount Jowitt, United States of America v Dollfus Mieg 
er Cie S. A., [19521 AC 582 at 605. 
17 The word derives from the Latin assatis, meaning sufficiency. The old French legal phrase aver asetz meant 
to have sufficient goods and effects to meet claims such as debts and legacies. 
18 
... property available 
for the payment of the debts of a person or corporation. " J-owitt's Dictionary of English 
Law_ Sweet & Maxwell 2nd, London_ 1977. 
19 See the Merchant of Venice, Shakespeare, Act 4 Scene 1 1199 - 101. 
20 1 do not possess drugs dropped into my handbag without my knowledge: Lockyer v Gibb [196612 All ER 653 
at 655 per Lord Parker CJ. 
21 in Roman law, from which our concept of possession derives, "... the facts needed to acquire possession were 
physical control, 'corpus possessionis', and an awareness of the situation, 'animus'... ", R. M. Dias, 
Jurisprudence 5ed, Butterworths, London 1985 at 274. These concepts equate to "possession In fact" and 
"possession in law": see Pollock and Wright, An Essay on _Possession 
in the Common Law., 1888, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press. p. II- 
C. Property 
Property is ownership of an asset. It is a bundle of rights 22, including the right 
to possession23. This pen in my possession is the property of my employers. 
I have it, but it is not mine. 24 
d. Legal Relationships 
We speak loosely of a person's possessions and property as if they were assets. 
More accurately, the words "possession" and "property" refer to legal 
relationships between persons in respect of assets. If an asset is a thing (such 
as this pen) and possession is a relationship between a person and a thing (such 
as my control of this pen), property is a legal relationship between persons in 
respect of things25 (the right of my employer to say to me, "Give it back"). 
However, it is often in practice convenient to think of property in the same 
terms as possession, as a relationship between persons and things. Where 
ownership and possession of an asset are with two different persons, the legal 
relationship between those persons is usually described as a bailment. 26 
e. Property is relative 
In practice property and possession usually coincide in the same person27. The 
two terms are closely related and were once used interchangeably28. More 
recently the terms have become distinct, but linked in that each one raises the 
22 See, Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air op. cit., at 259. 
23 "An owner is prima facie entitled to possession ... 
" Pollock op. cit., p. 25. 
24 For a discussion of the distinction between property and possession in the context of the law of theft, see Rv 
Gomez [19931 1 All ER I per Lord Lowry at 24. 
25 "Thus, for the lawyer, the law of property is concerned with the network of legal relationships prevailing 
between individuals in respect of things. " K. J. Gray and RD. Symes, Real Property and Real People, Principles 
of Land Law, London, Butterworths, 1981, at 8. 
26 See the definition of bailment per Holt CJ in Coggs v Bemard (1703) 1 All ER I at 5,6. 
27 "It is also said that possession is in a normal state of things the outward sign of ownership or title ........ Pollock 
op. cit., p. 4 
28 ...... but it is necessary to observe that there are numerous cases In the Year-book and old writers in which the 
word "property" is used to signify possession, and property is attributed alike to the owner, the bailee, and the 
trespasser Wright, op. cit., p. 122 
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presumption of the other29. Possession is the root of tItle3O, or property. In 
31 and negotiable the case of assets in current circulation, such as cash 
32 instruments, ownership follows possession. There can be no asset without 
property in It33 and no proprietary right that does not attach to an asset. 34 
In spite of the closeness of the two terms, there are important differences 
between them. While possession is, finally, based on questions of fact35. 
36 ownership is a question of law. As a corollary of this, possession is 
37 38 absolute but property is relative . Different persons may have property in 
4) e'W the same asset. Proprietary rights may be future, conditional and partial. They 
29 "An owner is prima facie entitled to possession, and possession is prima facie evidence of ownership". R. M. 
Dias, Jurisprudence, 5ed, Butterworths, London 1985 p. 272. 
30 Ibid p. 22 
31 "... chattels of such kind [coin or banknotes] form part of what the law recognizes as currency and treats as 
passing from hand to hand in point, not merely of possession, but of property. " Lord Haldane L. C., Sinclair 
v Brougham, (1914) 1 All ER 623,633, quoted in F. A. Mann, The Legal Aspect of Money, 5ed, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1992, p. 11. 
32 In the case of bills of exchange, a class of negotiable instrument, "The property and the possession are 
inseparable. " per Eyre C. J., Collins v Martin (1797) 1B&P 648 at 65 1. 
33 Assets are always owned (See R. M. Goode Commercial law, 1985, Penguin, London p. 55, note 41). However 
there are resources which are not assets and incapable of property. Indeed "... the vast majority of the world's 
human and economic resources still stand outside the threshold of property... ", Kevin Gray, Property in Thin 
Air, op. cit., p. 256. Examples of non-proprietary resources include the high seas, the upper stratum of 
airspace, light, air, fire, water, wild animals and language. 
34 A purported proprietary right that does not attach to an asset is a mere personal right: see Mac-Jordan 
Construction Ltd v Brookmount Erostin Ltd (in receivership) [19921 BCLC 350, CA. 
35 See the discussion in section 2(a) below. 
36 "We shall see that there is no such thing as natural property, and that it is entirely the work of law.... There 
is no Image, no painting, no visible trait, which can express the relation that constitutes property. It is not 
material, it is metaphysical; it is a mere conception of the mind.... Property and law are born together, and 
die together. Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases. " Bentham, 
Theory of Legislation, Principles of the Civil Code, Part I pp. 111 - 113, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul 
Ltd., 193 1. 
37 "Possession is single and exclusive. As the Romans said, 'plures eandem rem in solidern possidere non 
possunt. ' This follows from the fact of possession being taken as the basis of a legal right. Physical possession 
is exclusive, or it is nothing. If two men have laid hands on the same horse or the same sheep, each meaning 
to use it for his own purposes and exclude the other, there is not any defacto possession until one of them has 
gotten the mastery" (Pollock, p. 21). (However, possession may be joint, as where two persons cohabit a home, 
and may be concurrent for different purposes: see Dias, Jurisprudence at 277. ) 
38 "Propertiness is represented by a continuum along which varying kinds of 'property' status may shade finely 
into each other. " Kevin Gray, Propem, in Thin Air op. cit., at 296. 
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may subsist as against some persons but not others. 39 Any right of property 
may be relative to competing proprietary rights in the same asset. 40 41 
f. Possession and Property as Remedies 
Without property, one could not assert rights to assets in the hands of others 
(and "custody" would be a meaningless term). Property is the courts' 
recognition of the rights of the owner out of possession. 42 Property is (in 
origin) a remedy43 which evolved from judicial decisions, and it is inseparable 
from the old court procedures through which they were reached. 44 Property 
39 Equitable property is enforceable against all but the bona fide purchaser for value of the legal estate without 
notice of the equitable property. 
40 Indeed, the idea of property Is only necessary where there are competing claims to assets; without such 
competing claims, the possession of assets is sufficient for their enjoyment: see section f. below. 
41 The historically relative nature of proprietary interests arising under a trust is discussed by W. S. Holdsworth 
in History of English Law, Menthuen & Co. Ltd., London, in Volume IH, p. 434. 
42 See Holdsworth, op. cit., Volume H, Chapter 11, section 3, p. 52 
43 The process by which choses in action evolved from personal rights into proprietary rights was the development 
of proprietary remedies. "But, as the common law developed, it soon became apparent that certain actions in 
tort were in substance actions to recover property; and we have seen that, by means of developments both in 
the actions of detinue and trespass, the proprietary rights of the owner out of possession were coming to be 
better protected ... We might therefore 
have expected that the rights of the owner out of possession would come 
to be recognised as something more than a mere personal chose in action; and that they would develop into 
assignable rights of property. " W. S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Menthuen & Co, Ltd, London 
Volume VII, Chapter 11, Section 3, p. 52. The remedial origin of choses in action is also clear from the 
following passage in Blackstone: "At present we have only to remark, that upon all contracts or promises, either 
express or implied, and the infinite variety of cases into which they are and may be spun out, the law gives an 
action of some sort or other to the party injured in case of non-performance; to compel the wrongdoer to do 
justice to the party with whom he has contracted, and, on failure of performing the identical thing he engaged 
to do, to render a satisfaction equivalent to the damage sustained. But while the thing, or it's equivalent, 
remains in suspense, and the injured party has only the right and not the occupation, it is called a chose in 
action; being a thing rather in potentia than in esse... " Commentaries Book H, at 397. 
44 This is clear in the distinction between real and personal property: real property is, functionally, property for 
which real (possessory) actions were available in the courts, and personal property was, until recently, property 
for which such actions were not available: "... in the Middle Age, and indeed until 1845, the claimant of a 
movable could only obtain a judgement which gave his adversary a choice between giving up that thing and 
paying its value. And so, said we, there is no actio realis for a horse or a book. ", Maitland, Selected Essays, 
Cambridge University Press, 1936, Trust and Corporation, p. 146. 
The procedural nature of the category of property into which most custody assets fall, namely choses in action, 
is particularly clear. Choses in action, discussed in section 4. b below, were originally mere rights of action. 
Holdsworth comments, in his History of English La , "It is obvious that the number and variety of these rights, 
and the manner in which they are developed by the law, must to a large extent depend on the law of procedure. 
The law of actions determines necessarily the conditions under which a right is asserted by action" Holdsworth. 
op cit, p. 5 19. Equally, the purely procedural status of a certain category of choses in action, namely negotiable 
instruments, is made clear in the paper by J. S. Ewart, Negotiability and Estoppel (1900) 15 LQR (1900) 135 
- 
does not inhere in assets, or even exist in any abstract sense. It arises only in 
order to resolve disputes. 45 Property may differ from obligation in that it is not 
essentially personal; like obligation, however, it is essentially judicial. 46 Two 
consequences flow from this. Firstly, these legal concepts cannot develop ahead 
of case law. They consist of the case law, and, where events run ahead, the 
legal ideas are left behind. As an example of this conservatism, it will be 
argued (in section 2, and in chapters 3 and 4) that the computerisation of the 
securities markets have taken them beyond the scope of the concept of 
possession. Secondly, the value of seeking to extrapolate abstract principles 
from case law is limited. If one tries to understand property in abstract terms 
as a notional duplicate of the asset to which it relates, it quickly becomes 
anomalous, apparently being diluted, extinguished and arising de novo 
depending upon the circumstances. 47 The historic ftinction of property is as 
procedure for resolving situations in which competing claims to assets have 
arisen. It is only possible and only necessary to understand property in the 
context of those situationS48. The need for a concrete and indeed pragmatic 
approach is most clear in the cross border proprietary aspects of global custody, 
as discuss in chapter 7. 
at 136). Ewart discusses the distinguishing (before -492ýýCharacteristic of negotiable instruments that a 
transferee can sue in its own name in law, and comments, "All choses in action may be sued upon in equity 
in the name of the transferees of them. The characteristic in hand, therefore, is that of the courts of law, rather 
than of certain choses in action; and that which has been spoken of as a distinguishing characteristic of bills and 
notes is really but a point of practice, upon which different courts take opposite views. " 
45 See David Hayton, Hayton and Marshall, Cases and Commentary on the Law of Trusts, 9ed, London, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 1991, at p12: "To conclude, in order to understand the working operation of a trust it is better to 
regard the interest of a beneficiary as an in personam right to compel the trustees to perforrn the trust, .. F. as 
an equitable chose in action situated where the trustees reside and administer the trust. However, where things 
have gone wrong and trust property finds its way wrongly into the hands of a third party (other than equity's 
darling) then it is appropriate to regard the interest of a beneficiary, as a result of his equitable tracing rights, 
as an equitable in rem right. " 
46 Millet J commented during a talk given at Kings College, London in March 1995, "English law has always 
viewed rights in terms of remedies. " (1995) 6 KCLJ 1,18 
47 For example see the exception to the rule, nemo dat quod non habet, and the doctrines of title by estoppel and 
overreaching (see chapter 3 sections [B. 7] and C. 2. e] below. 
48 This is also true of possession. "The melancholy record of theorising on this topic [of possession] serves as 
a warning against an a priori approach. The Jurists, who theories have been discussed, proceed on the 
assumption that words always have to refer to some referent and are concerned to discover what this 'thing' 
is, the law, on the other hand, has proceeded functionally. " Dias, at 289. 
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9. Categories of Property 
English law distinguishes between real and personal property. Real property 
relates to freehold land. 49 and personal property relates to other assets. 
There are two typeS50 of personal property, choses in possession and choses in 
action. A chose in possession is a right of property in a tangible asset which 
can be enforced by taking physical possession of the asset. "'Chose in Action' 
is a legal expression used to describe all personal rights of property, which can 
only be claimed by action and not by taking physical possession,, 51. These are 
property rights in intangibles such as debts. 
Another necessary distinction is that between legal and equitable property. 
Modern English law has several branches, stemming from the different courts 
that have been sources of judicial precedent. The proprietary remedies granted 
by the (originally feudal) King's court as part of the common law give us the 
concept of legal (or technical) ownership. Those granted by the less formal 
Chancellor's court as part of the law of equity give us the concept of equitable 
(or beneficial) ownership. Legal ownership has been compared to the shell of 
a nut and beneficial ownership to its kernel. The legal owner of an asset must 
be involved in any dealing with third parties. Thus, the legal owner of shares 
receives the dividends from the issuing company and must be involved in any 
transfer of the shares. The beneficial owner of assets is entitled to enjoy them. 
Thus, the legal owner of shares must account for dividends and proceeds of sale 




The law of real property governs freehold interests in land and the law of chattels real governs leasehold 
interests. (In the early medieval era, leasehold interests differed from freehold interests in that the personal 
relationships that they reflected were economic and not feudal. The leaseholder did not owe homage to the 
freeholder. For this reason, the medieval courts long refused to protect leasehold interests by the proprietary 
remedies conferred by the feudal common law, and they were not recoverable by real actions, but treated as 
merely chattels protected by contractual remedies. However in the more commercial climate of the late 
medieval era a dispossessed leaseholder became entitled to recover his land. "The eventual solution was to call 
his interest a 'chattel real', so recognising the fact that it partook both of the nature of real property and of 
chattels. " Simpson, A History of the Land Law, 2ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, at 76. ) Blackstone 
describes chattels real as "... that kind of property being of a mongrel amphibious nature, originally endowed 
with one only of the characteristics of each species of things; the immobility of things real, and the precarious 
duration of things personal. " Commentaries on the Laws of England, Volume H Of the Rip_hts of Things (1766), 
at 387,388. 
"All personal things are either in possession or action. The law knows no tertium quid between the two". 
Colonial Bank v Minney (1885) 30 Ch D at 285 per Fry L. J, dissenting judgment upheld in House of Lords 
(1886) All ER Rep 468. 
Per Channell J, Torkingron v Magee [19021 All ER 991 
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are held by different persons, the relationship between the legal and beneficial 
owner is generally described as a tr-ust. 52 
h. Summary. - Personal Assets 
A -sets I _22s_ _ 
(or at least tangible assets) are capable of possession as well as of 
property. Where physical possession and property are with two different 
people, a bailment arises53. A right of property in a tangible asset is called a 
chose in possession and a right of property in an intangible asset is called a 
chose in action. Property may be legal or equitable. Where legal and equitable 
ownership are with two different persons, a trust arises. 
52 For a judicial discussion of the differences between trust and agency, see Baker v Archer-Shee (H. L. ) ( 19271 
A. C. 844, per Viscount Sumner at 850. 
53 The bailor retains a form of legal possession. 
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54 chose in chose in 
possession action55 
In the modern securities markets, as a result of the widespread use of nominees and of 
trends towards dernaterialisation and the pooling of securities (as chapter 3 below will 
54 As a matter of conunon law there is no such thing as an equitable chose in possession. "Uses, trusts and other 
equitable interests in property, though regarded by equity as conferring proprietary rights analogous to the rights 
recognised by law in hereditaments or in chattels, were regarded by the common law as being merely choses 
in action" Holdsworth, op. cit., at 516. However, the law of equity contemplates equitable choses in 
possession: see Pearson v IRC (198012 All ER (HL) 479, in which a life interest in intangible property (shares) 
conferring a present right to present enjoyment was treated as an interest in possession. 
55 Equity follows the law, and an equitable (or informal) assignment of a legal chose in action will confer on the 
assignee an equitable chose in action. 
The interest of a beneficiary under an unadministered estate is an equitable chose in action: Commissioner for 
Stamp Duty v Livingston [19651 A. C. 694, and Marshall v Kerr [19941 1 AC 148 An interest under a trust 
is an equitable chose in action against the trustee, provided it is unascertained. However, if it amounts to a 
present right of present enjoyment, then it is treated as a chose in possession i. e. an interest in the trust property 
(and so income is taxable when received by the trustee and not only when received by the benficlary): see Baker 
v Archer-Shee [19271 A. C. 844 and Pearson and others v Inland Revenue Commissioners. See also 
Commissioner of Stamp Duty (Queensland) v Livingston [ 1965] A. C. 604 and Cholmondeley v IRC (1986) STC 
384. 
- i2 - 
argue) the rights of most investors in securities are (as a matter of English law) equitable 
choses in action. 56 
2. Possession of Intangibles 
Equitable choses in action are intangible. Intangible property is incapable of physical 
possession. "Possession is a deceptively simple concept. It denotes a physical control 
or custody of a thing plus knowledge that you have it in your custody or control. , 57 
However Dias comments, "... the term [possession] is not confined to physical 
control.,, 58 Might it therefore be argued that intangibles are capable of possession? 
a. legal possession 
The context in which Dias made this comment related to the distinction between 
physical and legal possession. Legal possession has been described as the right 
59 to possess . 
It is true that the law recognises both physical (or actual) and 
legal (or civil) possession"60. However, the ultimate basis of possession is 
always fact rather than law because "the existence of the de facto relation of 
control or apparent dominion [is] required as the foundation of the alleged 
right. " 61 
constructive possession 
The concept of legal possession, then, does not help in showing that intangibles 
are capable of possession. The concept of constructive possession seems more 
promising at first sight. Possession in fact need not involve direct physical 
56 Equitable, because arising under a trust, and chose in action because intangible. Here, these interests are called 
choses in action under the common law which does not recognise equitable choses in possession. This seems 
helpful in order to place such interests in the context of the cornmon law history of choses in action, discussed 
in section 4. b below. 
57 Rt Boyesen [ 1982] 2 All ER 161 at 163, HL, per Lord Scarman. See also Marsh v Kulchar [ 19521 1 DLR 
593 at 595, per Kellock J: "The word 'possession' in English law is, as has often been pointed out, a most 





Dias, Jurisprudence, at 277 
"When the fact of control is coupled with a legal claim and right to exercise it in one's own name against the 
world at large, we have possession in law as well as in fact. " Pollock, Possession in the Common Law, at 16. 
and that there is no clear answer to the question, "Is Possession a matter of fact or a right" Pollock, op. cit., 
p 10 
Pollock op. cit., p. 10. 
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possession, for the law recognises symbolic, as opposed to actual (or physical) 
possession. 62 However, as with legal possession, the concept of constructive 
possession is derived from the concept of actual possession (i. e. physical 
possessi-on)63 and therefore cannot apply to intangibles. 64 
C. intangibles 
Legal possession and constructive possession having both fallen short, the 
question remains: is there any authority for the actual possession of an 
intangible? Two points should be made here. Firstly, common law and equity 
have approached this question differently; both this section and the next will 
consider the common law position, while the following section will turn to 
equity. Secondly, as discussed above in section Lf, one must take a concrete 
approach to this question. The term "possession" is used in different ways in 
65 different contexts , and it is therefore important to consider this question 
in the 
62 "Possession in the legal sense may exist without physical possession. It is possession attributed in law to a 
person and describes his or her legal relation to a thing with respect to other persons. It has sometimes been 
called constructive possession. " Rv Martin [19481 OR 963 at 966, per Laidlaw JA. "Handing over a key is 
a symbolic act, which at common law carried with it possession of that to which the key is the means of 
access. " Holt v Dawson [ 19391 3 Al I ER 635 at 637, per Scott LJ. 
63 "A person has actual possession (defacto possession, possession in fact) of a thing when he exercises physical 
control over it ... A person has constructive possession ... when someone representing 
him has actual possession 
of the thing. " Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law under "Possession". 
64 Relevant case law is mainly concerned with keys to rooms and boxes in which physical property is contained: 
"Constructive possession, properly speaking, exists in relation to the deeds in a box of which one has been 
given the key": US4 v Dollfits Mieg (1952] A. C. 582, Counsel for the respondent, at 589. Woodward v 
%odward (1991) 21 Farn Law 470 relates to the keys of a car. See also cases referred to by Dias, 
Jurisprudence at 278, and Sen v Headley [1991] 2 All ER 636. Another example of constructive possession 
arises in the context of taking security over imported goods. "The most common form of security is a pledge 
of the bill of lading and other shipping documents. This is treated in law as equivalent to a pledge of the goods 
themselves and is thus effective to give the bank a legal possessory interest in the goods. " R. M. Goode, 
Commercial Law, 2 ed, 1995, London Penguin p. 1027. 
65 See Shartel, Meaning of Possession (1932) 16 Minnesota Law Review 611 at 612, quoted in Dias at 285: 1 
want to make the point that there are many meaning of the word 'possession'; that possession can only be 
usefully defined with reference to the purpose in hand; and that possession may have one meaning in one 
connection and another meaning in another. " Clearly, possession for the purposes of the criminal law relating 
to drugs or offensive weapons, is not the same as possession in the context of custody. 'nis is partly because 
the meaning of possession in each legal context in which it arises was largely shaped by policy considerations 
peculiar to that context. See Dias, Jurisprudence, at p. 289: "... the nature of possession came to be shaped by 
the need to give remedies... ", and at 280,281: "Turning to the law of tort, the axiom is that possession is the 
basis of trespass, and the policy of this branch of law is to compensate the party whose interests have been 
affected ... 
The doctrine of 'trespass by relation' is another example of the artificial manipulation of the concept 
of possession so as to provide a remedy in trespass to one deserving compensation. " 
- 14- 
relevant coritext, i. e. ýhe possession of intangible personal property for the 
purposes of custody or safekeeping. There are many examples of possession 
of intangibles in other contexts66, but they do not assist here. 
Roman law gave the concept (described by Dias as "uncouth"67) of the 
possession of a right68. However, there is no judicial authority for the 
extension of this Roman concept into English common IaW69 (as opposed to 
equity: see below). Salmond argued70 that intangibles are capable of 
71 "incorporeal possession". Unfortunately, he does not give any judicial 
authority for the recognition by English common law of incorporeal possession; 
his argument is based on civil IaW72. Nowhere is there authority that, in 
English common law, intangible personal property is capable of possession in 
the context of safekeeping. 
66 Land law provides the doctrine of seisin. Certain fon-ris of real (or land related) property may be said to be 
intangible, and known as incorporeal hereditaments. Examples are reversions, remainders and advowsons. 
Seisin is the doctrine of possession of these things. However, it would be a quantum leap to extend the feudal 
doctrine of seisin to the late 20th century securities markets. Another example is the concept of possession of 
money for the purposes of the Debtors Act 1869 (which, when paid into a bank account, is in the nature of a 
debt and therefore intangible): see Middleton v Chichester, (1871) 6 Ch. 152, and Crowther v Elgood, (1882) 
34 Ch. D 69 1. See also Chief Constable of Kent vV and Another, Court of Appeal (Civil Division), [ 19821 3 
All ER 36. 
67 Jurisprudence at 274 
68 
possessio juris: see Dias, Jurisvrudence, at 274. 
69 N. E. Palmer discusses these questions in his book, Bailment, 2ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991. There 
have been cases in which a plaintiff suing a bailee for conversion has recovered the value of rights represented 
by documents, or of rights of action represented by documents. In Building & Civil Engineering Holidays 
Schemes Management Ltd v Post Office (1969] 1 QB 247 there was a bailment of holiday credit stamps. In an 
action for conversion, the bailor was held to be entitled to recover not only the value of the stamps as pieces 
of paper but a sum represented by their actual value to the bailor. In Borden Chemical Co (Canada) Ltd vJG. 
Beukers Ltd [19731 29 D. L. R. (3d) 337 there was a claim for conversion of a customer list. The bailee had 
used the list to deal with the customers on its own account. The bailor claimed for the conversion of its "entire 
distribution system". It was held that the conversion was only of the customer list, but the award included 
damages for the detention of the converted property. However these cases cannot be taken as authority that 
there can be possession (because bailment and conversion) of a right. Rather, the principle established by these 
cases is that, provided there is a piece of tangible property to form the subject matter of a bailment, damages 
awarded for conversion of that property by a bailee may include some element of consequential damages. 
70 In Jurisprudence, l2ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1966, section 58. 
71 "Corporeal possession involves, as we have seen, the continuing exercise of exclusive control over a material 
object. Incorporeal possession is the continuing exercise of a claim to anything else. " Jurisprudence, at 58. 
72 Roman, French, Italian and German law. 
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A major part of the difficulty in extending the doctrine of possession to 
intangibles is the lack of procedural precedent. 73 The modern common law of 
possession evolved from the legal procedures developed from the disputes 
relating to land and goods. 74 There was no procedure for, and hence there is 
no clear concept of, possessory remedies in relation to personal75 intangibles 
such as securities. 
common law 
In the context of custody the prudent approach is therefore to assume, given 
the absence of judicial authority to the contrary, that intangibles are incapable 
of possession at cornmon law. Therefore the handing over to a third party of 
control of intangible personal property for the purposes of safekeeping (or 
security), cannot give rise to bailment (or pledge), as these are conu-non law 
concepts based on possession. 
equity 
The courts of equity have always been more comfortable with intangibles than 
the common law courts, because an interest under a trust is intangible. In 
equity (if not at law) such an interest is capable of possession. Intangible 
property which is capable of possession in equity, or an equitable chose in 
possession, is (very broadly speaking) a present right to sue in equity, or a 
present right of present enjoyment. 76 If the handing over to a third party of 
control of intangible personal property for the purposes of safekeeping or 
73 Indeed in the last century it was unclear whether even materialised securities were capable of possession . ..... at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, it was very doubtful how, if at all, a husband could reduce into 
possession stock belonging to his wife. " Holdsworth, op. cit., p. 542 
74 "Under the old procedure an actual possessor who had been dispossessed might sue either in trespass for the 
wrong to his possessions, or in a form of action founded on right to possess (ejectment for land, trover for 
goods). " (Pollock, op. cit., p. 91). 
75 
i. e. not relating to land. 
76 In Pearson v IRC [1980] 2 All ER (HL) 479 an interest In possession in settled property was Judicially defined 
as "... a present right of present enjoyment" (per Viscount Dilhorne, at 485). (An interest In possession in trust 
assets is equated to an in rem right in such assets, as opposed to a mere in personam right against the trustee, 
and the difference is crucial for income tax and inheritance tax purposes: see David Hayton, Hayton an 
Marshall, Cases and Conunentary on the Law of Trusts, 9ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991, at p. 12. and 
Hayton, The Law of Trusts, 2 ed, 1993, London, Sweet & Maxwell, pp. 161-163) 
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security cannot give rise to the common law possessory concepts of bailment or 
pledge, it can give rise to their equitable equivalents, trust and charge. 
f. conclusions 
Intangibles cannot be possessed at law but can be possessed in equity. 
Therefore where control of assets (such as securities) are handed over to third 
parties, by way of safekeeping or security, the dernaterialisation of such assets 
has the effect of diverting the custodial or security relationship from common 
law to equity: no longer bailment, but trust; no longer pledge, but charge. This 
is legally significant because the shift from bailment to trust raises questions of 
higher fiduciary dUty'77 and the shift from bailment to charge raises questions 
of registration. 78 
3. Proprietary and Personal Rights 
a. Generally 
The preceding section discussed proprietary rights in assets. There is another 
class of rights in respect of assets: that of personal rights. Since medieval 
times, English law has treated the difference between the two classes as 
ftindamental. 79 
If A buys 10 cases of claret from B, who has more than 10 cases and who 
earmarks 10 specific cases for A in his cellar, A acquires 10 cases of claret (a 
proprietary right). If, however, B does not identify the 10 cases, then provided 
A has not yet paid for the wine8o A may merely acquires a contactual right 
against B for delivery of 10 cases of claret (a personal right). 
77 Chapter 4 will examine these issues in detail. 
78 While a pledge is not registrable, a charge may be. It is therefore important to ensure that a purported pledge 
over intangible securities Is not void as an unregistered charge. 
79 "In conventional legal doctrine much energy is devoted to patrolling the frontier between property and 
contract. ", Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, at p. 302. 
80 Sale of Goods Act 1979 Section 20A 
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The difference for A is clear on B's insolvenCy. 81 Aproprietary right attaches 
to the asset and is unaffected by B's insolvency. 82 However a personal right 
does not make A the owner of 10 cases but merely the unsecured creditor of an 
insolvent, and therefore A's claim will be subject to delay and abatement 
depending on the outcome of the liquidation. 83 
A personal right is only as good as one's ability successfully to sue the obligor; 
this may be defeated by the obligor's insolvency. 84 For this reason, legal 
commentators draw a fundamental distinction between personal and proprietary 
rights (or between obligations and ownership). 85 
The distinction is fundamental in the context of custody. If the custody client's 
rights are merely personal against the custodian, it takes the custodian's credit 
risk. If its rights are proprietary, it does not. However, we must tread with 
light feet in making the distinction here, because (at first sight) the custody 
assets themselves are personal (and not proprietary) in nature. 
The concepts of property and obligation are both dynamic, and have changed 
from time to time. Both concern the remedies made available by the courts in 
the context of disputes, and throughout legal history both have evolved as the 
approach of the courts, and the remedies made available by them, have 
changed. Indeed, the development of certain branches of the law might be 
summarily described the evolution of remedies (and therefore of rights) from 
the personal into the proprietary. Two leading examples of this are the law of 
equity, and the law of choses in action. As already indicated, chapter 3 below 
81 See Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (in receivership) [1994] 2 All ER 806 and chapter 5 below. 
82 Provided the transaction is not at an undervalue or otherwise voidable under the Insolvency Act 1986. 
83 Another adverse consequence of rights in respect of an asset being merely personal and not proprietary, is that 
if the holder of those rights suffers loss because of loss of or damage to the assets due to another's want of care, 
it cannot sue that other in negligence: see Leigh and Sillavan Ltd. v Aliakmon Shipping C1. Ltd. ("The 
Aliaknwn') [19861 2 All ER 145. 
84 And by other matters such as the lapsing of statutory limitation periods, set-off and estoppel. 
85 "The distinction between real and personal rights may be expressed as the distinction between property and 
obligation, between what I own and what I am owed. The common law observed this distinction strictly. " R. M. 
Goode, Commercial Law 2ed, 1995, Penguin, London, p. 31. (Before the Victorian advent of corporate 
insolvency law, the importance of the distinction was, primarily, transferability: see section b. 11 below. ) 
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will argue that rights of investors in securities are often, as a matt, -, - C'L ý, ' ISI ' En 'I 
domestic law, equitable choses in action. It would be useful, in 0-lis com, xt, 
to look again at the distinction between contractual and proprietary rights, as 
each of the categories of choses in action, and equitable property, has a personal 
(and not proprietary) flavour. 
b. Nature of choses in action 
It has been noted that a chose in action is property in an intangible. To 
understand the nature of choses in action it is helpful briefly to look at their 
history. 
(i) 77ze category 
"In its primary sense the term chose in action includes all rights which 
are enforceable by action - rights to debts of all kinds, and rights of 
action on a contract or a right to damages for its breach; rights arising by 
reason of the commission of a tort or other wrong; and rights to recover 
the ownership or possession of property real or personal.,, 86 Over the 
course of the last three centuries choses in action, in the financial world, 
began their long journey from intangibility to paper (before, with 
computerisation in the mid 20th century, starting the journey back again). 
"During the 16th century the conception of a chose in action was 
extended from a right to bring an action, to the documents which were 
the necessary evidence of such a right. When the law had reached this 
point, it was inevitable that the many new documents, which the growth 
of the con-imercial jurisdiction of the common law courts was bringing to 
the notice of the common lawyers, should be classed in this category. 
Thus, during the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, such documents as 
negotiable instruments, shares, policies of insurance, and bills of lading, 
were declared to be choses in action ....... 
87 
86 Holdsworth. op. cit., p. 516, 
87 Holdsworth, op. cit., pp. 527.528. 
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(il) Restrictions on assignment 
Choses in action were originally treated as personal rights of action, and 
for that reason were not assignable. 88 Maintenance (or the abusive 
trafficking in rights of action) was a serious concern in medieval 
England. 89 Therefore the general restriction on assignment of choses in 
action persisted long into the modem era, until it was eroded by the 
development of exceptions to accommodate the needs of commerce. 90 
"Negotiable instruments were assignable by the law merchant. Stocks 
and shares were in early days expressly made assignable by char-ter or 
Act of Parliament. " 91 
(Iii) Personal or Proprietary 
Before the beginning of corporate insolvency law, a key characteristic 
distinguishing personal rights from proprietary rights was their non- 
assignability92. Therefore, when the benefit93 of choses in action became 
. 
88 "In the language of Roman law, personal actions were founded upon an obligation; and an obligation might arise 
either out of contract or tort ..... but it is clear that a personal action, brought either on a contract or a tort, 
is essentially a personal thing .... On that account the common lawyers saw as clearly as the Roman lawyers 
that such rights of action were personal matters between these two persons. Therefore assigru-nent of such a 
right of action by the act of the two parties was unthinkable ". Holdsworth, op. cit., p. 520. 
89 "In England in the later medieval period, the disorderly state of the country, the technicality of the common 
law procedure, the expense of legal proceedings and the ease with which jurors, sheriffs and other ministers 
of justice could be corrupted or intimidated made maintenance and kindred offenses so crying an evil, that it 
was necessary to prohibit sternly anything which could in the smallest degree foster them. " Holdsworth, op 
cit p. 523. For the modem approach of the courts to this issue, see Trendtex Trading Corpn. v Credit Suisse 
[19821 A. C. 679. 
90 "It is clear from these illustrations that the law started from the idea that a chose in action is a personal non- 
assignable right. But, having found that a rigid adherence to the theory was in practice inconvenient and 
impossible it has partially modified it in many different directions; and these modifications have been carried 
further both by equity and by the legislature. The result is that, though very little is left of the broad principle 
from which the law started, it is necessary to know it, because it is still operative unless it has been modified 
to the common law, by equity, or by statute. " Holdsworth, op cit, p. 541. 
91 Holdsworth, op cit, p. 542 
92 "Tbe classic common law criteria of 'property' have tended to rest a twin emphasis on the assignability of the 
benefits inherent in a resource and on the relative permanence of those benefits if unassigned... This 
preoccupation with assignability of benefit and enforceability of burden doubtless owes much to the fact that 
the formative phases of the conunon law concept of property coincided with a remarkable culture of bargain 
and exchange. Non-transferable rights or rights which failed on transferee were simply not 'property'. Within 
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in some cases assignable they arguably became, in those cases, 
proprietary. "The result [of assignability] has been that some of these 
choses in action have changed their original character and become very 
much less like merely personal rights of action, and very much more like 
rights of property .... [this is] a branch of law, which comes at the 
meeting place of the law of proper-ty and the law of obligation". 94 
Where assets are held in custody, the difference between personal and 
proprietary rights is important in the event of insolvency. A chose in 
action, which is held in custody, is personal as against the obligor, and 
will clearly be affected by the insolvency of the obligor. However, as 
against the custodian, it-__iS capable of being proprietary and of being 
unaffected by its insolvency. In other words, securities (being choses in 
action) can be proprietary only where there is intermediation, or custody. 
It is only in the context of custody that the proprietary nature of securities 
has meaning. The proprietary nature of securities is their enforceability 
though the hands of a custodian (or, more precisely, in its insolvency). 
Broadly speaking, the law of property in the securities markets is the law 
of insolvency as it relates to custodians. 
the crucible of transfer lawyers affected to demarcate rights of 'property' from rights founded in contract or 
tort... " Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, op. cit. at 293. The importance of transferability in the concept 
of property is clear as late as 1965, in the judgment of Lord Wilberforce in National Provincial Bank v 
Ainsworth [1965] H. L. 2 All E. R. 472 at 494: "On any division, then, which is to be made between property 
rights on the one hand, and personal rights on the other hand, however broad or penumbral the separating band 
between these two kinds of rights may be, there can be little doubt where the wife's rights fall. Before a right 
or an interest can be admitted into the category of property, or of a right affecting property, it must be 
definable, identifiable by third parties, capable in its nature of assumption by third parties, and have some 
degree of permanence or stability. " 
93 Although the benefit of a contract may be assignable, its burden generally is not: see Chitty on Contracts, 26ed, 
1989, London. Sweet & Maxwell, Volume 1, paragraph 1431. 
94 Holdsworth, op. cit., p. 543. 
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a. Nature of Lquitable Propem 
Like choses in action, equitable proprietary rights began their legal history as 
personal rights, and then evolved into hybrid rights that are capable, upon a 
custodian's insolvency, of being proprietar-y. 95 
Historically and conceptually, equitable property begins with the personal 
fiduciary obligation (which the law of equity implies) of a trustee to hold trust 
property for the benefit of the beneficiary. This personal obligation give the 
beneficiary correlative personal rights against the trustee, to require that the 
obligation be observed. The gap between a personal right against the trustee in 
respect of trust property and a proprietary right in the trust property that will 
survive the trustee's insolvency is bridged by the convenient equitable doctrine 
of conversion: equity regards that as done which ought to be done. The law 
regards the trust property as belonging to the beneficiary, in equity, because the 
trustee should account to the beneficiary for the trust property. 96 
95 See Maitland, Selected Essavs, Cambridge University Press, 1936, Ile Unincomorate Body. ' pp 129,130: "A 
right which in ultimate analysis appears to be jus in personam (the benefit of an obligation) has been so treated 
that for practical purposes it has become equivalent to ius in rem and is habitually thought of as a kind of 
ownership, "equitable ownership ... ... It was made by men who had no Roman law as explained by medieval 
commentators in the innermost fibres of their minds. " See also Holdsworth, op. cit., Volume IV, pp. 432,433, 
434: "In early days the relation between the feoffee to uses and the feoffor or cestui que use was of a strictly 
personal character. [But the nature of the right was extended to bind other persons] ... In fact in 1466 it had been 
laid down that the conscience of any one was affected who obtained the estate in the land from the feoffees with 
notice of the use; and, applying the principle that one who was enfeoffed without consideration held to the use 
of the feoffor, the conclusion was easy that the conscience of any one to whom the estate was gratuitously 
conveyed by the feoffees to uses, was likewise bound whether or not they had notice of the use. But further 
than this the Chancellor would not go. The conscience of a purchaser for value without notice from the feoffees 
was not affected, and therefore he was not bound by the use .... These conclusions had been reached by the 
beginning of the sixteenth century; and when they had been reached, the root principle of the equitable 
ownership of modem English law had been ascertained. 
It was a wholly unique form of ownership which the chancellor had thus developed from a conscientious 
obligation of a very personal kind. It was not a truejus in rem because it was not available against the whole 
world. There were or might be many persons as against whom it could not be asserted. Then, although it 
rested on the chancellor's power to proceed against the person whose conscience was affected by notice of the 
use, it was far more than a mere jus in personam. It could be asserted against many persons besides the 
original feoffment. A right of so peculiar a kind could probably never have been invented by lawyers who had 
a firm hold of the Roman distinction between dominium and obligatio, or the modem distinction between jura 
in rem and jura in personam. " 
96 "Historically the courts of equity acted in personam .... 
But, although the basis of the equity jurisdiction was 
and still is, founded on an order in personam, the courts of equity evolved the doctrine that, in the eyes of 
equity, that which ought to have been done is treated as having been done. Thus under a specifically 
enforceable contract for the sale of land, the purchaser is treated in equity as the owner of property whether 
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Another convenient equitable doctrine is that of tracing, a process9_/ whereby 
a process whereby proprietary remedy rises in favour of the beneficiary upon 
the default of the trustee. "It has allowed him to pursue a "reified" trust-fund 
from investment to investment: in other words, to try to find some thing for 
which the original thing has been exchanged by means of a longer or shorter 
series of exchanges. The ideas of a trust-fund which is dressed up (invested) 
now as land and now as current coin, now as shares and now as debentures 
seems to me one of the most remarkable ideas developed by modem English 
jurisprudence. ', 98 
Conclusions 
The question of whether custody assets are personal or proprietary is important 
in determining whether they will be at risk on the insolvency of the custodian. 
Much of the custody portfolio consists, under English law, of equitable choses 
in action. Equitable property and choses in action, considered in abstract tenns, 
share the characteristic of being partly personal and partly proprietary99. 
However, their ambiguous nature is of limited practical relevance because, as 
has been indicated, the importance of proprietary status arises not in the 
abstract, but in insolvency. 
or not an order for specific performance has been made. Again, in the law of trusts a beneficiary is treated as 
immediately entitled to his interest in the trust property whether or not an order for the execution of the trust 
has been made against the trustee. In this way the plaintiffs rights, although founded on the ability of the court 
to make an order in personam against the other contracting party or the trustee, becomes an interest in the 
property itself, an equitable interest. Once the position is reached that an order for specific perfon-nance could 
have been made against the legal owner if the matter had been brought before the court, thereafter the legal 
owner holds the property shom of those rights which the court of equity would decree would belong to 
another. " Swiss Bank Corp v Lloyds Bank [ 1979] 2 ALL ER 853 per Browne-Wilkinson J at 865,866. See 
also A. G. for Hong Kong v Reid [1993] WLR 1144, per Lord Templeman at 1146. 
97 "Tracing properly so-called is neither a claim nor a remedy but a process". Per Millett J., Boscawen v Bajwa 
[199514 All ER 769 at 776. 
98 Maitland, Selected Essays, Cambridge University Press, 1936, Trust and Corporation, p. 134. See also In Re 
Oativay, Hertstet v Oarway ( 1903] 2 Ch 356. per Joyce J. at 359. "It is a principle settled as far back as the time 
of the Year Books that, whatever alteration of form any property may undergo, the true owner is entitled to 
seize it in its new shape if he can prove the identity of the original material. " 
99 "The ambivalent quality, for example, of the contractual chose in action provides a constant reminder of the 
fluid nature of [the] classifications ['contractual' and 'proprietary']. " "(N]o quantum leap differentiates contract 
from 'property'. for 'property' has no clear threshold. " Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, pp. 302,303. 
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In the late 19th century and early 20th century, there was uncertaint I- as to the 
correct treatment of choses in action in insolvency-100 Today, the position is 
clear. Not all the assets held by an insolvent are available for distribution 
among its creditors, but only those which belong to it'01. Distributable assets 
do not include assets held by the insolvent but owned by third parties, whether 
or not that third party ownership is equitable, and whether or not the assets are 
choses in action. 
However, in seeking to benefit from this rule in the era of electronic custody, 
clients face certain legal risks. Computerisation affects both the legal nature of 
the custody securities, and that of the custody relationship, as discussed in 
chapters 3 and 4. 
100 See Holdsworth op. cit., p. 543 
101 In the case of the bankruptcy of an individual, assets held by the individual on trust are excluded from his estate 
by Section 283(3)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1986. In the case of corporate insolvency, the authority for the 
exclusion of trust assets lies in the general principle that only assets owned by the company form part of its 
estate, as reflected in caselaw. See for example, Barclays Bank Ltd. v Quisiclose Investments Ltd. [1968] 3 All 
ER 651 and Re Kayford Ltd. [19751 1 All ER 604 and other cases discussed in R. M. Goode, Principles o 
Corporate Insolvency Law, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1990, at 55 and 56. 
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Chapter 3. Computerisation and Securities 102 
In the late 20th century, the securities markets have seen a growing trend towards 
computerisation. Paper instruments and certificates are replaced by electronic records, 
maintained by the various intermediaries through whom investors' securities are held. Because 
these databases are in general maintained by intermediaries and not issuers, increased 
computerisation means increased intermediation. 
The reason for computerisation is the efficiency of electronic technology103. However it has 
far reaching legal consequences. In the absence of clarifying legislation and case law, these 
consequences have not been fully analysed. 104 Computerisation has brought both a new order 
of operational efficiency and a new order of legal uncertainty to the securities markets. The 
following is an attempt to reduce this uncertainty by suggesting an approach to the legal 
consequences of computerisation. 
These consequences fall into two categories: changes to the legal nature of securities, and 
changes to the legal nature of the custodial relationship between investors and the intermediaries 
with whom they have a direct relationship. This chapter will discuss the effect of 
computerisation on securities. Its effect on the custodial relationship will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
Commercial arrangements relating to computerised securities are characteristically cross-border, 
and a legal analysis of them necessarily involves a consideration of private international law. 
However, the starting point of this analysis is the position under English domestic law, and the 
following discussion is made on the basis that English domestic law governs the commercial 
arrangements relating to computerised securities. While somewhat artificial, 105 it is a necessary 
preliminary to a consideration of the position under English private international law, which 
will follow in chapters 6 and 7 below. 
102 See I Benjamin, Negotiability and Computerisation (1995) 10 J. I. B. F. L. ý53 to 3,57 
1 
103 "Market participants have worked hard to simplify the flow of securities across borders through the development 
of global custody networks, international central securities depositories (ICSDs) and links between national 
central securities depositories (CSDs). 'Fhe ability to transfer securities in book-entry form has been the basis 
for these developments. " Bank for International Settlements, Cross-Border Securities Settlements, Basle, May 
1995, p. 46. 
104 See R. M. Goode, The Nature and Transfer of Ri , ghts 
in Demater ahsed and Immobil'sed Securities, (1996) 10 
J. I. B. FL. 167 
105 
although where foreign law Is not proved, the courts apply English law: see chapter 6 section C. 2. 
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A. Computerised Securities 
The shift away from paper and towards electronic or book-entry records is called 
dernaterialisation. Securities may take a variety of forms in wholly or partially 
dematerialised environments. These will be referred to as Computerised Securities. They 
include the following: - 
1. Inunobilised Securities 
Immobilisation has been defined as "The storage of securities certificates in a 
vault in order to eliminate physical movement of certificates/documents in 
transfers of ownership". 106 The two major European immobil isation systems are 
Euroclear and Cedel. "The first on the scene was Euroclear, founded in 
Brussels in late 1968 by Morgan Guaranty Trust. Cedel was organised and 
established in Luxembourg within 12 months, commencing operations in 
1971 ... The clearing systems were founded because they were necessary 
for the 
construction of the international bond market. Before the foundation of the 
automated systems both issue and trading depended on a system of physical 
delivery and transfer. The system could not keep up with the increasing 
number of trades and issues with the result that by 1967 the position was 
unsatisfactory and the system in difficulties. ... The underlying purposes of the 
two systems are ease of transfer of bonds and security. So long as most 
investors within the international bond market do not wish to have actual 
physical possession of their bonds, a physical delivery on initial issue or 
subsequent transfer would constitute a time-consuming, expensive, potentially 
insecure, and unnecessary function. Far better that the bonds should physically 
always remain in a safe and authorised depositary, and transfers merely be 
effected on the records of the two clearing systems. Risks are further reduced 
by the use of the systems because, when settlements are effected within them, 
they can be carried out by simultaneous transfers of cash and securities within 
the systems.,, 107108 
106 In the G30 Report. 
107 Terrence Prime, International Bonds and Certificates of Deposit, Butterworths, London 1990, pp. 233,234. 
See also R. M. Goode, The Nature and Transfer of Rights in Dematerialised and Immobilised- Securities, (1996) 
11 J. 1. B. F L. 167,169 
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2. Global Securities 
On the closing of an issue of eurobonds109, the paper customarily issued by the 
issuer is not made up of definitive bonds, but it takes the form of a global bond 
in substitution for the entire issue of definitives. The global bond is held by a 
common depository. The common depository agrees, in a letter of 
acknowledgement to the issuer, to hold the global for Euroclear and Cedel, who 
(in accordance with their General Terms and Conditions) in turn hold their 
interests in the global bond for those of their participants to whose accounts 
interests under the global are credited. The issuer promises to pay principal and 
interest to the holder of the global. 
The primary reason for issuing globals instead of definitives is the desire to 
avoid adverse US taxation consequences. In the case of temporary global 
bonds, at the end of a 40 day "lock up" period, definitives are issued to a 
depository acting for the relevant clearing system, upon the certification by 
Cedel or Euroclear that the participants to whom definitives are to be issued 
have in turn certified that the investments are not beneficially owned by US 
persons. Further, while definitives are security printed, globals are not. 
Because of the expense of security printing, bonds are sometimes issued in 
permanent global form and definitives are never issued. It is also customary for 
euronotes"O and eurocommercial paperl II to be issued in permanent global 
form. The temporary global is exchangeable wholly or in part at the request 
of the holder for definitives, and is reduced in value pro rata the value of 
definitives issued in exchange. Partial exchanges are endorsed on the global, 
which is cancelled when it is exchanged in full. A permanent global is 
generally only exchangeable for definitives upon the default of the issuer or the 




On the risks addressed by immobilisation, see John Marius, Advice concerning Bills of Exchange of, 1656, 
quoted in Milnes Holden The History of Negotiable Instruments in English Law, University of London, Athlone 
Press, 1955 p. 46: "Never make your Bills of exchange payable to such a one (naming his name) or to the bearer 
hereof, which is very dangerous ...... for a bill which shall be made payable to Robert W or Bearer hereof, may 
chance to miscarry, or come into a wrong mans hands ....... 
i. e. bonds issued in a currency other than that of the jurisdiction of the issuer. 
i. e. short term promissory notes denominated in a currency other than that of the jurisdiction of the issuer. 
i. e. short term debt instruments denominated in a currency other than that of the jurisdiction of the issuer. 
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interest to the holder of thiý global. (Ii-i the case of temporary globals, the 
holder is however only entitled to payment if the issuer defaults in its 
obligations to issue definitives on request. ) 112 
3. Repackaged Securities 
The chief example of a repackaged security is a depository receipt. Underlying 
securities are legally acquired by a depository (with certificates held on its 
behalf by a custodian). The depository holds its interest in the underlying 
securities on trust for holders of depository receipts. The identity of depository 
receipt holders from time to time is determined by reference to a register 
maintained by the depository. Securities are repackaged primarily to change 
their jurisdiction. Originally developed in the United States, an American 
depository receipt (ADR) programme permitted US investors to invest indirectly 
in non-US securities where direct investment in such securities was not possible 
or not attractive for currency, administrative, settlement, taxation, or regulatory 
reasons. 
4. Dematerialised Secutities 
Dematerialisation is defined as follows in The G30 Report: 113 "The elimination 
of physical certificates or documents of title which represent ownership of 
securities so that securities exist only as computer records. " In the UK, 
examples of dematerialised registered securities are gilts held within the Central 
Gilts Office, and equities and other registered corporate securities within 
CREST. 
112 If the issuer fails to issue definitives on default, the following enforcement problem arises. Investors have no 
locus standi against the issuer, as they are not the holders of notes. Their rights under the global may be 
enforced through a trustee (in cases where a trustee is appointed). However, where not trustee is appointed, 
their rights under the global can only be enforced through the common depository; in practice common 
depositories are unwilling to enforce on behalf of investors as they have a customer relationship with the issuer. 
To overcome this problem, it is usually provided that, if the issuer fails to issue definitives within 30 days of 
default, the obligations of the issuer under the global will become void; in their place, new obligations on the 
issuer arise under a deed poll executed directly in favour of investors (i. e. participants in Euroclear and CEDEL 
having entitlements under the global credited to their accounts). This provision will be referred to as "the 
Disappearing Global". 
113 Group of Thirty, Clearance and Settlement Systems in the World's Securities Markets 1989. 
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The above categories are not exclusive; for example, global securities are always also 
immobilised i. e. held through Euroclear and Cedel; 114 depository receipts are usually 
issued in global as well as definitive form, and global deposi IIII tory receipts are inunobilised 
through Euroclear, Cedel and/or the Depository Trust Company of New York ("DTC t. ). 
Securities may be held through chains of intermediaries with any number of links. For 
the sake of simplicity, the term "Investor" will be taken here to mean an investor whose 
interest is as direct as possible, i. e. (in the case of Immobilised and Global Securities) the 
participant in the clearing system; (in the case of Repackaged Securities) the holder of the 
depository receipt; and (in the case of Dernaterialised Securities) the registered holder of 
registered securities and the participant in the clearing system in the case of bearer 
securities. The term Computerised Securities will be used to mean the interest of the 
Investor in each of the above, and the term Physical Securities to mean securities which 
are not Computerised Securities. It will be assumed that the intermediary having a direct 
link with the issuer is located in England. 
It is important to establish the effect of the computerisation on the legal nature of 
securities. The issue falls naturally into two parts, as securities fall broadly into two 
categories: bearer securities and registered securities. The precise difference between 
them is a matter of extensive debate, but (in broad terms) may be summarised as relating 
to the procedure for their legal transfer. A bearer security promises on its face to pay 
the bearer, and the chose in action against the issuer is considered at law to be locked up 
in the instrument issued in respect of itl 15. Because they consist of tangible instruments, 
bearer securities are choses in possession. In general, whoever possesses the instrument 
116 legally owns the bearer security which is transferable by delivery of the instrument 
In this sense, bearer instruments are like cash. Examples of bearer securities are bearer 
bonds and certificates of deposits. In contrast, legal ownership of registered securities 
114 "Clearly, definitive bonds, having a physical existence can be removed from the clearing system and therefore 
traded, both within and outside the clearing systems. By contrast, a global bond must be retained within the 
system, and transfers can only be effected by book entries between accounts within the systems. " Prime, 
Interriational Bonds and Certificates of Depositl p. 233. 
115 See R. M. Goode, Commercial Law, 2ed, Penguin, London, 1995, p. 53. If the bearer security is a debt 
security, the instrument is a document of title to debt. 
116 Delivery of possession generally confers legal title, however if the deliveror intends to retain legal title, a 
bailment generally arises. 
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is determined prima facie by the register of members of the issuer. 117 In order legally 
to transfer a registered security, it is necessary for the register to be amended in favour 
of the transferee. Examples of registered securities are equities'18 and gilts119. Bearer 
securities will be considered in section B below and registered securities in section C. 
B Bearer Computerised Securities 
The most important example of the computerisation of bearer securities is the eurobond 
markets, where most securities are both immobilised and issued (initially at least) in 
global form. 120 
Because eurobonds are characteristically inunobilised and/or issued in global form, these 
forms of computerisation will be considered in this section. The other forms of 
computerisation, repackaging and dernaterialisation, will be discussed in the section on 
registered securities below. 121 
117 Societe Generale de Paris v Walker (1885) 11 App. Cas 20. While certificates may be issued, they are not 
documents of title, but merely documents evidencing title. 
118 i. e. shares of companies 
119 i. e. registered debt securities issued by the government of the United Kingdom through the Bank of England 
120 ,... definitive Eurobonds are usually warehoused with a 'common depository' for the two clearance systems 
Euroclear and Cedel. Euroclear and Cedel hold the bonds for the account of their respective securities account 
holders in each clearance system; where a transfer takes place it always takes place between one account holder 
of the clearance system and another; consequently, all transfers are effected by an electronic book entry system 
without any movement of the physical definitive Eurobonds. " Ravi C. Tennekoon, The Law and Regulation of 
, 
International Finance, Butterworths, London 1991, p. 167. 
121 In practice, the underlying securities in depository receipt programmes are generally limited to registered 
equities. In this jurisdiction, the major initiative for dernaterialisation is CREST, which relates to registered 
corporate equities and debt. However, certain bearer securities may be dernaterialised in the UK through the 
Central Moneymarkets Office ("CMO"). It is also true that, although generally global securities are only issued 
in respect of bearer securities, registered securities may be issued in global form and immobilised in a clearing 
system. Of course, a global form of registered security is not the exact equivalent of the global form of bearer 
securities. It is not a global note but a global certificate, for it does not constitute but merely represents the 
underlying securities, which are not and cannot be constituted by paper. While the underlying securities of a 
bearer global may be unissued, those of a registered global are unissuable. The exact status under English law 
of a bearer global is somewhat uncertain, but English law treats a registered global in the same way as a 
registered definitive, as evidencing the title of the person entered on the register as the owner of the securities. 
Indeed, the terms "global" and "definitive" in the context of registered securities owes more to practice 
borrowed from the bearer markets than to legal analysis. Another difference between bearer and registered 
globals is that the Disappearing Global problem discussed above does not arise with registered globals, for (as 
there is no need for any definitive paper to be issued on the issuer's default, but merely for reregistration from 
the name of the global holder into the name of the investors) the enforcement difficulties driving the 
Disappearing Global should not be present. 
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The major impact of computerisation on bearer securities appears to be the loss of 
negotiable status. 
In this discussion the term Bearer Computerised Securities will mean Computerised 
Securities which are derived from bearer securities. 122 
1. Negotiability 
The secondary markets in bearer securities have traditionally benefited from the 
doctrine of negotiability. A negotiable instrument has two attractive features. 
Firstly, it is transferable without formalitiesl23. Secondly, honest acquisition 
confers good title (even if the transferor did not have good titleI24). Thus, 
market transfers are rapid and reliable. 125 The negotiable instrument is "a 
privileged creative in the law"126 because of "the unassailable position of the 
bona fide holder for value" 127 or the holder in due course, who takes the 
instrument free from prior equities or defects in the title of the transferor. The 
general view is that these benefits are not available to securities which are not 
negotiable instruments. 128 
122 Derived because (in the case of Immobilised) the underlying securities are in bearer form or (in the case of 
Global Securities) the definitive securities are or would if issued be in bearer form. 
123 By physical delivery, or by endorsement and delivery in the case of certain instruments requiring endorsement, 
such as cheques. 
124 Provided the instrument is negotiated prior to maturity: see Brown v Davies (1789) 100 ER 466 
125 See JS Ewart, Negotiability and Estoppel, (1900) 15 LQR ixv 135 (1900), pp. 140,141: "The truth is that 
'negotiable' has an original and an acquired signification. Originally, it meant transferable; but afterwards it 
was used to indicate the effects of transfer, namely, that the transferee (1) took free from equities, and (2) could 
sue in his own name". (Ewart was writing before the implementation of s. 136 of the Law of Property Act 
IV 
1925 which generally permitted the legal assignment of choses in action, subject to prescribed formalities). 
126 Fifoot, The Law of Negotiable Instruments and the Law of Trusts, Journal of the Institute of Bankers , 
lix, 
p. 433, pp. 448,449. 
127 Milnes Holden The History of Negotiable Instruments in En _glish 
Law, University of London, Athlone Press, 
1995, p. 182. 
128 "The object of the law merchant as to bills and notes ... 
is to secure their circulation, therefore honest 
acquisition confers title. To this despotic but necessary principle, the ordinary rules of the common law are 
made to bend. " Ewart, op. cit., at 135 quoting Byles J, Swan v NR4, (1863) 159 ER 73; "The law merchant 
validates in the interests of commerce a transaction which the common law would declare void for want of title 
or authority. " Ewart at 136, quoting Baron Wilde, Swan v NBA 1862 7 H&N 634. 
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An instrument may acquire negotiable status either by statute129 or by 
130 In its medieval origin, commercial usage, as reflected in the law merchant. 
the law merchant consisted of the decisions of the borough, fair, staple and 
admiralty courts in commercial disputes. These were based on mercantile 
custom. In the Tudor era, such disputes began to be heard in the conu-non law 
courts where, in the early 17th century, it was established "... that a custom 
prevailing between merchants could originate a legal duty". 131 The law 
merchant as it relates to negotiable instruments was consolidated by Lord 
Mansfield in the 18th century and codified by the Bills of Exchange Act 
1882.132 
It is considered that negotiability is important for the integrity of the secondary 
markets in bearer securities, as it generally prevents secondary market 
transactions from being unscrambled because of defects in the title of previous 
holders of the securities in question, and obviates the need for purchasers to 
investigate the title of vendors. 133 It is generally 134 established that bearer 
129 
e. g. The Promissory Notes Act 1704 or the East India Company Bonds Act 1811. 
130 "As regards English law, there are only two ways in which an instrument can acquire the characteristic of 
negotiability: by statute or by mercantile usage in the English mercantile world. An instrument cannot become 
negotiable by agreement between the parties or by custom which is not general. " Philip Wood, Law and 
Practice of International Finance, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1980, section 8.3(4). 
131 Holden op. cit., p. 32. 
132 The general view is that the Act did not alter the law merchant, and so is persuasive authority as to the law 
merchant as it relates to instruments other than those expressly covered by it (bills of exchange, promissory 
notes and cheques are expressly covered). "It was not intended, in the first place, to alter the existing law, save 
by elucidating obscurities. " Fifoot, op. cit., p. 451. 
133 "It is clearly advantageous to a holder of a document to know that it is in a category of documents treated by 
law as fully negotiable in the narrow sense since a holder is thereby freed from the responsibility of enquiry 
into his transferor's title. This can be considered to be of the utmost importance in the case of negotiable 
securities available on a secondary market. A market in securities must function speedily with people being 
able to implement immediately their decisions to buy and sell. " Terrence Prime, International Bonds and 
Certificates of Deposit, Butterworths, London 1990, p. 238. See also Ravi C. Tennekoon, The Law and 
Regulation of International Finance, Butterworths, London 1991, p. 163: "In practice the issue of Eurobonds 
in the international markets would be made difficult unless the international investment community had no 
doubts as to the negotiable character of the Eurobond. " 
134 Certain provisions that have been incorporated in commercial paper have been considered to affect their status 
as promissory notes negotiable under section 83 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882. Such provisions include 
withholding tax grossing up provisions (having the result that the note is not a promise to pay a sum certain) 
and restrictions (driven by U. S. regulatory requirements) on negotiation of the instrument to nationals of certain 
countries (so that the note is not an unconditional promise to pay) and the enfacement of guarantees on the 
instrument. Such provisions must be considered on a case by case basis. 
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security in the secondary markets which are Physical Securities are negotiable 
instruments. 135 It might therefore seem desirable to argue that the movement 
of bearer instruments into computerised form has not been at the expense of 
their negotiable status. 136 There is no statutory confirmation of the negotiable 
137 status of Bearer Computerised Securities Therefore, to show that 
Computerised Securities are negotiable, it would be necessary to argue that they 
135 Domestic corporate bonds: Re General Eytates, 1868, L. R. 3 C 758; Higgs v Northern, 1869, L. R. 4 ex 387; 
Re Imperial Land Co, 1870, L. R. 11 ex 478; Bechuanaland Exploration Co. v London Trading Bank [ 18981 
2. Q. B. 65 8. 
Foreign government and corporate bonds: Gorgier v Mieville, 1824,3 B&C 45 .. Simmons v London 
Joint Stock 
Bank [ 189 11 1c 270; Benticle v London Joint Stock Bank [ 1893] 2C 120; Venables v Barring f 189213 C5 27. 
Scrip for bonds (i. e. certificates acknowledging the holders entitlement to be issued with bonds): Goodwin v 
Robarts (1875), L. R. 10 Ex 76. 
Scrip for shares (i. e. certificates acknowledging the holders entitlements to be issued with shares) : Rumball 
v Metropolitan, 1877,2 Q. B. D. 194. 
Secured bearer bonds: Webb v Herne Bay, 1870, L. R. 5. Q. B. 642; Fogg v School District, 1878,75 Mo App 
159 
Letters of credit: Re Agra & Mastennan's Bank, 1867, L. R. 2C 39 1; Johnnessen v Munroe, (1899), 185 N. Y. 
641. 
Depository Receipts: Nicholson v Sedgwick 1690, Ld Ray 180; Partridge v Bank of England 1846,9 Q. B. 396; 
Re Commercial Bank 1897 11 Man 494; Re Central Bank 1889 17 Ont 574; First National Bank v Security 1892 
51 NW Rep 303; Kirkwood v First National Bank 1894,5 8 NW Rep 10 16; Sauce v Exchange 1894 S8 NW Rep 
1135; Hagar v Buffalo 31 NY 448; Austen v Graham 1899 81 111 App S02. 
The above references are quoted in Ewart, op. cit., p. 156. See also the following: - 
Bearer bonds whether foreign or domestic, corporate or government: Edelstein v Schuler [1902] All ER Rep 
884 
Certificates of deposit: Custom and Excise Comrs v Guy v Butler (International) Ltd [1977] QB 377 at 382; 
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Co [19881 1 Lloyds Rep 259 at 276 (quoted in Encyclopedia of 
Banking Law, London, Butterworths 1994, F(116) n1) 
The more recent introduction of euro-notes and euro-commercial paper to the London secondary markets raised 
the question of whether these new forms of bearer security were negotiable in the absence of clear statutory or 
judicial authority. The general consensus in the legal conununity is that these physical instruments have become 
negotiable on the basis of commercial custom in London. 
136 Under the US Uniform Commercial Code, Computerised Securities are not negotiable except in respect of 
transfers across the books of clearing corporations. See C. W. Mooney Beyond Negotiability Cardozo Law 
Review [19001 Vol 12 305 at 333,334. 
137 It cannot be argued that Computerised Bearer Securities are negotiable as promissory notes under section 83 
of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 for a number of reasons, the chief of which is that they are not in writing. 
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are negotiable under the law merchant. This argument might take two forms. 
The first is that Bearer Computer'sed Securities are the same as the Physical 
Securities from which they derive, which are already recognised as negotiable 
by the law merchant. The second is that Bearer Computerised Securities form 
a new class of negotiable instrument which has been so recognised. 
The first argument is not sustainable. As indicated above, the term 
"Computerised Securities" refers here to the interest of the Investor in 
Immobilised and Global Securities. It is this interest which is dealt in the 
secondary markets and for which the benefits of negotiability are desired. This 
interest is fundamentally different from the Physical Security from which it is 
derived, in two respects. Firstly, the holder in due course of a Physical 
Security which is a negotiable instrument has possession of it; in contrast, the 
Investor in a Bearer Computerised Security does not have possession of any 
underlying Physical Securities, and his interest is intangible. Secondly, the 
holder in due course of a physical negotiable instrument can sue directly on it 
in its own name; in contrast, the investor in Bearer Computerised Securities 
(other than Dernaterialised Securities138) cannot. Its rights against the 
underlying issuer can in general only be enforced through an intermediary. 139 
Because Bearer Computerised Securities are intangible and (generally) indirect 
they are not the same as any Physical Securities that may underlie them. 140 
2. A new class of negotiable instrument? 
138 In the CMO, the investor in a Dernaterialised Security is given a right to sue the issuer directly, under the terms 
of an Agreement for the Dernaterialisation of CMO Instruments made between the Bank of England and CMO 
members. 
139 In the case of Immobilised Securities, the investor has directly enforceable rights only against the clearer, and 
not the underlying issuer. In the case of Global Securities the investor's rights (in the absence of default) are 
enforceable only against the clearer, which has rights against common depository, which in turn has rights 
against the issuer. Where a trustee has been appointed, the investor has rights against the trustee, who in turn 
has rights against the issuer. (It is true that, where no trustee has been appointed, upon the default of the issuer, 
the rights of the investor under the Global Securities may be replaced by direct rights against the issuer under 
a deed of covenant. However, as they arise under a separate instrument, these are not rights under the Global 
Securities .) 
140 It will be argued below that the intangible and indirect nature of Computerised Securities also prevents them 
from forming a new class of negotiable instrument. 
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Is it possible to argue, then, that the Bearer Computerised Securities form a new 
class of negotiable instrument recognised by the law merchant? There is no 
direct judicial authority to this effect. It might therefore be argued that they are 
negotiable within the law merchant on the basis of commercial practice (so that 
when the question does come before the courts, it is safe to assume that their 
negotiable status will be judicially recognised). 
In trying to anticipate the courts in this matter, it is helpful to look at how they 
have acted in the past. Although "... the courts have hesitated before admitting 
new entrants to the class"'141 judicial recognition of instruments as negotiable 
(from the recognition at the turn of the 13th century of Bills of Exchange142 to 
the recognition of share warrants of the turn of the 19th century 143 has followed 
commercial practice. 144 
The mercantile courts have traditionally attracted the custom of merchant 
litigants by this approach. Fifoot comments, "As methods of business alter, so 
must the law adapt to new conditions". 145 
It might therefore be argued that (although not the same as the Physical 
Securities that may underlie them), Bearer Computerised Securities are a new 
class of instrument that are negotiable within the law merchant, because the law 
merchant follows commercial practice. Bearer Computerised Securities have 
evolved from Physical Securities as a matter of operational convenience, without 
any commercial intention that their legal incidents should differ from those of 
141 Holden, op. cit., p. 83. 
142 See Holden, op. cit., p. 21. 
143 Webb, Hale & Co v Alexandria Water Co Ltd (1908) 93 L. T. 339. 
144 It does not matter that the commercial practice in question is not mercantile, i. e. that the computerisation of 
securities is a function of the practice of financial institutions and not of merchants. It was held in %odward 
v Rowe (1666) 2 Keb 105,132 that "... the law merchant is the law of the land, and the custom is good enough 
generally for any man, without naming him merchant", changing the rule from a case reported in 1612 in which 
the plaintiff failed because the dependant was "not in a merchant, but a gentleman". Fifoot, op. cit., p. 440. 
-ýstrument as negotiable must be notorious, certain and The market usage of treating an iI reasonable. See Kum 
v Wah Tat Bank Limited '(1967) 2 LloyA Rep 437 and General Reinsurance Corporation and Others v 
Forsakringsakriebolaget Fefinia Patrý (1983) 1 Q. B. 856. 
145 Fifoot, op. cit., p. 452 
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the Physical Securities from which they derive. It might perhaps be assumed 
that the law merchant will not defeat commercial intention, and honour the 
principle that "the law must be for trade, and not trade for the law". 146 
There is ample authority that the law merchant is a dynamic branch of law, 
evolving to reflect changing cornmercial practice from time to time. In the 
anomalous case of Crouch v Credit Foncier Co (1873) 147 the court rejected the 
argument that an instrument was negotiable at law because it was so treated by 
the business conununity, and held that no new types of negotiable instrument 
could be recognised; modern usage could not alter the law merchant. This 
148 view was in effect overruled by the decision in Goodwin v Robarts, which 
conclusively rejected the view that "the door [is] to be now shut to the 
admission and adoption of usage ... as though the law had been finally 
stereotyped and settled ...... 
149 Conunentators are united in the view that the 
Bills of Exchange Act 1882, while codifying the law of negotiable instruments, 
has not arrested its development. 150 This view is confirmed by the case of 
Bechuanalandl5l, in which bearer debentures were held to be negotiable. "It 
was, indeed, for the judge to decide, in accordance with the law of the Bills of 
Exchange Act, what were the necessary elements of negotiability. But, if it 
were proved that business men habitually treated a document as possessing those 
elements, there was nothing to prevent its admission within the charmed 
circle.,, 152 
146 Fifoot, op. cit., p. 444 
147 L. R. 8 Q. B. 374 
148 L. R. 10 Ex 76, affirmed by H. L. I App Cas 476 
149 This language was echoed in the Privy Council some 70 years later in Bank of Baroda, Ltd. v Punjab National 
Bank, Ltd. [1944] AC 176 at 183, as follows: "The law merchant is not a closed book, nor is it fixed or 
stereotyped". 
150 Section 97(2) of the Act provides that "'Me rules of con-imon law including the law merchant, save as so far 
as they are inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, shall continue to apply to bills of exchange, 
promissory notes and cheques". Such rules, as they may develop from time to time, also apply aforriori to 
other types of negotiable instrument. 
151 Bechuanaland Exploration Company v London Trading Bank, Limited [1898] 2 Q. B. 658. 
152 Fifoot. op. cit., p. 453 
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Further, the fact that Bearer Computerised Securities have existed for a 
relatively short time does not prejudice their candidacy for negotiable status. 
"We cannot concur in thinking that if proof of general usage has been 
established, it would have been a sufficient ground for refusing to give effect 
to it that it did not form part of what is called 'the ancient law merchant'. " 153 
Since the later 19th Century, the test has been general, and not ancient, usage. 
There are several examples of the robust approach of the courts in recognising 
new classes of negotiable instrument. 154 Thus, in principle, the law merchant 
is capable of recognising Bearer Computerised Securities as a new class of 
negotiable instrument. The question is whether it has in fact done so. 
Arguments against negotiability 
It will be argued here that the law merchant has not recognised Bearer 
Computerised Securities as a new class of negotiable instrument, primarily 
because of the intangible nature of Bearer Computerised securities. 
a. in&rect 
One obstacle to treating Bearer Computerised Securities as negotiable is 
their indirect nature. Manisty J considered US share certificates in 
London and County Banking Company Ltd. v London and River Plate 
Bank Ltd. (1887)155 and cornmented, "Now it seems clear to me that this 
instrument could not be sued upon by the person holding it per tempore, 
and could therefore not be negotiable. " The ability of the holder from 
time to time of an instrument to enforce it against its issuer in his own 
name has generally been taken to be an essential criterion of 
negotiability. 156 It was noted (at section [2] above) that, in general, an 
153 
per Cockbum C. J., Goodwin v Robarts (1875) LR 10 Exch 337 at 356 
154 See, for example, Lord MacNaghten in London Joint Stock Bank v Simmons [18921 A. C. 201, at 224: 
" [Cedulas] are treated as negotiable instruments. I do not see on what grounds they are to be denied the quality 
of complete negotiability. In a matter of this sort, it is not-desirable to set up refined distinctions which are 
not understood or are uniformly and persistently ignored in the daily practice of the stock exchange. " 
155 20 QBD 232, at 266 
156 See also Crouch v Credit Foncier Co per Blackburn I 
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Investor in Computerised Securities does not have directly enforceable 
rights against the issuer. 157 
However, an alternative view has been expressed. In the past the London 
legal community considered this question in relation to physical 
eurodollar bonds constituted under a trust deed which imposed limitations 
on bondholders' rights to sue the issuer so that generally only the trustee 
had rights of enforcement, and bondholders were able to sue the issuer, 
only if the trustee failed in its duties on their behalf. One leading counsel 
argued that the instruments were not negotiable because on the face of the 
bonds the person holding them for the time being was prevented from 
suing on them in his own name. Another leading counsel argued that the 
instruments were negotiable, and that the requirement of negotiability was 
not that the holder should have an unrestricted right to sue, but that in 
circumstances where he is given such a right, he should not need to sue 
in the names of prior holders. For this reason, the indirect nature of 
Computerised Securities may not necessarily be incompatible with 
negotiable status. 
b. intangible 
The clearer argument against Computerised Securities being negotiable 
is their intangibility The early negotiable instruments (bills of exchange 
and promissory notes) were recognised as negotiable because they were 
like money, and used by merchants as an alternative method of payment 
for goods. 158 Indeed the test of negotiability has been held to be that the 
instrument should pass from hand to hand like money159 and 
157 (Even in the case of Dernaterialised Securities in the CMO, the right of the investor to sue the issuer does not 
arise under an instrument, but is merely contractual, arising under the Master Dernaterialisation Agreement. ) 
158 The term "money" is said in its strict sense, as current coin and bank notes, rather than credit, or the balance 
of a bank account. See Mann, The Legal Aspects of Money, p. 5: "Bank accounts, for instance, are debts, not 
money... 
"A Bill of exchange is a security, originally invented among merchants in different countries, for the more easy 
remittance of money from the one to the other, which since spread itself into almost all pecuniary transactions. " 
Blackstone, Commentaries, Book II, at 466. 
159 See Lang v Sinythe (1831) in which Neapolitan bordereaux were held not to be negotiable because they did not 
pass from hand to hand in England like money or bank notes. 
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commentators have argued that the basis of the negotiability of 
instruments generally is their likeness to money: "Conu-nencing with 
money, it is usually said that the reason that a thief can pass a good title 
is because 'of the currency of it; it cannot be recovered, after it has 
passed into currency'. 160 'Bills of exchange and promissory notes are 
representatives of money circulating in the commercial world as such. '161 
Money passes with good title because it is money; and notes because they 
are like money. "162 
The rule with money is that property passes with possession. 163 If the 
basis of negotiability is the likeness of instruments to money, we would 
expect the same feature (the equation of possession with property) to be 
an important aspect of negotiability "For the purpose of rendering bills 
of exchange negotiable, the rights of property in them passes with the 
bills ... The property and the possession are inseparable. ', 
164 Of course, 
while the function of the early types of negotiable instrument (bills of 
exchange and promissory notes) was payment, the function of more 
recently recognised types (such as share warrants) is investment, and in 
this respect they are not functionally like money. However the 
fundamental principle (which arises from the original monetary function 
of negotiable instruments and, it is submitted, survives a change in that 
function) is that property passes with possession. 
Property is always with the holder, or the person having possession. For 
this reason, a negotiable instrument must be capable of possession. If it 
were incapable of possession, it could not confer upon its possessor (a 
holder) the status of holder in due course. 
160 Per Lord Mansfield, Miller v Race 1758 Burr 457 
161 Friedlander v Texas (1889) 130 US 416. 
162 Ewart, op. cit., p. 152 
163 (subject to equitable tracing in some circumstances where money has been paid In breach of fiduciary duty, and 
received, by a volunteer, or by a purchaser with notice of the breach). 
164 Per Eyre C. J. Collins v Martin (1797) 1B&P 648 at 651 
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Computerised Securities, being the interest of the Investor, are 
intangible165. As to whether intangibles are capable of possession for 
this purpose, it has been argued, in chapter 2 above, that they are not--- 
capable of possession at common law, but only in equity. Possession 
may of course be constructive as well as actual and "Delivery [of a bill 
or note] means the transfer of possession, actual or constructive, from 
one person to another". 166 Thus actual possession need not be with the 
holder, but may be with his servant or agent. 167 However, as was 
argued in chapter 2, in order to be capable of constructive possession, an 
asset must in tum be capable of actual possession. An intangible is 
capable of neither at law. Although intangible interests are capable of 
possession in equity, this does not assist in the context of negotiability 
which is part of the law merchant. As intangibles are incapable of 
possession outside the realms of equity, Computerised Securities cannot 
confer upon anyone the status of holder for the purposes of the law 
merchant, and it is only through such a person that the benefits of 
negotiability can be en oyed. i 
Intangibility poses another problem: an intangible cannot be an 
instrument. "An 'Instrument' is a Writing, and generally imports a 
document of a formal legal kind. ', 168 The Bills of Exchange Act defines 
both bills of exchange 169 and promissory notes 170 as being "in writing" 
and provides that "'writing' includes print". 171 Byles comments 172 that 









Investors have the right to call for underlying Physical Securities; however, if they do so, they convert their 
investment from a Computerised Security to a Physical Security. 
Byles on Bills of Exchange, 26ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, p. 97. See also In re Stapylton Retcher Ltd 
[19941 1 WLR 1181, per Judge Paul Baker Q. C. at 1195: "... delivery is the transfer of possession... " 
Byles, op. cit., 98 
John S. James, Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, 5ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986. 
In section 3(l) 
In section 83(l) 
In section 2 
At p. 2988 
-40- 
not necessarily, written on paper. It is conceivable that they might be 
written on parchment, linen, cloth, leather or any other convenient 
substitute for paper, not being a metallic substance" The Interpretation 
Act 1978 provides 173 that statutory references to "writing" shall, unless 
the contrary intention appears, include references to printing, lithography, 
photography and other modes of representing or reproducing words in a 
visible form. However, none of the above assists in extending the 
meaning of the tenn "instrument" to intangibles such as Computerised 
Securities. 174 
If the basis of negotiability is possession, and if the nature of an 
instrument is tangible, it is not clear that Computerised Bearer Securities 
can be either negotiable or instruments. There is no clear authority for 
treating an intangible as a negotiable instrument, and it may be legally 
impossible to do so. The way forward may be to extend the concept of 
negotiability to intangibles. However, this would be a quantum leap from 
the existing law merchant, and perhaps only achievable by statute. 
It is true that in the case of Inunobilised and Global Securities, there will 
be tangible instruments (and directly enforceable rights) in the hands of 
an intermediary depository or custodian175. This does not, however, 
render the interest of the Investor a negotiable instrument, because all 
173 In section 5 and schedule I 
174 Although an instrument cannot be intangible, there is authority that information stored on the hard disc of a 
computer may be a document for the purposes of orders for discovery under RSC Ord 24: see Alliance & 
Leicester Building Society v Ghahremani and Others, (1992) TLR March 19,1992 and Derby & Co Ltd v 
Weldon (No 9) [19911 2 All ER 901, per Vinelott J. However this principle is confined to the context of 
discovery. In Derby, Vinelott J bases his judgment on the principle in the earlier case of Grant v Southwestern 
and County Properties Ltd. [ 1974] 2 All ER 465. In the passage he quotes from that judgment, the policy basis 
for that decision, which ties it to its litigation context, is clear: "A litigant who keeps all his documents in 
microdot form could not avoid discovery because in order to read the information extremely powerful 
microscopes or other sophisticated instruments would be required. " (quoted at 906). Vinelott J goes on to 
comment, at 906: "The question in this case is not, I think, whether the database is a document but as to the 
circumstances in which and the means by which a party seeking discovery is entitled to inspect and take copies 
of that document. " It would therefore be unsafe to seek to extrapolate a general principle from these cases. 
175 i. e. the underlying Physical Securities in the case of Immobilised Securities, and the global note Itself In the 
case of globals. 
These underlying Physical Securities will also be expressed on their face to be negotiable; this is also a 
necessary criterion of negotiability: London and County Banking Co v London and River Plate Bank Ltd (1880) 
20 QBD 232, Jones & Co v Coventry [1909] 2 KB 1029, quoted in Prime, op. cit., p. 242. 
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negotiable instruments 11 are Intended to be ambulatory" 176. The Physical 
Securities underlying the Immobilised Securities are (as the term suggests) 
immobilised in Euroclear or Cedel 177 and "... neither the TGB [temporary 
global bond] nor an instrument similar to it has ever been traded in the 
markets between Eurobond dealers... "178 Moreover, Computerised 
Securities are not expressed to be negotiable on their face because, being 
intangible, they have no face. Thus the indicia of negotiability are 
distributed between the Intermediary and the Investor. The physical 
instrument (expressed to be negotiable) and directly enforceable rights are 
held by the intermediary, and the "ambulatory" security (i. e. one that 
passes from hand to hand like money) is held by the Investors. 
C. conclusion 
In the mid eighteenth century179the following test of negotiability was 
judicially stated180: "It may therefore be laid down as a safe rule that 
where an instrument is by the custom of trade transferable, like cash, by 
delivery, and is also capable of being sued upon by the person holding it 
pro tempore, then it is entitled to the name of a negotiable instrument, 
and the property in it passes to a bona fide transferee for value, though 
the transfer may not have taken place in market overt. But that if either 
of the above requisites be wanting, i. e., if it be either not accustomably 
transferable, or, though it be accustomably transferable, yet, if its nature 
be such as to render it incapable of being put in suit by the party holding 
it pro tempore, it is not a negotiable instrument, nor will delivery of it 
pass the property of it to a vendee, however bona fide, if the transferor 
himself have not a good title to it, and the transfer be made out of market 
overt. " 
176 Ewart, op. cit., p. 155 
177 The participant has a right to call for delivery out of Euroclear or Cedel of Physical Securities; however If this 
occurs, of course, the securities cease to be Immobilised Securities. 
178 Ravi Tennekoon, op. cit., p. 175. 
179 Miller v Race I Smith L. C. at 259 (1758) 
180 Blackburn J, Crouch v Credit Foncier (1873) L. R. 8. Q. B. 374 at 381, quoting from the notes to Miller v Race 
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In the absence of authority to the contrary, the test of negotiabilitV 
appears to remain firstly, that the instrument should be, by custom of 
trade, transferable, like cash, by delivery and (subject to the conunents 
at section (a) above) secondly that the instrument should be capable of 
being sued upon by the holder from time to time. 
Delivery is the transfer of possession: "Voluntary dispossession in favour 
of another is commonly regarded from the side of the former possessor, 
and called delivery.,, 181 As an intangible a Computerised Security is 
incapable of possession and therefore of delivery in the technical legal 
sense of that term. 182 It would therefore seem that Computerised 
Securities are neither instruments, nor capable of delivery (nor yet of 
being sued upon by the holder from time to time) and cannot be 
negotiable instruments. 
This analysis is made under English domestic law. As stated above, 
arrangements for the issue and transfer of Bearer Computerised Securities 
are characteristically cross border and therefore involve issues of private 
international law. English private international law is considered in 
chapter 6. 
Computerised Bearer Securities cannot, it seems, be negotiable 
instruments for the reasons outlined above, the most compelling of which 
is their intangible nature. In crossing into the electronic era, the 
secondary markets in bearer securities crossed an important legal 
boundary, and left the law merchant. Sections [6.7.8 and 9] below will 
argue that this may not matter. 
4. Intermediate Securities 
If Computerised Bearer Securities are not negotiable instruments, what are they? 
181 Pollock, Possession in the Common Law, op, cit., p. 44 
182 The discussion that follows will continue to use "delivery" in relation to Computerised Securities in its market 
sense, i. e. the crediting of the purchaser's account with the Computerised Securities in fulfilment of a bargain. 
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a. functional status 
The trend from a paper-based to an electronic environment offers 
settlement efficiencies and economies of scale. It has been recommended 
by G30 as an objective for the world's securities markets. 183 The New 
York Uniform Commercial Code provides for dernaterialisation. 184 The 
continuing computerisation of securities is inevitable. 
As an interim stage in the journey towards pure dernaterialisation G30 
recommends immobilisation. 185 Immobilisation is a form of custody, and 
the interest of the Investor in the immobilised securities may be described 
as the interest of a custody client. 
Inunobilisation involves intermediation, and in this way Immobilised 
Securities are akin to Global Securities and Repackaged Securities (and 
indeed the interests of all custody clients). Thus, if one wishes to classify 
securities according to the manner in which the Investor's interest is held, 
it is possible to identify three broad types: - 
(1) Physical Securities, consisting of or represented by paper issued by 
the issuer and held directly by the Investor; 
(2) Dematerialised Securities, where the Investor holds, and there is, 
in fact, no underlying paper; and 
183 Recommendation 3 of the G30 Report is that "Each country should have an effective and fully developed central 
securities depository, organised and managed to encourage the broadest possible industry participation (directly 
and indirectly), in place by 1992. " The Report goes on to comment (at p. 8) that "Central Securities 
Depositories should immobilise or dernaterialise the issues in safekeeping. While dernaterialisation offers 
particular advantages with regard to efficiency and flexibility, laws and practices of some countries and their 
markets do not permit dematerialisation. In these situations, consideration should be given to changing such 
laws to permit dematerialisation. " 
184 Article 8-102(b) 
185 Having commented that in jurisdictions where dernaterialisation is not possible, consideration should be given 
to changing local laws to permit dematerialisation, it goes on to comment: "However, the major goals of the 
depository can be accomplished by immobilising certificates, provided a system is in place that permits 
settlement without transfer and re-registration. This is typically accomplished through the use of a system in 
which the CSD (central securities depository] acts as a nominee for the beneficial owner. " (p. 
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(3) Intermediate Securities, where an underlying security is issued (or 
agreed to be issued) in paper form to an intermediary depository, 
trustee or custodian ("Intermediary") who holds the underlying 
paper (directly or indirectly) for the Investor, so that the Investor's 
interest is intangible and enforceable, not directly against the 
issuer, but only indirectly, through the Intermediary. 
It might be said that Physical Securities belong to the past, Dernaterialised 
Securities to the future and Intermediate Securities to the transitional 
present. 186 With Intermediate Securities, the interposition of the 
Intermediary serves to bridge old (paper-based) and new (electronic) 
practice. 
b legal nature 
What is the legal nature of Intermediate Securities? 
The important point is that the way in which securities are held 
determines their legal nature. Intermediate Securities are indirect and 
unallocated. 
(i) Indirect 
It was shown above that the Investor does not in general have 
directly enforceable rights against the issuer. Its rights in respect 
of the issuer can only be exercised through the Intermediary. 
In the case of Immobilised Securities, underlying Physical 
Securities are held through Euroclear or Cedel. Each of these 
clearing systems operates a system akin to global custody, 187 in 
that the physical safekeeping of Physical Securities is delegated by 
the clearer to depositories, which are generally located in the same 
jurisdiction of the issuer. Thus, there are two levels in 
186 Some might argue that, for this reason, custody (In the sense of safekeeping) Is not a long term Industry. 
187 In its legal structure; the clearers do not in general offer the value-added Information based services 
characteristic of the global custody product. 
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intermediation. The Investor has rights which are enforceable only 
through Euroclear or Cedel; the clearer has rights which are 
enforceable offly through its depository; the depository, as holder 
of the Physical Securities, is their legal holder and therefore has 
directly enforceable rights against the issuer. 
The position with Global Securities is similar, but more complex. 
We saw that a physical global bond in temporary or permanent 
form is issued directly to a common depository, which holds it for 
Euroclear and Cedel, which in turn hold their interest in it for 
participants who are Investors. Thus, as with Immobilised 
Securities, there are two levels of intermediation. 188 Thus, in each 
case, the underlying property is held for Investors through two 
Intermediaries. 189 In each case the underlying property is legally 
owned by the first Intermediary (i. e. the Intermediary having a 
direct link with the issuer, at one remove from the Investor. ) 190 
If legal title to the underlying property is with the first 
Intermediary, and if that title is held by the first Intermediary for 
the second Intermediary, which in turn holds for the Investor, the 
188 Broadly speaking, the underlying property is the global note. However the position is less simple than that with 
Immobilised Securities because the rights represented by the global may in certain circumstances be replaced 
by rights under other documents, namely definitives and the deed of covenant. Together, the global, the 
definitives (if any are in issue) and the deed of covenant create a network of contingent and mutually dependent 
rights, and identifying the exact legal nature of the global (ie of the underlying property) is not straightforward. 
However, for the purpose of this discussion the analysis of the legal nature of the global will be limited to those 
aspects of the network that are most important. 
In the case of permanent global bonds, the underlying property comprises the covenant of the issuer to pay 
principal and interest to the holder of the global, together with the right of the holder of the global to exchange 
the global for definitives upon the default of the issuer. In the case of temporary global bonds, the underlying 
property comprises the right of the holder to exchange the global for definitives, together with the right to 
receive principal and interest if the issuer defaults in its obligation to issue definitives. In cases where a deed 
of covenant is executed, the Disappearing Global provision, described in footnote II above, does not affect the 
analysis of the underlying property as it is merely a contingency, occurring only on default. 
189 In the case of Immobilised Securities, these are the clearer and its depository. In the case of Global Securities, 
they are the clearer and its common depository. 
190 This is because, in the case of Immobilised Securities, the underlying property consists of negotiable 
instruments. The first Intermediary has possession and therefore legal title, which follows possession. Global 
Securities are expressed to be in bearer form-, the underlying property is therefore legally owned by its holder, 
the first Intermediary. 
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legal nature of the Investor's interest becomes difficult to establish. 
The true legal nature of the custodial relationship is a complex 
question, which will be considered in detail in chapter 4 below. 
For the sake of brevity here that chapter's conclusions will be 
surnmarised as follows. As legal title is with the first 
Intermediary, the Investor's interest cannot also be in the nature of 
legal title. The only form of ownership that English law can 
confer on a person who does not have legal title to assets is 
equitable title. If the Investor has a proprietary interest'91 in the 
underlying property, it can only be equitable, because it is indirect. 
192 The separation of equitable and legal title creates a trust , of 
which the first Intermediary is the trustee. The beneficiary is the 
person for whom the first Intermediary directly holds the 
Underlying Property, i. e. the second Intennediary. If the interest 
of the second Intermediary is an equitable interest under a trust, the 
only manner in which a proprietary interest can be conferred on 
the Investor is under a sub-trust. 193 
This is the position under English law. Of course, the relationship 
between the second Intermediary and the Investor is not governed 
by English law, but by the governing law of the General Terms 
and Conditions of the clearers. 194 These jurisdictions do not 
recognise trusts in their domestic law. However, as chapter 7 will 
discuss, these jurisdictions have passed legislation in support of 
their clearing system which has the result of protecting the interests 
191 Another alternative is that the investor's rights are not proprietary but merely contractual. Contractual rights 
attract the insolvency risk of the Intermediary, while proprietary rights do not. The commercial expectation 
(reflected in the regulatory capital treatment of Intermediate Securities) is that the investor does not take the 
credit risk of the Intermediaries, and therefore that its rights are proprietary. It will be argued in chapter 5 
below that this expectation probably is correct. 
192 An alternative view, namely that arrangements of this type give rise, to bailment, is discussed In chapter 4 
below. 
193 Under Grainge v Wilberforce (1889) 5 TLR 436, which will be discussed in detail below, the law "looks 
through" bare sub-trusts, so that where A holds property on trust for B, who holds the property on bare sub- 
trust for C, A is deemed to hold the property directly for C and B drops out of the picture. However, this 
principle will not apply here as the second Intermediary (the clearer) is not a bare sub-trustee as it has active 
duties under its general terms and conditions in relation to the administration of the assets. 
194 (Belgian law for Euroclear and Luxembourg law for Cedel). 
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of Investors under an arrangement akin to a trust, and (as that 
chapter will argue) the analysis under English private international 
law is to recognise these arrangements as if they were trusts, 
because of the wide terms of the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987 
which implements the Hague Convention. 195196 
(ii) Unallocated 
Intermediate Securities are generally unallocated. 197 
195 The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition. 
In analysing the relationship between the first and second Intermediaries as a trust, the following distinction 
should be made. In many bond issues a trustee is appointed by trust deed to represent the bondholders from 
time to time. Such an appointment used to be traditional in England; it was preferred to the appointment of 
a fiscal agent as is customary in US bond issues. The trust discussed above of which the first Intermediary is 
the trustee ("the Inten-nediary Trust") is different from the trust which is created expressly by a trust deed. 
Where a trust deed is executed, the trust property is not the Underlying Property, but rights which are additional 
to and exist in parallel to the underlying property. In the trust deed, the issuer covenants directly with the 
trustee to pay interest and principal, and the trustee may enforce this covenant directly on behalf of bondholders. 
It is also provided in the trust deed that the rights to principal and interest comprised in the underlying property 
will not be enforced by the holder, and that the trustee has the exclusive right of enforcement. This provision 
binds the holder (the first Intermediary) as the underlying property is expressed to be issued subject to the trust 
deed. Accordingly, where trustees are appointed in respect of Intermediate Securities, two parallel trusts arise, 
one express (under the trust deed) and one by operation of law (the Intermediary Trust). 
196 The reasons for this arrangement, whereby the issuer gives two parallel covenants, are clear from the case of 
In re Uruguay Central and Hyguerital Railway Company of Montevideo (1879) 11 CD 278, which concerned 
a bond issue in which the obligation of the company to pay principal and interest to holders of the bonds was 
expressed as a covenant of the company to the trustee, and was not undertaken by the company directly to the 
holders. The company fell into arrears in interest payments and 6 bond holders presented a petition for its 
winding up. The petition was dismissed inter alia because holders were not creditors of the company under s. 
91 of the Companies Act 1862, their rights of action being through the trustee only. per Jessel, M. R. at 380, 
381: "There can be no question that upon that deed the holders of the bonds are not creditors; they are merely 
cestuis que trust of a charge, having a right, no doubt, to put their trustees in motion to compel payment under 
the covenant, but not having any independent right to sue the company at law or in equity. " 
197 In the case of Inu-nobilised Securities, the underlying property comprises definitive bonds that are issued with 
distinctive numbers. (In the case of bonds which are London listed the rules of the London Stock Exchange 
require definitive bonds to be issued with serial numbers: section 13.22. e of the Stock Exchange's Listing Rules 
and distinguishable from one another. ) Therefore particular Physical Securities forming part of the underlying 
property could in theory be allocated to particular Immobilised Securities. In practice however particular 
underlying bonds are not in general earmarked for particular accounts at Euroclear or Cedel. All securities 
accounts at Euroclear are fungible. While Cedel offers both fungible and non-fungible accounts, only a very 
small minority of securities are held on a non-fungible bases. ) Thus, the interest of the Investor is pooled with 
the interests of all other Investors in Inunobilised Securities of the same issue, at the level of the second 
Intermediary (the clearer). (There is no pooling at the level of the first Intermediary, the local depository, 
because all the underlying property is held for the second intermediary, and there is therefore no pooling of the 
second Intermediary's interest with the interests of third parties. ) 
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The legal consequences of commingling the assets of different 
persons is a complex subject, which chapter 5 below will examine 
in detail. While in certain circumstances unallocated arrangements 
with an intermediary can effectively render the rights of Investors 
merely contractual as against the intermediary, in the case of 
Immobilised and Global Securities the Investors' rights are 
proprietary, on the basis of the analysis that will be developed in 
chapter 5. 
If the Investor's right is unallocated, the only way that it can be a 
proprietary right attaching to the underlying property is by way of 
co-ownership with all the other Investors in the same issue. 
Because the underlying Property is unallocated, it is co-owned. 198 
English law recognises two forms of co-ownership: joint tenancy 
and tenancy in common. Both terms derive originally from land 
law but can apply equally to the co-ownership of personal 
property. The difference between joint tenancy and tenancy in 
common lies in the four unities. 199 
198 
199 
In the case of Global Securities, the position is slightly different because the Investor's interest is not merely 
unallocated, but also incapable of allocation, for the simple reason that there are no underlying definitives that 
could be earmarked for particular Investors. The underlying property consists of a global note representing the 
entire issue of bonds. The fractional parts of the global equating to individual definitives do not have distinctive 
numbers and are not otherwise distinguishable one from the other. 
The first Intermediary holds the global for the two second Intermediaries, Euroclear and Cedel. Thus, in the 
absence of allocation, the interests of the two second Intennediaries are pooled with each other at the level of 
the first Intermediary. As with Immobilised Securities, the interests of Investors are also pooled at the level 
of the second Intermediaries. 
Thus, in the case of Irnmobilised Securities, there will be commingling in the jurisdiction of the second 
intermediaries (Belgium and Luxembourg); in the case of Global Securities, there will be commingling in the 
jurisdiction of the first Intermediary (England) and also in those of the second Intermediaries (Belgium and 
Luxembourg) in circumstances where allocation would not have been possible because the different parts of the 
underlying property have no inherent identity. 
See Re Goldcorp Exchange Lid 99 3 WLR 199. This idea will be developed in chapter 5. 







In other words, in order for a joint tenancy to be established, each 
co-owner must be entitled to possession of the whole of the co- 
owned property, have the same quantum of interest in it, have title 
by the same instrument and have the interest for the same interval 
of time. The unities will in practice not be present in Intermediate 
Securities, which are therefore co-owned by Investors under a 
tenancy in con-imon. 
Intermediate Securities are therefore interests under equitable 
tenancies in cornmon. In their legal nature, Intermediate Securities 
are akin to unit trusts. 200 
The Benefits of Negotiability 
To recap, it has been argued that Intermediate Securities are not negotiable 
instruments, and are interests under equitable tenancies in common. The 
benefits of negotiability are ease and integrity of secondary market transactions. 
It is argued (in sections 6 and 7 below) that such benefits may also be enjoyed 
by Intermediate Securities, if not under the law merchant, then under other 
branches of law including the law of equity. 
6. Ease of Secondary Market Transactions 
The old common law rule was that choses in action were not assignable, 
because of a policy against maintenance. An exception was evolved by the law 
merchant from the medieval period onwards in favour of negotiable 
instrumentS201. Then, in 1873202 a statutory exception was created, which was 
Osborne's Concise Law Dictionarv. See also Megarry & Wade, The Law of Real Property, London, Stevens 
& Sons, 1984, pp. 419 - 422. 
200 The capital value of a unit trust is variable because units are redeemable as well as transferable. Immobilised 
Securities and temporary Global Securities are comparable because the investor can remove his interest from 
the arrangement (by requiring physical delivery in the case of Immobillsed Securities, or by calling for 
definitives in the case of temporary globals). Permanent Global Securities differ in that the interest of the 
investor can be transferred to another investor, but cannot be removed from the equitable tenancy in common. 
The adverse tax consequences of unit trust status are avoided for the reasons discussed in section B. 9 below. 
201 Indeed, the original meaning of negotiable was, transferable. 
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later replaced by . 136203 of the law of Property Act 1925204. This permits the 
legal assignment of choseE in action provided certain formalities and restrictions 
are observed. These are (broadly) that: - 
the assignment is absolute; 
the assignment is in writing; and 
written notice of the assignment is given to the obligor. 
Compliance with the last two items would be inconvenient in the secondary 
markets, 205 and hence part of the concern to preserve negotiable status. 206 
The law of equity has long recognised assignments of choses in action. Because 
equity and the common law are separate branches of law it is not necessary to 
identify an exception to the old common law rule to permit a chose in action to 
be assigned in equity, and accordingly neither negotiable status nor compliance 
with section 136 are necessary. 
202 Under the Supreme Court Judicature Act 1987, s25(6) (repealed). 
203 " 136 (1) Any absolute assignment by writing under the hand of the assignor (nor purporting to be by way of 
charge only) of any debt or other legal thing in action, of which express notice in writing has been given to the 
debtor, trustee or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to claim such debt or thing 
in action, is effectual In law (subject to equities having priority over the right of the assignee) to pass and 
transfer from the date of such notice - 
(a) the legal right to such debt or thing in action; and 
(b) all legal and other remedies for the same; and 
(c) the power to give a good discharge for the same without the concurrence of the assignor... " 
204 The statutory regimes for the transfer of registered securities are currently provided by the Stock Transfer Act 
1963 in the case of physical equities and gilts, the Stock Transfer Act 1982 in the case of dernaterialised gilts 
and the Companies Act 1989 in the case of dernaterialised corporate securities. 
205 In particular, the need for the assignment to be in writing would be problematic. Secondary market transactions 
in Computerised Bearer Securities, like the securities themselves, are characteristically electronic, with no 
written instrument of transfer. Written contract notes or other confirmations may be issued, but these are 
merely in the nature of records. If it is not legally possible to effect secondary market transactions in 
Computerised Bearer Securities electronically (with the result that purported electronic transfers take effect in 
contract only) this would clearly pose a major problem in practice. 
206 In theory, the Uncertificated Securities Regulations 1996 which form the basis for CREST may also be used 
to permit electronic transfers in the euro bond markets, as the regulations are not limited to the CREST system. 
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It was argued above (in Chapter 3 section 4) that Intermediate SecuritieS207 are 
208 not legal but equitable. Equitable property cannot be legally transferred 
Any assignment of an Intermediate Security must therefore be an equitable 
assignment. 
While this obviates the need for compliance with section 136, it raises other 
problems. Section 53(l)(c) of the Law of Property Act 1925 provides as 
follows: 
It a disposition of an equitable interest or trust subsisting at the time of the 
disposition, must be in writing signed by the person disposing of the 
same, or by his agent hereunto lawfully authorised in writing or by 
will.,,. 209 
The effect of a purported equitable assignment that does not comply with this 
section will be to confer on the assignee merely contractual rights, leaving it 
vulnerable to the vendor's insolvency 210or double dealing. 211 
207 The Term "Intermediate Securities " is defined in Chapter 3 section 4 to mean intermediate Computerised 
Securities 
208 Because the common law cannot recognise the transfer of property which it does not in turn recognise. 
209 The section replaced section 9 of the Statute of Frauds (1677) (repealed), which provided as follows: "all grants 
and assignments of any trust or confidence shall likewise be in writing, signed by the party granting or assigning 
the same, or by such last will or devise, or else shall likewise be utterly void and of none effect" 
210 Upon the purported assignor's insolvency, the purported assignee would be merely an unsecured creditor. If 
the purported assignor went on fraudulently to dispose of the securities to a third party under an assignment 
complying with section 53(l)(c), then provided the third party had no notice of the fraud, it would take the 
securities free of any interest of the purported assignee. 
211 Legal corrimentators customarily identify the following disadvantages of equitable (as opposed to legal) 
assignment, in addition to section 53(l)(c): 
(1) the risk that the assignor may subsequently dispose of the assigned asset under a legal assignment to a bona 
fide third party without notice of the prior equitable assignment, the legal assignee taking priority over the 
equitable assignee ("the priority disadvantage"); 
(ii) the risk that the assignee may owe moneys to the issuer, which may be set off by the Issuer against the 
payment obligation under the assigned instrument ("the set off disadvantage"); and 
(iii) the disadvantage that an equitable assignee cannot sue the issuer in its own name, but must join the assignor 
("the enforcement disadvantage"). 
-52- 
As indicated above, in an electronic environment, it would be impracticable to 
obtain the signature of the assignor. Contract notes and other confinnations 
may be issued in writing, but these are in the nature of records and not 
dispositions. It would therefore be desirable to show that section 53(l)(c) does 
not apply. Four alternative arguments to this effect are available, based in turn 
on the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the rules relating to bare sub-trusts, the 
view that no disposition is involved in secondary market transactions in 
Intermediate Securities, and finally, the principles of English private 
international law. 
a. Equitable estoppel 
One approach to overcoming the problem of section 53(l)(c) is to rely on 
the doctrine of estoppel. It would be unconscionable for a vendor, who 
has sold Intermediate Securities to a purchaser and received 
consideration, to argue that, because the requirements of section 53(l)(c) 
have not been satisfied, the purchaser does not own the Intermediate 
Securities. Equity will not permit statute to be used as an instrument of 
fraud212, and upon receipt of the purchase price, equity would estop the 
vendor from denying the title of the purchaser on the basis of section 
53(j)(C)213214. 
However, these are relative disadvantages of equitable as opposed to legal assignment, and arise in respect of 
equitable assignments of property which is capable of both legal and equitable transfer. We saw that 
Intermediate Securities are equitable and therefore incapable of legal transfer. The analysis is therefore 
different. The priority disadvantage cannot arise if there can be no such thing as a legal transferee. The set 
off disadvantage cannot arise because the only legal owner of the Intermediate Securities is the first 
Intermediary, and the issuer is on notice that the first Intermediary does not own the Intermediate Securities 
beneficially, and would therefore not be entitled to set off. The enforcement disadvantage does not apply to 
Immobilised Securities. The assignee need not join any assignor if it wishes to sue the issuer. It may need to 
join an intermediary, but this is not an incident of equitable transfer, but due to intermediation. (It was also 
shown that, in the case of Global Securities where no trust deed is executed, the investor will be able to sue 
the issuer directly in its own name, under the deed of covenant. ) Further, under the rules of private international 
law, the Enforcement disadvantage may not apply were the proper law of the assigned property is not English 
law: see Mark Moshinsky The Assignment of Debts in the Conflict of Laws, (1992) L 109 QR, 591. 
212 See Rochefoucauld v Boustead [18711 1 Ch 196 per Lindley L. J. at 206. See also Oughtred v IRC (19601 AC 
206 and Neville v Wilson [1996] 3 All ER 171. 
213 Equitable estoppel in the context of section 53(l)(c) is discussed by Denning MR in Re Wmdervell's Trusts (No 
2) [197413 All ER 205 at 213: "... there was an equitable estoppel. His conduct was such that it would be quite 
inequitable for him to be allowed to enforce his strict rights (under a resulting trust) having regard to the 
dealings which had taken place between the parties: Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) All Cas 439 at 
448. " 
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In the event of the vendor's insolvency, this estoppel would be effective 
against the vendor's liquidator. 215 
However, this estoppel only operates against the vendor. It would not 
affect third parties, so that if the vendor fraudulently disposed of the 
same securities to a bona fide third party, perfecting that disposal in 
writing, then provided the third party did not have notice of the prior 
transaction, it would take the securities free of the interest of the original 
purchaser, who would be left as an unsecured creditor of the vendor. 
Estoppel is therefore not an answer to section 53(j)(C). 216 
Bare sub trust 
Another approach is the "bare sub trust" argument. This is as follows. 
In the securities markets, as in certain others, it is customary for the 
conclusion of the contract of sale, and the delivery of property pursuant 
to that contract, to take place on different dates. The interval between 
contract and delivery is called the settlement interval. It has long been 
established that, during the settlement interval, the vendor holds the 
purchased property on trust for the purchaser, under a constructive trust, 
proWded the contract is specifically enforceable (and provided also that 
the purchased property is allocated to the bargain). "So long as the 
vendor enters into a specifically enforceable contract for the sale of 
property he becomes a constructive trustee thereof for the purchaser until 
the contract is completed by the transfer of the property to the purchaser 
or to the order of the purchaser.,, 217 
214 This produces a result similar to, but not identical with, the constructive vendor-pur chaser trust discussed below. 
Unlike constructive trust, equitable estoppel does not confer equitable title on the purchaser, but rather prevents 
the vendor from denying it. See Waltons Stores Interstate Ltd. v Maher (1988) 62 A. L. J. R. 110, per Brennan 
J at 125. 
215 because the liquidator stands in the shoes of the insolvent company. See Goode, Commercial Law, p 850. 
216 Although it does not address fraud risk, it does address insolvency risk, for the estoppel would bind the 
liquidator of the vendor. See the persuasive authority of In re Sharpe [19801 1 WLR 219. 
217 D. J. Hayton, Underhill and Hayton, Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees, 15ed, Butterworths, London, 1995, 
p. 399 
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It is clear that a vendor-purchaser trust arises upon agreements for the 
sale of shares in a private company218. However an agreement for the 
sale of securities in the secondary markets is probable not specifically 
enforceable. 219 
Nevertheless, there is authority that the payment of the purchase price 
will give rise to a vendor-purchaser trust even where the contract is not 
specifically enforceable. Where the purchase price under a bargain is 
paid before the completion of the bargain by the delivery of the securities 
to the purchaser, the vendor holds the securities on trust for the 
purchaser. "Once the purchaser has wholly fulfilled his side of the 
contract (eg by paying over the purchase price) but the vendor still has 
title to the property then the vendor holds the property on a bare trust for 
the absolutely entitled purchaser.,, 220 This principle is illustrated in the 
case of Chinn v CollinS 221 in which the discussion by Lord Wilberforce 
of a vendor-purchaser trust arising upon an agreement for sale and 
payment of purchase price, indicates that compliance with section 53(l)(c) 
is unnecessary. 222 
218 See Oughtred v IRC [1958] 1 All ER 252 
219 This is because specific performance is a discretionary remedy, which will not be granted in cases where 
damages would be an adequate remedy for the breach of the agreement for which specific performance is 
sought. As securities could be purchased from a third party in the market, damages would be an adequate 
remedy for a contract of this kind. 
220 Underhill and Hayton, op. cit., Article 36. 
221 (H. L. ) [19811 A. C. 533 
222 'Then the respondent contended that, granted the identity of the shares ... he could not be regarded as a 
beneficiary in respect of them because he could not get specific performance of the agreement.... But in my 
opinion the whole contention is misconceived. The legal title to the shares was at all times vested in a nominee 
for [the trustees] and dealings related to the equitable interest in these required no formality. As soon as there 
was an agreement for their sale accompanied or followed by payment of the price, the equitable title passed at 
once to the purchaser, ... and all that was needed to perfect 
his title was notice to the trustees or the nominee, 
which notice both had at all material times. " (at 548). See also Holroyd v Marshall (1862) 10 HL Cas 191 in 
which Lord Chelmsford discusses the principle of a vendor-pur chaser trust without linking the principle with 
the availability of specific performance and Dixon J in Palene Shoes v Krohn (1937): "Because value has been 
given on the one side, the conscience of the other party is bound when the subject comes into existence, that 
is, when, as is generally the case, the legal property vests in him. Because his conscience is bound in respect 
of a subject of property, equity fastens upon the property itself and makes him a trustee of the legal rights of 
ownership for the assignee. " 
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An acknowledged objective of the securities markets is delivery versus 
payment ("DVP"), or the synchronisation of the delivery of securities and 
the payment of their purchase price in the settlement of bargains. 223 This 
is in order to reduce counterparty risk, or the risk for either party (party 
A) that the other party (party B) will fail to deliver or pay in 
circumstances where party A has delivered or paid and is therefore unable 
to withhold delivery or payment to limit the damage of party B's breach 
of contract. However, for operational reasons, true DVP remains in 
many cases something of a holy grail. Delivery may precede payment, 
and payment may precede delivery. 
In cases where payment precedes delivery (even by a short interval) the 
legal position of the vendor is as follows. During the first part of the 
settlement interval (after the bargain but before payment) it continues to 
own the securities beneficially. During the second part of the settlement 
interval (after payment but before delivery) it holds the securities as bare 
trustee for the purchaser. 
It has been noted that the interest of the Investor in Computerised 
Securities is itself an equitable interest under a sub-trust. 224 The vendor- 
purchaser trust must therefore be in the nature of a sub-sub-trust. During 
the second part of the settlement interval, therefore, the Computerised 
Securities are held on bare constructive sub-sub-trust by the vendor for 
the purchaser. 
It is established that the law "looks through" bare sub-trusts (as opposed 
to sub-trusts where the trustee has active duties). The position of a bare 
trustee (Mr Moody) was considered in the case q Re Lashmar225. "It f 
appears to me that the true way to regard this will is to look through 
223 See G30 Recommendation 5: "Delivery versus payment (DVP) should be employed as the method for settling 
all securities transactions. " 
224 
see Chapter 3 section 4. b. 1 above. 
225 Re Lasluwr; Moody v Penfold 64 LT 333, CA. 
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'16 Moody as nobody. "2ý The effect of "looking through" a bare sub- 
trustee is that, where A holds property on trust for B, and B in turn holds 
his interest in the property as bare sub-trustee for C, A is deemed to hold 
the property on a direct trust for C. In Grainge v Wilberforce227 it was 
stated228 that "The case, therefore, fell within the principle that where A 
was trustee for B, who was trustee for C, A held in trust for C, and must 
convey as C directed. "229 
Applied to secondary market transactions in Computerised Securities, 
these principles produce the following result. The second Intermediary 
(i. e. the clearing system) (A) holds the underlying property on sub-trust 
for the Investor (B). B concludes a bargain for the sale of the securities 
to C. The purchase price is paid before the securities are delivered. 
When payment is made, B holds his interest on a bare constructive sub- 
sub-trust for C under the principle in Chinn v Collins ("the first stage"). 
Thereupon, A is deemed to hold the underlying property on a direct sub- 
trust in favour of C under the principle in Grainge v Wilberforce ("the 
second stage"). C now owns the Computerised Securities by operation 
of law, even in advance of the time when Ns database is amended in his 
favour. 
It is submitted that section 53(l)(c) does not apply to this transaction. 
The first stage escapes by virtue of section 53(2), which provides: - 
"(2) This section does not affect the creation or operation of 
resulting, implied or constructive trusts.,, 230 
2-16 
per Lindley, L. J. at 335. And again . ..... it appears to me, therefore, that there is no active trust, no active duty 
whatever to be performed by the trustees ... I think, therefore, that no estate remained in the trustee. " per Fry, 
L. J. at 336. 
227 (1889) 5 TLR 436 
228 by Chitty J, at 437. 
229 See also Grey v IRC [1958] 1 All ER 246 per Upjohn J at 250; revsd CA [195812 All ER 428 at 433 per Lord 
Evershed MR. 
230 An example of this analysis being applied is found in Oughtred v IRC per Lord Radcliffe (dissenting) at 625: 
"On June 18,1956, the son owned an equitable reversionary interest In the settled shares; by his oral agreement 
of that date he created in his mother an equitable interest in his reversion, since the subject-matter of the 
agreement was property of which specific performance would normally be decreed by the court. He thus 
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The second stage escapes by virtue of the same section. There are a 
limited number of ways in which a trust can arise. by statute, by the 
intentional act of the parties, and by operation of law. Trusts arising in 
the last manner are called implied trusts. The trust in favour of C created 
by the second state is neither statutory nor express, but arises by 
operation of law and is therefore implied. 231 Section 53(l)(c) does not 
apply to implied trusts by virtue of section 53(2)232. 
Therefore, if payment precedes delivery, section 53(l)(c) will not apply 
to secondary market transaction of Intermediate Securities. Of course, 
to the extent that payment precedes delivery, the purchaser takes the 
credit risk of the vendor. The answer to this problem may be that the 
interval between payment and delivery need, for the purpose of 
disapplying 53(l)(c), be only a scintilla of time. Since settlement in these 
markets is generally effected, not directly between the parties to a 
transaction, but through correspondent banks and custodians or other 
intermediaries who require to receive payment or delivery instructions a 
certain "lead time" before they are able to implement them, the risk that 
the vendor may reverse a delivery or payment instruction during the 
scintilla of time which begins when the purchase price is received and 
ends when the securities are due to be delivered, may be sufficiently 
remote to be discountable. However, it is understood that in practice, 
delivery often precedes payment, which often takes place on a gross basis 
at the end of the business day. 
C. No disposition 
became a trustee for of that interest sub modo; having regard to sub-s (2) of s. 53 of the Law of Property Act, 
1925, sub-s (1) of that section did not operate to prevent that trusteeship arising by operation of law. " 
231 It is probably constructive rather than resulting. 
232 This view might appear to conflict with the decision in Grey v IRC, discussed above. Referring to this case 
as authority, David Hayton writes: It is vital to appreciate that Xs direction to T to hold the property for B, 
instead of A, amounts to a disposing of his subsisting equitable interest to B within section 53(l)(c). " (Hayton 
and Marshall: Cases and Commentary on the Law of Trusts, p. 55). However, the conflict is more apparent 
than real, for the following reason. In Grey, the transaction which failed because of section 53(l)(c) was an 
attempt to create an express trust (ie the oral direction of the settlor to the trustees). In the above analysis, the 
transactions which escape the terms of section 53(1)(c) are both implied trusts. See also Neville v Wilson [19961 
3 All ER 171. 
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(1) original promise 
The third possible argument is that there is no disposition. Earlier 
this chapter referred, loosely, to the transfer of negotiable 
instruments. However, it has long been argued that bearer 
securities are not transferable. "The note is an original promise by 
the maker to pay any person who shall become the bearer; it is 
therefore payable to any person who successively holds the note 
bonefide, not by virtue of any assignment of the promise, by an 
original and direct promise moi4ng from the maker to the 
bearer233. The implication of this argument is that secondary 
market transactions in such instruments are not dispositions. 
The original promise argument applies to Physical Securities. 
However, it is uncertain whether it applies to Intermediate 
Securities. The Investor is not the bearer of the Underlying 
Property, and therefore the value of Intermediate Securities cannot 
be based on an original and direct promise moving from the maker 
to the bearer. 
In order to argue that secondary market transactions in 
Intermediate Securities are not dispositions, one must look at the 
nature of such transactions. When A, an Investor, sells his 
Intermediate Securities to B, what is the process whereby the 
clearer (the second Intermediary) ceases to hold its interest in 
respect of the underlying property for A, and begins to hold it 
for B? 
trust in favour of a class 
It was argued (in Chapter 3 section 4. b. i above) that the civil law 
relationship between the clearer acting as second Intennediary and 
investors would be recognised under English private international 
law as if it were a trust. 
233 Per Storey J in Bullard v Bell 1817, Mason 243. See also T7wmpson v Perrine 1882 106 U. S. 593. Quoted 
in Ewart, Negotiability and Estoppel, (1900) 14 LQR (1900) 135 p. 136. 
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This quasi trust (arising under local Decrees)` is not expressed 
to be in favour of individually identified Investors but in favour of 
Investors as a class, the composition of that class being 
ascertainable from time to time by reference to the records of the 
clearer. Secondary market activity in Intermediate Securities is 
settled by changes in the identity of the members of a class. 235 
Property remains at all times with the class. If an individual leaves 
the class, it loses its interest under the trust, not because of its 
individual identity, but because of the loss of class membership. 
Similarly, if an individual joins the class, it gains an interest under 
the trust, not because of its individual identity, but because of its 
class membership. Property is an incident of class membership, 
and for this purpose, class membership confers status distinct from 
individual identity. 
Such status does not of course amount to separate legal personality 
(permitting property to be legally owned by the class), and 
therefore the class cannot be said to be corporate. However, the 
class has a status sufficient for the equitable ownership of property. 
It may therefore be described as "quasi-corporate", in the sense 
that it enjoys equitable proprietary rights independently of the 
separate personalities of the members of the class from time to 
time. 
A secondary market transaction has the effect of altering the 
database of the clearer, but not the terms of the trust. When a 
secondary market transaction is settled, the Intermediary ceases to 
hold for A and starts to hold for B, because A has left and B has 
joined the category of persons for whom its interest in the 
securities held. B becomes a beneficiary, and beneficially owns the 
234 Belgian Royal Decree No. 62 of November 1967 and Luxembourg Grand Ducal Decree of February 197 1. 
235 The composition of the class is determined by the clearer's database which is akin to a register of bondholders, 
in that the identities and holdings of investors are determined by reference to it by time to time. (For this 
reason, while the Underlying Property consists of or relates to bearer securities, Intermediate Securities are a 
species of registered security. ) 
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securities, under an original and direct trust moving from the 
trustee to the beneficiaries from time to time. 236 
By analogy, if A declares a trust in favour of the spouses of his 
siblings from time to time, and if A's brother divorces Mary and 
marries Sarah, Mary cannot be said to have disposed of her interest 
under the trust to Sarah. 237 Could it therefore be argued that 
secondary market transactions in Intermediate Securities are not 
dispositions for the purposes of section 53(l)(c)? It is necessary 
first to examine the meaning of the term 'disposition'. 
(iii) "disposition " 
Section 205(l)(ii) of the Law of Property Act 1925 includes the 
following provision: 
...... disposition' includes a conveyance and also a devise, bequest, 
or an appointment of property contained in a will ...... 
The meaning of the term in the context of section 53(l)(c) is 
considered at some length in Grey v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners238. 
236 The basis of B's entitlement is the entry of its name in this database. Although there may be a contractual 
document in which A agreed to sell its interest in the Intermediate Securities to B, this document is not the basis 
of B's title: it merely imposes contractual obligations on A to procure that its name is replaced by that of B on 
the database. It is a contract and not a conveyance. 
237 Terrence Prime advances a similar argument in connection with the express trust arising where a trust deed is 
executed: see International Bonds and Certificates of Deposit p. 243. 
238 [1959] 3 All E. R. 603. In this case, a settlor transferred shares to trustees to hold as his nominees. The settlor 
later orally directed the trustees to hold the shares on various trusts for his grandchildren. Declarations of trust 
were subsequently executed as deeds by the settlor and the trustees in favour of the grandchildren. On the 
question whether the deeds were chargeable with ad valorem stamp duty as voluntary dispositions, it was held 
that they were so chargeable because the earlier parole directions were not effective because of section 53(l)(c). 
"My Lords, if there is nothing more in this appeal that the short question whether the oral direction that Mr. 
Hunter gave to his trustees on Feb. 18,1955, amounted in any ordinary sense of the words to a 'disposition 
of an equitable interest or trust subsisting at the time of the disposition', I do not feel any doubt as to my 
answer. I think that it did. Whether we describe what happened in technical or in more general terms, the full 
equitable interest in the eighteen thousand shares concerned, which at that time was his, was (subject to any 
statutory invalidity) diverted by his direction from his ownership into the beneficial ownership of the various 
equitable owners, present and future, entitled under his six existing settlements. " per Lord Radcliffe at 607. 
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"If the word "disposition" is given its natural meaning, it cannot, 
I think, be denied that a direction given by Mr. Hunter whereby 
the beneficial interest in the shares theretofore vested in him 
became vested in another or others is a disposition. -239 
It had been argued that the meaning of the term 'disposition' for 
the purposes of the section is limited to sense of 'grants and 
assignments, 240, but this argument failed. 241 
While this narrow interpretation of the word was rejected, the 
judgment also indicates the criterion which delimits the term. The 
transaction under consideration was a disposition because it 
"diverted", "displace[d]" and caused Mr Hunter's equitable interest 
to become "vested in another ...... 
It was shown above (in chapter 2) that an equitable interest is a 
type of property, and that property may be loosely considered as 
a legal relationship between a person and an asset. The case 
indicates that a disposition consists of dissolving the relationship of 
an asset with one person (or class of persons) and forming a new 
relationship between the asset and another person (or class of 
persons). 242 
In cases where the proprietary relationship is between an asset and 
a class of persons who are identified for the purpose of that 
relationship by membership of that class and not individually, one 
239 Per Viscount Simonds at 506. 
240 On the basis that the Law of Property Act 1925 was a consolidating act, and did not alter the effect of section 
9 of the Statute of Frauds, which applied to grants and assignments. 
241 On the basis that the Statute of Frauds had been amended by the Law of Property (Amendment) Act 1924, 
which contained amending provisions in section 3 and schedule 3 which was duplicated in the consolidating act 
of 1925. 
242 There is also authority that the dissolving of one proprietary relationship, without the forming of a new one in 
respect of the same asset, can be a disposal. "The word 'disposition' , taken by itself, and using it in its mo st 
extended meaning, is no doubt wide enough to include the act of extinguishment Re Leven (Earl) (Decd), Inland 
Revenue Comrs v Willianu Deacon's Bank Ltd [1954] 3 All ER 81, at 85, per Wynn-Parry J; "I think that a 
surrender is clearly a disposition", Inland Revenue Comrs v Buchanon [1957] 2 All ER 400 at 402, CA, per 
Lord Goddard CJ. 
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may argue that changes in the membership of the class do not 
affect the original proprietary relationship and are therefore not 
dispositions. A change in class membership is not a disposition, 
but a form of devolution. 243 
Where the owning class has corporate status, the above analysis is 
uncontroversial. When a shareholder in an incorporated company 
disposes of his shares, there is not also a pro tanto disposition of 
the assets of the company. This is because a corporation has legal 
personality distinct from the individual identity of its 
membership, 244 and the ownership of the underlying assets is not 
affected by changes in the membership of the company. Of 
course, although the issuers of Computerised Securities are often 
corporate, the bondholders are not their members, and the bond 
issues themselves are not corporate. Does the "no disposal" 
argument survive the lack of corporate status? It becomes arguable 
that it does, when one looks at the law relating to unincorporated 
associations. 
(iv) unincorporated associations 
It was argued above that Intermediate Securities are interests under 
trusts, the beneficiaries of whom are the Investors from time to 
time. In this respect they are comparable to certain unincorporated 
243 The transaction or act of the parties is the change of membership; the new member's new ownership of the 
property in place of the old member, is not the transaction, but its juridical consequence. Property "passes" 
by operation of law, and not by the act of the parties. It is not disposition, but devolution. The distinction 
between these terms is clear in the law of succession. Where property vests in a person by virtue of his status 
and not his individual identity as party to a transaction, his acquisition of the property upon acquiring that status 
is devolution (by operation of law) and not disposition (by act of the parties). The distinction is made in section 
2 of the Succession Duty Act 1853; see Northumberland vA. G [19051; Earl of Setland v LordAdvocate 3 App 
Cas 505; and Braybrooke v A. G. 11 ER 685. 
244 "A corporation may be defined as a body of persons (in the case of a corporation aggregate)... which is 
recognised by the law as having a personality which is distinct from the separate personalities of the members 
ofthe body... from time to time.. ". Blackstone compares corporate personality to river which continues the 
same although waters ever change (borrowing an image from Heraclitus). I Commentaries, 469 (1765-1769) 
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associations. 245 "Unincorporated associations cannot themselves 
own property, not having legal personality ...... - 
"46 In the case 
of unincorporated associations (other than registered friendly 
societieS247) then, "The method of holding property... is a question 
of general law and construction of the rules of the association and 
any documents transferring property to the association" - 
248 Assets 
may be held in one of three ways: firstly, the assets may be held 
personally by the members as joint tenants; secondly, the assets 
may be held personally by the members not as joint tenants but 
subject to the contractual rights and liabilities of each of the 
members to each others as members of the association; thirdly, the 
assets may be held in trust for the members of the association. 249 
245 These have been defined as "two or more persons bound together for one or more common purposes, not being 
business purposes, by mutual undertakings each having mutual duties and obligations, in an organisations which 
has rules which identify in whom control of it and its funds rests and on what terms and which can be joined 
or left at will. The bond of union between the members of an unincorporated association has to be contractual. " 
Conservative and Unionist Central Office v Burrell [1982] 2 All ER 1, per Lawton LJ at 4. Of course, 
Intermediate Securities are not unincorporated associations because they are not associations. 
. 
246 Paul Todd, Textbook on Trusts, Blackstone, London 1991, pl. 08. 
247 In the case of registered friendly societies, there is a statutory provision. "All property belonging to a registered 
society, whether acquired before or after the society is registered, shall vest in the trustees for the time being 
of the society, for the use and benefit of the society and the members thereof, and of all persons claiming 
through the members according to the rules of the society. " Section 54(l)) of the Friendly Societies Act 1974. 
248 Jean Warburton, Unincorporated Associations: Law and Practice, 2ed, London Sweet & Maxwell, 1992, p. 43. 
249 See NeWle Estates Ltd v Madden [19621 1 Ch 832, per Cross J at 849, in the context of considering the ways 
in which a gift to an unincorporated association may take effect. The holding of the property of an 
unincorporated association on trust is facilitated by the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964 (see below). 
"While the expendable assets for the time being of a members' club are usually in the physical control of its 
officers or servants .... those assets, as well as 
immovable and other types of durable property, require, in the 
case of such a club, to be vested in some legal person - often two or three trustees - who will hold the legal title 
in a fiduciary capacity for the use and benefit of the club and its members. " J. F. Josling and L. Alexander, 
Law of Clubs, 6ed, Longman, London 1987, p. 6. See also Re Bucks Constabulary (No 2), [19791 1 All ER 
623 per Walton J at 626: "If a number of persons associate together, for whatever purpose, if that purpose is 
one which involves the acquisition of cash or property of any magnitude, then, for practical purposes, some one 
or more persons have to act in the capacity of treasurers or holders of the property. In any sophisticated 
association there will accordingly by one or more trustees in whom the property which is acquired by the 
association will be vested. These trustees will of course not hold such property on their own behalf. Usually 
there will be a committee of some description which will run the affairs of the association... and the normal 
course of events will be that the trustee, if there is a formal trustee, will declare that he holds the property of 
the association in his hands on trust to deal with it as directed by the committee. If the trust deed is a shade 
more sophisticated it may add that the trustee holds the assets on trust for the members in accordance with the 
rules of the association. Now in all such cases it appears to me quite clear that, unless under the rules 
governing the association the property thereof has been wholly devoted to charity, or unless and to the extent 
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There is a large body of case law concerning such trusts in favour 
of non-commercial unincorporated associations, the membership of 
which varies from time to time. It is clear that at least some of 
these cases concern associations which permit chanees of 
membership to take place without writing. 250 As far as section 
53(l)(c) is concerned, it might be thought that these cases would 
consider the section 251, and deal with the apparent problem that 
changes of membership involve the disposal of an equitable 
interest, and therefore require to be in writing. However, the point 
has never been taken. The case law "... fails to explain how the 
equitable interest of a member passes on his resignation without 
compliance with Law of Property Act 1925 s. 53(l)(c)...,, 252. 
A satisfactory explanation may be the " quas i-corpo rate" analysis 
outlined above. Many of the cases concern a different issue, i. e. 
the rule against perpetuities, which arises where there is a trust in 
favour of a changing class of persons from time to time. 253 In 
to which the other trusts have validly been declared of such property, the persons, and the only persons, 
interested therein are the members. " 
250 For example, Came v Long (1860) 2 De GF & J, 45 ER 550 concerned the Penzance public library. Rule 1 
provided that "Subscribers of one guinea annually, being duly elected and paying one guinea entrance, shall be 
ordinary members. " Also, Neville Estates Ltd v Madden [1961] 3 All ER 769 concerned the Catford 
synagogue. "By-law A read 'The members of this synagogue consist of seatholders, i. e. persons (whether male 
or female) who shall be in occupation of seats at this synagogue'. An applicant for membership was first 
interviewed by the minister. His application then went before the board of management, and if they considered 
him suitable the application was sent to the United Synagogue for its approval. Each member paid a 
subscription and forfeited his rights of membership if he failed to keep up his payments. " Per Cross J at 772, 
773. 
251 
or, before 1925, section 9 of the Statute of Frauds (1677) which it replaced. 
252 Jill Martin, Hanbury & Martin, Modem Equity, l4ed, London Sweet & Maxwell, 1993, p. 368. Again, "When 
a member of an ordinary social club resigns his membership, how does this equitable interest in the property 
of the club pass to the other members without the signed wfiting required by this statute? This is a matter 
which has never been satisfactorily explained. " J. H. C. Morris and W. Barton Leach, The Rule Against 
Perpetuities 2ed, London Stevens & Sons, 1962, p. 315. 
253 "Before the 1964 Perpetuities and Accumulations Act there were particular legal obstacles confronting gifts to 
unincorporated bodies. The gift could not be an absolute gift to such a body because such body has no legal 
personality. It could not be a valid gift if construed as a gift to the present and future members of the body 
because the intent to ensure beriefitting future members required the capital to be kept intact and held on trust 
for only the income to be used, so that the capital would remain available for the benefit of future members. 
This rendered the gift void for infringing the rule against remoteness, though since the 1964 Act such a gift 
would be valid for the statutory perpetuity period. - Hayton and Marshall, Cases and Commentary on the Law 
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some cases the purported trust fails as a perpetuity. 'ý54 In such 
cases, there are indications that the rule against perpetuities is the 
only difficulty with this method of holding property. 255 In other 
cases, the trusts escape the rule against perpetuities (because they 
are charitable'256y or permit the disposal of capital, so that they 
are not endowment trusts caught by the rule, 257 or benefit from a 
statutory exception258). In these cases, which confirm the validity 
of trusts in favour of fluctuating bodies of individualS, 259 there is 
no indication that the continuing validity of such trusts depends 
upon written transfers of the equitable property by retiring 
members and in favour of new members. 260 
This view is confirmed by the case of Re Conveyances, Abbatt v 
Treasury Solicitors and others. 261 In this case, land was acquired 
by an ex-servicemen's club and held by the club's trustees. The 
club subsequently altered its constitution and extended its 
membership. The trustees sold part of the land and difficulties 
arose as to their ability to make a good title. On a summons to 
determine the question of title, it was held at first instance that the 
property did not belong to the present members, but only to those 
of Trusts, 9ed, 1991, London Sweet & Maxwell, p. 193. 
254 For example, In re Drummond, Ashworth v Drummond [191412 Ch 90. 
255 " If the devise had been in favour of the existing members of the society, and they had been at liberty to dispose 
of the property as they might think fit, then it might, I think, have been a lawful disposition. " Came v Long, 
per Lord Campbel I L. C at paragraphs 79,80. See also Leahy v A. G. for New South Wales [1959] AC 45 7, per 
Simonds V. C. at 486: "No difficulty will arise if only a charitable body can be selected. " 
256 
e. g. Cock v Manners (1871) LR 12 Eq 574 
257 
e. g. In re Smith [19141 1 Ch 937; In re Price [19431 1 Ch 422; In re Drummond [19141 2 Ch 90; In re 
Lipinski's Will Trusts [19761 1 Ch 235. 
258 
e. g. Leahy v A. G, for New South Wales [ 19591 AC 457. 
259 " It is a trust for private individuals, a fluctuating body of private individuals,.. " In re Drummond, per Eve J 
at 97. 
60 It is of course true that the issue in most of these cases was the initial validity of the trust in question. 
However, the fact that the point is never taken, obiter or otherwise, suggests that it may not apply 
261 [19691 3 All ER 1175 
-66- 
who had been members at the date of alteration of the constitution. 
On appeal it was held that title vested in the trustees in trust for all 
262 the present members of the club If section 53(l)(c) had 
applied, it would have prevented the new members from acquiring 
an interest, unless of course written instruments were required to 
be executed disposing of club property upon every change in club 
membership. While this is theoretically possible, it is unlikely, 
and nowhere indicated in the judgment. There was no indication 
that the requirements of section 53(l)(c) applied or required the 
acquisition of beneficial title by the new members to be in writing. 
The implication is that there are no dispositions. This view is 
supported by the language of Cross J in Neiille Estates Ltd v 
Madden263 in his discussion of a trust in favour of an 
unincorporated associations's membership from time to time: 
the donors meant this fund.. to be held on trust for the synagogue 
as a quasi-corporate entity,, 264 (The author's italics). This 
supports the "no disposal" argument outlined above. Of course, an 
unincorporated association is, by definition, not a corporation. 
However, by the interposition of a trust between the association 
and its property, the owner of the property may be said to be made 
"quasi-corporate", so that changes in the membership of the 
association do not affect the identity of the owner, or involve a 
disposition for the purposes of section 53(j)(c). 265 
262 "The property was held for the benefit of the new members just as much as the old... " per Lord Denning, 
M. R., at 1174. 
263 [19611 3 All ER 769. 
264 
at 779. The term "quasi-corporate entity" is also used in a similar context in Re Grant's Will Trust [1979] 3 
All ER 359 at 366. 
265 Arguably, further support for this view is found in the following passage in Jean Warburton, Unincorporated 
Associations: Law and Practice, p. 46: "Rules which are incorporated into the terms of the trust can further 
protect and clarify the members' rights, for example by providing that a members' interest shall cease on his 
ceasing to be a member. Such a clause avoids the difficulty that strictly speaking, any assignment of a 
member's equitable interest should be in writing. " See also Underhill and Hayton, Law relating to Trusts and 
Trustees, pp. 216-217 
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Indeed, Maitland goes so far as to argue that the customary view 
that club property is held on trust should give way to a frankly 
corporate analysis. 266 
Nowadays the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated 
associations is taken to be fundainental, and the description of a 
trust as "quasi-corporate" may seem strange. However it seems 
less strange when one considers the history of company law. Until 
the statutory codification of company law in the mid-nineteenth 
century, the distinction between conunercial associations having, 
and not having separate legal personality was neither simple nor 
clear. Section C below will discuss this in more detail. 
In the eighteenth century, much business was carried on by 
unincorporated associations. 267 
were held through trustees 
The assets of these associations 
"Indeed, extremely rare was the 
eighteenth century unincorporated organization that did not make 
at least some use of trustees. "268 This was in order to overcome 
the legal obstacles to an unincorporated body holding property. 269 
The exact legal status of these unincorporated bodies with 
266 1 do not think that the result [of the trust analysis] is satisfactory. The "ownership in equity" that the member 
of the club has in land, buildings, furniture, books, etc. is of a very strange kind. ... There are some signs that 
in course of time we may be driven out of this theory. ... the property of the "unincorporated 
body" is to be 
taxed as if it belonged to a corporation. This is a step forward. ... The natural inclination of the members of an 
English club would, so I think, be to treat the case exactly as if it were a case of corporate liability. "Maitland, 
Trust and Corporation, pp. 196,197,198. 
267 It is true that [at the end of the eighteenth century] a considerable amount of England's business was being 
handled by groups that were not incorporated, but which were, as has been already said, grasping at the 
advantages of corporateness. " A. B. Dubois, The English Business Company after the Bubble Act 1720 - 1800, 
Octagon Books, 1971, New York, p. 85. 
268 Dubois, op. cit., p. 222. 
269 "We have seen that in the middle ages the law knew many miscellaneous communities and groups which 
perfon-ned many miscellaneous functions - governmental, charitable, religious, and social... They assorted as 
badly with the new view, taught by the Roman lawyers, that only a person natural or artificial could be 
recognized as capable of rights and duties ... It followed that these unincorporated groups were incapable of 
owning property; and without property the activities of a group must be very limited ... 
The legal recognition 
which the common law found itself unable to give was supplied by the machinery of the equitable trust. These 
groups might not be able to own property, but property could be held on trust for them. " Holdsworth, Volume 
IV, pp. 477,478. 
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transferable stock was unclear, both in the cornmercial world"'70 
and to the courts: "... it was not until many years later [than the 
early eighteenth century] that in dealing with unincorporated 
companies the Courts perceived the essential difference between 
partnerships and companies. ', 271 Even in the early nineteenth 
century, the distinction was not always -zlear. 
272 The legal 
distinction between a group of people holding property through a 
company, and a group of people holding property through a trust, 
is, as a matter of legal history, unclear. This is partly because 
equity has made a significant contribution to the development of 
company IaW273 and partly because, in the great era of 
unincorporated cornmercial associations, participants in such 
270 " Commercial men did not firmly grasp the distinction between a large partnership and a chartered company till 
after the passing of the Bubble Act in 1720. " Holdsworth, Volume IH p. 192. Again, in the late seventeen 
century . ..... the line between corporate and unincorporated societies was generally disregarded by the projectors 
of companies. Bodies of persons joined together to form a society, which differed from an incorporated joint 
stock company in no particular, except in the absence of a charter. " Holdsworth, Volume III p. 215. 
271 Formoy, The Historical Foundations of Modem Company Law, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1923, pp. 37, 
38. 
272 " But the unbeschrankte Haftbarkeit of partners was still maintained. 'nat was a thoroughly practical matter 
which Englishmen could thoroughly understand. Indeed from the first half of the nineteenth century we have 
Acts of Parliament which strongly suggest that this is the very kernel of the whole matter. All else Parliament 
was by this time willing to grant: for instance, active and passive Pýnocessfahigkeit, the capacity of suing and 
being sued as unit in the made of some secretary or treasurer. And this, I may remark in passing, tended still 
further to enlarge our notion of what can be done by "unincorporated companies". It was the day of half- 
measures. In an interesting case an American court once decided that a certain English company was a 
corporation, though an Act of our Parliament had expressly said that it was not. " Maitland, Selected Essays, 
Cambridge University Press, 1936, Trust and Comoration, pp. 209,210. 
273 Notwithstanding the statutory codification of company law in from the mid nineteenth century to the present 
day, the role of the courts in developing the body of company law upon which statute rests is clear. (See G. M. 
Anderson and R. D. Tollison, The Myth of the Corporation as a Creation of the State, International Review of 
Law and Economics, (1983), 3,107 - 120 and David Milman, The Courts and the Companies Acts: the Judicial 
Contribution to Company Law, [1990] L. M. C. L. Q., 401. ) In particular, the Chancellor's court played a major 
role. See also Maitland, p. 129: "... a branch of the law of trusts became a supplement for the law of 
corporations, and some day when English history is adequately written, one of the most interesting and curious 
tales that it will have to tell will be that which brings trust and corporation into intimate connection with each 
other. 
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associations kept their affairs away from the courts, due to the 
statutory restrictions on their activities. 274 
For these reasons, the treatment of unincorporated trust 
arrangements as quasi-corporate has a basis in English law. 275 
This approach, or the view that the interposition of a trust between 
investors and the underlying property forms a quasi-corporate shell 
or barrier between them, is reflected in case law concerning the 
status of shares of property companies. 276 
This is further support for the argument that a change in the 
identity of investors holding Intermediate Securities is not a 
disposition. 
(v) Summary 
To surnmarise the argument, the essence of a secondary market 
transaction in Intennediate Securities is a change in the identity of 
274 The Bubble Act 1720 (repealed 1825). See section C below. "The unincorporated association rarely came into 
contact with Parliament, the courts, or the Crown officials. " (Dubois, op. cit., p. 438) See also Maitland, 
Discussion the holding of property by clubs in Trust and Corporation, at pp. 197,198: "But what I am 
concerned to remark is that, owning to the hard exterior shell provided by a trust, the inadequacy of our theories 
was seldom brought to the light of the day. Every now and again a court of law may have a word to say about 
a club, but you will find nothing about club-property in our institutional treaties. " "In any event, in the period, 
there was a nebulous haze over exactly what the Crown officers meant by their references to 1. partnership". 
The business man was obviously the last one who wanted to see this enigma resolved. " (Dubois, op. cit., p. 
236. ) 
275 R. M. Formoy discusses the position of large unincorporated conunercial associations at common law in the 
eighteenth century, and comments, "The difficulty to be met was to determine the attitude which was to be taken 
up by the law with regard to this new commercial development. It was not until after the Legislature had 
regulated these undertakings that the Courts perceived the point of view from which they were to be regarded, 
and these undertakings, instead of being treated as partnerships, were treated as quasi-corporations, a change 
which was facilitated by the introduction of partnerships or companies formed by deed of settlement. " op. cit., 
p. 3 1. 
276 The old rule was that such shares were realty. However "[The case of Bligh v Brent (1836) 2Y& C] dealt 
with shares in the Chelsea Water-works Company. It was decided that they were personal property; realty held 
for the purpose of a trading company being in equity deemed to be in the nature of personal estate ... This 
argument was applied in ... 
Edward v Hall (1855), 6 De G. A&G. 74 ...... 
R. R. Formoy, The Historical 
Foundations. of Modem Company Law, London. Sweet & Maxwell 1923, p. 8. Importantly, Edward v Hall 
concerned an unincorporated company, supporting the view that the interposition of a trust between investors 
and the underlying property can form a quasi-corporate shell. 
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individuals together forming a class for whom property is held in 
trust. Such transactions are more in the nature of devolution than 
disposal. For this reason, it is arguable that secondary market 
transactions in Intermediate Securities are not dispositions and that 
therefore section 53(l)(c) of the Law of Property Act (which 
requires disposals to be in writing) is not applicable. 
e. private international law 
A simpler and more pragmatic argument can be based on private 
international law. As chapter 6 section [E] below will argue in detail, the 
approach of the Rome Convention to formality of transfer is generous. 
A transfer will be formally valid if (broadly) it satisfies the requirements 
either of the law governing the transfer or the law of the jurisdiction in 
which either of the parties (or any agent acting on their behalf) is 
situated. Thus, the restrictions of section 53(l)(c) can be avoided by 
routing a transaction through an agent situated in a jurisdiction with no 
equivalent to that section. 
f. conclusions 
There are four alternative arguments that section 53(l)(c) should not be 
a problem for the secondary markets in Intermediate Securities. The first 
is that the transferor is estopped from taking the point. While this 
argument does not protect the purchaser from the vendor's double 
dealing, it protects the purchaser in the vendor's insolvency. The second 
argument is that section 53(l)(c) is disapplied by section 53(2). 
However, this argument is only available where payment precedes 
delivery and therefore may be of limited use in practice. The third 
argument is that the section does not apply as there is no disposal. The 
fourth argument is that section 53(l)(c) may not be applicable because 
English law may not govern the question. 
Taken together, these arguments may provide a reasonable basis for the 
view that section 53(l)(c) is not relevant to the secondary markets in 
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Intermediate Securities277 , and therefore that the absence of negotiable 
status is not a disadvantage for Intermediate Securities for the purpose of 
ease of secondary market transactions. However, in the absence of 
statutory clarification, a small measure of uncertainty must remain. 
7. Integrity of Secondary Market Transactions 
It was stated in Chapter 3 section [B. 11 above that the first benefit of negotiability is ease 
of secondary market transactions, and that the second benefit is the integrity of those 
transactions (i. e. the general inability of trades to be reversed). Section 5 argued that the 
first benefit is probably available to non-negotiable securities. The same may be true of 
the second. On the basis that Intermediate Securities are not negotiable, this section will 
examine the position of a purchaser where the vendor does not have a good and 
unencumbered title. 
In the case of negotiable instruments, "A bona fide transferee for value acquires a good 
title free of any defects in the title or defences available against the claims of any 
277 Even if the "no disposition " argument fails, the courts may take a robust approach to the matter. The case of 
In re A. E. G. Unit Trust (Managers) Ltd. 's Deed. Midland Bank Executor & Trustee Co. Ltd. v A. E. G. Unit 
Trust Managers Ltd. [1957] 1 Ch 415 is cited by Terrence Prime (in International Bonds and Certificates of 
Deposit, Butterworths, London, 1990 p244 note 3), with the comment, "It may well be that in any case the Law 
of Property Act 1925 has no application to situations which are primarily commercial and where application 
would lead to absurdity. " 
In this case the trust deed of a unit trust provided that the excess of the amount of income available for 
distribution over the amount of income (determined by the managers in their discretion to be distributed) should 
be accumulated as capital. The managers informed the trustee that they proposed to accumulate all income 
available for distribution in the present year and at all times thereafter. The trustees sought directions from the 
court as to whether the clause permitting accumulation was valid, notwithstanding the provisions of s164 of the 
Law of Property Act 1925. This section provides that settlements or disposals of property in such manner that 
income shall be accumulated for any longer period than as provided in that section, shall be void. 
It was held that the provision was valid and that the section did not apply. Wynn-Parry J considered whether 
s164 applied, and in particular whether investment in a unit trust could be a settlement or a disposition (at 420): 
"In my view the word "settle" has no application in this case. Then it is said that in the transaction by which 
a person becomes a certificate holder a disposition of property is involved. No doubt in one sense a disposition 
of property is involved, because money or money's worth is paid over, but it is not every disposition to which 
the section applies. The section only applies to such dispositions as, reading the section as a whole, can 
reasonably be said to fall within its ambit. " He concluded that it did not for a number of reasons, including 
the view that if the section did apply, "The result ... is very curious ... 
This appears to me to afford further support 
for the conclusion to which I have come, namely, that the section does not apply at all. " (at 426. ) 
To have to conclude that section 53(l)(c) applies to Intermediate Securities so that the rights of all transferees 
of Eurobonds was merely contractual, would also be very curious. 
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transferor or holder. This characteristic distinguishes a truly negotiable instrument from 
an assignment of a debt by a creditor or an instrument which is merely 'transferable' by 
virtue of trade custom such as a bill of lading. Transferees of a transferable instrument 
obtain only such title which the transferor himself possessed. Similarly, assignees of 
debts take 'subject to the equities ...... 278279. 
Adverse equities fall for the present purpose into two categories. "There are generally 
supposed to be two points at which 'negotiability' affects the rights of the holder of bills 
and notes. The first has regard to equities affecting liabilit upon them; and the second 
relates to the equities of the real owner of the paper, as against some holder of it who 
claims title through a finder, a thief, or a fraudulent trustee.,, 280 It is therefore possible 
to speak of "the issuer's equities" and "the true owner's equities". The true owner's 
equities are the equitable equivalent of the common law nemo dat rule, which also 
reflects the principle that the true owner may recover its property. 
The general view is that loss of negotiable status necessarily means loss of protection 
against the nemo dat rule and adverse equities. "A negotiable instrument, for the general 
convenience of commerce, has been allowed to have -an effect at variance with the 
ordinary principles of law. ', 281 The traditional view is that, for this reason, the law 
merchant is more advantageous than the common law. 282 To assess the accuracy of this 
view, this section will consider the rights of the true owner. 
278 Tennekoon, The Law and Regulation of International Finance, p. 163. 
279 The phrase nenw dat quod non habet means, nobody can give that which he does not have. "The rule of the 
common law is that only the legal owner of goods or one who has been authorized or otherwise held out as 
entitled to dispose of them can make a disposition which will be effective to divest the legal owner of his title 
or encumber his interest. In principle, therefore, the owner is entitled to pursue his goods even into the hands 
of an innocent purchaser for value, and to assert proprietary rights over the proceeds and products of his 
property. " Goode, Conunercial Law, p. 60 
280 Ewart, op cit, p. 143. "True owners equities" may also be asserted by an equitable assignee of a debt as 
against the assignor who remains its legal owner. But where the instrument is negotiable, the debtor may 
receive a good discharge from the legal owner, even though it has notice of the assignment; (In other words, 
the rule in Dearle v Hall [1824-341 All ER 28 does not apply to negotiable instruments): Bence v Shearman 
[1898] 2 Ch 582. 
281 
per Tindal J in Jenkyns v Usbome, 1844 7 M&G 699, quoted in Ewart, op cit, p. 154. 
282 The reputation of the common law has traditionally been low among commercial people: "... it is well if, after 
great expense of time and money, we can make our own Counsel (being common lawyers) understand one-half 
of our case, we being amongst them as in a foreign country. " (Sir Josiah Child, Discourse about Trade, 1690, 
quoted in Holden Milnes, op. cit., p 421. ) 
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(a) the rights of the true owner 
(1) nemo dat 
The law merchant provided one exception to the nemo dat rule in favour 
of negotiable instruments. If this exception is not available to 
Intermediate Securities because they are not negotiable instruments, it is 
tempting to try to find other exceptions that might benefit them. It might 
have been arguable that the market overt exception was available, but this 
has now been abolished by statute. 283 
A better argument is that it is not necessary to find such an exception, 
because Intermediate Securities are equitable. Nemo dat is a rule of 
common law, and the common law does not apply to equitable property 
(such as Intermediate Securities) which it does not recognise. 
(ii) true owner's equities 
Equity addresses competing claims to assets by considering the priorities 
between them. The rule is that a bonafide purchaser of the legal estate 
for value without notice of the prior equitable interest takes free of it. 284 
Of course, this rule cannot assist in relation to Intennediate Securities for 
they are equitable and so their purchaser does not acquire a legal 
estate. 285 Thus the purchaser of a eurobond faces two legal problems if 
283 Goods sold in market overt (i. e. within the City of London between the hours of sunrise and sunset) have 
traditionally been excepted from the nemo dat rule, and the buyer will acquire good title to the goods 
irrespective of defects in the title of the seller, if he buys in good faith without notice of any defect in title. 
However the market overt rule was abolished by section I of the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1994. It had 
been judicially argued (by Bayley J, dissenting judgment, %okey v Pole (1890) 4B& Ald 1) that the Stock 
Exchange is the market overt for exchequer bills. Could it have been argued that London bond markets are 
markets overt'! 
Probably not. Intermediate Securities are ýhattels, but choses in action. The rule (as reflected in caselaw and 
section 22 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979) has only ever been applied to tangible personal property. 
284 Pilcher v. Rawlins (1872) 7 Ch App. 259 
285 This point is drawn out in the case of Macmillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust PLC (No. 3) [19951 3 All 
ER 747 at 770 In relation to transfers of shares in the DTC. A transfer of shares into the DTC as indirect 
nominee for a beneficial owner may permit the rule to be invoked; however an intra-DTC transfer cannot, for 
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he is challenged by someone claiming to be its true owner. Firstly, his 
investment is not a negotiable instrument and, secondly, his interest is not 
legal, but merely equitable. What then is his position as equitable owner 
faced with competing equitable claims? 
It is necessary for this purpose to distinguish between equitable interests 
and mere equities: the first is proprietary and the second is merely 
personal. 286 The rule is that, upon the assignment of an asset, mere 
equities do not bind purchasers for value without notice of theM. 287 
However, an equitable interest will bind all but equity's darling. 288 
Intermediate Securities are equitable. It is therefore crucial to determine 
whether the rights of a true owner are mere equities, or equitable 
in such a transfer the legal title does not move. 
Also, Roy Goode argues, in Legal Problems of Credit and Security, 2ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1988, 
that "... the general rule in favour of the bone fide purchaser of the legal title for value and without notice does 
not apply to the assignment of a debt. This is because section 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925 expressly 
provides that a statutory assignee of a debt takes subject to equities, and it has been held that a prior equitable 
interest is an equity for this purpose. " In Harding Corp. Ltd. v Royal Bank of Canada [ 19801 4 W. W. R. 149, 
to which Professor Goode refers, it was held that priorities between an earlier general assignment of book debts 
and later assignment of specific book debts was determined by the order in which notice was given to the 
debtors, and accordingly went to the later, specific assignee. 
286 " An equity is not an existing real right in an asset but rather a personal power in one person to set aside, 
reduce or extinguish to his own advantage an asset held by another. Equities are broadly of two kinds, those 
which entitle a person to have revested in him an asset improperly acquired by another and those which entitle 
him to reduce or extinguish his personal liability to another. Typical examples of the first kind of equity are 
the right to rescind a contract for fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence... " R. M. Goode, Commercial 
Law, p. 30. The nature of a mere equity as personal and not proprietary is discussed by Lord Wilberforce in 
National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth [ 195512 All ER 472 at 497: "In the authorities, the word [an equity] is 
used in several senses and for several purposes. Sometimes it is used as referring merely to the exercise of an 
equitable remedy, such as a remedy by injunction; the thought seems to have been that, since the courts will 
interfere by injunction to prevent interference with, or departure from, a right, that gives to the proprietor of 
the right something which is capable of binding not only the other party but his assignees, or successors, 
provided, of course, that they have notice of the right. In this form, the argument is clearly fallacious. The 
fact that a contractual right can be specifically enforced, or its breach prevented by injunction, does not mean 
that the right is any the less of a personal character or that a purchaser with notice is bound by it; what is 
relevant is the nature of the right, not the remedy which exists for its enforcement. " 
287 "Whereas an equitable interest is an actual right of property, such as an interest under a trust, a mere equity 
is not a right of property but a right, usually of a procedural nature, which is ancillary to some right of 
property, and which limits or qualifies it in some way". Snell's Principles of Equity, 28 ed, 1990, London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, p. 25. 
288 As between competing equities the first in time prevails unless estopped by gross negligence or fraud. 
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interests. 289 There is authority that (at common law) a fraudulent 
transfer is no transfer; the defrauded person retains full title. 290 The 
same principle applies in equity, for equity follows the law. The result 
is that, under the principles of equitable priority, the true owner's equitles, 
will always bind the purchaser of Intermediate Securities. 291 
It will therefore be necessary to find a basis for the integrity of the 
secondary markets in Intermediate Securities other than the law merchant 
and the principles of equitable priority 
EstoppelL9-2- 
At the turn of the century, J. S. Ewart argued293 that the true basis of 
negotiability is not the law merchant but the common law doctrine of 
estoppel. 294 While in general choses in action not covered by the law merchant 
289 (In the discussion of "true owner's equities" by Ewart referred to in section b below, it is not necessary to 
clarify this point because the purchaser of the Physical Bonds in question acquired legal title. ) 
290 Davis v. Bank of England (1824) 2 Bing 393; In re Bahia and San Francisco Pty Co (1865) Law Report 3 QB 
118; Oliver v. Bank of England [1901] 1 Ch D 552; (1902) 86 248 AC; 
291 There is a special rule of law governing priority of competing assignments of debts and other choses in action. 
This is known as the rule in Dearle v Hall (1828) 3 Russ; 38 E. R. 475 L. C., and will apply where the same 
chose in action is assigned, or purported to be assigned, by one assignor to more than one assignee. (Of course, 
this is different to the issue of true owner's equities, which may be claimed against a holder who claims title 
through a finder, thief or fraudulent fiduciary. In other words, Dearle v Hall concerns the problem of 
competing assignments, where true owner's equities arise where there are successive assignments, one of which 
is bad. Under the rule in Dearle v Hall, the first assignee to give notice to the debtor or trustee takes priority 
provided it had no notice of any earlier assignment. 
292 "There is said to be an estoppel where a party is not allowed to say that a certain statement of fact is untrue, 
whether in reality it is true or not. [Note: See Co Litt 352a 'Estoppel is when one is concluded and forbidden 
in law to speak against his own act or deed, year though it be to say the truth'... ] Estoppel may therefore be 
defined as a disability whereby a party is precluded from alleging or proving In legal proceedings that a fact 
is otherwise than it has been made to appear by the matter giving rise to that disability. Estoppel is often 
described as a rule of evidence, but the whole concept is more correctly viewed as a substantive rule of law. " 
Halsbury's Laws of England, 4ed, 16.951. See Sinun v Anglo-Anwrican Telegraph Co. (1879) 5 QBD 118, 
per Brett L. J. at 206,207: "The estoppel assumes that the reality is contrary to that which the person is 
estopped from denying, and the estoppel has no effect at all upon the reality of the circumstances. An my view 
estoppel has no effect upon the real nature of the transaction: it only creates a cause of action between the 
person in whose favour the estoppel exists and the person who is estopped. " 
293 In his article, Negotiability and Estoppel, (1900) 14 LQR 135. 
294 Indeed he objected to the use of the word "negotiable". "The word 'negotiability' with its double entente is not 
only unnecessary, it is disturbing and distracting. " op. cit. (p. 155). 
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"must be assigned subject to the equities existing between the original parties 
to the contract... this is a rule which must yield, when it appears from the 
nature or terms of the contract that it must have been intended to be assignable 
295 free from, and unaffected by, such equities". 
The types of choses in action in whose favour the rule must yield are those in 
active circulation. "There is a real distinction among choses in action ... 
namely, between those 'intended to be assignable' free from equities, and those 
not so intended - or, as the present writer ventures to suggest, between 
ambulatory and non-ambulatory contracts. , 296 Ewart notes that all instruments 
treated as negotiable under the law merchant "... have a common characteristic 
(they are intended to be ambulatory),, 297 and argues that this characteristic, and 
not the law merchant, is the basis for their "negotiability". The test is 
circulation. "Are they intended to be ambulatory? That is the question. If so, 
the original contractor cannot set up his equities against an innocent transferee; 
and a true owner must keep possession, and not, by parting with it, permit the 
appearance of ownership in another person. , 298 
Applied to Intermediate Securities, this reasoning leads to the pleasing 
conclusion that the very existence of the secondary market in Intermediate 
Securities is the legal basis of its integrity: "... we are now fairly well able to 
say that choses in action pass to a transferee free from equities, where that was 
the intention of the parties (the wit of man has at length come that far)... ', 299 
Ewart argues that this result is achieved without recourse to the law merchant. 
"These results are in no way due to the law merchant; they are not in 
antagonism to the general law; they are part of it ...,, 
300 
This section will now consider how these estoppels operate. 
295 Re Agra and Masteman's Bank, 1867, L. R. 2 Ch at 397, quoted in Ewart op. cit. at p. 137. 










(1) issuer's equities 
"Estoppel proceeds upon misrepresentation.,, 301 Ewart argues that, in 
the case of ambulatory contracts (which might be described as securities 
in the secondary markets) the issuer is estopped from setting up its 
equities against a bona fide purchaser by its representation to pay the 
bearer. "'Where there is a distinct promise held out by the company 
informing all the world that they will pay to the order of the person 
named, it is not competent for that company afterwards to set up equities 
of their own., 302303 In other words, although there may be equities, yet 
the company is estopped from setting them up ... No support is required 
-304 from the law-merchant ... 
This argument can be adapted to assist with Computerised Securities, as 
follows. The issuer is estopped from setting up equities against the first 
Intermediary (the common depositary or depositary of the clearer) by its 
representation to pay the bearer. No such estoppel operates against the 
first Intermediary in favour of the second Intennediary (the clearer) or 
the second Intermediary in favour of the Investor. However, no 
estoppels are necessary. The first and second Intermediary cannot set up 
equities because, in their hands, the securities are not choses in action 
owed by them but property which is beneficially owned by another. 
This solves the problem of issuer's equities. 
(ii) true owner's equities 
The ground is shakier for the argument supporting the estoppel of true 
owner Is equities. Ewart argues that the true owner is estopped from 
setting up its equities by the doctrine of ostensible ownership or (where 
301 Ewart, p. 157 
302 
per Lord Herschell, Colonial Bank v Cady, 1890 App Cas 267, quoted by Ewart at p. 154. 
303 Lord Hershell's dictum in Colonial Bank v Cady related to common law estoppel; there is also an equitable 
doctrine of estoppel: See Re W7ndervell's Trusts [1974] 1 All ER 47 
304 
p. 144. Compare the concept of title by estoppel in relation to reg'stered securIties, discussed In section C 
below. 
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it has entrusted its securities to a broker) by ostensible agency: 
ostensible ownership may often estop a true owner ... from setting up 
his 
title as against an innocent purchaser ... 
305 for neglect as to the custody 
of your property then, be it horses, seals, or transferable documents, 
may, where other persons are misled by ostensible title in possessors of 
them, estop the owner from following this property. This is the general 
law and was not borrowed from the law-merchant.,, 306 Furthermore, "if 
the owner of a chose in action clothes a third party with the apparent 
ownership and right of disposition of it, he is estopped from asserting his 
title, as against a person to whom such third party has disposed of it, and 
who received it in good faith and for value.,, 307 
It may be hard to extend this doctrine to the markets in Intermediate 
Securities. The doctrine of ostensible ownership arises on the basis of the 
neglect of the true owner, and one may be the victim of fraud without 
negleCt308. In financial markets where the use of Intermediaries is both 
customary and commercially necessary, it is difficult to argue that such 
a practice gives rise to an estoppel. Thus the problem of third party 
equities still remains. 309 
(C) contractual proi4sion 
One approach to this problem is to ask whether the law of contract can 
provide a basis for the integrity of the secondary markets in Intermediate 
Securities. Immobilised and Global Securities are issued subject to terms 




p. 151. See also the dissenting judgment of Viscount Cave L. J. (with the concurrence of Lord Atkinson) in 
Jones v Waring and Gillow, Ltd [19261 A. C. 670 (H. L. ) 
307 Lord Herschell, Colonial Bank v Cady, (1890) 15 App Cas 267, quoted p. 154. 
308 See Macmillan Inc. v Bishopsgare Investment Trust PLC (December 1993) (Unreported version), per Millett J 
at 85: "... where the documents of title are entrusted to an agent and used by him to raise money, the mere 
possession of those documents by the agent is not enough to raise an estoppel against his principal. In addition 
there must either be negligence on the part of the principal In parting with the documents, or the agent must 
have been given actual authority to use them as security. " (The reported judgment, [1995] 3 All ER 747, does 
not include this text. ) 
309 Another reason for caution with the estoppel approach is the rule that estoppel is a shield and not a sword. 
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acquiring the securities, agree to be bound by their terms. 310 These 
Terms and Conditions could in theory provide that any third party 
equities will be overreached when a secondary market transaction takes 
place, although such provision is not customary. 311 Would such 
contractual provision be effective? 
Between the two parties to a transaction, the disposing and the acquiring 
bondholders (A and B), there is of course privity of contract under the 
principle in Clarke v Dunraven. However, B's concern is not that A 
will assert adverse equitable interests, but that some third party (C) will 
do so. If C is a bondholder (i. e. the holder of other bonds forming part 
of the same issue) at the relevant time, it will be contractually bound 
under the rule in Clarke v Dunraven. However, if C is not a bondholder 
and subject to the terms and conditions at the relevant time, it will not be 
contractually bound. It is uncertain whether it would be estopped from 
asserting its interest against B, particularly if C had at no time in the past 
been bound by the terms and conditions (for example because it was the 
beneficiary under a trust of which A was the trustee, the terms of which 
A breached by disposing of the bonds to B). 
Thus, contractual provision may reduce, but cannot eliminate, the 
problem of third party equities. 
(d) Tracing 
A pragmatic partial solution may be offered by the equitable rules of 
tracing. These rules were briefly discussed in chapter 2 section 4. c. In 
legal theory, third party equities may attach to Intermediate Securities in 
the hands of a purchaser. In practice, however, they may not be able to 
attach to them, because of the impossibility of actual allocation through 
fungible accounts. It was shown (in chapter 3 section A. 4. b. 1i above) 
that Intermediate Securities are held through accounts at Euroclear and 
310 Following the principle in Clarke v Dunraven [18971 A. C. 59, in which two contenders in a yacht race were 
held be contractually bound to each other under the terms of the conditions of the yacht club, to which each was 
held to have agreed to be bound by entering the race. 
311 Similar provision (as between members) is contained in the Reference Manual of the CGO: see sections 8.2.4 
and 8.2.5. 
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Cedel which are, in general, fungible. Where Intermediate Securities 
sold by A to B are subject to equities in favour of C, C may ha-ve 
difficulty in identifying the securities to which its equities attach. 
Suppose that C's equities arose because C is the beneficiary of a trust 
under which A agreed to hold bonds fof C. Suppose further that, in 
setting up this trust, C (as settlor and beneficiary) transferred 50 bonds 
to A, and that D (a third party) also transferred 50 bonds to A. Suppose 
A (in breach of the trust in favour of Q subsequently transferred 50 




Should C seek to assert its equities against B or E, or both of them? 
The rules of equitable tracing indicate the answer. 312313 
It was shown (in chapter 2 section 3. c above) that, upon the default of the 
trustee, the remedial proprietary process of tracing arises in favour of the 
312 (Tracing through fungible accounts in which the assets are commingled with other assets is only possible in 
equity, and not at common law: See El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings pcl and another [ 1993] 3 All ER 717, per 
Millett J at 733,734: " This makes it necessary to consider separately the common law and equitable tracing 
rules. In the present case, it is manifestly impossible to follow the money at common law. The international 
transfers of money were made electronically; the plaintiffs money was mixed, not merely with the money of 
other victims or of the fraudsters themselves, but with the money of innocent third parties... however, none of 
these features creates a problem for equity. ") 
313 (The relevance of these rules in relation to accounts at Euroclear and Cedel is a matter of private International 
law. Where the trust in favour of C arises under English law, there Is authority that these rules will be applied 
by the English courts even though the accounts are govemed by civil law. See El Ajou for authority that trust 
assets may be traced through civil law jurisdictions. ) 
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beneficiary, permitting it to follow trust assets into the hands of third 
parties. 314 In order to address cases where trust assets are commingled 
with other assets, equity went on to develop rules for tracing trust monies 
and other assets through mixed accounts or funds. 
The earlier cases proceeded on the basis of notional allocation where 
actual allocation was not possible, attributing particular debits in an 
account to particular credits in accordance with rules that varied with the 
circumstances. 315 
In the late 20th century, financial arrangements and financial fraud have 
become more complex. While these rules may have worked well in 
earlier times, they would often be impracticable today. For this reason, 
the rules have been simplified, in order to obviate the need for even 
notional allocation. 
Where a loss occurs to a global fund due to a common misfortune, the 
loss will in general be borne ratably by the beneficiaries. This common 
sense approach was taken in Barlow Clowes v lbughan316' where fund 
investors suffered loss due to the fraud of a fiduciary. It was held that 
to have sought to allocate particular losses to particular investors would 
have been impracticable and arbitrary and the losses were therefore borne 
ratably. 
314 See Underhill and Havton, article 95. 
315 (1) As between a banker and customer, in a running bank account, it is the sum first paid in, that is 
first paid out (Devaynes v Noble, Clayton's Case (1816) 1 Mer 572, per Sir Wrn Grant MR at 798). 
(2) As between a trustee (or other fiduciary) and a beneficiary, where trust monies are mixed with the 
trustee's own monies in an account operated by the trustee, the latter are in general presumed to be 
drawn out first (because of a presumption against breach of trust: Re Hallett's Estate, Knatchbull 
v Hallett [1874 - 801 All ER 793). 
(3) However, as against a trustee acting in breach of trust, this rule may be reversed if it operates to 
the beneficiary's disadvantage (In re Oaiway, Hertset v Oatway [190312 Ch 357). (Essentially the 
beneficiary can claim an equitable charge over the account. ) 
316 Barlow Clowes International Ltd. (in liq. ) and others v ýbughan and others (19921 4 All ER 22. See also Re 
Eastern Capital Futures (in liq. )[1989] BCLC Ch D 371. 
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A further recent development in equitable tracing is the concept of the 
to cascading charge" in the case of El Ajou Land Holdings p1c and 
another317. 
(Further recent developments in the tracing rules, concerning the need for 
a continued fund into which assets can be traced, are considered in 
another context in chapter 5 section D. 2. ) 
These rules can be applied to the scenario outlined above, in which C 
cannot determine whether his assets are in the account of B or E. 
Extrapolating from the rule in Barlow Clowes, B and E must both meet 
C's claims in equal portions. Alternatively, under the rule in El Ajou, C 
can choose whether to assert all its claims against B, or all against E, or 
some against each of them. 318 The latter would seem to produce an 
arbitrary result, and it might be expected that the courts would favour the 
rule in Barlow Clowes. 
If the rule in Barlow Clowes does prevail, B might derive some comfort 
from the fact that, where A operates an active account (so that the book 
entry whereby B took stock from A was not the only debit to Ns account 
on that day), B will be able to share the misfortune of C's adverse 
interest with other participants, and thereby reduce its losses. Indeed, in 
317 [19931 3 All ER 717 "The victims of a fraud can follow their money in equity through bank accounts where 
it has been mixed with other moneys because equity treats the money in such accounts as charged with the 
repayment of their money. If the money in an account subject to such a charge is afterwards paid out of the 
account and into a number of different accounts, the victims can claim a similar charge over each of the 
recipient accounts. They are not bound to choose between them. Whatever may be the position as between 
the victims inter se, as against the wrongdoer his victims are not required to appropriate debits to credits in 
order to identify the particular account into which their money has been paid. Equity's power to charge a mixed 
fund with the repayment of trust moneys (a power not shared by the common law) enables the claimants to 
follow the money, not because it is theirs, but because it is derived from a fund which is treated as if it were 
subject to a charge in their favour" per Millet J at 735,736. (The judgment of Millet J was reversed in the 
Court of Appeal [199412 All ER 685, although not on this point, but rather on the question of notice. See also 
Ja 2] [1995] 2 All ER 213. Support for the Judgment in El Ajou v. Dollar Land Holdings plc and anotheg_, LY 
this "cascading charge" approach is found in Hallett's pze' 1894 2 
""237 at 245 per Davey U, and in Re 
Tilley's Wills Trust [1967] 2 All ER 303 
318 Of course, a clearing system might seek contractually to provide for how tracing (or the allocation of shortfalls 
following debit entries to accounts) shall operate. For an example, see rule 8.2.6 of the CGO Reference 
Manual. Such provision is more likely to operate as an estoppel than to alter proprietary rights, and would not 
be effective against non-partic i pants (I. e. where C is not a participant -a likely circumstance where C is the 
customer of A). 
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circumstances where the fraud is not discovered until holdings of the 
stock has been transferred from the accounts of B and E across the 
accounts of many other participants, the rule in Barlow Clowes might 
operate to allocýtte the shortfall (C's claim) ratably among all participants 
holding such stock within the clearing system. 319 Clearly, this would 
strengthen B's position, by treating third party equities as part of the 
systemic risk of the system. 
(e) private international law 
As was argued in above in the context of section 53(j)(C), 320 a simpler 
argument can be based in private international law. Under the principles 
discussed in chapter 6 section D below, the question of whether true 
owner's equities will bind a purchaser will be governed by le-x situs. 
Chapter 7 section C. 6 argues that lex situs of institutional securities is the 
jurisdiction of the clearer. In view of the dominant role of the continental 
clearers, integrity of English transfer may routinely fall to be determined 
by Belgian and Luxembourg law. 
In Luxembourg, Article 7 of the Grand Ducal Regulation of 17 February 
1971 Modifying the Circulation of Securities has the effect of transferring 
the risk of true owner's equities from the purchaser to the clearing 
system. 321 The Belgian Royal Decree of 1962 has the effect of defeating 
unpublished adverse claims once securities have entered the clearing 
system. 
319 Of course, tracing would in theory stop at an overdrawn account in accordance with Bishopsgate Investment 
Management v Homan [1994] and Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd. However, in practice, it will be unusual for an 
account in a clearing system ever to have a negative balance. Both Cedel and Euroclear include provisions in 
their General Terms and Conditions permitting them to reverse credit entries to inter alia to prevent debit 
balances arising. 
320 (at section I. d) 
321 ]Fhe article might be translated into English as follows: "Article 7: At the time of the delivery of a security to 
a current account with the depositary, the depositary is responsible for verifying that the security is not the 
subject of any claim which is still valid. In a case where it has accepted or delivered a security which is the 
subject of such claims, the depositary will be responsible under the general law. Every publication of a claim 
subsequent to such delivery will be ineffective. In the case of a claim after delivery to current account, the 
custodian should deliver to the claimant an attestation setting out the date of the deposit in the current account. " 
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Aq iII is 
, AS in the context of section 53(l)(c), a problem with relying on thi 
argument is that it prejudices English clearing systems in favour of their 
overseas rivals. 
(f) Conclusions 
Although not negotiable instruments, Intermediate Securities are protected 
from the adverse claims of issuers by the doctrine of estoppel. The risk 
of third party adverse claims may in practice be so reduced by contractual 
provision, the rules of tracing and private international law, as to the 
more theoretical than real. 
8. Conclusions 
Because they are computerised, Intermediate Securities are not negotiable instruments. 
In view of this, Engl* stic law cannot, finally, provide a completely certain and 
legally robust basi 
I fo r 
=of 
econdary markets in Intermediate Securities. However, 
English private international law has the probable result that the possible disadvantages 
under English domestic law of loss of negotiable status (section 53(l)(c) of the Law of 
Property Act 1925 and true owner's equities) are inapplicable, because in questions of 
transfer formalities and competing proprietary claims, it will apply the local law of the 
clearer. The position under Belgian and Luxembourg law for Intermediate Securities as 
regards transfer formalities and true owner's equities is comparable to that under English 
domestic law for negotiable instruments. 
It is ironic that English law should in effect require participants in the bond markets to 
go abroad to overcome the difficulties it raises, and a legislative solution to these 
problems would be welcome. 
9. Taxation Consequences 
This section will consider the taxation consequences of the computerisation of the markets 
in bearer securities. 
a. withholding tax 
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A concern among the issuers of eurobonds is to retain the benefit of the 
19 eurobond exemption". This concerns withholding tax. There are clear 
commercial advantages for issuers and investors if interest is to be paid gross. 
Under section 349(2) of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 ("ICTA"), 
interest paid to a person in the UK must in general be paid net of withholding 
tax, subject to certain exceptions. One exception is created by sections 
349(3)(c) and 124, broadly and inter alia in favour of interest paid on any 
quoted Eurobond held in a recognised clearing system and beneficial owned by 
a non-UK resident. Cedel, Euroclear and First Chicago Clearing System are 
currently recognised clearing systems for this purpose. A "quoted Eurobond" 
is defined as a security which, inter alia, is in bearer form. 322 This raises the 
following concern. The benefit of the eurobond exemption may be lost in 
respect of Computerised Bearer Securities, because the interest of the investor 
in such securities is unallocated and intangible (i. e. not in bearer form). 
The concern is more apparent than real, in the case of Immobilised, Global or 
Repackaged Securities. Although the interest of the investor may not be in 
bearer form, the global or definitive paper issued by the issuer is expressed on 
its face to be in bearer form, and it is on this paper that interest is payable by 
the issuer. 
b. stamp duty 
For the purposes of stamp duty, the London legal community has considered 
whether issues of Global Securities may fall for taxation purposes within the 
definition of a unit trust (on the basis that the second Intermediary was the 
trustee). It did so because adverse tax consequences would flow from an issue 
of globals being a unit trust. Firstly, prior to 1988, unit instrument trust duty 
was payable upon the creation of a unit trust; however, unit trust instrument 
duty was abolished in 1988. Secondly, transfers of units generally attract stamp 
duty. In the case of unit trusts expressly established as such, stamp duty is 
avoided by structuring secondary market transactions as issues and redemptions; 
while transfers to the manager of the unit trust do take place, these are subject 
to special provisions. Of course, stamp duty is a tax on instruments of transfer, 




duty reserve tax ("SDRT") which is payable on agreements to transfer 
chargeable securities. 
Chargeable securities are defined in section 99 of the Finarce Act 1986 to 
include units under unit trust schemes. While depositary receipts are exempted 
from the definition, there is no exemption for interests held through clearing 
systems. Accordingly, if Global Securities and Immobilised Securities are units 
in unit trusts, secondary market transactions in them may attract SDRT. This 
would be particularly hard because the Revenue imposes a triple charge on 
transfers of securities into clearing systems under sections 70-72 and 96 to 97 
of the Finance act 1986 (equating to a triple charge for depositary receipt 
arrangements in sections 67-69 and 93-95 of the same Act) on the basis that 
transfers thereafter will not attract stamp duty. 
The taxation definition of unit trust that applied before 1987 might arguably 
have been wide enough to catch arrangements for Immobilised and Global 
Securities. Section 57(l) of the Finance Act 1946 used to provide: 
"'unit trust scheme" means any arrangements made for the purpose, or 
having the effect, of providing, for persons having funds available for 
investment, facilities for the participation by them, as beneficiaries under 
a trust, in any profits or income arising from the acquisition, holding, 
management or disposal of any property whatsoever". 
However, section 75 was amended by the Finance Act 1987 to follow the 
definition of unit trust in the Financial Services Act 1986 (subject to exemptions 
that may be granted by the Revenue but no relevant exemptions have been 
granted). Section 75(8) of the Financial Services Act provides as follows: 
"In this Act - 
11a unit trust scheme" means a collective investment scheme under 
which the property in question is held on trust for the 
participants;... " 
Section 75(l) provides: - 
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"In this Act "a collective investment scheme" means, subject to the 
provisions of this Section, any arrangements with respect to 
property of any description, including money, the purpose or effect 
of which is to enable persons taking part in the arrangements 
(whether by becoming owners of the property or any part of it or 
otherwise) to participate in or receive profits or income arising 
from the acquisition, holding, management or disposal of the 
property of sums paid out of such profits or income. " 
It may be argued that arrangements for Immobilised Securities and Global 
Securities do not satisfy this primary definition as the purpose and effect of such 
arrangements are not participation in or receipt of profits or income. Although 
that may be the purpose and effect of investment in the underlying issue, the 
purpose and effect of interposing an Intermediary to create Inu-nobilised or 
Global Securities are the achievement of settlement efficiencies and compliance 
with US securities restrictions. In any case, Immobilised and Global Securities 
are taken out of the definition by virtue of Section 75(2), which provides that: - 
"The arrangements must be such that the persons who are to 
participate as mentioned in sub-section (1) above ... [i. e. Investors] 
do not have day to day control over the management of the 
property in question ... " 
Since the Intermediary does not have discretionary management powers over the 
Underlying Property, Immobilised and Global Securities are not collective 
investment schemes. For this reason, they are not unit trusts for taxation 
purposes or subject to SDRT. If for any reason Investors delegated 
management to the Intermediary, SDRT would prima facie be payable. In that 
case it might be argued that the triple charge amounted to an implicit 
disapplication of SDRT, or alternatively that SDRT was not payable because 
secondary market transactions do not involve transfers (along the lines of the 
argument that they do not involve dispositions for the purposes of section 
53(l)(c) of the Law of Property Act 1925: see section 2. c above. ) 
10. Regulatory Consequences 
a. collective investment schemes 
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For the reasons outlined in section 9 above, arrangements for 
Immobilised and Global Securities are not collective investment schemes 
for the purposes of the Financial Services Act 1986. 
(However it is arguable that if Investors delegated management decisions 
to the first Intermediary, the armngement might fall within the definition 
of a collective investment scheme. The regulatory consequences of this 
would be that promotion restrictions would apply under section 76, and 
that the business of operating the arrangement would amount to 
investment business requiring authorization under the Financial Services 
Act 1986. In addition, SDRT might be payable. ) 
b. balance sheet 
The Intermediation of Computerised Securities should not affect their risk 
weighting for the purposes of regulatory capital. Although, it has been 
argued, the interest of the investor is equitable, unallocated and generally 
enforceable only through the Intermediary, the investor does not take the 
credit risk of the Intermediary, because its interest is protected in the 
Intermediary's insolvency by a trust. Risk weighting follows credit risk, 
which remains that of the underlying issuer. 
11. General Conclusions 
The operational result of the computerisation of debt securities has been intermediation 
and intangibility The legal consequence is that computerised debt securities are not 
negotiable instruments but are interests under equitable tenancies in common. The loss 
of negotiability does not necessarily entail the loss of the benefits of negotiability. A 
number of alternative arguments are available under English domestic and private 
international law to demonstrate that written transfers are unnecessary for secondary 
market transactions, and it can be shown that the purchaser takes the securities free of 
any issuer's equities on the basis of estoppel. In theory, it is not entirely clear that, 
under English domestic law, the purchaser takes free of the true owner's equities. 
However, modern tracing rules lessen the impact of true owner's equities by spreading 
the burden of any shortfall ratably among all participants in the relevant clearing system. 
In any case, English private international law will probably refer questions of adverse 
proprietary rights to the law of the place of the clearing system in which Inter-mediate 
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Securities are held, and the local law of the major clearers addresses these problems. In 
general, computerisation has no adverse taxation or balance sheet consequences. While 
the old bases for a legally robust secondary market have been lost, new ones are 
available. The fundamental legal nature of the securities has changed, but the legal 
operation of the secondary markets should be unaffected. 
C. Registered Computerised SecuntieS323 
The impact of computerisation on the legal nature of registered securities must now be 
assessed. 
1. Computerisation 
The following are important examples of English Computerised Securities. 
CGO 
The Central Gilts Office ("CGO") was established in 1986 as a joint 
initiative by the Bank of England ("the Bank") and the London Stock 
Exchange. It is a computerised system for the book-entry settlement of 
gilt-edged (and certain other) securities between CGO members. The 
CGO service is operated by the Central Gilts Office of the Bank. An 
assured payment system provides for payment through settlement banks 
of the cash consideration for transfers. 
Records of members' stock balances are maintained in accounts within 
the CGO. Intra-member transfers of stock are made by instructions to 
the system. This contrasts with transfers of stock outside the CGO, 
which require the delivery of stock transfer forms and stock certificates 
to the Bank of England registrar. The book-entry basis of the CGO 
system removes the need for stock transfer formS324 and stock 
323 Registered securities in computerised form will be referred to as Computerised Registered Securities, and 
registered securities not in computerised form as Traditional Registered Securities. 
324 Transfers of stock through the CGO ("exempt transfers") are removed from the scope of section 53(l)(c) by 
the provisions of section 1(2) of the Stock Transfer Act 1982. 
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certificates. Stock transferred through the CGO remains registered on the 
register maintained by the Bank's registrar. Notification of CGO 
transfers is made to the registrar by the CGO system. The CGO 
reference manual provides325 for an equitable interest to pass to the 
transferee with book entry transfer. Legal title remains determined by 
the register. 
b. CREST 
CREST is an electronic system for the paperless settlement of corporate 
securities in London, largely modelled on the CGO. Eligible securities 
include UK registered corporate equity and debt and interests in foreign 
corporate securities. Bearer securities are not be eligible. 
Under the Companies Act 1985, a company registered under that Act is 
generally required to issue certificates in respect of shares and 
debentureS326 and to register transfers of shares or debentures only if it 
receives an instrument of transfer in prescribed form. 327 
Dernaterialisation within CREST is achieved by the Uncertificated 
Securities Regulations ("the CREST Regulations") made under section 
207 of the Companies Act 1989, which permits regulations enabling title 
There is no need for CGO transfers to comply with the restrictions in section 136, for the following reasons. 
Section 136 provides an exception to the general common law restriction on the assignment of choses in action. 
A more appropriate exemption is provided under a special statutory regime for stock. Section 47(l)(a) of the 
Finance Act 1942 (as amended by the Stock Transfer Act 1982) permits the Treasury to make regulations 
providing "for the transfer in law by instruments in writing or otherwise" of government stock. Under this 
section, the following provision was made in paragraph 4 of the Government Stock Regulations 1965(SI 
1965/1420 as amended by SI 1981/1004 and SI 1985/1146), which permits stock to be transferred through the 
CGO without written instruments. 
Outside the CGO, instruments of transfer are currently required by paragraph 4 of the Government Stock 
Regulations 1965 (SI 1965/1420). 
325 in section 8.2.8 
326 Section 185(l) 
327 Section 1830). 
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to securities to be evidenced and transferred without a written 
instrument. 328 
Legal ownership of shares is determined primarily by the register of 
329 members of the issuer, which is prima facie evidence of legal title, 
although the register does not indicate the equitable ownership of 
shares. 330331 
In CREST (as in the CGO) legal ownership continues to be determined 
by the register. A CREST member has its name on the register of the 
issuer and, in addition, has an account at CREST showing a credit 
balance in respect of its holding. It may acquire new securities from 
another CREST member by the debiting of the transferor's account and 
the crediting of its account. At the same time as this book entry transfer, 
a registration instruction is sent to the registrar of the issuer, and an 
instruction issued to the buyer's settlement bank in respect of the 
purchase price. Two hours later, the register of the issuer is in general 
amended in favour of the acquiring CREST member332. The CREST 
Regulations provide that, during this two hour settlement interval, the 
transferee CREST member will acquire a "defined equitable interest" in 
the securities. 333 
328 Section 207(l). (This is very broadly comparable to the Stock Transfer Act 1982 that provided the statutory 
basis for the dernaterialisation of gilts. ) 
Sections 53(l)(c) and 136 are expressly disapplied to transfers within CREST by the CREST Regulations. 
329 See Sections 352 and 361 of the Companies Act 1985. The court has power to rectify the register: section 359. 
330 section 360 
331 There is no statutory requirement for the issuer of debentures to maintain a register of debenture holders, but 
in practice it will have to do so if it wishes to issue debentures in registered fon-n. If a register of debenture 
holders is maintained, sections 190 and 191 of the Companies Act 1985 impose certain requirements concerning 
such matters as the location of the register and rights of inspection. It is customary to provide in the terms and 
conditions of the debentures that title will be determined by the register (and this will also be recited on the fact 
of the certificate). There may also be wording in the terms and conditions providing in effect that the issuer 
will not be affected by notice of any trusts. 
332 (The interval is three days in the CGO. ) 
333 Regulation 25. 
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C. depositary receipts 
Depositary receipts were discussed in section A. 3 above under the 
heading, repackaged securities. The underlying securities are pooled in 
the hands of the depositary and the interest of the investor (arising under 
a trust) is represented by book entry in a clearing system. 
d. nature of Computerised Registered Securities 
All Computerised Registered Securities are intangible. In addition, 
repackaged securities are unallocated, and indirect (because of the 
interposition of the depositary). 
It was argued (in section 4. B above) that computerisation has had a 
profound effect on the legal nature of bearer securitieS334 by giving them 
these characteristics. However, it will be argued that (in the case of 
registered securities) these characteristics do not represent significant 
changes, because of the nature of Traditional Registered Securities. 
2. Intangible Nature of Traditional Registered Securities 
The practice of maintaining registers of ownership of securities developed 
335 originally as a means of recording the ownership of joint stock companies 
Accordingly the nature of company shares must be considered. 
Readily available authority indicates that shares are intangible. A share is not 
the same as a share certificate, which is not a document of title but a document 
evidencing title. 336 
334 (although this legal change does not necessarily have adverse commercial consequences) 
335 See In re Bahia and San Francisco Railway Co. (1865) Law Report 3 Q. 13.584, per Blackburn J at 595,6: 
"When joint stock companies were established, the great object was that the shares should be capable of being 
easily transferred; and the legislature has made provision ... that the company shall keep a register of the 
members... " 
336 A share in a company is the share of its owner in the company's capital. Shares are personal estate or property 
I ank v. Whinney (1886) 11 App panies Act 1985 Section 182(1)). A share is a chose in action (Colonia B 
, 'CAS -t6). The nature of the chose in action is contractual. It arises upon the issue of the share (Re VGM 'ZZgs 
Limited I Ch [1942] CA 235 per Lord Greene MR at 241) under the contract made between the 
shareholder and the compan-Y-CTMStT=ed-Vy- the articles of association (Borland's Trustee v. Steel Brothers & 
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This chapter will argue that shares are also unallocated and indirect. These 
features are only apparent when one examines the history of company law, and 
in particular its debt to the laws of partnership and equity. 
3. Unallocated Nature of Traditional Registered Securities 
The unallocated nature of Traditional Registered Securities owes much to the 
law of partnership. 
a. partnershi 337 p 
In the 16th Century joint stock companies, trading as a single person with 
jointly contributed capital, became the dominant commercial vehicle. 338 
The rise of joint stock companies was checked by the South Sea 
Bubble. 339 
Co Limited [1901] 1 Ch 279; see Companies Act 1985 Section 14(l)). A share comprises obligations as well 
as rights (Per Lindley LJ in Re National Bank of Wales, Taylor, Phillips and Richard's case [1879] 1 Ch 298 
(CA) at 305) for example, liability for calls on unpaid or partly paid shares. "A share is the interest of a 
shareholder in the company, measured by a sum of money for the purposes of liability in the first place and of 
interest in the second, but also consisting of a series of mutual covenants entered into by all the shareholders 
inter se in accordance with Section 16 of the Companies Act 1862 ... A share is not a sum of money ... but 
an interest measured by a sum of money, and made up of various rights contained in the contract. " (Per Farwell 
J, Borland's Trustee v. Steel Brothers & Co Ltd at 288) 
337 Today the term company is generally used to mean a company incorporated under the Companies Acts, and a 
distinction is made between corporations (having legal personality and limited liability) and partnerships, having 
neither. (The registered limited partnership is a hybrid. ) However, historically, this distinction was not so 
clear. There is no necessary link between limited liability and separate legal personality: see RR Formoy, 
The Historical Foundations of Modem Companv Law, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1923, p. 58. Moreover 
there is some old authority for treating partnerships as having separate legal personality: Hoidsworth, Volume 
III, pp 197,198. 
338 See Holdsworth, op. cit., p. 202. 
339 "Then in 1720, as all know, the South Sea Bubble swelled and burst. A panic-stricken parliament issued a law, 
which, even when we now read it, seems to scream at us from the statute book. ... It threatened with 
punishment men who without lawful authority "presumed to act as a corporation. " Maitland, Selected Essays, 
Cambridge University Press, 1936, Trust and Corporation, pp. 218,219. See also Palmer's Company Law, 
23nd Edition, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1992, pp. 1009,1010. 
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"... it may be observed that the one permanent effect of the Bubble Act, 
paradoxically enough, was to help ensure the continued importance in 
England of the unincorporated joint stock company. " 340 Where the 
Bubble Act had rendered incorporation impracticable, business ventures 
were conducted through unregistered assoc lat ions. 341 These associations 
were, at law, partnershipS342 with transferable stock. 343 Thus, the 
commercial and financial activity of the industrial revolution was 
supported largely by the company 
transferable stock. 344 
undivided share 
in the fonn of a partnership with 
Thus the historical function of the registered security was to serve as the 
measure of the investor's capital interest in a joint stock company. 
Registered securities developed as a means of permitting interests in joint 
stock to be transferable. 345 While the terminology used to describe this 
interest has varied, 346 the characteristic that distinguished the joint stock 
companies from the old regulated companies that preceded them was the 
340 A. B. Dubois, The English Business Company after the Bubble Act 1720-1800 Octagon Books, 1971, New 
York, p. 39. 
341 See Dubois, p. 214. 
342 " Legally speaking these bodies were partnerships... " P. S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979, p. 562. 
343 "What the government did not foresee was the mobility of the partnership share which business men and lawyers 
would work out. By the end of the century business conducted in partnership had reached the point where the 
financial interest was almost if not entirely as liquid as it was with incorporated companies. " Dubois, pp. 38, 
39. 
344 With Gladstone's Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 the incorporation of companies became possible by public 
registration, and the formation of large unincorporated commercial associations became unlawful. That and 
subsequent Acts have prohibited the formation of unincorporated associations for gain having membership 
exceeding a certain small number (originally 25, and reduced in 1856 to 20 ("the 20 partner rule"). 
345 See In re Bahia and San Francisco Railway Co. (1865) per Blackbum J at 595,596. 
346 "At the beginning of the seventeenth century the terms "stock" and "share" and "capital" had not acquired their 
definite modem meaning. " Formoy, op. cit., p5. "... the vagueness of contemporary terminology. .. -The words 
joint stock, capital, capital stock, and fund were used interchangeable to describe the sum total of the 
proprietors' interest in the company. " Dubois, op. cit., p346. 
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fact that the interest of each investor was undivided. 347 This Is of 
course reflected today in the balance sheet treatment of registered 
securities. 348 It also accords with the historical links between companies 
and partnerships, because partnership property is held by the partners 
under a joint tenancy (modified, in the case of company assets, by the 
exclusion of the right of survivorship)349. 
C. registered debt securities 
Registered securities may be issued in the form of debentures, or as debt 
as well as in the form of equity However, registered debt securities as 
well as shares are unallocated: while shares represent the undivided 
interest of members of a company in its capital, registered debt 
represents the undivided interest of co-debtors to an entity in the conunon 
debt. 350 
d. no identity 
A registered security represents the undivided and indistinguishable 
interest of the investor in assets which are jointly co-owned by it with all 
other investors in securities of the same issue. This is because "Unity of 
possession is a feature of all fon-ris; of co-ownership., '351 Beca(ise the are 
not legally divided one from the other, one would expect registered 
securities to be legally indistinguishable one from the other. 
347 " the term "stock" is used in a general way as co-extensive with the whole property, but is more frequently 
applied to what may be termed the trading or floating capital. " Fon-noy, op. cit., p6. 
348 With, in general, no allocation between the two sides of the balance sheet 
349 The characteristic of a joint tenancy is that the interest of each co-owner is undivided. 
350 See Holdsworth, op. cit., Volume M, p. 207 
351 E. H. Bum, Cheshire and Bum's Modern Law of Real Property, 15ed, London, Butterworths, 1994, p. 214. 
Any wording showing an intention to create separate and distinct interests severs a joint tenancy, creating 
instead a tenancy in common. See Cheshire and Bums p. 208. 
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The law in this area is somewhat unclear, but the better view is that there 
is no inherent identity in registered securities. 352 It is impossible to 
distinguish Ns securities from B's securities (except of course by 
reference to their current ownership), not merely because they are the 
same as each other, but because they are not divided from each other. 353 
"There is no identity in stock.,, 354 
e. numbering of shares 
Between 1862 and 1948 there was a statutory requirement that each share 
in a company having a share capital be distinguished by its appropriate 
number355. During this interval, directly relevant case law is scarce and 
contradictory. 
In Ind's Case356, Ind accepted a transfer of 50 shares, executing it in 
blank as to the distinctive numbers of the shares. These were 
subsequently inserted. By mistake the numbers inserted were those of 
shares which did not, at the time of transfer, belong to the transferor 
(who was, however, the owner of 50 other shares in the company at the 
relevant time). 
352 In the discussion that follows it is assumed that the securities in question belong to a class, all the securities in 
which are pari passu and fully paid. 
353 This is the position as between the issuer and the investors. The position differs if the interests of third parties 
are taken into account. For example: Company A issues to both B and C shares in a class all of which are fully 
paid and pari passu. As between A, B and C, all the shares are the same. If B charges its shares to D, as far 
as D is concerned, Xs shares and B's shares differ in that Ns shares (and not B's shares) are subject to its 
charge. This is a further example of the relative nature of property discussed in chapter 3 above. In this 
discussion the interests of third parties will not be considered further. 
354 Bank of England v Cutler [1907] 1 KB 889, per Lawrence J at 909. 
355 Companies Act 1862, s 22, Companies (Consolldatlon) Act s 22(2); Companies Act 1929 s 62(2). 
356 Re the International Contract Company (1872) 7 Ch App 485. 
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On a winding up Ind argued that he was not a member. It was held (on 
appeal) that the transfer had passed 50 shares to Ind, who was therefore 
not entitled to have his name removed from the list of contributories. 357 
However, the later case of Platt v. Rowe358 takes another approach. In 
this case, P brought certain numbered shares in a company through his 
stockbroker. At the relevant time the transferor was not registered as 
owner of the particular shares, which had been allotted to other persons, 
because "... there was something like chaos in the transfer department of 
the company [and] ... the intemperance of a certain portion of the staff 
led to confusion ...,, 
359. P was issued a certificate by the company, but 
subsequently sued the vendor to recover the purchase price. It was held 
that P was entitled to recover, for there had been a total failure of 
consideration. 360 "The law requires that each share shall be numbered 
in order that it may be identified and that the title to it may be 
traced,, 361362. 
Ind's Case is cited with approval in the Australian case of Brady v 
Stapleton. 363 Apart from this, it has proved impossible to find any cases 
in which either of these contradictory judgments is discussed. It seems 
357 1 think that the numbering of the shares is simply directory for the purposes of enabling the title of particular 
persons to be traced, but that one share, being merely an incorporeal right to a certain portion of the profits of 
the company, is the same as another, and that share No I is not distinguishable for that purpose from share No 
2, in the same way that a grey horse is distinguishable from a black horse. Practically one share is not 
distinguishable from another, and if a holder of shares, who had the same number of shares or a larger number 
than what he professed to transfer, executed a deed of transfer to so many shares, and by mistake the wrong 
numbers were put in the transfer, that would not prevent the fifty shares which belonged to him from passing 
to the transferee. The numbers might afterwards be rectified". (Per Mellish L. J. at 487. ) 
358 (1909) 26 TLR 49. 
359 
per Swinfen Eady I at 5i. 
360 " No transferor could transfer any shares which had not already been allotted or transferred to him, and his 
document of title to the shares would show the number of shares to which he was entitled, and he could only 
transfer those and no others" per Swinfen Eady J. at 51. 
361 
per Swinfen Eady I at 5 1. 
362 Ind's Case is distinguished on the dubious grounds that the decision in Ind's Case was based on the fact that 
the wrong number was inserted in error, rather than the view that numbers are unnecessary. per Swinfen Eady 
J. at 52. 
363 [19521 88 CLR 322. 
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that the principle in Ind's Case (that individuall identification is not 
necessary) should be favoured over that in Platt v Rowe, which indicates 
that the individual identification of particular shares is both possible and 
a necessary precondition of their transfer. This proposition is untenable 
today, when listed shares are unnumbered. 364 It is also at odds with the 
historic nature of registered securities, which is unallocated. 
In 1948, numbering became optional for (broadly) shares in a class all of 
which are pari passu and fully paid365. In the recorded debate of the 
relevant section in the bill that introduced this change, the reason for the 
end of compulsory numbering was not discussed. It was presumably 
introduced to facilitate secondary market transfers, and is certainly a 
strong indication that the rule in Platt v Rowe (that individual 
identification of shares is a pre-condition for transfer) is not good law. 
Commercial numbering systems identify issues of securities but do not 
identify particular securities within an issue. Accordingly, case law and 
cornmercial and official practice indicate that individual registered 
securities do not have inherent identity 
f. fraudulent transfer cases 
Case aw relating to fraudulent transfers of registered securities also 
indicate that Traditional Registered Securities are unallocated. 
364 And therefore not individually identifiable. In theory, one might seek individually to identify unnumbered 
securities by tracing them through the hands of their successive owners from time to time. However, actual 
(as opposed to notional) tracing would depend upon a record of transfers. In practice no such record may be 
maintained. While it has been recommended that registers of transfers should be maintained as a matter of good 
secretarial practice (see Boyles & Sykes, Gore Brown on Companies, 44ed, Jordons, Bristoh, 1986, s16.3) there 
is no legal obligation to maintain them. Moreover the impracticability of actual tracing registered securities 
through the hands of successive owners was emphasised in Davis v. Bank of England (1842) 2 Bing 393: 
"Indeed, from the manner in which stock passes from man to man, from the union of stocks bought of different 
persons under the same name, and the impossibility of distinguishing what was regularly transferred from what 
was not, It is impossible to trace the title of stock as you can that of an estate". (per Best C. J. at 408) 
For authority that identification is a not a necessary precondition of the transfer of registered securities, see the 
discussion of Hunter v Moss in chapter 5 below. 
365 By Companies Act 1948 s74, replaced by Companies Act 1985 s 182(2). 
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In re Bahia and San Francisco Railwa), Companýý66 concerned a 
fraudulent transfer of shares from A to BI and B2. BI and 132 were 
registered and a certificate was issued. The shares were then transferred 
through the Stock Exchange from BI and B2 to C. The fraud was 
discovered and the Court ordered Ns name to be restored to the register. 
C sued the company It was held that C was entitled to damages from 
the company equal to the value of the shares at the time of the 
rectification of the register. The basis of the decision was estoppel367. 
The estoppel was founded on the implied warranty of title by the 
company in issuing the share certificate to B1 and B2. While the 
368 - estoppel rendered C entitled to damages it did not pass title to C. 
369 Title remained with A, for a forged transfer is no transfer 
In Bank of England v Cutler370 the Courts marked the turn of the 
century by showing greater concern for the integrity of the secondary 
market. The subsequent transferee's position was not disturbed, and new 
stock was brought in the market in order to restore the registration of the 
original stockholder. "When the forged transfer is said to be a nullity, 
that merely means that it has no effect upon the [original] stockholder's 
property; the title to E1544 15s worth of stock remained intact. But the 
subsequent transfers cannot be str-uck out of the Bank books except as the 
result of an action wherein the transferees have been shown to be affected 
by complicity in the fraud. Prima facie a transfer which the Bank has 
permitted is valid, and if acted upon bona fide and for value the Bank is 
estopped as well from touching it as from saying that it is invalid"371. 
366 (1865) '1 aw Rep, 3 QB 118 1- -. -. Y, 
367 " Having, therefore, put the names of [BI and 1321 upon the register and granted them a certificate the company 
are estopped after that statement has been acted upon, and cannot deny that those persons were the legal holders 
of the particular shares which have been transferred to the claimants". (Per Lush J at 698). 
368 The correct measure of damages was considered further in re Ottos Kopje Diamond Mines Ltd [1893] 1 Ch 618. 
It was held to be the value of the shares on the date when the company refused to register the transferee. 
369 . It turn out that [B, and 1321 had in fact no shares, and that the company ought not to have registered them as 
shareholders or given them certificates, the transfers having been a forgery" (per Cockburn CJ at 595). 
370 [19071 1 KB 889 
371 
per Lawrence J at 908. 
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This builds on a concept of right, or title by estoppel that was discussed, 
obiter, in the judgment of Cotton LJ in Simm v Anglo-American 
Telegraph C0372. He described "title by estoppel" as a species of title 
which is not transferred through the fraudulent transfer, but which arises 
de novo (as against the issuing company) on the basis of the estoppel. 373 
Thus, the title of bona fide purchasers are prima facie valid374 on the 
basis of title by estoppel, which is not transferred, but arises de novo. 
The fraudulent purported transfer of existing property can bring new 
property into being. 375 
The point is well illustrated in Bank of England v Cutler. Following the 
fraudulent transfer, the name of the original stockholder was removed 
from the register, and later restored to the register. During this period, 
her property and title were unaffected. 376 The case indicates that her 
interest was quantitative and not qualitative, in the sense that her property 
and title did not attach to particular units of stock. 377 
372 (1879) 5 QBD 188 at 213,216. 
373 " If [D] had sold in the market the 50001 of stock belonging to A, an innocent purchaser would have acquired 
a title by estoppel against the company; not because [D] had transmitted to him any title of their own, but 
because he had acted upon the faith of the representation made by the company in issuing the certificate". at 
216. 
374 
see Cutler v. BoE, per Lawrence J, at 908. 
375 There does not seem to be any analogy in the law relating to transfers of other forms of personal property. The 
various exceptions that are available to the rule nemo dat quod non habat, are not based on the creation of new 
proprietary rights, but the transfer of exiting ones (albeit not those of the transferor. Equally, the rule in Dearle 
v. Hall (whereby priority as between successive assignees of a debt or other chose in action is governed by the 
order of notice to the debtor, so that a second assignee may acquire title to debt which was no longer the 
assignor's to give) does not create new proprietary rights, for the first assignee's rights are postponed to those 
of the first assignee to give notice. 
376 The forged transfer "... had no effect upon the stockholder's property, her title to f 1544.15s worth of stock 
remained intact". per Lawrence J at 908. It should be noted that her title was to "f 1544.15s worth of stock", 
not to particular stock. 
377 Indeed the judgment prevents one from considering her interest in qualitative terms. If her interest had 
consisted of a particular parcel of stock, it must have ceased to attach to the original stock when that was 
transferred from her, and can only have attached to the new stock when that was in turn transferred to her. 
However the judgment indicates that her title to stock was continuous. Although the Bank was under a duty 
to buy in stock in order to eliminate any dilution of the total stock in issue, this buying in was not a pre- 
condition of the stockholder's proprietary interest, for she never lost it. "... Mhen this had been done her 
property in law and her apparent title upon the books would once more accord". per Lawrence LJ at 908. 
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"There is no identity in stock', 378. Issues of Traditional Registered 
Securities are divided into units for the purpose of quantification, but not 
g 
for the purpose of individual identification, for they are undivided. 
contrast bearer securities 
In their unallocated nature, traditional registered securities differ from 
physical bearer securities, which are historically derived, not from joint 
stock enterprises, but from cornmercial trading debt. Although today 
both registered and bearer securities are launched in the primary market 
in large issues, physical bearer securities were issued singly long before 
they were issued in large numbers together. Traditional registered 
securities were never issued singly. A traditional registered security 
represents an unallocated share of a larger fund, whereas a Physical 
Bearer Security constitutes a distinct debt: it is constituted by a separate 
covenant to pay, or chose in action in favour of the holder, whereas a 
registered security is a fractional share in the obligation of the issuer. 




The repackaging of securities into depository receipts involves the 
intermediation of a depository, who holds its interest in the underlying 
securities on trust for investors. Their interest is indirect and equitable. 
This does not represent a radical departure from position of with 
Traditional Registered Securities, which historically owes much to the law 
of trusts. 
equity 
Unincorporated companies sought to address the legal difficulties 
associated with the lack of legal personality, by appointing trustees under 
a deed of settlement. The trustees could hold and convey the company's 
378 
per Lawrence J at 909. 
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assets, and bring any actions in the name of the company. 379 "We have 
seen that much can be done under cover of a trust without the necessity 
for a grant of incorporation. "380 While the common law would govern 
the relations between the trustees and the outside world, the internal 
affairs of the company (including its winding up381) were governed by 
equity. 382 Another reason for avoiding the cornmon law courts was the 
irregular status of these associations during the currency of the Bubble 
Act. 383 Equitable jurisdiction over unincorporated commercial 
associations was well established by the late 17th century. 384 
Registered shares were brought out of equity and into the common law 
by the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856, which replaced the deed of 
settlement with a memorandum of association, and thereby ending the 
central role of the trust in the constitution of companies. However, it is 
still customary for issues of registered debentures to be made under a 
trust deed, so that registered corporate debt remains in most cases 
equitable and not legal. 
5. Summary 
The computerisation of registered securities has not changed their fundamental 
legal nature, as both Traditional and Computerised Registered Securities are 
intangible and unallocated. However, while undoubtedly simplifying the law 
relating to the transfer and evidencing of registered securities by removing the 
379 " The constituting of trustees for the company got over the difficulty that the company as a fluctuating body had 
in suing. " Formoy, op. cit., pp. 41,42. 
380 Holdsworth, op. cit., Volume IV, p. 47. 
381 See Formoy, op. cit., pp. 75,89,93. 
382 " When difficulties of internal operation arose in the case of the unincorporated association, the only possible 
forum where adequate relief could be obtained was the Chancellor's court. " Dubois, op. cit., p. 227. 
383 " Since the unincorporated company was definitely not "the creature of the state, " the state in Its turn was less 
accessible to such a unit. ... Nevertheless, for a century in which the business man was at great pains to shun 
the courts, the unincorporated association did make fairly frequent use of the aid of the Court of Chancery, 
which by closing its eyes to the legal irregularity of the unincorporated group with a joint stock, adhered to its 
well-established practice of welcoming new litigants. " Dubois, op. cit., p. 227. 
384 See Holdsworth, op. cit., Volume IV, p. 218. 
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need for paper, computerisation does raise important secondary legal issues for 
registered securities. Two examples relate to debenture status, and fraudulent 
transfers. 
6. Debentures 
A borrowing, or document relating to it, which falls within the meaning of the 
term 'debenture' attracts many statutory provisions. 385 It is therefore important 
to determine whether Computerised corporate debt fall within the definition of 
debenture. 
Gore-Browne386 goes on to consider the meaning of the term under the common 
law, in the Companies Act 1985 and in the Financial Services Act 1986. None 
of these provides a precise or narrow definition, but it is clear that for the 
purposes of each, the term involves the common law concept of a document 
creating or acknowledging a debt. It has been argued387 that an intangible 
cannot be an instrument. Can it be a document? 
Jowitt's Dictionary of English LqW388 defines "document" as "any solid 
substance upon which matter has been expressed or described by conventional 
signs, with the intention of recording or transmitting that matter. " The term is 
389 not limited to paper or writing, and includes visual and sound recordings 
However it has not been possible to find any authority that the term includes 
intangibles such as computer records. This may of course be because the 
385 These are enumerated in detail in Gore-Browne on Companiesl Boyle & Sykes 44ed, Jordans, London 1994, 
volume 1, at 17.14) and include requirements under the Companies Act 1985 relating to certificates, registers, 
trust deeds and registration of charges, the inclusion of a debenture within the definition of investment in the 
Financial Services Act 1986, so that business in debentures may be regulated under that act, and the ability to 
appoint an administrative receiver under the Insolvency Act 1986. 
386 At 17.14.1 to 17.14.3. 
387 (in chapter 3 section [B. 3. bj) 
388 2ed, John Burke, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1977 
389 See the Civil Evidence Act, 1968 section 10(l) (visual and sound), Standen v Licensing Control Conunission 
[ 199012 NZLR 722 at 725, per Greig J (sound), Grant v Southwestern and Country Properties [ 1975] Ch. 185 
(sound, for the purpose of R. S. C. 0.24 r. I 0(l) and Senior v Holdsworth, e-x p. Independent Television News 
[1976] Q. B. 23 (visual, for the purpose of R. S. C. 0.24 r. 10(l)). 
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relevant decisions and statutory provisions date from a pre-electronic era. 390 
However, the prudent view is that an intangible is not a document and therefore 
not a debenture. 
Where corporate debt is dernaterialised in CREST, debenture status may be 
preserved by identifying some tangible documen; , associated with the issue. 
Where the debt is constituted by a trust deed391, this may be treated as a 
debenture. Otherwise, any written instrument recording the terms of issue of 
dernaterialised debt may serve the purpose. In each case, it should be possible 
for the issuer to identify some document connected with the issue that creates 
or acknowledges debt, and thereby attracts debenture status. 
7. Fraudulent TransferS392 
The law relating to fraudulent transfers of Traditional Bearer Securities 
(discussed in section B. 7 above) favours the holder in due course at the expense 
of the defrauded true owner. In contrast, in the case of Traditional Registered 
Securities, both the bona fide transferee and the defrauded true owner are 
favoured at the expense of the issuer. 
390 See, for example, Hill vR [1946] K. B. 329 at 333. per Humphreys J: "To constitute a document, the form 
which it takes seems to me to be immaterial; it may be on anything on which the information is written or 
inscribed - paper, parchment, stone or metal. " 
391 Most domestic sterling debt is so constituted. Only unquoted domestic debt, for example that issued as 
consideration in a takeover, may not have a trust deed. In the euromarkets, however, a trust deed is optional. 
392 It was shown (in chapter 2 section 3. b. ii above) that common law historically restricted the assignment of choses 
in action, and that bearer securities became transferable under the law merchant as an exception to this 
restriction. The law merchant does not concern registered securities. The historic basis for the transferability 
of registered securities must, then, be determined. 
"Stocks and shares were in early days expressly made assignable by charter or Act of Parliament" (Holdsworth, 
op. cit., Volume VH, p. 542) or by royal charter, although, as early as the 16th century, there was doubt as 
to whether the common law restriction applied (Holdsworth, op. cit., pp. 202,203). One might speculate that 
one reason for doubt was the view that, in respect of the registered securities of unincorporated associations, 
assignments could take place only in equity (as the securities only existed in equity) and were not subject to the 
common law rule for that reason. 
In any case the present statutory regimes for the transfer of registered securities are currently provided by the 
Stock Transfer Act 1963 in the case of traditional equities and gilts, the Stock Transfer Act 1982 in the case 
of dernaterialised gilts and the Companies Act 1989 in the case of dernaterialised corporate securities. 
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In the historic development of this principle, the issuing corporations led the 
way that the courts came to follow. 393 The risk of fraudulent transfers of 
registered securities was borne voluntarily by the issuing companies' 
management in order to encourage the secondary markets in their shares. This 
approach was subsequently taken up by the courts in the late eighteenth century. 
In the nineteenth century the shift from policy to lxx was consolidated as the 
legal basis for the approach was developed in a large body of case law. The 
rule that the issuer should bear the risk of fraudulent transfers of registered 
securities rests on the doctrine of estoppel, which operates against the issuer on 
the basis of the representations made in the register of members. 
The principles emerging from this case law may be very broadly surnmarised 
as follows. 
(a) A forged purported transfer is no transfer, and title remains with the 
original holder; 394 
(b) both in equity and at law. 395 
393 "It was not until the latter part of the century that the courts decided whether the risk of loss should fall on the 
proprietor whose stock was fraudulently transferred, on the purchaser in good faith, or on the corporation. 
Nevertheless, with the question of the negotiability [in the old sense of transferability. ] of their stock at stake, 
the large business corporations tended to assume the risk of loss. With the South Sea Company, in 1722, a 
decree of the Master of the Rolls embodying an application of the caveat emptor rule to the situation was 
received favourably by the directors. However, the general court [i. e. the general court of directors of the 
company] voted to protect both the original proprietor and the purchaser if both were the victims of fraud. The 
original proprietor would be permitted to retain the stock, and the purchaser would be given an equivalent 
amount in treasury stock. 
A similar attitude was taken by the court of directors of the Bank of England, the Royal African Company, and 
the London Assurance Corporation, but it was not until 1765 that this boon to the cause of the security of 
transfer of stock had its official recognition in the courts. [Note: Ashby v Blackwell and the Million Bank, 
Amb. 503 (Chancery, 1765). ] It was held to be the duty of the company to save han-nless both the bona fide 
purchaser and the original proprietor, a decision that reflects the fact that the shareholder was a real proprietor, 
in the sense that he was regarded as having an interest in the company of which he could not be involuntarily 
divested. " (Dubois, op. cit., pp 361,362. ) 
394 Davis v. Bank of England (1824) 2 Bing 393; In re Bahia and San Francisco Ply Co (1865) Law Report 3 QB 
118, Oliver v. Bank of England [19011 1 Ch D 552; (1902) 86 248 AC; 
395 Midland Ry Co v. Tqvlor (1862) 8 HL Cas 75 1, per Lord Westbury LC at p756. 
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(C) The original holder is entitled to require the issuer to restore its name to 
the register (and to receive sums equal to dividends lost due to the 
transfer); 396 
(d) unless its own conduct (through fraud or gross negligence) amounts to a 
ratification of the fraud, or an estoppel against suing the issuer. 397 
(e) In order to grant restitution to the original holder, it is not necessary to 
trace the securities in question nor to join their current holder. 398 
The issuer is estopped from denying the title of the subsequent bona fide 
purchaser of the securities; 399 
(g) however no estoppel arises in favour of the direct transferee (X) under a 
forged transfer; 400 
(h) nor in favour fa subsequent transferee if it holds the securities 
beneficially r X. 01 IrX 
396 Sloman v Bank of England (1845) 14 SIM 442; Oliver v. Bank of England; Welch v. Bank of England [1955] 
1 Al I ER 811. 
397 Welch v. Bank of England [ 1995] 1 All ER 811. Gross negligence will defeat the original holder's claim (Coles 
v Bank of England (1839) 10 AD &E 437) but mere negligence will not unless it amounts to an estoppel (Bank 
of Ireland v Evans Charities Trustees (1855) V HLC 389). 
398 Barton v London & NW Ry Co (1888) 38 ChD 144; Sloman v Bank of England; per Sir L Shadwell at 447,448; 
the rule is also implicit in all the other cases relating to forged transfer and referred to in this section. 
399 In re Bahia and San Francisco Pty Co. "Having, therefore, put the names of [the transferees under the 
fraudulent transfer] upon the register, and granted them a certificate, the company are estopped after that 
statement has been acted upon, and cannot deny that those persons were the legal holders of the particular shares 
which have been transferred to the claimants. " Per Lush J at 598. Some cases emphasise the register as the 
form taken by the issuer's representation; others (for example, In re Ottos Kopje Dianwnd Mines, Ltd (1893) 
1 Ch 618, per Bowen L. J. at 628) emphasize the certificate. 
400 Simm v. Anglo-American Telegraph Co (1879) 5 QBD 188 
401 Sitrun v. Anglo-American Telegraph Co. 
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(1) In having regard to both the original holders' rights of restitution and to 
the estoppel in favour of the bona fide purchaser, the issuer must avoid 
diluting the securities in issue. 402 
Dilution is in practice avoided (in the more recent cases) by the issuer 
buying securities in the market for the account of the original holder. 403 
(k) The issuer is entitled to an indemnity from the broker 404 (or 
transferee)405 presenting the fraudulent transfer (however innocently), on 
the basis of an implied warranty that the transfer is valid. 
Thus, the market integrity is achieved in the secondary markets in Traditional 
Registered Securities by placing the risk of fraudulent transfers on the issuer; 
the basis for this is estoppel, arising from the representation made by the issuer 
in the register as to the ownership of the securities and by the issue of a 
certificate. 
These arrangements are disturbed by computerisation. No certificates are 
issued. 406 In the case of depositary receipts, the register of the issuer is 
uninformative as to the identity of investors (for the register shows only the 
name of the depositary). The Government Stock Regulations4O7 limit the 
liability of the Bank (regulation 22A) (in effect) for fraudulent transfers, 
although the defrauded owner's recourse against third ýuarrtie) is unaffected 
(regulation 22B). Thus, in the case of DRs and CGO 
`sto4;; 
k, 10 investors are not 
protected as they are with Traditional Registered Securities. In the case of 
CREST securities, no statutory provision alters the traditional position, so 
presumably the issuer is still liable in respect of registered fraudulent transfers 
402 Bank of England v. Cutler (1908) [1907] 2 KB 889 per Lawrence J at 908,909. 
403 Sheffield Corpn v. Barclay, HL (1904-7) All ER Rep 747; Bank of England v. Cutler, per Lawrence J at 909. 
404 Bank of England v. Cutler, Secretary of State for India v. Bank of India Ltd [19381 65 Ind App 286; Stanley 
Yeung Kai Yung v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corpn [19811 AC 787. 
405 Sheffield Corpn v. Barclay. 
406 In any case, gilts certificates cannot give rise to estoppel: Government Stock Regulations 1965 regulation 7 (SI 
1965/1420). 
407 Sl 1965/1420 
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on the basis of the representation made by registration. However, the CREST 
Regulations severely limit the issuer's ability to decline to register transfers that 
may be fraudulent408 and thereby protect itself from such liability 
D. Conclusions - Bearer and Registered Securities 
1. Generally 
This chapter has considered the consequences of computerisation for the legal 
nature of securities. It has been shown that, for bearer securities, 
computerisation has forfeited negotiablility and therefore changed the legal 
nature of the securities. However, in practice the secondary markets should not 
be affected, as the benefits of negotiability are available by other means. In the 
case of registered securities, computerisation has no profound effect on the legal 
nature of the security. As creatures of equity, they are intangible, unallocated 
and indirect, and need little adaptation for the computerised environment. 
Debenture status should in practice be preservable. However, without the 
cross-border arguments that assist the bearer bond markets (which are 
dominated by the European clearers), the traditional basis for integrity of 
secondary market transactions may no longer be available. 
2. Registered and Bearer Securities 
To return to the changes in the nature of bearer securities caused by 
computerisation, in section B. 4 above it was shown that the effect of 
computerisation was (broadly speaking) to turn bearer securities from negotiable 
instruments into Intermediate Securities. It was noted that Intermediate 
Securities are unallocated, intangible and equitable. The difference between 
bearer and registered securities might be sunu-narised as follows: 
(i) unallocated and allocated While the interest of the holder of a registered 
security is unallocated, the interest of the holder of a bearer security is 
allocated; a bearer security is not an undivided share of a larger fund co-owned 
with other investors, but a distinct debt owed by the issuer to the bearer alone 
and constituted by the instrument. 
408 regulation 23 
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(ii) intangible and tangible While registered securities are intangible and 
certificates in respect of them are merely evidence of title, in the case of bearer 
securities the chose in action against the issuer is locked up in the bearer 
document, which is a tangible document of title. 
(iii) equity and the law merchant While the law relating to registered 
securities owes much to equity, bearer securities are the creation of the law 
merchant. 
On this basis, it is submitted that the effect of computerisation has been to turn 
bearer securities into registered securities. 
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Chapter 4. Computerisation and the custody relationship409 
The effect of computerisation on the legal nature of securities has been considered. Its effect 
on the legal nature of the custody relationship will now be assessed. 
1. 
2. 
The Traditional View 
The global custodian usually maintains two types of account in the name of the client: 
securities accounts and cash accounts. The cash from time to time credited to the cash 
accounts may represent the proceeds of sale of custody assets, dividends and other income 
received in respect of custody securities. 
Both the cash and the securities accounts represent choses in action owned by the client. 
The cash accounts represent debts owed by the custodian. The securities accounts 
represent choses in action owed directly by the underlying issuer, and held for the client 
by the custodian as bailee. 
Cash 
a. The DebtorlCreditor Principle 
Custodians have traditionally been banks. It is a clearly established principle 
that the deposit of cash with a bank establishes the relationship of debtor and 
creditor between the bank and the depositor4lo. Customers money is not held 
by the bank by way of trust4l 1. The bank is free to use the deposited money 
as it pleaseS412 and the depositor's rights of repayment are contractual and not 
409 See J Benjamin, Custody; an English Law Analysis, (1994) 9 J. I. B. F. L. 121. 
410 Carr v. Carr (181 625. 
411 Foley v. Hill (1848) 2 HLC 28. 
412 South Australian Insurance Co v. Randellf 1869] 1ý ER 775 at 759. 
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proprietary413. On the bank's insolvency, therefore, the depositor must prove 
414 as an unsecured creditor 
It has generally been assumed that the debtor/creditor principle applies to 
custodians in respect of clients' cash accounts . 
415 Custodians generally conduct 
their business on the basis that it does, using the money credited to the custody 
cash accounts for their own purposes, and not segregating it as trust money. 
While this approach is probably correct, two points arise. The debtor/creditor 
principle applies to money deposited with banks. Custodians may not be banks, 
and the credit balance of the custody cash accounts may not represent deposits. 
b. Trust Over Cash 
The credit balances of the cash accounts may represent, not deposits, but rather 
the proceeds of sale of custody assets or income derived from custody assets. 
Section 3 below will argue that (notwithstanding the traditional view), in a 
computerised environment, custody assets may in most cases be held by the 
custodian not as bailee but as trustee for the client. The proceeds of sale of 
trust property416, and income derived from trust property417, are generally if 
subject to the same tr-usts as the property to which they relate. This raises the 
risk for custodians of a duty to segregate cash. 
The answer to this problem for the bank custodian is provided by the case of 
Space Investments418. In this case it was held that, where a bank trustee 
lawfully deposits trust money with itself as banker, it becomes beneficially 
413 "True it is that in the case of money paid into the banker's account it is converted into a debt, while in the case 
of money placed in a special repository it remains in specie" - Re Halletts EFtate, Knatchbull v. Hallett [ 1874- 
801 All ER 793 per 'Desiger LJ at 746. 
414 Space Investments Ltd v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co (Bahamas) Ltd [1986] 3 All ER 75. 
415 Barings Brothers & Co. Limited is a global custodian. In March 1995, after the company went into 
administration and before the announcement of the agreement of ING Bank to buy the Barings group and take 
over its debts, it was generally assumed that the balance of the cash accounts held by the company for the 
pension funds which were its custody clients was at risk. This money amounted to some f 100 million. 
416 See Re Hallett's Estate, Knatchbull v. Hallett [j874-80] All ER 793. 
417 Swain v 77ze Law Society C. A. [19811 3 All ER 797,813, per Lord Justice Oliver. 
418 Space Investments Ltd v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co (Bahamas) Ltd [19861 3 All ER 75. 
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entitled to that money, and owes only a contractual duty of repayment. In order 
to be certain of benefiting from this rule, bank custodians should consider 
including express wording in their custody agreements, authorising them to- 
deposit any trust money credited to the cash accounts with themselves as 
banker. 
Under the Client Money Regulations419, client money held by persons 
authorised under the Financial Services Act 1986 in connection with investment 
business must in general be held on a statutory trust in accordance with those 
regulations. However, the regulations do not apply to an approved bank, 
insofar as it holds money on behalf of its clients in an account with itself420. 
"Approved bank" is defined to include (in respect of accounts opened in the 
UK) an institution authorised under the Banking Act 1987. Moreover, a pure 
custodial service (i. e. one involving only safekeeping, settlement and 
administration) does not involve investment business for the purposes of the 
Financial Services Act, so that the Client Money Regulations will not apply. 
(However, the SIB has indicated that it may bring custody within the scope of 
regulatable investment business in the near future. ) 
C. Deposit-taking business 
Section 3 of the Banking Act 1987 provides that no person shall in the United 
Kingdom accept a deposit in the course of carrying on a deposit-taking business 
other than an authorised institution. 421 Breach of section 3 is a criminal 
offence. 
While the point is arguable, it would be prudent to assume that the maintenance 
of a custody cash account may amount to deposit taking business for this 
purpose. Paragraph 14 of the Banking Act 1987 (Exempt Transactions) 
419 The Financial Services (Client Money) Regulations 
420 Paragraph 4 of Regulation 1.02. 
421 " Deposit" is defined in section 5 broadly as a sum of money paid on terms under which it will be repaid with 
or without interest on demand or at an agreed time, and which is not referrable to the provision of property or 
services or the giving of security. Section 6 provides broadly that the term 'deposit taking' applies to a business 
if in its course money received by way of deposit is lent to others, or any other activity of the business is 
financed wholly or to any material extent out of the capital or the interest on money received by way of deposit. 
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Regulations 1988422 creates an exemption in favour of the acceptance of 
deposits (broadly) by a person who is authorised under the Financial Services 
Act 1986, if accepted in the course of or for the purpose of engaging in dealing, 
arranging deals, managing investments or operating collective investment 
schemes with or on behalf of the depositor. Custodians are generally (but not 
universally) so authorised. However, it would be prudent to assume that the 
provision of the core custodial services does not amount to an "investment 
business" activity for the purposes of the exemption. 
Therefore any global custodian which is not a bank should maintain a custody 
cash account as client money in the name of the client with a third party bank 
and operate the account as trustee on the client's behalf. 
3. Securities 
The traditional characterisation of the custodian in respect of securities423 (and other non- 
cash assets such as bullion424) is as the bailee of the client. "A bailment arises 
whenever specific goods are delivered into the possession of someone other than the 
person immediately entitled to them, on condition that those identical goods are returned 
to the deliveror or disposed of in accordance with his instructions when the purpose of 
425 426 The essence of bailment is the delivery of possession (as the bailment is fulfilled". 
opposed to the delivery of title)427 by the bailor to the bailee. Thus, the custodian has 
422 Sl 1988/646 (as amended). 
423 " These bonds are her bonds deposited with Mr Hallett according to the receipt, for safe custody, which would 
make him, no doubt, an ordinary bailee". Re Hallett's Estates, Knatchbull v Hallett [1874-801 All ER 793, per 
Jessell MR at 708. See also Kahler v. Midland Bank, HL (1950] AC 24. 
424 See Dolýftu Mieg v. Bank of England [1949] 1 Ch 369. 
425 NE Palmer, Liability of Bankers as Custodians of Client Property 1. 
426 See also the classification of bailments in the judgment of Holt, C. J. in Coggs v Bemard (1703) 2 Ld. Raym 
909. 
427 In addition to possession of the bailed assets, a bailee has a limited proprietary interest in them which is based 
on possession. However, this interest, called "special property", is less than title. "So feeble and precarious 
was property without possession, or rather without possessory remedies, in the eyes of medieval lawyers. that 
Possession largely usurped not only the substance but the name of Property; and when distinction became 
necessary in modem times, the clumsy term 'special property' was employed to denote the rights of a possessor 
not being owner". (Pollock, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law. 1888, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
p. 5. ) 
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possession of the custody securities, but they are owned by the client and are unavailable 
to the creditors of the custodian upon its insolvency. 
This traditional view of the custody relationship is challenged by computerisation for a 
number of reasons. The chief of these is dernaterialisation. As discussed in chapter 3, 
securities are increasingly intangible, they are therefore incapable of possession and 
428 bailment. This section will argue that the natural characterisation of the modern 
custody relationship under English domestic law is therefore not bailment, but trust (with 
the consequent commercial need for the custodian carefully to limit the level of its duties 
by contract). 429 
a. Ownership 
[A] conveyance which simultaneously confers both possession and 
ownership upon the grantee cannot create a bailment, as an owner of goods 
430 cannot constitute himself their bailee at common law". 
Traditional Registered Securities may be registered in the name of the global 
custodian (or its nominee) who will hold legal title. The question arises, are 
these arrangements compatible with a bailment? In Zivnostenska Banka 
National Corporation v. Frankman431 the shares which were the subject of the 
action were deposited with a bank and registered in the name of the bank's 
nominee. While the implications of the use of a nominee were not discussed, 
the arrangements did not affect the view that the deposit of shares with the bank 
constituted a bailment. "... [T]he relationship between the respondent and the 
432 appellants is that of bailor and bailee". However, it would be unsafe to 
conclude, on the above basis, that a bailment may arise where an owner of 
goods transfers legal title to goods to another. In Zivnostenska Banka the Law 
Lords did not take the point. 
428 For a discussion of whether an intangible is capable of possession, see chapter 2 section 2. 
429 For a discussion of contractual limitation of implied fiduciary duty, see chapter 8 below. 
430 NE Palmer, Bailment 2nd Edition, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1991 p. 2. 
431 [19501 A. C. 57. 
432 Per Lord MacDermott, at 74. 
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objects. "438 As discussed in chapter 3, the securities held in modem global 
custody are dernaterialised (or immobilised, in global form or repackaged), and 
represented, not by physical certificates, but by entries in the books of the 
relevant intermediary. In the hands of the global custodian, such securities are 
intangible. 
Chapter 2 above argued that intangible property is incapable of possession. 
Accordingly, it is "... improbable that the courts will develop the ... supposition 
that there may be a bailment of an intangible thing". 439 "It is almost 
universally agreed that no one can become a bailee without possession of a 
tangible chattel. 440 The apparent incompatibility of intangibles with bailment, 
and their compatibility with trust, adds weight to the view that the global 
custodian may be a trustee. 
C. Fungible Custody and Equivalent Redelivery 
Global custodial arrangements in respect of securities are often fungible, in the 
following sense. The global custodian aggregates client holdings in a particular 
security into one commingled holding ("Client Holding"). In the case of 
securities held through a sub-custodian, the Client Holding will be represented 
in the books of the sub-custodian by an account in the name of the global 
custodian. In cases where a sub-custodian is not employed, the Client Holding 
in registrable securities will be registered in the name of the global custodian 
or its nominee, and the Client Holding in bearer securities (held through a 
clearing system in which the global custodian is a participant) will be held in 
an account in the name of the global custodian. While the global custodian's 
house position in any security will be segregated from the Client Holding, there 
will in general be no record of any allocation between clients in the books of 
the sub-custodian, in the relevant register of registrable securities or the books 
of the global depositary, as the case may be. The only note of the respective 
entitlements of the individual clients to the Client Holding will be in the books 
438 Swiss Bank Corporation v. Lloyds Bank Ltd. and Others, CA [ 198012 All ER 419 per Buckley U 43 1. 
439 Palmer, Bailment p. 13. 
440 [bid p. 99. See also Dias, Jurisprudence, at 281: ""A bailee is a person who gets possession of a chattel from 
another with his consent. " 
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of the global custodian. This arrangement will be referred to as "Fungible 
441 Custody ". 
Thus, while it is possible at any time to determine how many of the individual 
securities comprised in the Client holding are attributable to a particular client, 
it is not possible to determine which ones. 
A corollary of Fungible Custody is that the redelivery obligation owed by the 
global custodian to clients is not an obligation to return the securities originally 
deposited in specie, but merely an obligation to return securities equivalent to 
those originally deposited. The shares that a client receives (or delivers) out of 
global custody will almost certainly not be the same ones that it put in. 
Case law indicates that the deposit of fungibles without a duty of segregation 
and without in specie redelivery rights may not be compatible with bailment. 
In South Australian Insurance Co Ltd v. Rande11442 it was held that an 
arrangement having these features was not a bailment. 443 The case of USA v. 
Dollfus Mieg et Compagnie, S. A. 444 provides further evidence for the view that 
441 Reasons for Fungible Custody include economies of scale, administrative convenience and accounting facility. 
442 (1869) 6 Moo PCCNS 341. 
443 In this case, corn was deposited by a fanner with a miller, to be stored and used as part of the miller's stock 
in trade. It was mixed with corn deposited by other farmers under the same terms with the miller. On delivery 
the farmer was given a receipt stating "received, etc. ... to store". 
Notwithstanding this, the miller was free 
to deal with the corn as its own property. The farmer had the right at any time to claim corn of like quality 
and quantity to that deposited, but could not claim back the original corn. The miller had the option, instead 
of delivering wheat, of paying the market price of such wheat at the time of demand. The stock was destroyed 
by fire and for insurance purposes it became necessary to determine whether the corn belonged to the miller 
beneficially. 
It was held that the transaction amounted to a sale by the farmer to the miller and was not a bailment of the 
corn, the corn was beneficially Owned by the miller. "A bailment of trust implies, that there is reserved to the 
bailor the right to claim a re-delivery of the property deposited in bailment ... 
Whenever there is a delivery of 
property on a contract for an equivalent in money or some other valuable commodity, and not for the return 
of an identical subject-matter in its original or an altered form, this is a transfer of property for value - it is a 
sale, not a bailment. ... 
An incident of property, that is in bailment, is, that the bailor may require its 
restoration" (per Sir Joseph Napier at 358). 
444 HL (19521 1 AC 582. 
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Fungible Custody and equivalent redelivery are incompatible with bailment. 445 
'Mis case indicates that where there is no segregation, there is no bailment and 
a creditor/debtor relationship arises. 446 
These cases indicate that Fungible Custody is incompatible with bailment. 
However, conflicting authority is available in Harding v. CC, -nmr of Inland 
Revenue 447 that, while traditionally bailment requires the in specie return of the 
445 in this case the Bank of England held, for the governments of the USA, France and the UK, 64 numbered gold 
bars claimed to be the property of a French company. The bars had been wrongfully seized by the German 
authorities during the second world war and taken to Germany. After their recovery by allied forces they were 
lodged at the Bank of England by the three governments for safe custody pending their ultimate disposal. 13 
bars were sold in error by the Bank. The company claimed, inter alia, redelivery of the bars. The action was 
allowed to proceed in respect of the 13 bars that had been sold, as in respect of them the bailment had been 
terminated. However, the action was stayed in respect of the others because the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
applied to claims for the recovery of property in the possession or control of a sovereign state. As bailors the 
three sovereign states were treated as being in possession or control of the 51 bars. 
It was made clear obiter dicta in the judgments that segregation was considered to be necessary to establish a 
bailment. There was much discussion of whether the gold bars were effectively segregated. It was found that 
they were, although in error these arrangements for segregation had been breached when the 13 gold bars were 
sold. As for the other bars: - 
"These bars were held for the time being in specie to the order of [the three governments]" (per Lord Radcliffe, 
at 615). Bailment imposes a duty of segregation. "I have already gated my view that in regard to the 64 bars 
there was a contract of bailment and an obligation was thereby imposed on the bank to keep these bars separate 
and intact and not to allow them to become merged in the general pool of customers' gold ... " (per Earl Jowitt 
at 604). 
446 . Ever since 1940 the Bank of England in operating a gold set-aside account had not kept separate the gold 
belonging to one customer from the gold belonging to another customer, though the customers' gold, considered 
globally, was kept separate from gold belonging to the Bank itself. Under the "gold set-aside" account ... the 
Bank on receiving gold ... from a customer would weigh the gold and assay 
it. Until the completion of 
weighing and assay the particular gold would be kept separate in the name of the depositor, but once thew 
operations were completed, there would be recorded in the books of the bank the number of ounces of fine gold 
comprised in the deposit, and the depositor would be entitled to receive from the bank the number of ounces 
of fine gold so ascertained, less charges. The customer would, however, no longer be entitled to receive any 
particular bars of gold in satisfaction of his contract. The contract, in short, once weighing and assaying had 
been completed, created a relationship between the depositor and the bank closely resembling that of debtor and 
creditor, except that the Bank's obligation was to be discharged by the handing over of the requisite number 
ounces of fine gold. " per Earl Jowitt, at 598. 
It was found that the gold bars in this case were segregated under a special arrangement. "If there had been 
no special arrangement ... [for segregation] ... 
I should have been of the opinion that the bailment of the 
individual bars had been tenninated when the account was credited with the fine gold content. " per Earl Jowitt, 
at 599. 
447 [19771 1 N. Z. L. R. 337 The case concerns an agreement relating to livestock. 
"It seems to me that the transaction recorded in the agreement ... has the essential characteristics of a 
bailment 
while the document itself is in the nature of a bailment. According to its provisions the possession of the 
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goods originally deposited, "Nuivalent" redelivery obligations are compatible 
with bailment. See also Mercer v Craven448 Tlus, there is some basis fbr 
arguing that, provided it can be shown that the parties intended that the client 
should retain a proprietary interest in the custody securities, the mere fact that 
the Bank's redelivery obligations are "equivalent" and not in specie may not 
itself defeat such intention. However, the prudent view seems to be that 
bailment requires in specie redelivery. 
However, if the pooling of different clients' Custody Securities may be 
incompatible with bailment, it is not incompatible with trust. Provided that the 
custodian segregates the deposited assets from its own, a trust may be identified 
over the whole of the custody assets, of which the custody clients are equitable 
tenants in common. This idea will be developed in chapter 5 below. 
Swnmary 
Several characteristics of the modem global custody product indicate a trust 
rather than a bailment. 'Mese are the passing of title, dematerialisation and 
Fungible Custody (with its corollary of equivalent redelivery). 
The role of the custodian has evolved far beyond its traditional role as a bailee. 
The question arises, has it taken the law relating to bailment with it, so that 
bailment may now include transfer of legal title and relate to intangibles held 
in a pool? Or has it left bailment behind so that now the global custodian is a 
trustee? 
Professor Palmer refers to the evolution of the law relating to hire purchase to 
illustrate the flexibility of the concept of bailment. "Indeed, hire-purchase 
livestock is given to the bailees but the ownership or property in the stock is retained by the bailor. Although 
the provisions of cl. 6 which allow the bailees to sell surplus stock, the progeny or replacement of the stock 
bailed, may operate to prevent the bailees from returning at the termination of the bailment of the identical 
stock, originally bailed, the bailor retains the right to require the proceeds of such sale to be used in purchasing 
replacements of any stock sold or lost by the bailee. Also there is provision in cl. 5 that the bailees will on 
determination of the bailment return to the bailor stock of the like nature, quality, condition and respective ages 
as the stock bailed. In any case, I adopt, with respect, the dictum of Turner J. in Motor Mart W. v. Webb 
([1958] N. Z. L. R. 773 at 781]) that "A bailment does not necessarily entail upon the bailee the obligation to 
deliv the bailor the thing bailed"" (Per Coates J. at 340). 
448 (19 , 5) 11 LQR 11-18. 
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affords a fixther example of the way in which bailment has adapted to modem 
circumstances " 449 
This theme is picked up in a New Zealand judgment. "... [I]t would be a 
mistake to conclude that the transaction of bailment is one which has refused, 
and can still refuse, to undergo the evolution and adaptation which the common 
law imposes upon every legal institution; and although the baHments known to 
Roman Law were sufficient for Lord Holt C. J. in 1703,1 decline to assume 
that, under the pressures and stresses of modem legal necessity, some new 
mutation may not have burst into flower, of a quality to startle the author of the 
"450 Institutes were he privileged to behold it ... 
However, in the absence of direct judicial authority, it would be prudent to 
assume that the law is today what it was yesterday, and that the global 
custodian, by moving into the late 20th century, has moved into a new legal 
category, and is a trustee. 451 
f. custodian trustees 
Global custodians who are trustees should not be confused with custodian 
trustees fbr the purposes of section 4(3) of the Trustee Act 1907. Statutory 
custodian trustees hold trust property while leaving the administration and 
management of the trust to managing trustees. Custodian trustees may be 
appointed in connection with a debenture issue. 
449 Palmer, Bailment p. 6. 
450 Motor Mart W. v. V*bb [ 1958] NZLR 773 per Turner J at 780. 
451 The bailment analysis will still, of course, be available where physical instruments am held on a segngated 
basis. 
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Chapter 5. The Allocation problem 452 
A. Identity in Securities 
Individual Physical Bearer SecuritieS453 may be distinguished one from the other, because 
each has inherent identity derived from the physical instrument that constitutes it. In 
contrast, registered securities (whether Traditional Registered SecuritieS454 or 
Computerised Registered SecuritieS455) have no inherent individual identity, as they 
represent an unallocated fraction of the property represented by the whole issue of which 
they form part. Chapter 3 argued that computerisation has the effect in practice of 
transforming bearer securities into registered securities, so that the computerisation of 
securities involves the loss of their individual identity. One computerised security within 
an issue is undifferentiated from another. 
Recent case law has caused some concern in London among custodians and their clients, 
and prompted a debate in the legal community about what will be referred to in this work 
as "the Allocation Problem". This arises where there is Fungible Custody. 456 The 
Allocation Problem is the possible legal difficulty in asserting proprietary rights over 
assets forming part of the conu-ningled pool, when one cannot identify which particular 
assets within the pool are subject to such proprietary rights. 
This chapter will argue that the Allocation Problem is governed by different lines of 
cases, raising different principles, depending on whether the securities in question are 
Physical Bearer Securities or registered securities. Each will be considered in turn. 
Common sense would suggest that want of allocation should not defeat property rights 
in circumstances where allocation is jurisprudentially impossible (i. e. within a holding of 
registered securities). This conclusion will be reached in section E. However, it will 
also be argued that the type of property right that arises by operation of law in such 
circumstances may not be an interest under a trust, and this chapter will therefore argue 
452 See J. Benjamin, Custody; an English Law Analysis, (1994) 9 J. I. B. F. L. 188. 
453 i. e. bearer securities in the form of physical instruments. See chapter 3. 
454 
I. e. registered securities not in computerised form. See chapter 3 
455 
i. e. registered securities in computerised form. See chapter 3 
456 This term was defined in chapter 4 to mean, broadly, the commingling of the assets of dIfferent clients in a 
pool. 
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that it is desirable (in the case of all securities in Fungible Custody) to address the 
allocation problem by express language providing for equitable co-ownership of the 
securities by the custody clients. 
B. The Allocation Problem 
1. Loss of Property Risk 
The Allocation Problem concerns "... the law's insistence that proprietary 
rights cannot be acquired in fungibles forming an unidentified part of a bulk 
until they have been separated by some suitable act of appropriation "457. This 
arises both at law and in equity The conunon law rule is well established in 
458 case law concerning the sale of goods, and is given statutory force in section 
16 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.459 The rule in equity is based on the 
principle that a trust cannot be validly established without certainty of subject 
matter. 460 Accordingly, a trust cannot be created by the legal owner of a 
conuningled pool of assets who purports to transfer to a beneficiary equitable 
title of an unallocated portion of that pool. 461 
Because, in Fungible Custody, the Custody Securities of respective clients are 
not individually identifiable, some commentators have argued that the rights of 
clients may be confined (broadly) to a contractual right against the custodian, 
arising under the custody agreement, to call for redelivety of securities 
457 R. M. Goode, Ownership and Obligation in Commercial Transactionsl L. Q. R. 103, July 1987,433 at 436. 
458 See Healey v Howlett & Sons (1917] 1 K. B. 337, In re Wait [1927] 1 Ch 606, Carlos Federspiel & Co. S. A. 
v Charles Twigg & Co. Ltd. [ 19571 1 Lloyd's Rep. 240, Re London Wine Co. (Shippers) Ltd., [ 1986] PCC 12 1, 
In re Stapylion F7etcher Ltd. ( 1994] 1 WLR 118 1, and other cases referred to in the last cited case. 
459 This provides as follows: "Subject to section 20A below, where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained 
goods no property in the goods is transferred to the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained. " 
Section 20(A) (inserted b the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995 s1 (1) in response to Law Commission paper 
No. 215) provides for title in ex-bulk goods to pass under a tenancy in common, where the purchase price has 
been paid. 
The rule relates to goods, and securities are not goods but (generally) choses in action. Goods are defined in 
Section 61(l) of the Sale of Goods Act exclude things in action. 
460 Knight v Knight (1840) 3 Beav 148 
461 See In re Wait [ 1927] 1 Ch 606 
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equivalent to those deposited462. The client's relationship with the custodian 
in respect of securities may be that of debtor and creditor (in the broad sense 
of obligee and obligor). The risk that clients' rights in this respect may be 
merely contractual will be called, "Loss of Property Risk". 
The implications are serious, both for the clients and for the custodian. 
a. Credit Risk of Custodian 
If the clients have proprietary rights in the Custody Securities, those 
assets will not be available to the general creditors of the custodian in the 
event of the custodian's insolvency, or to judgment creditors of the 
custodian. However, if the clients' rights are merely contractual, the 
Custody Securities will be so available and the clients will rank as 
unsecured creditors. In short, clients will take the credit risk of the 
custodian. 
b. Other Risks 
An important factor contributing to the growth of global custody in the 
1980s was the perception that it is a low risk business for the custodian. 
This perception is reflected in the capital adequacy treatment of custody, 
whereby client assets do not attract a capital weighting. There are in fact 
many risks associated with the holding of assets in global custody. These 
are discussed in the International Society of Securities Administrators' 
Report on Global Custody RiskS463. One should therefore ask why 
462 In an article published in 1987 (R. M. Goode, Ownership and Obligation in Commercial Transactions, (1987) 
103 LQR, 433), Professor Goode considers the implication of the principle for immobilised securities held in 
fungible accounts with clearers such as Euroclear and Cedel. This argument was developed in an article by 
Robert Ryan and applied to investments held fungibly by global custodians. (Robert Ryan, Taking Security Over 
Investment Portfolios held in Global Custody [19901 10 JI1BL 404). 
463 ISSA, Symposium Report, 6, May 1992. Among the risks identified in the ISSA Report are: - 
- country risk, or risk connected with holding assets In a foreign country, e. g. political, economic, 
fiscal and legal changes, or gaps in supervisory coverage; 
- counterparry risk, or risk of non-fulfilment of a trade contract due to inability or unwillingness. 
- credit risk, or risk that a counterparty will fail to deliver or pay in full on due date or be liquidated 
or go bankrupt; 
- liquidity risk, or risk that settlement of an obligation will not be made on due date, but on some 
unspecified date thereafter; 
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custodians (and their regulators) treat custody as a low-r1sk business. It 
is because they assume that the above risks are in general borne, not by 
the custodian, but by its client. This assumption is based on the further 
assumption that the custody securities belong to the client, for "If I own 
goods, I bear the burden of accidental loss or damage". 464 465 On the 
basis that the custodian is a trustee, the above risks are borne by the 
client, subject only to the custodian's duty of care under the general 
law. 466 Thus, if the custody por-tfolio suffers a loss which is not 
attributable to the fault of the custodian, the custodian is not obliged to 
make good the loss. 
If, however, the custody securities do not belong to the client, and if 
therefore the custodian is not a trustee but a debtor, the general law will 
not reduce the custodian's redelivery obligation to one of proper care. 
Under the general law, the duty of tr-ustees is to take the proper level of 
care, while the duty of debtors is strict. The redelivery obligation of the 
custodian will therefore be strict (and apply whether or not the securities 
in question are available to the custodian in the custody portfolio) unless 
there is effective contractual provision to the contrary. In other words, 
the global custodian may bear all the risks whereby custody securities 
may become unavailable for redelivery, unless the provisions in the 
global custody agreement, which limit its liability, are effective. 
The effectiveness of exclusion clauses is discussed in Chapter 8. 
C. Tawtion 
- market risk, or risk arising from market price fluctuation of securities and currencies during the 
settlement interval; 
- operational risk, or risk of loss due to clerical errors, organisational deficiency, delays, fraud, 
system failure, default by third party service providers and similar incidents; 
- settlement risk, or risk that a party will default on settlement or payment obligations; 
- systemic risk, or risk that the inability of one institution to meet its obligations when due will cause 
other participants to be able to meet their obligations when due; and 
- transfer risk, or risk that a country will introduce exchange controls. 
464 RM Goode, Ownership and obligation in Commercial Transactions (1987) 103 433 at 434 
465 This is subject to contractual provision to the contrary; see chapter 8 below. 
466 See chapter 8 for a discussion of the level of this duty. 
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If the delivery of securities by the client to the custodian involves 
transferring property in those securities to the custodian, and if the 
redelivery of securities to the client at the end of the custody arrangement 
involves transferring property in those securities to the client (or to its 
order) both steps may be treated as a disposal for taxation purposes 
giving rise to a potential liability for capital gains tax and, in respect of 
certain securities, a liability to tax under the accrued income scheme or 
similar legislation. Furthermore, if the entire property interest passes to 
the custodian, so too will the entitlement to underlying tax credits, 
leaving the custodian potentially in the position of a dividend 
manufacturer and potentially prejudicing the availability of treaty reliefs. 
The stamp duty implications of such transfers would also need to be 
reviewed if they involved a change in the beneficial ownership of the 
securities concerned. In short, if the rights of clients are merely 
contractual, the global custody product may be taxable in a manner akin 
to a repurchase program. 
d. Charging Custody Securities 
If the client has no proprietary rights in the custody securities, he cannot 
charge those securities (whether in favour of the custodian or a third 
party). It has been suggested467, however, that a charge may be given 
over the client's contractual rights against the custodian under the custody 
agreement. The value of such security to any third party will depend 
upon the credit risk of the custodian. Thus, the value of portfolios of 
securities held in custody as collateral for borrowing will be reduced, as 
it will be subject to the credit risk of the custodian as well as that of the 
issuer. 
It is therefore important to address the Allocation Problem (and therefore Loss 
of Property Risk) in the context of custody 
2. The Cases 
Debate about the Allocation Problem has focused on the following line of cases. 
467 Robert Ryan, Taking Security over Investment Portfolios held in Global Custody, [1990] 10 JEBL 404. 
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a. Re London Wine (Shippers) Ltd. 468 
This case concerned a wine importing company to which a receiver had been 
appointed pursuant to a floating charge in favour of a bank. The company held 
wine in various warehouses. Most of the wine had been sold to individuals who 
left the wine in the possession of the company's warehouse agent. There was 
no segregation of any wine crates or cases in favour of any particular 
individual. The individuals claimed that they had a proprietary interest in the 
relevant crates or cases of wine. The receiver argued that they had merely 
unsecured claims for delivery of wine against the company. 
Judgment was given in favour of the receiver, on the basis that the individuals 
did not have any proprietary interests in the wine because there had been no 
allocation; proprietary rights could not pass at law for want of allocation or in 
equity for want of certainty of subject matter. 
Similar issues arose in the case of Hunter V MOSS, 469 in which it was held that 
lack of allocation did not prevent property from passing. However this case 
concerned shares, and the decision was based on the nature of shares. It is 
therefore not relevant to all types of security. This case will be discussed in the 
section on registered securities below (section E). 
b. In re Stapylton Retcher Ltd. 470 
The facts of this case were similar to those of Re London Wine, except that the 
wine intended for customers was segregated from the trading stock of the 
company. This difference was held by Judge Paul Baker Q. C. to be crucial: "I 
do not regard that decision [in Re London Wine] as inevitably governing the 
case before me. One obvious difference in the present case is the segregation 
of the wine purchased by the customers in a separate part of the warehouse and 
the careful maintenance of records within the company. Further as the London 




(1986) PCC 121 
[19931 1 WLR 934. 
In re Stapylton Fletcher Ltd., In re Ellis, son & Vidler Ltd_ [ 1944] 1 WLR 118 1. 
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other available source, there was no ascertainable bulk in that case. "47, I On 
this basis judgment was given in favour of the claimants from the liquidators. 
"In summary, on the facts here, I conclude that if a number of cases or bottle-s 
of identical wine are held, not mingled with the trading stock, in store for a 
group of customers, those cases or bottles will be ascertained for the purposes 
of section 16 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 even though they are not 
immediately appropriated to each individual customer. Property will pass by 
cornmon intention and not pursuant to section 18 rule (5). They will take as 
tenants in common.,, 472 
Aq 
As custodians segregate their house positions from Cli ient Holdings, might be 
thought that Fungible Custody can benefit from the rule in Stapylton Eetcher. 
However, the Allocation Problem concerns want of certainty of subject matter 
for an equitable interest to arise, and the case (unlike Re London Wine) related 
only to legal interests arising in the sale of goods. 473 A later case, Re 
Goldcorp, considered both equity and law. 
C. Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd. (in receivershi )474 p 
Goldcorp, a dealer in precious metals, agreed with certain customers to sell 
gold to them and hold it for them on an unallocated basis. It represented that 
it would set aside and hold a pool of gold sufficient to meet the claims of 
unallocated customers, but did not do so. It became insolvent and its stock of 
gold was insufficient to meet unallocated customers' claims. In a dispute 
between receivers appointed pursuant to a floating charge and unallocated 
customers, judgment was given (reversing the decision of the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal reported in Liggett v Kensington) in favour of the receivers. 





473 .. As I have found for the first four claimants in the case relating to E. S. V. on the basis of the passing of 
property at law, I do not have to consider the alternative lines of argument based on trusts, fiduciary 
relationships or other equitable principles in relation to these claims. " (at 1201). 
474 [ 19941 2A 11 ER 806 
- 128- 
This decision would seem to support the authority of Re London Wine. Indeed 
it was in part based on that earlier case. 475 
However, on a closer reading, the judgment provides authority that Fungible 
Custody is not affected by the Allocation Problem, and is not caught by the 
principle in Re London Wine, because custodians do segregate their house 
positions from Client Holdings. Lord Mustill distinguishes ('generic goods' the 
source of which is not specified) from 'ex-bulk' goods (which must come from 
a specified source). 476 The case for the claimants failed (both at law and in 
equity) because on the facts Goldcorp was an example of generic goods. 477 if 
it had been a question of ex-bulk goods, the position would have been 
different. 478 
475 "The facts of that case were not precisely the same as the present, and the arguments on the present appeal have 
been more far-reaching than were there deployed. Nevertheless their Lordships are greatly fortified in their 
opinion by the close analysis of the authorities and the principles by Oliver I and in other circumstances their 
Lordships would have been content to do little more than summarise it and express their entire agreement. "per 
Lord Mustill at 823. 
476 "It is common ground that the contracts in question were for the sale of unascertained goods. For present 
purposes, Two species of unascertained goods may be distinguished. First, there are 'generic goods'. These 
are sold on terms which preserve the seller's freedom to decide for himself how and from what source he will 
obtain goods answering the contractual description. Secondly, there are 'goods sold ex-bulk'. By this 
expression their Lordships denote goods which are by express stipulation to be supplied from a fixed and a pre- 
determined source, from within which the seller may make his own choice ... but outside which 
he may not go. 
For example, 'I sell you 60 of the 100 sheep now on my farrn'. " at 814. 
477 " An fact, however, the case turns not on appropriation but on ascertainment, and on the latter the law has 
never been in doubt. It makes no difference what the par-ties intended if what they intend is impossible: as is 
the case with an immediate transfer of title to goods whose identity is not yet known. ... Their Lordships have 
laboured this point, about which there has been no dispute, simply to show that any attempt by the non-allocated 
claimants to assert that a legal title passed by virtue of the sale would have been defeated, not by some and 
legal technicality but by what Lord Blackburn [in Treatise on the Effect of the Contract of Sale called 'the very 
nature of things'. The same conclusion applies, and for the same reason, to any argument that a title in equity 
was created by the sale, taken in isolation from the collateral promise. " at 814. 
478 " neir Lordships therefore turn to consider whether there is anything in the collateral promises which enables 
the customers to overcome the practical objections to an immediate transfer of title. The most direct route 
would be to treat the collateral promises as containing a declaration of trust by the company in favour of the 
customer. The question then immediately arises: what was the subject matter of the trust. Their Lordships do 
not doubt that the vendor of goods sold ex-bulk can effectively declare himself trustee of the bulk in favour of 
the buyer, so as to confer pro tanto an equitable title. But the present transaction was not of this type. " (at 
815. ) Because there was no segregation of the clients' entitlement from the trading stock of the company, the 
court could not infer an intention that the cornmingled assets should be held on trust for clients. If there had 
been such segregation, it might have done so. 
See also the following passage: "The only remaining alternative, consistently with the scheme being designed 
to give the customer any title at all before delivery, is that the company through the medium of the collateral 
promises had declared itself a trustee of the constantly changing undifferentiated bulk of bullion which should 
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However, the position remains unclear. Nowhere is it categorically stated that 
if client and house assets had been segregated, the interest of unallocated clients 
would have been proprietary; it is merely indicated that they might have 
been. 479 As Cooke P understated in the court below, "... it is a difficult area 
480 of law". 
Because of the seriousness of Loss of Property Risk, the prudent view would 
be to assume that it is present. 
A C! As indicated in section A above, when considering the relevance of the 
Allocation Problem for Fungible Custody, the position differs according to 
whether the securities held in Fungible Custody are Physical Bearer Securities, 
or registered securities. Although Physical Bearer Securities are inherently 
capable of allocation, in Fungible Custody they are unallocated. In contrast, 
section E below will argue that the inherent ftingibility of registered securities 
provides an answer to the Allocation Problem that is unavailable to Physical 
Bearer Securities. 
C. Physical Bearer Securities 
have been set aside to back the customers' contracts. Such a trust might well be feasible in theory, but their 
Lordships find it hard to reconcile with the practicalities of the scheme, for it would seem to involve that the 
separated bulk would become the source from which alone the sale contracts were to be supplied: whereas, as 
already observed, it is impossible to read the collateral promises as creating a sale ex-bulk. ... 
Let it be 
assumed, however, as did McKay J in his dissenting judgment, that the creation of a separate and sufficient 
stock would have given the non-allocated purchasers some kind of proprietary interest, the fact remains that the 
separate and sufficient stock did not exist. " at 820. 
479 Lord Mustill considers Re Wait [1927] 1 Ch 606 at pp 814,815 of his judgment. In that case, W. bought 1,000 
tons of wheat to be shipped from Oregon. He subsold 500 tons to the claimants, who paid in full. It was 
shipped but before it arrived W. Went bankrupt. His trustee argued the claimants' rights were merely 
contractual. It was held by the majority in the Court of Appeal that to 500 tons due to the claimants had not 
been appropriated, so no proprietary interest passed. However the court was divided and Sargant L. J. argued 
in his dissenting judgment that the claimants had an equitable assignment of part enforceable against the whole. 
In Go0corp, Lord Mustill conunents, "It is unnecessary to examine in detail the decision of the Court of Appeal 
in Re Wait [1927] 1 Ch 606 ... 
for the facts were crucially different. There, the contract was for a sale ex-bulk. 
... 
It was this feature which prompted the dissenting opinion of Sargant U that the sub-purchasers had a 
sufficient partial equitable interest in the whole to found a claim for the measuring out and delivery of 500 tons. 
No such feature exists here. " In this way, he indicates that ex-bulk provision would have permitted such an 
argument as that of Sargant U in Re Wait. On the other hand, he then goes on to refer to judgment of Atkin 
U in same case, indicating no title can pass even in ex-bulk provision. 
480 Liggett v Kensington [19931 1 NZLR 257 at 268. 
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In the case of Physical Bearer Securities, the Allocation Problem can be reduced (but not 
eliminated) on the basis of timing, as follows. 
1. Timing 
a. two lines of cases 
The issue under consideration in Re London Wine was the acquisition, by 
the purchasers, of proprietary interests in assets forming part a fungible 
pool. The key cases discussed in the judgment relate to the sale of goods 
transactions in which the same issue arose, i. e. whether property can be 
effectively transferred in respect of an unallocated portion of a pool. The 
important point is that in all these cases the mixing of the whole 
antedates the possible ownership of part. 
In one case that was discussed, the mixing of the whole predates the 
ownership of part, and this case is clearly distinguished by Oliver J. 
"The cases principally relied on in support of [the submission that the 
buyers own the wine as tenants in common] were Spence v. Union 
Marine Insurance ..., and Inglis v. Stock ... The former is of little help 
because it was concerned with a wholly different question [the author's 
italics], namely, what is the result when specific goods which 
undoubtedly were in separate individual ownership to start with became 
so mixed as to be indistinguishable ". 481 The "wholly different question" 
is the preservation of existing proprietary rights, as opposed to the 
creation of new ones. 
English case law makes a clear distinction between two situations. The 
first is where there is a purported transfer of an unident1fied part of a 
fungible bulk without appropriation. The second is where property 
belonging to several persons is commingled into a fungible bulk without 
segregation (commingling). In the former, Re London Wine and 
Goldcorp indicate that new proprietary rights do not arise, whether in law 




- 131 - 
b. Conuningling482 
There is a long line of authority establishing the principle, based on 
D- 
Roman law, that where the goods of different owners are mixed together 
so that they cannot be separated, the owners will hold the commingled 
goods as tenants in common. 483 These cases concern accidental or 
wrongful commingling; the parties have not intended it or agreed upon 
its outcome. These decisions, and those that informed them, were made 
482 The latin term for commingling is confusio: "Confusio is the Latin word for the mixing of goods belonging to 
two different owners, so that they cannot be separated". Per Staughton J., Indian Oil Corp Ltd v Greenstone 
Shipping S. A., the Ypatianna, [19871 3 All ER 893 at 894. 
483 In the case of Buckley v Gross ((1863) 3 B&S 566,122 ER 213), tallow belonging to dIfferent persons melted 
and flowed together into the sewers. It was held that the original owners did not lose their property in the 
mixture. "The tallow of the different owners was indeed mixed up into a molten mass, so that it might be 
difficult to apportion it among them; but I dissent from the doctrine that, because the property of different 
persons is confused together, that entities a third person to steal it with impunity. Probably the legal effect of 
such a mixture would be to make the owners tenants in conunon in equal proportions of the mass, but at all 
events they do not lose their property in it. " (per Blackburn J. at 574-575. ) 
In the case of Spence v. Union Marine Insurance Co. Ltd. ((1868) LR 3 CP 427 a ship's cargo consisting of 
bales of cotton, was shipped for various consignees. The ship was lost at sea. Some of the bales were 
delivered to the appropriate consignees; some were lost and some were recovered but had become 
indistinguishable by the obliteration of the marks on them; this last category was sold. The plaintiffs had a 
consignment of which only a small proportion was received in an identifiable state. The price of cotton having 
fallen, the plaintiffs wished to argue that the remainder of their consignment should be treated as having been 
lost outright so that they could claim for total loss (and not merely average loss) under their policy of insurance. 
It was held that there had been no actual or constructive total loss . ..... when goods of different owners become 
by accident so mixed together as to be undistinguishable, the owners of the goods so mixed become tenants in 
common of the whole in the proportions which they have severally contributed to it". (per Bovill, C. J., at 437. ) 
In the case of 7he 1patianna, the owner's vessel was chartered for the carriage of a cargo of crude oil from 
the Soviet Union to India. At the time the cargo was loaded, the vessel was carrying a residue of Iranian crude 
oil left over from its previous voyage and the cargo of Soviet crude was mixed with the residue without the 
consent of the consignees. There was no evidence that the two were of different qualities. After unloading at 
Madras some oil remained on board. The consignees claimed that this oil had become their property. Before 
this case, there was a line of authority that English law differed from Roman law in the case of the wrongful 
co-mixing of property. Under English law, where one party mixed his property with the property of another, 
so that they became indistinguishable, and did so wrongfully without the other person's consent, the innocent 
party became the owner of the whole (Lupton v White (1808) 15 Ves 432. ) Indian Oil Corp substituted "... the 
rule which justice requires. This is that where B wrongfully mixes the goods of A with goods of his own which 
are substantially of the same nature and quality, and they cannot in practice be separated, the mixture is held 
in common and A is entitled to receive out of it a quantity equal to that of his goods which went into the 
mixture, any doubt as to that quantity being resolved in favour of A". (per Staughton J. at 907,908. ) 
Thus, the only difference between the rules applicable to accidental co-mixing and wrongful co-mixing is that 
in the latter, any doubt as to quantity is resolved in favour of the innocent party. 
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not upon the notion, that strict justice was done, but upon this; that 
484 it was the only justice, that could be done". 
The question arises, can the same principle be applied to circumstances 
where the property of several persons is mixed by the agreement of those 
persons (for example under the express or implied terms of a custody 
agreement)? The answer will depend upon the intention of the parties in 
Y485 Cooke P refers to the each case. In the case of Coleman v. Harve 
judgment of Staughton J in Indian Oil Corp, and comments, "In my 
opinion the same should apply to a consensual [mixing] such as occurred 
in this case, at least where the evidence does not point to an intention to 
486 part altogether with ownership from the start". Thus, where it is 
possible to show that the parties who have agreed to mix their property 
together, intend that their proprietary rights should not be thereby 
extinguished, it should also be possible to identify a tenancy in common. 
(c) Old and New Custody Securities 
This principle applies to Fungible Custody as follows. Those custody 
securities that were transferred to the custodian at the initiation of the 
custody relationship will be referred to as "the Old Custody Securities". 
In the case of Old Custody Securities, the client's proprietary interest is 
not extinguished, but continues as an interest in an equitable tenancy in 
conunon. 
However, this may not be true of securities purchased by the client and 
transferred to the custodian during the currency of the custody service 
("New Custody Securities"). Where the custodian is instructed by a 
client (client 1) to settle a purchase transaction of 50 bonds on its behalf, 
the manner in which the custodian delivers those bonds into the client's 
484 
per Staughton, J., quoting from the judgment in White v Lady Lincoln, 77ze Duke of Newcastle v Kinderley 
(1803) 8 Ves 363,32 ER 395, in Indian Oil Corp, at 902. 
485 (1989) 1 NZLR 723. 
486 See also Judge Paul baker Q. C. in In re Stapylton Retcher [19941 1 W. L, R. 1181 at 1199: "So one may use 
the tenancy in common as a tool for remedying an unforseen mixing, damage or loss. If the creation of a 
tenancy in con-unon can be brought about by the construction of law, it can equally be brought about by 
agreement either express or to be inferred from the circumstances. . 
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custody account may be as follows. If the counterparty employs a broker 
(acting as principal) who also acts for another client of the global 
custodian, (client 2) and if client 2 purchases bonds on the same day 
through the same broker, the broker may aggregate the orders, or the 
global custodian may aggregate the settlement of the bonds of clients I 
and 2, so that one transfer of bonds into the client holding may satisfy 
487 both of them 
In such a case it is not possible to identify the particular bonds to which 
the transaction relates. Such identification would only be possible if the 
delivery obligation was satisfied by a transfer into the Client Holding of 
50 bonds (and perhaps only if no other such transfer took place on the 
same business day). This may be unlikely in practice. Because it may 
not, in practice, be possible to identify such securities before they enter 
the pool of the Clients Holding, it may not be possible to argue that the 
holding of them is an example of commingling. Therefore it would be 
prudent to assume that the Allocation Problem may be relevant to the 
Fungible Custody of Physical Bearer Securities. 
2. Tenancy in Common 
However it is possible to address Loss of Property Risk by appropriate wording 
in the custody documentation expressly creating a tenancy in common. 
The natural answer to the Allocation Problem is co-ownership. Rather than 
seek to identify a trust in favour of each client over their unallocated portion of 
the Client Securities, one may identify one global trust over all the Client 
Securities of a particular type in favour of all relevant clients as tenants in 
conunon. 
487 Another possibility is "internal settlement", where one client of the global custodian sells securities to another 
such client. "Internal settlement. A settlement that is effected through transfers of securities and funds on the 
books of a single intermediary. An internal settlement requires both counterparties to maintain their securities 
and funds accounts with the same intermediary" Bank for International Settlements, Cross-Border Securities 
Settlement Basle, May 1995, Glossary. 
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It was shown (in section Lb above) that such equitable tenancies in common 
probably arise by operation of law in cases of confusio or commingling, in 
relation to Old Securities, so that pre-existing proprietary rights are not 
extinguished by Fungible Custody. However, it was also noted that such co- 
ownership arrangements do not arise by operation of law where it is sought to 
create new proprietary rights over part of a pool. 488 (The position differs in 
New York where, under the Uniform Commercial Code, co-ownership is 
implied in such circumstances. 489) 
The judgment in Re London Wine indicates that, in these circumstances, while 
a tenancy in common will not arise by operation of law, it may be established 
by clear express provision. 490 
The prudent course would therefore be to include very clear express wording 
in the custody documentation to create such equitable tenancies in common 
among the custody clients over the commingled Client Holdings. 
The structure of these equitable tenancies in common is comparable to the 
structure of a unit trust. Each client will have an interest in an undivided 
488 See the comments of Mustill J in Karlshamns 01jefabriker v Eastport Navigation Corporation [ 1982] 1 All E. R. 
208 at 214, quoted by Judge Paul Baker Q. C. in In re StapyltonRetcher at 1197 in the following passage: "The 
passing of property is concerned with the creation of rights in rem, which the purchaser can assert, not only 
against the vendor but against the world at large, and which he can alienate in such a way as to create similar 
rights in a transferee. Where there are multiple contracts of sale in the hands of different buyers, in relation 
to undivided bulk, there are only two possible solutions. First, to hold that the buyers take as joint owners in 
undivided shares. English law has rejected this solution. The only alternative is to hold that the property does 
not pass until the goods are not only physically separated but separated in a way which enables an individual 
buyer to say that a particular portion has become his property under the contract of sale... " And see also Re 
Goldcorp Exchange Ltd at 820. 
489 Section 8-313. See Judge Paul Baker Q. C. in In re Stapylton Retcher at 1197, "The reference to English law 
as rejecting the solution of undivided shares is a reminder that in the United States of America that solution has 
been adopted. " 
490 "1 cannot see how, for instance, a farmer who declares himself to be a trustee of two sheep (without identifying 
them) can be said to have created a perfect and complete trust whatever right he may confer by such declaration 
as a matter of contract. And it would seem to me to be immaterial that at the time he had a flock of sheep out 
of which he could satisfy the interest. Of course, he could by appropriate words, declare himself to be a trustee 
of a specified proportion of his whole flock and thus create an equitable tenancy in common between himself 
and the named beneficiary, so that a proprietary interest would arise in the beneficiary in an undivided share 
of the flock and its produce. But the mere declaration that a given number of animals would be held upon trust 
could not, I should have thought, without very clear words pointing to such an intention, result in the creation 
of an interest in common in the proportion which that number bears to the number of the whole at the time of 
the declaration. " Oliver J at 137. 
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portion of the securities comprised in the tenancy in common equal to that 
which the number of such securities credited to their account in the global 
custodian's books bears to the total number of such securities in the client 
position. 
A separate tenancy in common exists in relation to each type of security from 
time to time comprised in clients' portfolios. This is because, in practice, it 
will not be the case that each client's portfolio includes the same range of 
securities in the same proportions. A necessary feature of a tenancy in common 
is unity of possession. 491 "Unity of possession is common to all forms of co- 
ownership. Each co-owner is as much entitled to possession of any part of the 
492 [property] as the others". 
This multiplication of tenancies in common should not create any administrative 
difficulty, because their existence is notional and automatic, and does not 
require any practical step to be taken. 
Chapter 3 considered the effect of computerisation on securities, and concluded 
that Immobilised, Global and Repackaged Securities (together Intermediate 
Securities) were interests under equitable tenancies in common. The holding 
of securities in Fungible Custody introduces another such level of 
intermediation, through which the interest of the investor is equitable and co- 
owned. 
In conclusion, the natural solution to the Allocation Problem is the equitable co- 
ownership of the Client Securities by the clients under tenancies in common. 
The case law indicates that such arrangements may not arise by operation of 
law, at least in respect of New Securities. It is possible that (because the 
historical role of the custodian, the current market perception of that role and 
the taxation and regulatory treatment of global custody all indicate an intention 
that client property in custody assets should be preserved) the Courts would 
hold that tenancies in common do so arise. The likelihood that the Courts 
would not so hold may be considered remote. However, the impact of such an 
event would be serious. Therefore, in the absence of direct authority for 
491 See Halsbury's Laws, 4th Edition, volume 35,636. 
492 Megarry & Wade, The Law of Real Property, 5th Edition, 419. 
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tenancies in common arising over New Securities by operation of law, it would 
be prudent to establish such equitable co-ownership arrangements by clear 
express wording493. This wording could be included in the custody contract, 
or even behind the scenes in a deed poll executed by the custodian. 
D. Registered Securities 
1. The impossibility of Allocation 
Unlike registered securities, Physical Bearer Securities are constituted by paper 
instruments which are choses in possession. 494 These instruments confer upon 
each holder a chose in action against the issuer (usually a debt). This chose in 
action differs from the chose in action constituting a registered security, for it 
is complete, in the sense that it is the whole of the benefit of a separate 
covenant to pay. In contrast, the interest of the owner of a registered security 
is fractional, in the sense that it is an undivided share of the obligations of the 
issuer in respect of the entire issue of securities. 495 
Because they are undivided, individual registered securities are incapable of 
allocation within a holding of such securities. 
2. Old Securities 
It was shown in section D. 1 above that, in the case of Physical Bearer 
Securities, the Old Securities are protected by the commingling rule, under 
which tenancies in common arise by operation of law. The position for 
registered securities is slightly different, for they are undivided. When Old 
Physical Bearers Securities are placed in Fungible Custody, they are mixed; 
when Old registered securities are placed in Fungible Custody, they are both 
mixed and unified, because the Client Holding of the custodian or its nominee 
of registered securities is undivided. It is arguable that the confusio cases cover 
493 This is the approach taken by London Settlement Systems in addressing the same legal problem arising when 
securities are pooled in the course of settlement. See the Talisman Clearing House Regulations, Regulation 
E. 5.13. a and the Central Gilts Office Reference Manual Section 8.2.8. 
494 See chapter 3 section 4. A 
495 See Chapter 3 section C. 2. f 
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both situations. 496 However, the position is unclear as all of the conuninglin-g 
cases relate to tangible goods which, although mixed, are legally capable of 
division. 
A body of case law that applies more naturally to these circumstances is that 
concerning the equitable rules of tracing. 497 These rules concern ex-bulk 
interests in undivided property (including bank accounts). 498 These were 
discussed briefly in chapter 2 section 3. c and further in chapter 3 section 7. B. d- 
Although the tracing r-ules are most commonly called into play as a remedy, in 
order to recover trust assets which have been misappropriated in breach of trust, 
they also apply in the absence of breach of trust, as a means of determining 
trust property499 Accordingly, where Fungible Custody takes place, tracing 
should be available even though the client agreed to those arrangements. 
In the case of Re Hallett's Estate500 Sir George Jessel states that where money 
which is owned in equity by one person is mixed together with other money, 
equity will impose a charge on the "indistinguishable mass,, 501 in the hands of 
the trustee or third parties. Thus, the equitable interest under a trust becomes 
an equitable interest under a charge, when it is mixed in an indistinguishable 
mass. This conversion from one type of equitable interest to another 502 upon 
commingling is natural. An interest under a trust is a species of title, while a 
charge is merely an encumbrance. While a trust requires certainty of subject 
496 See, for example, Buckley v Gross (1836) 3B&S 566 per Blackburn J at 575. 
497 See Ford and Lee, Princij)les of the Law of Trusts, 2nd ed, Sydney, The Law Book Company Limited, 1990, 
1719.1 at p. 475. 
498 "... this is the case of a banking account where all the sums paid in from one blended fund, the parts of which 
have no longer any distinct existence... " Claytons Case, per Sir Wrn Grant MR at 798. 
499 "There is no distinction therefore between a rightful and a wrongful disposition of the property, so far as 
regards the right of the beneficial owner to follow the proceeds" Re Hallett's Estate per Jessell M. R. at 708. 
Although for nearly a century after Re Hallett's Estate all tracing cases involved a tracing claim to the proceeds 
of unauthorised dispositions, the ability of beneficial owners to trace proceeds of authorised sales was confirmed 
in Aluminium Industrie Vaassen B. Vv Rontalpa Alwninium [19761 1 Lloyd's Rep 443. 
500 Knatchbull v Hallett [ 1874 - 80] All ER 793 
501 
at 80 1. 
502 A charge is always equitable and cannot subsist at law: "Since a charge is a mere encumbrance and does not 
involve any conveyance or assigru-nent at law, it can exist only in equity or by statute. " R. M. Goode, 
Commercial Law, p. 646. 
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matter, it is in the nature of a charge to attach to an asset without necessarily 
exhausting it, so that the question of which part of the asset is impressed with 
the charge, does not arise. 503 Professor Hayton refers to "-fundamental law 
underlying equitable tracing principles: that, as Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465 
shows, even where there is at the outset a clear trust of a separate fX, that trust 
of EX ceases to exist once wrongfully mixed with the trustee's, or an innocent 
volunteer's own EY, so that to disentangle matters the beneficiaries then have 
a charge over the E(X + Y) fund or its product for EX and interest or, if the 
f(X + Y) had been profitably invested, a share of each investment in the 
proportion X to X+y.,, 504 
The scope of the tracing charge has been the subject of much judicial 
discussion. The largest claims were made for it in the case of Space 
InvestmentS505. It was opined that the tracing charge attaches to all the assets 
of the trustee, on the basis that those assets have been swollen by the trust 
assets the subject of the tracing claim. 506 
However, this "swollen assets" approach was criticised by conunentatorS507 and 
judicially in Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (in receiversh, p)508. Lord MuStIJ1509 
quotes Court of Appeal in Re Diplock's Estate, 510 as follows: "The equitable 
remedies presuppose the continued existence of the money either as a separate 
503 For a discussion of the nature of a charge, see Swiss Ban* Corporation v Lloyds Bank [1980] 2 All ER 419 at 
426. 
504 Uncertainty of Subiect-Matter of Trusts, (1994) 110 LQR 335. 
505 Space Investments v Canadian Imperial Bank (19861 3 All ER 75 
506 Lord Templeman said, obiter, that where a bank trustee in breach of trust treats trust moneys as if they had 
been placed on deposit with it, "In these circumstances it is impossible for the beneficiaries interested in trust 
moneys misappropriated from their trust to trace their money to any particular asset belonging to the trustee 
bank. But equity allows the beneficiaries ... to trace the trust money to all the assets of the 
bank and to recover 
the trust money by the exercise of an equitable charge over all the assets of the bank. Where an insolvent bank 
goes into liquidation that equitable charge secures for the beneficiaries and the trust priority over the claims of 
the customers in respect of their deposits and over the claims of all other unsecured creditors. " at 76,77. 
507 See Professor Goode, Obligation and Ownership in Commercial Transactions (1987) 103 LQR 433 at 445-447. 
508 [19941 2 All ER 806, at 831,832. 
509 
at831 
510 [19481 Ch 465 at 521 
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fund or as part of a mixed fund or as latent in property acquired by means of 
such a fund. If, on the facts of any individual case, such continued existence 
is not established, equity is as helpless as the common law itself. " Because of 
this, there can be no tracing through an overdrawn account: "Their Lordships 
should, however, say that they find it difficult to understand how the judgment 
of the Board in Space Investments Ltd v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 
Trust Co (Bahamas) Ltd..., on which the claimants leaned heavily in argument, 
would enable them to overcome the difficulty that the money said to be 
impressed with the trust were paid into an overdrawn account and thereupon 
ceased to exist... The observations of the Board in Space Investments were 
concerned with a mixed, not a non-existent, fund. "511 
The swollen assets theory was rejected in Bishopsgate Investment Management 
Ltd. (in liquidation) v Homan512, which referred extensively with approval to 
the decision in Goldcorp. 513 In Fungible Custody there is an existing 
distinguishable fund, in the form of the Client Holding. Accordingly, the 
tracing charge is imposed, not over the whole of the custodian's assets, but over 
the Client Holding. No express language is required to create this charge, 
which arises by operation of law. 
New Securities 
However, the tracing rules cannot assist with New Securities, for here it is not 
a question of preserving existing property rights, but of allowing new ones to 
arise. The question then becomes, can equitable proprietary rights be conferred 
in an unallocated portion of a holding of property, where the parts of that 
holding are undivided and therefore incapable of allocation? 
511 
per Lord Mustill, at 827 
512 [1994] 3 WLR 1270, per Leggatt L. J. at 1279: "1 do not accept that it is possible to trace through an overdrawn 
bank account or to trace misappropriated money into an asset bought before the money was received by the 
purchaser. " See also Re Haller & Co. [1894] 2QB 237 at 245 per Davey U. 
513 This case included more frank criticism of Space Investments. See for example Dillon LJat 1275, who refers 
to first instance decision of Vinelott J: "Vinelott J rejected the submissions of B. I. M. founded on the Space 
Investments case. He considered that Lord Templeman could not have intended to effect such a fundamental 
change to the well-understood limitations to equitable tracing. " 
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Akin to Cash 
Unlike an issue of Physical Bearer Securities, an issue of registered securities 
represents one undivided obligation (or undivided group of obligations) of the 
issuer. The registered securities making up such an issue represent undivided 
fractions of that obligation. For this reason registered securities are akin to 
cash within the banking system. The credit balance of a deposit account 
represents the debt of the bank to the account holder. Whatever the size of that 
balance, it represents one debt; a balance of flOO does not represent 100 
separate debts for El each. 
For this reason, the case law relating to the allocation of cash in bank accounts 
can be used to assess the Allocation Problem for registered securities. 
(a) entire account 
There is no doubt that a trust can be effectively created over the entire 
balance of an identified bank account. 514 
no account 
It is equally clear that where the intention is to create a trust over a sum 
of money, but the money in question is not placed in an identified 
account, the trust will fail for want of certainty of subject matter. In Mac- 
Jordan Construction Ltd v Brookmount Erostin Ltd (in receivershi )515, p 
Mac-Jordan, a building firm, agreed to undertake building works with 
514 
515 
In Re Nanwa Gold Mines Ltd [1955] 3 All ER 219, Nanwa proposed a scheme for the reduction of its capital 
the issue of new shares. In a circular letter to shareholders it invited applications for new shares and explained 
that their issue was conditional on certain events, and that if these did not occur the application monies would 
be refunded, and that in the meantime they would be placed in a separate bank account. The application monies 
were so paid. A receiver was appointed under a debenture and the scheme was abandoned. On a summons 
to determine whether the application monies were the property of the company or of the applicants, it was held 
that it was the property of the applicants. Harman J noted that the promise to pay the money into a separate 
account accorded with section 51(3) of the Companies Act 1948 (now replaced by sections 86 and 87 of the 
Companies Act 1985 which were in turn repealed by Section 212(3) and Schedule 17 part I of the Financial 
Services Act 1986), which provided "All money received as aforesaid shall be kept in a separate banking 
account so long as the company may be liable to repay it under the last foregoing sub-section... " "That looks 
to me as though there had been an attempt to erect by statute a kind of trust for applicants in a case of this 
sort. " (at 224. ) 
[19921 BCLC 350 
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Brookmount, a property developer, in a contract incorporating JCT 
standard terms, which included provision that Brookmount would pay 
retention monies into a separate fund and hold them as trustee for Mac- 
Jordan. No fund was ever set aside for the retention monies. 
Brookmount executed a floating charge over all its assets in favour of its 
bank, and later became insolvent. The bank appointed administrative 
receivers under its floating charge. Mac-Jordan claimed that it had a 
proprietary interest in the retention monies under a tr-ust, and the that 
monies were therefore not subject to the charge. 
Judgment was for the receivers. Because no fund had been set aside, 
there was no allocated subject matter for a trust, and accordingly the 
interest of Mac-Jordan in the retention monies was merely contractual: 
"In the event, however, no fund was ever appropriated and set aside by 
Brookmount in respect of the retentions made under the building contract. 
It is that default that has created the problems giving rise to this 
litigation.,, 516 If Brookmount had set aside a fund, Mac-Jordan would 
have been a beneficiary of the trust fund thereby constituted. 517 
The case can be distinguished from Fungible Custody. The problem in 
Fungible Custody is that the assets to which a particular client's interest 
must attach is greater than that interest. The problem in this case was 
that there were no identified assets to which an interest could attach. If 
there had been such assets, there would have been an interest: "In the 
present case, the contractual right does not relate to any specific asset or 
assets. Indeed, if it did, there would be no problem. The plaintiff would 
on well-established principles, be able to claim an equitable interest in the 
asset or assets in question...,, 518 
516 
per Scott U at 352. 
517 
at 355. See also Re Jartay Development Ltd. (1983) 22 Build. L. R. 134; Rayak Construction v Lampeter Meat 
Co. Ltd. (1979) 12 Build. L. R. 30; Neste Oy v Lloyds Bank PLC (1993) 2 Lloyds Rep 658, and Concorde 




In other words, the case is not authority that a trust must fail for want of 
certainty of subject matter where it relates to part of a bulk, but rather 
than it must so fail where it relates to no assets at all. 
C. ex bulk 
The important question, therefore, is whether it is possible to create an 
equitable interest in cash ex bulk, i. e. over part of the balance of a bank 
account or other debt. There is authority that this is possible (although 
the nature of such an interest is variously described in the relevant cases 
as an assignment, a trust and a charge). 
It has long been clear that a purported assignment of part of an debt is 
effective in conferring an equitable interest in the debt. In Brice v 
Bannister519 an assignment of part of a future debt was recognised as a 
valid assignment of a chose in action (although the point that the 
assignment was only of part of the debt was not taken). In In re Row, ex 
parte South'520 a direction by a creditor to a debtor to pay part of a debt 
to a third party was recognised a conferring a proprietary interest on the 
third party in the debt, although it is not clear whether that interest was 
by way of assignment or charge. (Again, in this case the point that the 
direction related only to part of the debt was not taken. ) In Durham 
521 Brothers v Robertson, there is some ambiguity as to the nature of the 
equitable interest conferred by a purported assignment of part of a 
debt. 522 
In the 1920s the case law tends to identify the nature of the equitable 
interest as arising under an assignment and not merely a charge. In re 
519 (1878) 3 QBD 569, C. A. 
520 (1818) 36 ER 907 
521 C. A. [18981 1 Q. B. 765 
522 See Chitty I at 769: "... an engagement or direction to pay, out of a debt or fund, a sum of money constitutes 
an equitable assignment, though it does not operate as an assignment of the whole fund or debt. A mere charge 
on a fund or debt operates as a partial equitable assignment. ". 
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Steel Wing Company, 523 Lawrence J comments: 524 "The assignment of 
part of a debt however operated in equity to transfer the part assigned, 
and consequently in my judgment constitutes the assignee a creditor in 
equity of the company in respect of that part. -525 In the case of Palmer 
Y526 v Ca re , 
Lord Wrenbury approves the dictum of Lord Truro in the 
earlier case of Rodick v Gandell (1852): "The law as to equitable 
assignment, as stated by Lord Truro in Rodick v Gandell [(ID. M. & C. 
763,777,778] is this: 'The extent of the principle to be deduced is that 
an agreement between a debtor and a creditor that the debt owing shall 
be paid out of a specific fund coming to the debtor ... will operate as an 
equitable assignment of the ... 
fund to which the order refers. "527 
However, with modern case law it is less clear that equity can confer title 
(as opposed to a mere charge) over part of a debt. The case of Swiss 
Bank Corpn v. Lloyds Bank528 529 establishes the following principle: 
523 [ 192 11 1 Ch 349 
524 
at356 
525 (However, as assignment of part of a debt cannot take effect as a statutory legal assignment: See In re Steel 
Wing Company [19211 1 Ch 349, per Lawrence J at 354, in which he considers section 25(6) of the Judicature 
Act 1873, which was replaced by section 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925. ) 
526 [1926] All ER Rep 650 
527 
at 65 1. 
528 [1979] 2 All ER 853; [198012 All ER 419; [198112 All ER 449. 
529 This case concerned an English company, IFT, which borrowed money from SBC in order to buy securities 
in an Israeli company, FIBI. The Bank of England gave exchange control consent to the loan subject to 
conditions, one of which was that the loan should be repaid out of the FIBI securities or their proceeds of sale. 
In the loan agreement between SBC and IFT, IFT coverianted to observe all the Bank of England's conditions. 
IFT bought the securities with the borrowed money. Its ultimate parent, Triumph, went into financial 
difficulties. Lloyds agreed to assist Triumph on condition that IFT guaranteed Triumph's liabilities. To support 
this guarantee IFT equitably charged the FIBI securities to Lloyds. Triumph went into liquidation. IFT sold 
the securities and deposited the proceeds with Lloyds. SBC claimed a declaration that it was entitled to require 
repayment of the loan out of the proceeds. 
Judgment was given at first instance for SBC. The covenant to observe the Bank of England's conditions was 
specifically enforceable. It gave SBC an equitable change or interest in the proceeds, taking priority to Lloyds 
equitable charge. It was not necessary to show that the parties intended to create such a charge or interest, but 
merely that they had agreed (in effect) that the debt should be paid out of the specified property. 
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"... if a debtor undertakes to segregate a particular fund or asset and to 
pay the debt out of that fund or asset, the inference may be clear, in the 
absence of any contra indication, that the parties' intention is that the 
creditor should have such a proprietary interest in the segregated fiind or 
asset as will enable him to realise out of it the amount owed to him by 
the debtor ... if the obligation be to pay out of the fund, a debt due by 
one party to the transaction to the other, the fund belonging to or being 
due to the debtor, this amounts to an equitable assignment pro tanto of 
the fund". 530 531 
Thus it is clear that an equitable interest can be conferred over part of a 
pool of undivided property. Provided the pool is allocated, the part need 
not be. However it is not clear that this interest is a trust interest; it may 
be merely a charge. 532 
5. Equitable Charge 
It has been established that equitable charges can be granted over an unallocated 
portion of a holding of property, where the parts of that holding are undivided. 
This charge arises from an agreement to satisfy a contractual obligation out of 
an earmarked fund or pool. This principle may be applied to the Allocation 
Problem as follows. 
The decision was reversed on appeal, on a point of fact. It was held that the parties had not agreed to the 
repayment of the debt out of specified property, but rather merely to observe the Banks conditions from time 
to time (which conditions might have changed so as not to require repayment in that manner). An appeal by 
SBC to the House of Lords was dismissed. . 
Although SBC lost on a point of fact, the principle forming the basis of the first instance decision was upheld 
530 
per Buckley LJ at 426, who cites the cases of Palmer v Carey and Rodick v Gandell as authority for this 
statement. 
531 At first instance, a slightly different basis for the equitable interest is given, as follows: "the doctrine that, in 
the eyes of equity, that which ought to have been done is to be treated as having been done ... 
Once the 
position is reached that an order for specific performance could have been made against the legal owner if the 
matter had been brought before the court, thereafter the legal owner holds the property shorn of those rights 
in the property which the court of equity would decree belongs to the other" (per Browne-Wilkinson J at 866). 
532 Browne-Wilkinson J refers to Barclays Bank v Quistclose Invesmtents Ltd [1968] 3 All ER 615 and comments, 
"In my judgment that case is wholly consistent with the principle that a contractual promise to apply earmarked 
monies for a specific purpose creates an equitable interest in those monies, whether by way of charge or by way 
of trust. " (at 868 at first instance). See also Re ILG Travel Ltd [ 1995] 2 BCLC 128. 
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Under the custody agreement providing for Fungible Custody, the custodian 
agrees to deliver to the client (or to its order) out of the Client Holding 
securities equivalent to those originally deposited. Thus there is an agreement 
to satisfy a contractual redelivery obligation out of an earmarked pool (the 
Client Holding). 
There is no express agreement to create a charge. However, this does not 
prevent it from arising: "In my judgment if a contract binds one party to pay 
a debt out of specific property, such a contract is specifically enforceable and 
creates an equitable charge or interest in the specific property, whether or not 
the parties knew and intended the legal consequence to follow. To put it 
another way, parties must be taken to intend the legal consequences of the 
contracts they make. ', 533 Indeed, the absence of express agreement to create 
534 a charge has the benefit of obviating the need for registration. 
The general nature of a charge is the subject of some debate. Professor Goode 
argues that a charge "... is a mere encumbrance and does not operate to transfer 
any proprietary interest". 535 However, in the context of tracing, it operates to 
confer a proprietary interest. Thus when Buckley L. J. considers the nature of 
the equitable charge in the Court of Appeal in Swiss Bank Corporation v Lloyds 
Bank Ltd536 he states that an equitable charge may "... take the form either of 
an equitable mortgage or of an equitable charge not by way of mortgage ... 
The essence of any transaction by way of mortgage is that a debtor confers on 
his creditor a proprietary interest in the property of the debtor, or undertakes 
in a binding manner to do so ...... 
Thus, the interest of the custody client under such an implied charge is not 
registrable, and is proprietary. However, it is still unclear that such an interest 
533 Swiss Bank v Lloyds Bank Per Wilkinson Browne J at first instance, at 869. 
534 The registration requirements of the Companies Act 1985 relate to "... a charge created by a company... " (CA 
1985 Section 395 1 (1)). The point is brought out in the proposed new version of section 395(2) (to be 
substituted by sections 92 et seq of the Companies Act 1989: ""Charge" means any form of security (fixed or 
floating) over property, other than an interest arising by operation on law; " 
535 J Milnes Holden, The Law and Practice of Banking- 8 ed, Pitmans, London 1993, Volume 2, at 21 the 
[charge] conveys nothing but merely gives the "chargee" certain rights over the property". 
536 [19801 2 All ER 419 at 425,426. 
- 146- 
is as satisfactory as equitable title. Be-cause no one client controls the dealings 
in the whole of the Client Holding (merely that undivided fraction of it 
attributable to its account) this implied charge would probably be classified as 
a floating charge. C) 
537 A number of disadvantages are associated with floatincy 
(as opposed to fixed) charges. Although in this case the charge is not 
registrable, it would be postponed to the claims of preferential creditors in the 
liquidation of the custodian. 538 
Another problem with a tracing charge is the "lowest intermediate balance" rule 
discussed in Re Goldcorp. In this judgment Lord Mustill endorsed the decision 
in Roscoe v Winder 539 that the ability to trace into an account is limited to the 
lowest balance of that account between the time when the trust assets entered 
the account, and the time when tracing is sought. 540 Whether or not this rule 
would be applied to the Client Holding is uncertain, fbr "The law relating to the 
creation and tracing of equitable proprietary interests is still in a state of 
development.,, 541. However, if applicable, it would clearly be problematic in 
an actively traded Client Holding that might fluctuate in size from time to time. 
It is therefore necessary to ensure that the interest of the client arises under a 
trust and not merely a change. 
6. Trust Interest 
Hunter V MOSS542 may be of assistance in the search fbr authority that a trust 
can be created over an unallocated part of a holding of registered securities. 
The facts of this case were as fbIlows. Moss was the registered holder of 950 
537 A test of a floating charge is that the chargor retains freedom to deal with the charged assets: Siebe Gorman 
v Barclays ( 1979] 2 Lloyds Rep 142 
538 (and become generally unenforceable upon administration) 
539 [ 19151 1 Ch 62 
540 " In these circumstances the bullion belonging to the Walker & Hall claimants which became held by the 
company's receivers consisted of bullion equal to the lowest balance of the metal held by the company at any 
time: see Janws Roscoe (Bolton) Ltd v Mnder [1915] 1 Ch 62. " (at 831. ) 
541 Goldcorp, per Lord MustiH at 832. 
542 (1993] 1 WLR 934; [1994] 1 WLR 452, CA. 
- 147- 
shares in a company with 1,000 shares in issue. Moss made a declaration of 
trust over 5% of the company's issued share capital in favour of Hunter. A 
valid trust was held to have been created over 50 of Moss's shares. Moss 
applied by motion for the judgment to be recalled, arguing that the trust failed 
for want of certainty of subject matter. 
The motion was dismissed by Rimer Q. C., on the basis that, in a trust over 
intangibles, the requirement for certainty of subject matter does not necessarily 
entail segregation or appropriation. "The defendant did not identify any 
particular 50 shares for the plaintiff because to do so was unnecessary and 
irrelevant. All 950 of his shares carried identical rights ... Any suggested 
uncertainty as to subject matter appears to me to be theoretical and conceptual 
rather than real and practical543. 
This decision should be treated with some caution. 544 On the particular facts 
of the case, it was clearly in the interests of justice that a valid trust should be 
found. The judgment, which was pragmatic, focused more on the merits of the 
dispute before the court than the wider principles of equity discussed earlier in 
this chapter. 545 Furthermore, the shares in question were in a private company, 
and the implications for the custody and settlement in the markets in publicly 
traded securities were not considered. 
It would be prudent to follow the greater weight of the combined authority of 
the other cases cited in this section, that in the absence of allocation, an 
equitable interest cannot subsist as an interest under a trust, but can only take 
effect as a charge. 
543 
per Colin Rimer QC (sitting as deputy High Court Judge) at 946. 
544 See David Hayton, Uncertainty of Subiect-Matter of Trusts, (1994) 110 LQR 335. In particular, inter vivos 
transfers are not distinguished from testamentary transfers. 
545 "Dillon L. J. then dealt with Mac-Jordan Construction Ltd v Brookmount Erostin Ltd (1991) 56 B. L. R I but did 
not get to the heart of it. " David Hayton, Uncertainty of Subject-Matter of Trusts, p. 337. 
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Conclusions - Registered Securities 
A trust requires allocated subject matter, and cannot be created ex-bulk. A- 
charge is different, for it can (and often does) attach to an asset without 
exhausting it. A charge is therefore the natural (and probably only possible) 
characterisation of an ex-bulk equitable interest. However a charge is less 
satisfactory for the custody client than an interest under a trust. 
The natural solution to this problem is the same as the solution to the Allocation 
Problem for Physical Registered Securities: expressly to create a trust over the 
whole of the client holding, for the clients together as tenants in conunon. 
Conclusions 
Where the securities of more than one client are commingled in Fungible Custody, there 
is some doubt that such clients have adequate proprietary rights in such securities. Such 
doubt could readily be removed by legislation546. An alternative approach is contractual 
establishing co-ownership rights in equity. 547 Such wording should be included in the 
custody agreement as a matter of prudence. 
546 (See, for example, the Belgian Royal Decree No 62 of November 1967, the Luxembourg Grand-Ducal Decree 
of February 1971, the German Depotgesetz of 1937 and article 8-302 of the New York Uniform Commercial 
Code. ) 
547 See, for example, CGO Reference Manual section 8.2.8 and Talisman Clearing House Regulations, Regulation 
E. 5.1.3. a. 
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Chapter 6. English Private International IaW548 
"It has not been easy for the conflict of laws to adapt itself to the changes in social and 
commercial life which the twentieth century has witnessed. , 549 
General 
1. Legal Uncertainty 
Two great changes have affected the securities markets in the late 20th century: 
international isation and computerisation. The rise of cross border investment 
made global custody necessary; computers made it possible. But although 
securities business is international and electronic, settled law does not yet reflect 
this. Chapters 3 and 4 considered how traditional concepts of personal property 
fail adequately to account for assets in the securities markets which are 
intangible and unallocated. 
The legal aspects of cross-border arrangements are inherently unpredictable. 
While much admirable work has recently been done in advocating550 and 
implementing551 reform of private international law on a local and multi-lateral 
basis in developed jurisdictions, such reform will not introduce certainty into 
the securities markets as long as courts of unreformed countries may assume 
jurisdiction. The problem is particularly acute in the emerging markets, where 
local courts may be unlikely to decline jurisdiction in matters concerning locally 
issued securities, and where the legal understanding of cross-border securities 
arrangements may differ from that in the developed markets. For this reason, 
548 This is a complex area of law, and discussed in highly summary form in this section. The following is not a 
systematic treatment of the subject, and merely considers those aspects of conflicts of law that are of particular 
interest in the context of the proprietary aspects of global custody. 
549 Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, l2ed, 1993, London, Sweet & Maxwell, p. 7. 
550 See Randall Guynn, Modernising Securities Ownership, Transfer and Pledging Laws, MA, London 1996. 
551 See the revised Article 8 of the US Uniform Commercial Code, section 8-110. 
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in practice, the forum of a dispute is the key issue. 552 Further, enforcement of 
judgments is of central importance. Even where judgment is obtained in 
England concerning assets held abroad, local recognition and enforcement of 
that judgment remains a further obstacle to be surmounted, while the 
enforcement of competing local or foreign judgments against the assets cannot 
be excluded. 
This chapter will consider English private international law as it relates to 
global custody, and the following chapter will consider general issues of private 
international law as they relate to taking security over, and the intermediation 
of, custody assets. 
2. Cash and Securities 
Cases concerning the securities held in global custody may involve private 
international law, as such securities may constitute property situated in a foreign 
country. It might be thought that the same will be true of the cash element of 
a custody portfolio, but this is not the case. 
A portfolio of international securities is likely to generate multi-currency cash 
balances. This is because income and proceeds of sale of securities are likely 
to be denominated in the currencies that are legal tender in the jurisdictions 
from which they are paid. Because of the structure of the international banking 
settlement system, currency is generally held in the jurisdiction in which it is 
legal tender. 553 Thus, where a London global custodian554 maintains a credit 
balance of US $1 million for a custody client, it will not of course keep a huge 
pile of dollar bills in its vaults in London to match that credit balance. The 
asset of the global custodian corresponding to that credit balance will be a 
further credit balance of $1 million (or, more likely, part of a larger balance) 
in favour of the global custodian in the books of its correspondent bank in New 
552 Once an action concerning foreign securities has been commenced in the jurisdiction of the issuer, the En,, -, 
Ilsh 
courts would be most unlikely to entertain an action on the same issue. This underlines the importance of 
jurisdiction clauses in global custody documentation. 
553 See the discussion of eurodollars by Terence Prime, in International Bonds and Certificates of Deposit 
Butterworths, London, 1990, pp 4,5 
554 It is assumed here that the global custodian in London is a bank. 
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York. 555 The dollar account of the global custodian at the New York 
correspondent may be said to constitute dollars, while that of the custody client 
at the London global custodian may be said to constitute eurodollars. Where 
U. S. dollar income or proceeds of sale of custody securities are paid to the 
global custodian on behalf of custody clients, they are likely to be paid directly 
to its New York correspondent bank. 
Because of the use of correspondent banks, it might be thought that the global 
custodian is holding the client's non-sterling money overseas. However, this 
is not the case. The asset of the client is not the dollars in New York, but the 
eurodollars in London. Chapter 4 considered the legal relationship between the 
custodian and its client. It was seen that, in the case of that part of the custody 
portfolio consisting of cash, this relationship is generally that of debtor and 
creditor. In other words, where a custody portfolio includes a positive balance 
of $1 million, the asset of the custody client is a debt owed to it by the global 
custodian to pay the client $1 million. The eurodollar deposit of the global 
custodian with the New York correspondent is the asset, not of custody clients, 
but of the global custodian. The cash asset of the custody client is not located 
in a foreign country. For this reason, the discussion of private international law 
in this and the following chapter will be confined to securities. 
3. Approach of the courts 
"The questions that arise in conflict of laws cases are of two main types: first, 
has the English court jurisdiction to determine this case? And secondly, if so, 
what law should it apply? ', 556 As the first issue before the courts will always 
be the question of jurisdiction, it will be considered this first in section B 
below. Section C will consider the approach of the courts to choice of law in 
general terms. 
Jurisdiction 
555 The correspondent bank is also most unlikely to keep a pile of dollar bills; instead, its asset corresponding it 
its dollar liability to the global custodian, is likely to be a credit balance in its favour with the Federal Reserve 
Bank, or a settlement bank if it does not have an account at the Fed. 
556 Dicey and Morris, volume 1. p. 4. The passage continues, "T'here may be sometimes a third question, namely, 
will the English court recognise or enforce a foreign judgment purporting to determine the issue between the 
parties" Recognition of foreign judgments will not be considered in detail in this work. 
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The rules that determine whether the English courts will have jurisdiction in any 
particular case concerning global custody, differ according to whether or not the matter 
is related to insolvency. Insolvency jurisdiction is considered in cbapter 7. Non- 
insolvency jurisdiction is considered in this section. 
Every action in the English High Court must be started by writ. Two different regimes 
apply depending on whether or not the defendant is domiciled in the EC (including 
England) or the EFTA. If it is so domiciled, the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 
1982 (as amended by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1991) ("the Act") applies, 
harmonising English jurisdiction rules with European rules. Broadly speaking, if the 
defendant is domiciled elsewhere, the general law jurisdiction rules apply. These two 
regimes will be considered in sections 1 and 2 below; section 3 will go on briefly to 
consider the circumstances in which the court may lose or decline to exercise jurisdiction 
which it prima facie has. 
1. The Act 
The Act gives effect in English law to the Brussels and Lugano Conventions on 
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments ("the Conventions', 55 7)55 8. The 
Brussels Convention was made between EC member states, and the Lugano 
Convention was made between EC and EFTA member states. The two 
Conventions are in like fonn. Title 11 of each of the Conventions relates to 
jurisdiction. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom have signed one or both of the 
Conventions, and they will be referred to as Contracting States. 
scope 
Broadly speaking, the Conventions cover civil and commercial matters 
(but not insolvency-related matters or arbitration). 
557 
558 
For the full titles of the Conventions, see article I(l) of the Act. 
In sections 2(l) and 3A(1) of the Act respectively. 
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b. domicile 
The rules determining jurisdiction under the Conventions are primarily 
based on the domicile of the defendant. The general rule is that a 
defendant may be sued in the Contracting State where he is domiciled, 
and may be sued by another Contracting State only in accordance with 
special rules of jurisdiction. 
To determine the meaning of domicile, the Conventions and the Act must 
be read together. Under the Conventions, the seat of a company or other 
legal person is treated as its domicIle559. In order to determine that seat, 
the courts must apply its rules of private international law. 560These rules 
are provided in section 42 of the Act. 
Under section 42, companies having a seat in England would generally 
include both companies incorporated in England, and foreign companies 
having a registered branch in England, having (in each case) a place of 
business (i. e. carrying on any activity561) in England (whether or not 
amounting to central management and control). Thus, foreign sub- 
custodians may be domiciled in England if they have a London branch. 
A company has its seat in a Contracting State other than the United 
Kingdom if (broadly) that state is either its place of incorporation and 
registered office (or official place of service) or its place of central 
management and contro, 562 and it has its seat in that state under local 
l 563 aw 
C. non-exclusive jurisdiction 
559 This provision is duplicated in section 42(l) of the Act. 
560 Article 53, first paragraph. 
561 'business" includes any activity carried on by a corporation or association, and "place of business" shall be 
construed accordingly" (section 42(8)). 
562 Section 42(6) 
563 Section 42M. 
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- defendant domiciled in England. If the defendant is domiciled in 
England, the English courts generally have jurisdiction. 564 They will 
not, however, have jurisdiction if another Contracting State has exclusiVe 
jurisdiction (see section [d] below) or if proceedings have already begun 
in another Contracting State. 
This might confer jurisdiction on the English court where a suit is 
brought against an English global custodian or sub-custodian, or a foreign I 
sub-custodian with a branch in London. 
- English trust. The English courts generally have jurisdiction in claims 
against a trustee or a beneficiary under a trust if the trust is domiciled in 
England565 or in connection with a trust governed by English IaW566. 
It was seen (in chapter 4) that the relationship between the custodian and 
its client under English law is likely to be characterised as that of trustee 
and beneficiary. A trust is domiciled in England for this purpose567 if 
English law is the system of law with which the trust has its closest and 
most real connection. This should be the case if a global custody 
agreement is in place the global custody relationship (and therefore the 
trust) is governed by that document. Therefore, assuming the global 
custody agreement is governed by English law, the English court should 
have jurisdiction in all litigation against the global custodian or its client 
concerning the proprietary and fiduciary aspects of the relationship 
between them. 
- movable property in England. While the situs of property is important 
in cases outside the scope of the Act and the Conventions, in general, 
under the Act and the Conventions, jurisdiction follows the domicile of 
the defendant, and not the situs of property. However, an exception is 
564 Article 2. 
565 Article 5(6) of the Conventions 
566 Article 17 paragraph 2 of the Conventions. 
567 In accordance with article 53 of the Conventions and section 45 of the Act. "Of course it is art1ficial and novel 
to speak of the domicile of a trust at all. But it is a convenient form of shorthand. " Dicey & Morris. The 
Conflict of Laws, p. 81. 
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made under the Act where the defendant is domiciled in Scotland or 
Northern Ireland and the case concerns proprietary rights in movable 
prope y568. 
d. exclusive juris&ction 
- public register Regardless of domicile, the Conventions confer 
exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of the relevant Contracting States in 
certain circumstances. These include proceedings which have as their 
object the validity of entries in public registerS569, and in this case 
jurisdiction is conferred on the courts of the Contracting State in which 
the register is kept570. Dicey comments, "In England it is not likely to 
be of practical significance except in connection with problems relating 
to registered land... ', 571. However, it might be argued that public 
registers for this purpose include the registers of public companies. 
Thus, if a custody client sought an order that a French register be 
amended in its favour, the French courts might have exclusive 
jurisdiction in the matter. 
- submission. Very broadly, where two parties, one of whom is 
domiciled in a Contracting State572, agree (in customary written form) 
that the court of a Contracting State are to have jurisdiction in connection 
with their relationship, that court will have exclusive Jurisdiction. 573 
568 Including security interests, and the right to dispose of the property. Schedule 4, article 5(8) 
569 Other cases are (broadly) proceedings concerning immovable property, the constitution of companies, patents 
and trademarks and the enforcement of judgments. 
570 Article 16(3) of the Conventions. 
571 Volume 1, p 385. 
572 A different rule applies for such agreements where neither party is so domiciled: article 17 paragraph 2. 
573 Article 17 of each of the Conventions, which are in different fon-n. For the position before the Conventions 
were implemented, see Trendte-x Trading v Credit Suisse [19801 1 Q. B. 629, per Denning MR. at 658: "At once 
we come upon the clause which gives exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of Geneva. T"hat clause must be given 
full effect unless its enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust or that the clause was invoked for such 
reasons as fraud ---" 
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Submission to the jurisdiction of a Contracting State in a trust instrument 
confers exclusive jurisdiction in any proceedings brought against (inter 
alia) trustee or beneficiary involving the trust relationship. 574 On the 
basis that the global custodian is a trustee, this would include jurisdiction 
clauses in the global custody agreement. 
e. Summary 
AS a broad rule, in non-insolvency related proprietary matters, it should 
be possible to sue the following persons in England: 
- the London global custodian (probably under every head 
discussed above other than public register and movable property), 
- the client (if it is incorporated in England or has an English 
branch, and carries on some activity in England - English domicile 
- or if the client is domiciled in another Contracting State and the 
global custody agreement is governed by English law - English 
trust- , or again if there is a submission to the English courts in the 
global custody agreement); and 
- the foreign sub-custodian which is domiciled in another 
Contracting State (if the sub-custody agreement is governed by 
English law - English trust- or contains a submission to the 
English court. 575 
574 (For exceptions to this rule, see Article 17 paragraph 4. ) 
575 It should also be noted that under article 24 of the Conventions, the English courts have jurisdiction "for such 
provisional, including protective, measures as may be available under the law of [England], even if, under this 
Convention, the courts of another Contracting State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. " Thus, 
even where the substance of a dispute is to be brought in France, the English courts would be able to grant a 
mareva injunction (restraining a defendant from removing his assets out of the jurisdiction pending trial) or an 
Anton Piller order (for the inspection of premises to discover documents or chattels to which the plaintiff may 
be entitled). Both of these may affect an English custodian holding documents or securities for its clients in 
London. 
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General Law 
In cases outside the Act (broadly, where the defendant is not domiciled in the 
EC or EFTA)576 the jurisdiction rules under the g%l IY neral law will appk, as 
follows. Whereas the "European" regime discussed above is based on domicile, 
the "old English" regime discussed below is based on presence. 
The English court has jurisdiction if the defendant is present (at the time of 
service of the writ, even fleetingly) in England, or submits to the jurisdiction 
of the court. Otherwise, the court has discretionary power to assume 
jurisdiction (by giving leave for service out of the jurisdiction) in the cases 
mentioned in Order 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. 
a. present in England 
Service of a writ is permissible on a defendant who is present in England, 
provided it is not domiciled in another Contracting State and provided 
also the matter is not one in which another Contracting State has 
exclusive jurisdiction. 577 In addition to companies incorporated in 
England and those having registered branches in England, any foreign 
company carrying on business in England (whether or not registered here) 
is present for these purposes. 578 
Thus, it should be possible to sue a foreign sub-custodian which carries 
on business in London (whether or not through a registered branch) 
provided (broadly) that its head office is not located in the EC or EFTA. 
This is true whether or not the sub-custody agreement is governed by 
English law or contains a submission to the jurisdiction of the English 
576 
and in cases otherwise outside the scope of the Conventions, but not in cases in which article 16 of the 
Conventions confers exclusive jurisdiction on a Contracting State, regardless of domicile (e. g. proceedings 
concerning public registers, and also not in cases where the parties have submitted to the jurisdiction of a 
Contracting State in accordance with article 17). 
577 Qjcej, rule 24, volume 1, p 298. 
578 Service may be effected under the Companies Act 1985 section 725(l) (in the case of Env-lish incorporated 
companies) and section 695(1) in the case of English registered branches of foreign companies, and otherwise 
under Orqer 65 rule 3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (in the case of companies carrying on business in 
England at common law but unregistered at the companies registry. 
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court (although an exclusive submission to another court might dI splace 
English jurisdiction: see section 3 below). 
submission 
The court has jurisdiction where the defendant submits to it. Submission 
can be inferred from conduct579 or from contractual terms. Such a 
jurisdiction clause will be effective, provided there is proper provision for 
the service of process on the defendant (or its agent). )80 
Thus a well drafted English jurisdiction clause (appointing an English 
process agent) will bring a foreign sub-custodian within the jurisdiction 
of the English court. It would seem that this is the case even where the 
action relates to movable property which is situated in another 
jurisdiction. 581 Therefore, in the absence of insolvency, the English 
court could make an order concerning the ownership of foreign securities. 
The willingness of foreign courts to recognise such an order may be 
another matter. 
C. leave to serve writ outside the jurisdiction 
In addition, the English court has a discretionary power to assume 
jurisdiction by granting leave to serve a writ outside the jurisdiction in 
certain circumstances under RSC Order 11, r1(1). 582 The plaintiff must 
579 
e. g. acknowledging service of the writ. 
580 Where (broadly) a process agent is appointed in England, service may be effected without leave of the court 
for service abroad: RSC Order 10, rule 3. 
581 Although the courts of another Contracting State will have exclusive jurisdiction in matters relating to 
immovable property (i. e., broadly, property associated with land) under Article 16 of the Conventions, there 
is no equivalent provision for movable property. 
82 Provided, of course, the defendant is not domiciled in a Contracting State, or the matter is one over which a 
Contracting State has exclusive jurisdiction. 
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make out a strong case before leave will be granted. 583 The grounds 
listed in 0.11, r I(I) include the following584. 
E-. - 
_, glish contract. Service of a writ out of the jurisdiction Is permissible 
with the leave of the court if the claim is brought to enforce, rescind, 
dissolve, annul or otherwise affect a contract which (inter alia) was made 
within the jurisdiction. 585 
Accordingly, an action against a foreign sub-custodian which has no 
presence in England, under a sub-custody contract which is not governed 
by English law and which does not contain a submission to English 
jurisdiction, may be within this provision if it was accepted by fax 
received in England. 
- property situated in England. Service of a writ out of the jurisdiction 
is permissible with the leave of the court if (inter alia) the claim is made 
to assert, declare or determine proprietary or possessory rights, or rights 
of security, in or over movable property, or to obtain authority to dispose 
of movable property, situate within the jurisdiction. 586 "This 
jurisdiction, it will be observed, is essentially directed in rem, and does 
583 Under 0 11, r 4(2), no leave will be granted " unless it shall be made sufficiently to appear to the Court that the 
case is a proper one for service out of the jurisdiction under this Order. " 
584 Service of a writ out of the jurisdiction is also permissible with the leave of the court if relief is sought against 
a person domiciled within the jurisdiction (0.11 r. 1(1)(a)). (Domicile for this purpose is determined in 
accordance with the Act: 0.11, r. 1(4)). ) However, this is unlikely to be important for present purposes, as any 
company domiciled in England is likely also to be present in England. 
585 .. If the parties enter into negotiations by correspondence from different countries, the contract is made where 
the letter of acceptance is posted. The same is the case if the acceptance is by telegram. But in conunercial 
transactions today communication by telephone, telex and telefax is much more corrimon than by post or 
telegram. It is now well established, following the decision of the Court of Appeal in Entores v Miles Far East 
Corporation (which has been approved by the House of Lords) that is the parties use "instantaneous" means of 
communication such as telephone, telex or telefax, the contract is made where the acceptance is communicated 
to the offeror. " 2Lcea, volume 1, p. 329. 
586 0.11, rI (1)(i) 
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not extend to personal jurisdiction over persons outside England beý, ond 
dealing with property in England. "587 
Chapter 4 argued that the proprietary interest of the client in the custody 
assets will in most cases be an interest under a trust of which the global 
custodian is the trustee. The location of this interest will be considered 
in section [E] of chapter 7 below, where it will be argued that such trust 
interest is situated in the jurisdiction of the custodian, i. e. in England. 
This has the possible result that, irrespective of the location of the 
underlying securities, the English courts have jurisdiction to hear cases 
concerning all aspects of the client's proprietary rights in the custody 
assets, and the claims of others to whom the client has given a security 
interest (or other proprietary interest) in the portfolio (e. g. the global 
custodian under "flawed asset" or security arrangements, third party 
secured lenders or tracing claimants). The interposition of the custody 
trust, it is argued, confers jurisdiction on the English courts in such 
matters. This is particularly important in connection with the use of the 
portfolio as collateral. 
17- 
- r-riglish law trust. Service of a writ out of the jurisdiction is 
permissible with the leave of the court (broadly) in an action against a 
588 trustee to execute a written trust governed by English law This 
applies whether or not the trust property is situate in England. 589 On the 
basis that the global custodian is a trustee, this may apply to actions to 
enforce the terms of the global custody agreement. 
3. Loss of Jurisdiction 
The English court may lose or decline jurisdiction which it prima facie has in 
accordance with certain rules, including the following. 
587 This provision is modelled on article 5(8) of Schedule 4 to the Act, which confers jurisdiction under the Act 
where movable property is situated in England and the defendant is domiciled in Scotland or Northern Ireland 
588 RSC, Ord 11, r1 (1)0). 
589 See Dicel, vol 1, p. 354. 
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The rule of sovereign immun, ty590 provides that a foreign state is generally 
immune from the jurisdiction of the English courts, subject to important 
591 exceptions 
In accordance with the doctrine offorum non conveniens the English courts may 
inter alia stay or strike out an action when this is necessary to prevent injustice. 
The doctrine is based on the view than some other forum is more appropriate, 
and may be invoked to prevent jurisdiction shopping592. However this 
discretion does not seem to extend to cases in which jurisdiction is conferred by 
593 the Convention 
The related doctrine of lis alibi pendens applies when simultaneous actions are 
pending in different Contracting States involving the same parties and the same 
or related matters. In the case of simultaneous actions in England and (broadly) 
EC or EFTA countries, the Conventions require proceedings in the second 
jurisdiction to be stayed, and jurisdiction to be declined, in certain 
circumstances594. 
Where the parties to a contract have agreed to submit the contract, to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of a foreign court, the English court will stay proceedings 
brought in England unless the plaintiff proves that it is just and proper to allow 
the proceedings to be brought. 595 Where exclusive submission is to the court 
596 of a Contracting State, the English court has no jurisdiction 
590 Now codified in the State Immunity Act 1978, implementing the European Convention on State Immunity of 
1972. 
591 There is an exception in relation to commercial transactions: section 3(1) of the Act, according with the earlier 
common law rule reflected in Trendrex v Central Bank of Nigeria [19771 Q. B. 529 (C. A. ). 
592 See Spiliada Maritime Corp v Consulex (1987) AC 460 and Re Harrods (Bueros Aires) Linuted [19921 Ch 72 
593 See 2 Lcej, volume 1, p. 274. 
594 See section 8 of the Conventions. 
595 See Dicey, volume 1, pp. 31 et seq. 
596 Unless neither party is domiciled in a Contracting State, in which case the English court has jurisdiction only 
if the chosen court has declined jurisdiction: article 17 of the Conventions. This restriction applies where 
submission is in customary written form. This is the corollary of the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of article 
17. 
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The English court also has no jurisdiction in matters such as those concerning 
the validity of entries in public registers maintained in a Contracting State other 
than the UK, where the Conventions confer exclusive jurisdiction on the court 
of that other Contracting State. 
It is impossible to address the entire range of litigation that might in theory be brought 
in the English courts in connection with global custody. Rather than attempt to do so, 
this chapter will consider the general principles of choice of law before turning to the 
English private international law aspects of those issues that were considered under 
English domestic law in chapter 3, and which concern the impact of computerisation on 
the nature of securities. These are, integrity of transfer, formalities of transfer and 
negotiability. 
C. Choice of Law; General Principles597 
1. The Issue 
Once it has been established that the English court has jurisdiction in a matter, 
it is necessary to determine whether it should apply English domestic law or 
foreign law. 
2. Approach 
a. categories and connecting factors 
English private international law's approach is (firstly) to place cross- 
border scenarios into categories, and (secondly) to identify factors in 
those scenarios that connect them to particular jurisdictions. 598 
Categorisation is determined by English law as the law of the forum or 
lex fori. 599 Thus, in a matter before the English courts concerning 
597 The importance of choice of law in financial and securities transactions is discussed by Guynn and Tahyar, The 
Importance of Choice of Law and Finality, Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, iv. 2 1996 p. 170. 
598 See Dicel, vol 1, p 30. 
599 .. There can be little doubt that classification of the cause of action is in practice effected on the basis of the law 
of the forum. Equally, connecting factors are always determined by English law as lexfori. " North and Fawcett, 
Cheshire and North's Private Intemational Law, 12ed, Butterworths, London 1992, p 45. See also Moshinsky, 
The Assignment of Debts in Conflict of Laws, [1992] LQR 109,591 at 621: "... it is legitimate for the English 
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foreign securities, English domestic law would determine the legal 
location or situs of the securities. 
ternu 
The terms for the connecting factors are customarily given in latin. 600 
2. Approach to Foreign Law 
Foreign law must be proved as fact. 601 
proved, English law will be applied. 602 
3. Renvoi 
If foreign law is not pleaded and 
courts to apply principles of English law to define the nature of the dispute... ". However, "... the judge must 
not rigidly confine himself to the concepts or categories of English internal law, for If he were to adopt this 
parochial attitude, he might be compelled to disregard some foreign concept merely because it was unknown 
to his own law. The concepts of private international law, such as "contract", "tort", "corporation", "bill of 
exchange", must be given a wide meaning in order to embrace 'analogous legal relations of foreign type' 
[Nussbaum]. " (Cheshire, pp 45,46). For an example of this approach being taken by the Swiss Federal Court 
in relation to a trust, see Harrison v Credit Suisse, discussed in chapter 7 section E below. See the first 
instance decision of Macmillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust PLC (No 3) [199513 All ER 747, per Millett 
J at 760: " the situs of a thing, like any other connecting factor, must be ascertained by reference to the I. ex 
fori. " 
600 'The lex causae is a convenient shorthand expression denoting the law (usually but not necessarily foreign) 
which governs the question. It is used in contradistinction to the lexfori, which always means the domestic law 
of the forum, i. e. (if the forum is English) English law. The lex causae may be more specifically denoted by 
a variety of expressions, usually in Latin, such as ... 
lex loci contracrus (law of the country where a contract 
is made), lex loci solutionis (law of the country where a contract is to be performed or where a debt is to be 
paid), Jex situs (law of the country where a thing is situated), Jex loci actus (law of the country where a 
legal act takes place, lex nwnetae (law of the country in whose currency a debt or other legal obligation is 
A, vol 1, p. 30. expressed). " Dice 
601 " In any case to which foreign law applies, that law must be pleaded and proved as a fact to the satisfaction of 
the judge by expert evidence or sometimes by certain other means. " 2Lic2L rule 18(l). See also Baker v 
Archer-Shee (H. L. ) [19271 A. C. 844, per Lord Blanesburgh at 874: "T"he true effect of American, as of any 
other foreign law, Is in England a question not of law but of fact. " The consequences of treating foreign law 
as a question of fact are that it must be pleaded and proved (usually by expert evidence: see section 4(l) of the 
Civil Evidence Act 1972). 
602 See Qýicey Rule 18(2). See also Baker v Archer-Shee (19271 A. C. 849, per Viscount Sun-Lner at 849: "There 
is no finding as to the law of the State of New York and, in accordance with the settled rule, we must presume 
that the general law of New york which is here relevant - namely, the law of trusts and wills - is the same as 
our own. " 
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"The problem of renvot arises whenever a rule of the conflict of laws refers to 
the "law" of a foreign countr-v, but the conflict rules of the foreign country 
would have referred the question to the "law" of the first country or to the- 
"law" of some third country. "603 When English law refers a matter to, say, the 
law of France, does that mean the domestic law of France, or French private 
international law, which may well refer the matter on somewhere else (or back 
to England again, creating a hall of mirrors)? 
Although renvol has long enchanted commentators, "The history of the renvoi 
doctrine in English law is the history of a chapter of accidents. "604. It 
originated in 19th century cases concerning the formal validity of wills. It is 
excluded by the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations6O5. In the light of recent judicial comments, renvol should be 
treated as inapplicable in conunercial matters. 606 
D. Integrity of Transfer 
Chapter 3 considered the impact of computerisation on the legal nature of securities, and 
argued that, under English domestic law, it had significant implications for the integrity 
and ease of transfers of bearer securities, as it involved the loss of negotiable status. 
That chapter also indicated that some of the problems caused by computerisation under 
domestic law may be cured under private international law. This section returns to these 
603 Dicey, volume 1, p. 71. 
604 PLicey, volume 1, p. 77. 
605 Article 15 
606 See the first instance of MacnWlan Inc v Bishopsgate Investwnt Trust p1c (No 3) (1995] 3 All ER 747, per 
Millett J at 766. "There is no authority on the question, (of whether English law applies the doctrine of renvoi 
in this context] but in my judgment the question should be answered in the negative The doctrine has most 
frequently been applied in the field of succession. Outside that field it seems that it has been applied only to 
legitimation by subsequent marriage. It has not been applied in contract or other commercial situation. It has 
often been criticised, and it is probably right to describe it as largely discredited. It owes its origin to a 
laudable endeavour to ensure that like cases should be decided alike wherever they are decided, but it should 
now be recognised that this cannot be achieved by judicial mental gymnastics but only by international 
conventions. 
See also 777: "In my judgment there is or ought to be no scope for the doctrine of renvol in determining a 
question of priority between competing claims to shares... " 
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questions, starting with the approach of the English courts to conflict of laws issues 
relating to the integrity of transfers of securities held in global custody. The following 
sections will consider conflicts of law in relation to ease of transfer and negotiability 
AS, section B above indicated, the first step is to establish jurisdiction. 
1. Jurisdiction 
According to the jurisdiction rules discussed in section B the English courts 
would have jurisdiction, for example, to hear an action against a London-based 
global custodian and/or its London-based client, by a third party victim of fraud 
who claims an interest in custody securities that were brought from or through 
a fraudster. In this example, no bad faith on the part of the custodian or the 
client is alleged. The securities in question are French bonds held through 
Cedel, and the fraudster, who is based in London, has transferred the securities 
to the custodian under an English law transfer, with settlement through Cedel 
into the account of the sub-custodian ("the Example"). 
The English courts would have jurisdiction to hear the matter (on the basis of 
the domicile or presence in England of the defendant(s)) and London would be 
a likely forum for the claim. 
2. Categorisation 
It was seen (in section [C]) that, after jurisdiction has been established, the next 
step in conflicts of laws is to categorise the matter. The leading case on the 
issues raised in the Example is Macmillan Inc. v Bishopsgate Investment Trust 
pLC (No 3)607. 
Macmillan, a company in the Maxwell group and a Delaware corporation, 
brought an action to recover shares in a New York subsidiary, Berlitz ("the 
Shares"). The Shares had been held by BIT as nominee for Macmillan and 
(without Macmillan's authority) were put up by BIT as security to various 
financial institutions (the defendants in the action) to secure borrowings by the 
Maxwell group. By the time of the hearing all the Shares had been transferred 
607 (19951 3 All ER 747 (first instance); 
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to those financial institutions in order to perfect their security interests. By 
agreement between the litigants all the Shares had been sold. "The question for 
determination now is whether Macmillan retained an interest in the shares 
superior to that of any of the Defendants and is accordingly entitled to the 
corresponding part of the proceeds of sale. "608 "Each of the Defendants claims 
to have been, or ... to have derived title through, a bona fide purchaser for 
value of the shares without notice of Macmillan's interest.,, 609 At first instance, 
judgment was given for the defendants, on the basis that they were bona fide 
purchasers for value without notice. This judgment was upheld in the Court of 
Appeal. 610 
The initial question of characterisation was disputed. 611 However, the approach 
of the court was clear. "In my judgment the Defendants have correctly 
characterised the issue as one of priority. ', 612 
a. Undestroyed Proprietary Base 
More precisely, the issue falls into a particular class of priority, relating 
to the concept of the "undestroyed proprietary base". In his judgment, 
Millett J distinguishes this from "Dearle v Hall" type priority issues, and 
from tracing. 
The natural analysis of the present case is "... as a claim by the original 
owner to recover his property from a third party who claims to have 
acquired an interest in the property superior to that of the claimant.,, 613 
608 
per Millett J at first instance, 752 . 
609 
at 752 
610 (although the reasoning relating in particular to the correct connecting factor differed: see below) 
611 . There is at the outset a fundamental disagreement between the parties as to the proper characterisatlon of the 
dispute for the purposes of English conflict of laws. The Defendants insist that the question at issue is 
concerried with the priority of competing interests in a chose in action. Macmillan insists that its claim lies in 






b. Dearle v Hall 
In contrast, the type of priority dispute governed by the rule in Dearle v, 
Hall relates to "-successive assignments of the same debt or fund. -614 
In other words, the undestroyed proprietary base type of dispute concerns 
the a contest between a transferee and a predecessor in title; Dearle v 
Hall type claims concern a contest between successive assignees. 615 
C. Tracing 
Millett J also distinguishes questions of priority from tracing. He refers 
to his earlier judgment in El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings616, and 
comments, "In my judgment there is no similarity between the two 
cases.,, 617 In other words, "undestroyed proprietary base" type priority 
disputes concern relative claims of title; tracing concerns identifying the 
assets to which such title can attach. 
If the correct categorisation is priorities, the question remains, priorities in 
relation to what? The appropriate category for matters concerning securities 
other than negotiable instrumentS618 is that of intangible movableS619. 
614 
at 76 1. 
615 . It is probably the case that the distinction between these two kinds of priority dispute corresponds broadly in 
practice with the distinction between cases which [in English domestic law] are governed by the rule in Dearle 
v Hall and those which are not" at 762. 
616 (1993) 3 All E. R. 717; see also the appeal of the case at (19941 2 All ER 685 and El Ajou v dollar land 
Holdings pic and another (No 2) (199512 All E. R. 213. The case is discussed briefly in chapter 3 section 7. d. 
617 That case was concerned with tracing, not title. It was not disputed that the defendant received the money from 
the fraudsters ... and that they could not extinguish their victim's 
beneficial interest in the money of which they 
had defrauded him. The question was whether the money which the defendant received could be identified with 
the proceeds of the fraud-The present is the converse case. It is concerned with title, not tracing. " At 758, 
759 
618 Conflicts of law are discussed in relation to negotiable instruments in section F below. 
619 See Dicey, volume 2. chapters 22 and 24. It is, of course, somewhat artificial to describe an intangible as a 
movable, for a thing that occupies no physical space cannot actually be moved from place to place. However. 
the distinction between movables and immoveables is the leading distinction in conflicts of law" (see PLcey, 
volume 2, p 916) and serves (however notionally) to divide land-related property from other types of property. 
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The position is governed both by statute and by case law. 
3. Statute 
a. Ae Rome Convention 
The Contracts (Applicable law) Act 1990 implements the Rome 
Convention620 in the UK. The Rome Convention applies "to contractual 
obligations in any situation involving a choice between the laws of 
different countries621"622, subject to various exceptions including ones in 
favour of negotiable instruments and trusts. 623 Chapter 4 argued that the 
interest of a client in the custody securities is that of a beneficiary under 
a trust. However, the terms of the exception for trusts are confined to 
the internal constitution of the trust and do not extend to the question of 
whether transfers of trust units are subject to third party equitable 
interests. 
Article 12 of the Rome Convention provides as follows: 
" Ibluntary assignments624 
I. The mutual obligations of assignor and assignee under a 
voluntary assignment of a right against another person ("the 
debtor") shall be governed by the law which under this Convention 
applies to the contract between the assignor and assignee. 
620 The Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations. 
621 (Whether or not the countries in question are party to the convention: see Article 2) 
622 Article I 
623 
1 ns arising under bills of exchange. cheques an [The rules of this Convention] shall not apply to: ... (c) obligatio 
promissory notes and other negotiable instruments to the extent that the obligations under such other negotiable 
instruments arise out of their negotiable character; ... (g) the constitution of trusts and the relationship between 
settlors, trustees and beneficiaries... " 
624 These questions of course concern with contractual, voluntary assignments, rather than with assignments arising 
by operation of law, for example on insolvency or pursuant to a court order. 
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2. The law governing the right to which the assignment relates 
shall determine its assignability, the relationship between the 
assignee and the debtor, the conditions under which the assignment 
can be invoked against the debtor and any questions whether the 
debtor's obligations have been discharged. " 
To apply these provisions to the integrity of transfers of securities one 
must took at the nature of transfers. 
Contractual and Proprietary Aspects 
A transfer or assignment has two aspects; it is both a contract and a 
conveyance. The Rome Convention distinguishes between these. Thus, 
Article 12(1) indicates that the contractual aspects of an assignment, as 
between the assignor and the assignee, will be governed by the proper 
law of the contract of assignment625; in accordance with Articles 3 and 
4, this will be the law chosen in the assignment626 or, in the absence of 
such choice, the law of the country with which the contract is most 
closely connected627' generally the country of central administration of 
the corporate obligor (transferor)628. 
On the other hand, Article 12(2) indicates that the aspects of the 
assignment that apply as between the debtor and the assignee are 
governed by the proper law of the transferred property. It is convenient 
to refer to these aspects as proprietary. 629 
625 This accords with the common law rule in Lee v Adby (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 309 and Re Anziani [ 19301 1 Ch 407. 
626 Article 3(1) 
627 Article 4(1) 
628 Article 4(2) 
629 See chapter 2 section 3. b for a discussion of the personal and proprietary aspects of choses in action. Under 
section 3(3)(a) of the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990, the Gull iano-La garde Report on the Rome 
Convention may be considered in interpreting the Convention. This report indicates, on p. 10, that " -since 
the Convention is concerned only with the law applicable to contractual obligations, property rights ... are not 
covered by these provisions. " However, since Article 12(2) concerns the relations between the debtor and the 
assignee, and since that relationship is proprietary in the sense of being the subject matter of the assignment. 
the Article must be taken to be an exception to this comment. 
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The application of Article 12 to the Example must be considered. The 
legal issue in the Example, and in the whole question of the integrity of 
transfers, is proprietary: is the transfer subject to pre-existing adverse 
proprietary claims, or does it overreach them? Article 12(l) cannot be 
not relevant, as the Example is not concerned with the mutual obligations 
of the assignor and assignee630. Neither, however, is it clear that Article 
12(2) is relevant. 
C. Different Proprietary Relationships 
Diggy extrapolates from Article 12(2) the following rule: "... the validity 
of the assignment and the obligations of third parties - in other words, all 
the property aspects of the transaction - are governed by the law under 
which the right [assigned] was created. "631 This suggests that Article 
12(2) governs the position in the Example. However, the terms of 
Article 12(2) may not be so wide. 
Chapter 2 argued that property is relative. Different persons may have 
competing proprietary rights in an asset. 632 The means by which the 
courts address competing claims to assets is by considering the priorities 
between them. In the Example, the claimant does not argue that the 
transfer to the Custodian was invalid but that the property of the 
custodian is subject to the competing property of the claimant. As 
Macmillan indicates, the issue is of one of priorities. 
In other words, the issue in the Example is wider than the proprietary 
relationship between the Custodian and the " debtor"633 The issue is the 
630 See the first instance decision in Macndllan, in which Millett J refers to "... the intrinsic validity of any of the 
assigru-nents, its contractual effect as between the immediate parties thereto, or the mutual obligations of assignor 
and assignee. All such questions are governed by the proper law of the assignment. ... 
Such questions must be 
distinguished from questions of priority which are concerned with the proprietary effect of the assignment on 
the assignor and third parties such as Macmillan claiming under him. An assignment is only a species of 
contract, and the parties to it can choose the system of law by which they indent their contract to be governed; 
but they cannot be their contract choose the laws which will govern its effect upon third parties. " (at 760) 
631 
volume 2, p 980. 
632 See chapter 2 section I(e). 
633 This is the terin used in Article 12 to denote the obligor of the right which Is the subject of the transfer. 
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contest between that relationship on the one hand, and on the other the 
proprietary relationship between the debtor and the claimant 63-4. Because 
property is relative, the proprietary position of the custodian (and its 
client) cannot be determined by reference only to the custodian's 
relationship with the debtor. Third party interests have to be taken into 
account, as in the Example. 
The application of Article 12(2) to these questions is dubious. 635 It refers 
to "the relationship between the assignee and the debtor", and not the 
relationshipj between the debtor, the assignee and third parties. 
4. Case law 
Until recently, the non-statutory rules for determining lex causae for questions 
of priority in relation to intangible movables were highly uncertain. 636 
However, the position has now been clarified by Macmillan, in which the 
637 Court of Appeal held that the position is governed by lex situs 
Lex Situs 
Because lex situs governs the possible vulnerability of the custody portfolio to 
fraud in this way, it is vital to identify the situs or legal location of the custody 
securities. The Court of Appeal indicated that, in the case of shares, situs will 
usually be the place of incorporation of the company to which the shares relate. 
However, where securities are intermediated through global custodial 
634 This is the position where there has been no breach of duty by the defendant. If the defendant had defrauded 
the claimant, the position would differ, for the basis of the claim would rest upon an equitable claim of the 
claimant as against the defendant. This point is brought out in Macmillan at first instance by Millett J, at 758. 
635 The Gull iano-La garde Report on the Rome Convention does not shed light on this issue. 
636 "The assignment of intangible things, such as debts, has long been one of the most intractable topics in the 
English conflict of laws. The writers on the subject are fundamentally divided and the little case law that exists 
is old. confused and inconclusive. " Mark Moshinsky, The Assignments of Debts in the conflict of Laws (1992) 
LQR 591. See the cautious suggestions in Dicey, volume 1, p. 182 and volume 2, p. 981. 
637 (rejecting the first instance reasoning of Millett J that lex loci acw applies). See a discussion of this judgment 
in 1996 (111) LQR 198-202 
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arraneements, and in particular inunobilised in a central clearing syscem, I 
chapter 7 section C. 6 will argue that situs is the location of the intermediary. 
E. Formalities of Transfer 
Chapter 3 considered section 53(l)(c) of the Law of Property Act 1925638, which 
requires a disposition of an equitable interest to be in writing. It argued that, because of 
intermediation the interest of the custody client in its securities will in most cases be 
equitable. However, the secondary markets in Intermediate Securities do not use written 
transfers. A number of domestic law arguments were cited to show that compliance with 
section 53(l)(c) may not be necessary. Private international law provides another line 
of defence against that section. 
1. Jurisdiction 
The first issue in conflicts is jurisdiction. A French fraudster (acting through 
its Belgian agent) might transfer French bonds held through Euroclear to a 
London-based global custodian for the account of its London-based client under 
an English law oral transfer ("the First Transfer)". The fraudster then purports 
to transfer the same bonds to a third party under a written English law transfer 
("the Second Transfer"). The First Transfer is settled through Euroclear and 
the bonds are credited to the Euroclear account of the sub-custodian. The 
transferor goes into insolvent liquidation, and the third party brings an action 
in England against the global custodian and/or its client for delivery of the 
bonds, on the basis that the First Transfer is invalid by virtue of section 
53(l)(c) ("the Question"). 
The English courts would have jurisdiction the try the Question on the basis of 
the domicile or presence in England of the defendant(s). 639 
638 (in section 6) 
639 Belgium would not necessarily be a more likely forum to be chosen by the claimant, in view of the fact that 
the claim is based on English law formal requirements. 
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1. Substance and Procedure 
The next problem is whether these formal requirements raise matters 
-of 
substance or merely of procedure. If matters of substance are involved, the 
next step in the conflicts analysis will be, as usual, to categorise the matter in 
order to identify the body of rules that will determine lex causae. However, if 
these are merely matters of procedure, no categorisation is necessary, for JaIll 
matters of procedure are governed by the domestic law of the country to which 
the court wherein any legal proceedings are taken belongs (lexfori). , 640 The 
hope would be to show that matters of substance are involved, in order to avoid 
the necessary reference to English domestic law (of which section 530)(c) 
forms part. ) 
Indirect authority on the question of whether section 53(l)(c) raises matters of 
substance or procedure, is arguably provided obiter dicta in the case of 
Rochefoucauld v Boustead. 641 The case concerned section 7 of the Statute of 
Frauds 1677, which required declarations of trusts of land to be evidenced in 
writing, and which has been replaced by section 53(l)(b) of the Law of 
Property Act 1925. It might be argued that the drafting of section 53(l)(b) is 
comparable to that of section 53(l)(c), and that the drafting of section 7 of the 
Statute of Frauds is comparable to section 9 of that Act, which was replaced by 
section 53(l)(c). In Rochefoucauld, Lindley L. J. cornments642, "The statute 
relates to the kind of proof required in this country to enable a plaintiff suing 
here to establish his case here. It does not relate to lands abroad in any other 
way than this. It regulates procedure here, not title to land in other countries. " 
However, this is not conclusive. The Statute of Frauds imposes formal 
requirements on a range of different transactions. These requirements fall into 
two categories, depending upon the sanctions specified for their breach. The 
penalty for non-compliance with section 4 (parole promises) is merely a bar to 
enforcement. However, in the case of a larger number of the requirements 
("the Second Class"), non-compliance affects the validity of the transaction. 
640 Dicey, Rule 17, volume 1, p 169. 




643. Certain transactions "... shall be utterly void and of none effect" others 
., shall not either in law or equity be deemed to taken to have any other or 
greater force or effect [than that specified]644 i yet others shall not "... be. 
646 allowed to be good... "645, or are simply prohibited 
The difference between the two categories for the purposes of conflicts of law 
is brought out in Leroux v Brown647, which concerned section 4. In this case 
an action was brought by a proposed employee for damages after the 
repudiation by a proposed employer of an oral contract of employment 
concluded in France. Under French law the agreement was enforceable 
although not in writing; section 4 of the Statute of Frauds required a written 
agreement. 648 
Thus, section 4 goes to procedure and not substance, and is therefore governed 
by lexfori. However, the basis of this decision is the wording of the statutory 
provisions: "Looking at the words of the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, 
and contrasting them with those of the Ist, 3rd, and 17th sections this 
conclusion seems to me to be inevitable. " Section 4 is procedural because its 
terms distinguish it from those other sections falling into the Second Class. 
Section 9 falls into the Second Class, and section 53(l)(c) replaces it. 
On this basis, it is submitted that the requirements of section 53(l)(c) are 
substantive and English law as lexfori does not necessarily apply. In order to 
643 Sections 5,7 and 9. 
644 Section I 
645 Section 17 
646 Section 3. 
647 (1852) 12 C. B. 801. Affirmed in Royal Exchange Assurance Corp v Vega (19011 2 K. B. 567, [19021 2 K. B. 
584. For the same distinction, see the judgment of Scrutton L. J. in Republica de Guatemala v Nunez [ 19271 
1 K. B. 669 at 690 and 69 1. 
648 .... if the 4th section of the statute of frauds applies, not the validity of the contract, but only to the procedure, 
the plaintiff cannot maintain this action, because there is no agreement, nor any memorandum or note thereof, 
in writing. On the other hand, ... if the 4th section applies to the contract itself ..., inasmuch as our law cannot 
regulate foreign contracts, a contract like this may be enforced here. I am of the opinion that the 4th section 
applies not to the solemnities of the contract, but to the procedure; and therefore that the contract in question 
cannot be sued upon here. The contract may be capable of being enforced in the country where it was made: 
but not in England. Per Jervice J. C. at para 823A 
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determine applicable law, the next stage in the conflicts analysis is 
categorisation. 
Categorisation 
The Question concerns the form and validity of the First Transfer. This is a 
contract for the assignment of intangible movables. Lex causae of the formal 
validity of contracts of assignment of intangible movables must be established. 
4. Formal Validity 
Article 9 of the Rome Convention649 includes the following provisions: - 
"Formal validity 
IA contract concluded between persons who are in the same 
country650 is formally valid if it satisfies the formal requirements of the 
law which governs it under this Convention or of the law of the country 
where it is concluded. " 
2. A contract concluded between persons who are in different 
countries is formally valid if it satisfies the formal requirements of the 
law which governs it under this Convention or of the law of one of those 
countries. 
3. Where a contract is concluded by an agent, the country in which 
the agent acts is the relevant country for the purposes of paragraphs I and 
2.,, 651 
649 
implemented in the UK by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990. 
650 "- ... it is first necessary to describe exactly what is meant by persons being or not being in the same country. 
... 
If the parties' agents (or one party and the agent of the other) meet in a given country and conclude the 
contract there, this contract is considered, within the meaning of paragraph 1, to be concluded between persons 
in that country, even if the party or parties represented were in another country at the time. " Guiliano and 
Lagarde Report. This indicates that the test is presence and not domicile. 
651 Articles 5 and 6 contain disapplications in favour of consumer contracts and contracts relating to immovable 
property. 
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These requirements are disjunCtiVe652, and compliance with the fbrmal 
requirements of any of the specified laws will obviate need fbr compliance with 
any other. 653 Renvoi is not relevant. 654 
Thus, in the Question, in accordance with Articles 9(2) and 9(3), the First 
Transfer is formally valid if it satisfies the formal requirements of English law 
(as the governing law of the transfer or the law of the location of the transferee) 
or Belgian law (as the law of the location of the agent of the transferor). 
Belgian655 law does not require a written transfer, and so the First Transfer is 
valid. Thus the formal requirements of section 53(1)(c) may be avoided, by 
concluding transfers through agents located in jurisdictions with no equivalent 
requirements. 
5. Mandatory Rules 
In the Convention, Article 9 is subject to Article 7(2), which contains a 
656 reservation in favour of the application of mandatory rules of the fbrum. 
652 Arguably this alternative approach reflects the English common law position: see Wm Grunen v Digby (1962) 
31 Beav 56 1. 
However, other case law suggests that the courts wifl insist on either one or the other. For the proper law of 
the chose in action, see Cia Colombiana de Seguros v Pacific Steam Navigation Co. [19651 1 Q. B. 101, per 
RoskiU I at 128,129; & re Queensland mercantile and Agency Co ( 189 1]I Ch 536; ( 18921 1 Ch 219 and Re 
Fry [ 1946] Ch 312. For lex loci actus, see the judgment of Scrutton L. J. in Republica de Guatemala v Nunez 
[[ 1927] 1 KB 669, at 688,690 and 69 1. 
653 The Giuliano and Lagarde Report comments that this generous approach was adopted " ... in order to avoid 
parties being caught unawares by the annulment of their acts on the grounds of an unexpected formal defect. 
Article 9 has ... laid down a fairly flexible system based on applying 
in the aftemative either the law of the place 
where the contract was entered into-or else the law which governs its substance. * "... no priority has been 
accorded either to the lex causae or to the lex loci aaw. If the act is valid to one of these. two laws, that is 
enough to prevent defects of fonn under the other from affording grounds for nullity. ' 
654 " Renvoi must be rejected as regards fonrLal validity as in all other matters governed by the Convention" 
GiuLiano and Lagarde Report. (cf. Article 15). 
655 Under the Royal Decree No. 62 of 1967, which establishes the rtgime of fungibility which is the basis of 
Euroclear. 
656 'Nothing in this Convention shall restrict the application of the rules of the law of the forum in a situation 
where they are mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract". 
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" ... Of course, under the system established by Article 7, it will be fbr the court 
hearing the case to decide whether it is appropriate to give effect to these 
mandatory provisions and consequently to disregard the rules laid down in 
Article g. "657 The issue is then whether the English court will regard the 
requirements of section 53(l)(c) as a mandatory rule of the fbrum for the 
purposes of Article 7(2), and apply them irrespective of the more liberal 
approach indicated by Article 9(2) and (3) of the Rome Convention. 658 
In the case of In re Fry659, share transfers were executed in New Jersey by way 
of gift. The transferor died before consent required by English domestic law 
for registration of the transfer under the English Defence (Finance) Regulations 
1939 was obtained. The argument that the transfer was valid in equity because 
le-x causae was lex loci acw (New Jersey), was rejeCted. 660 Romer J661 
applied the comments of Turner U in Milroy v Lord. 662 "I take the law of this 
Court to be well settled that, in order to render a voluntary settlement valid and 
effectual, the settlor must have done everything which, according to the nature 
of the property comprised in the settlement, was necessary to be done in order 
to transfer the property and render the settlement binding upon him. ... there 
is no equity in this Court to perfect an imperfect gift. " However, the rejection 
of lex loci actus in this judgment does not seem to be based on the court's 
discretion in relation to mandatory rules of the fbrum, but rather on the rule of 
equity in relation to voluntary assignments, which is not relevant in the 
secondary securities markets, where consideration is routinely given. 
657 Giuliano and Lazande Report 
658 The Report goes on to comment, "... despite the opinion of sonic jurists, it must be frankly recognized that no 
clear indication in favour of the principle in question seems diseemible in the English cases. " However, the 
English cases it cites (RaLU Bros Y Sota y Aznar [1920] 2 KB 287; Regazzone v Sethia [1958] AC 301 (H. L. ); 
Rossano v Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. [196312 QB 352) all relate to the rule now contained in Article 
7(l) (recognition of mandatory rules of foreign law) rather than to that conudned in Article 7(2) (maridatory 
rules of the forum). Article 7(l) is not incorporated into the law: Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 Section 
2(2). 
659 In re Fry, Deceased, Chase National Erecutors and 7rustees Corporation v Fry [19461 1 Ch 312. This case 
applied the comments of 11imer LJ in Milroy v Lord. 
660 
at 318. 
661 At 315. 
662 ( 1861 -73] AH ER 783 at 789 
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Overall, the position is unclear. However, the requirements fbr written 
evidence of transactions was imposed by statute in the 17th century663 and last 
addressed by statute at a time664 when Parliament could not conceive of a fbrm 
of infbrmation that was neither documentary nor oral. It is therefbre to be 
hoped that the courts would consider that section 53(l)(c) is anachronistic in the 
electronic era, and does not fbrm part of the mandatory rules of the fbrum. If 
so, the requirements fbr written transfers of Intermediate Securities can readily 
be avoided under the rules of private international law. 
E Negotiability 
Chapter 3 considered the concept of negotiability under English domestic law in the 
context of global custody. It concluded that the electronic arrangements through which 
debt securities are held in global custody may have cost them negotiable status under 
English domestic law. This section will consider whether the rules of English private 
international law affect the position. 
1. Jurisdiction 
Section D above considered a scenario ("the Example") in relation to the 
integrity of a transfer of non-negotiable instruments. In the Example, a third 
party victim of fraud brings an action in England against a London-based global 
custodian and/or its London-based client, claiming an interest in French bonds 
held by the global custodian for the client through a sub-custodian's Cedel 
account, on the basis that the securities were bought from or though a fraudster. 
It was seen that the English courts have jurisdiction. 
One defence that might be advanced is that the bonds are negotiable, so that the 
transfer to the sub-custodian was made free of the interest of the claimant. The 
complication here is that the bonds are immobilised through Cedel. 'Die 
fbIlowing sections will take this issue in tvm stages, starting with the approach 
of the courts to bearer bonds which are not so immobilised or otherwise 
663 in the Statute of Frauds Act 1677 
664 in the ISO-0s, with the law of Property Act 1925 
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computerised ("Traditional Bearer Securities") befbre turning to irnrnobilised or 
otherwise computerised bearer bonds ("Computerised Bearer Securities"). 665 
2. Traditional Bearer Securities 
Certain provisions of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 relate to conflicts of 
Iaw666. However, these provisions are not relevant to this discussion, as they 
667 do not concern the proprietary aspects of secondary market transactions 
The common law conflicts rules fbr determining lex causae fbr the negotiability 
of a bearer instrument are as fbllows. Private international law proceeds by 
categorisation. As documentary intangibles, bearer instruments are categorised 
as choses in possession (or tangible movables) and not as choses in action (or 
intangibles). As choses in possession, the general principle is that the law 
determining negotiable status is lex loci acw. 
668669 
Transaction not instrument 
It follows that the status of negotiability may be said to attach, not to 
instruments, but to transactions in them, fbr an instrument may move from 
country to country, and the question of whether a transaction in it is protected 
by negotiability depends upon the country in which that transaction takes place. 
670 
665 For the full definitions of these terna, see chapter 3 section A. 
666 Section 72 ("... the United Kingdom is one country for the purposes of the law of negotiable instruments [Bills 
of Exchange Act 1882]... " PLcey, volume 1, p 26). 
667 Section 72 concerns formal validity, interpretation, duties of holder and due date of payment. 
668 Morris The Conflict of Laws,, p. 369. Alcock v Sndth [ 18921 1 Ch 238 and Embiricos v Anglo-Austrian Bank 
[ 19051 1 K. B. 677 
669 .. In the conflict of laws, negotiable instruments are thereforr. trvated as chattels, i. e. as tangible moveables. 
V-, rhether they are "negotiable" is a question to be determined by the law of the country where the alleged 
transfer by way of "negotiation* takes place and this is, in the nature of things, the country in which the 
instrument is situated at the time of the delivery. " Dicey, volume 2, p. 1420. 
670 Thus, in Picker v London and Counny Banking Co (1887) 18 Q. B. D. 515, Prussian bonds w'Lhout the coupon 
sheets attached were held not to be as negotiable in England, &Idiough they were negotiable by mercantile 
custom in Prussia. Equally in Lang v Smyth (1831) 7 Bing 284, Neapolitan bordereaux were held not to be 
negotiable in England because they did not pass from hand to hand in England like money or bank notes. In 
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On this basis, the crucial issue is not that where the underlying bonds were 
issued, but where the transaction takes place. 671 
Computerised Bearer Securities 
It must be established how this rule applies to Computerised Bearer Securities 
such as the bonds in the Example. 
a. Yhe problem of categorisation 672 
There are special conflicts rules for negotiable instruments. This raises 
the fbllowing problem. If a matter is categorised as one of negotiability 
it must be referred to the special rules on negotiable instruments. These 
rules may indicate that the security in question is not a negotiable 
instrument, and suggest in turn that a different categorisation may have 
been more appropriate. In other words, categorisation contains an 
element of prejudgment. This Problem may have been less important 
when all the securities which were candidates for negotiable status were 
clearly distinguishable from those which were not (because they were in 
physical bearer form) and the only variable to be considered was 
relation to transfers taking place in England, "I think that both upon principle and upon authority, whether the 
instrument in queation be an English instrument or a foreign instrument, the usage necessary to support a claim 
to rank as negotiable must be in either case a usage in England. " (Bechuanakwid v London 7h2ding Bank [ 18981 
2 Q. B. 65 8, per Kennedy K at 672) 
Conversely, if the transaction in question takes place in a foreign country, the negotiable status of the instrument 
for the purposes of that transaction will be determined by the English courts by reference to the law of that 
foreign country. In Alcock v Sndth (18921 1 Ch 238 an instrument was sold in Norway at a time when it was 
negotiable under the law of Norway, but not under the law of England (as it was overdue and, under the Bills 
of Exchange Act, could only be transferred subject to equities). It was held that Norwegian law governed and 
the transfer was not subject to the plaintiff's equities. 
671 This "transaction specific" approach may be coffqwcd to the statutory *several laws' approach to Bills of 
Exchange: "It is important to realise, that a bill of exchange does not contain a single contract but a series of 
promises to pay made, by the acceptor, the drawer and each subsequent indorser, all of which are contained in 
the same instrument. Section 72 clearly treats each of UwAe contracts as a separate one for the purposes of the 
conflict of laws and thus adopts what has been called the "several laws" doctfirie as opposed to the "single law" 
doctrine which at one time found favour with English courts in cases decided before the acts. " Morris, p 366. 
672 Dicey dryly comments, "The problem of characterisation has given rise to a voluminous literature, much of it 
highly theoretical. I'he consequence is that there am almost as many theories as writene, and the theories are 
for the most part so abstract that, when applied to a given case, they can produee almost any result. They 
appear to have had almost no influence on the practice of the courts in Englarid. For this reason, no attempt 
wW be made to summarise them in detail ... " Volume 1, p 35. 
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(broadly) the presence or absence of mercantile custom (or statute) 
conferring negotiable status. Howeverý with the computerisation of the 
eurobond marketS673 this rule of thumb may have broken down. 
It would therefore be helpful to be able to show that miscategorisation 
will have no adverse result, because the rules fbr negotiable and non- 
negotiable securities are the same. 
The conflicts rules fbr integrity of transfer in relation to securities other 
than negotiable instruments were considered in section D above. The 
leading case in that context is MaCM111an674, which concerns shares. 
p 675 Under English law, shares are intangibles, and they are not negotiabl'. 
The first instance decision in Macmillan was based on a rule in fývour of 
lex loci acw; the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment, but on the basis 
of an alternative rule in fMur of lec situs. On the facts of that case, the 
two coincided. It will be submitted that, in the case of Intermediate 
Securities, the two always coincide, just as they always coincide in the 
case of Traditional Bearer Securities. 
b. situs of intangible 
Chapter 3 section 4 argued that the interest of a participant in an 
immobilised clearing system such as Cedel is not the same as the 
underlying bond. Rather, as an Intermediate Security, it is an interest 
under a trust. Chapter 7 section C. 6 below will argue that the situs of 
673 
se4e chapter 3. 
674 [1995] 3 All ER 747; 1996 (Court of Appeal). 
675 (although shares are negotiable under the law of the StaLe of New York. See the N. Y. UCC section 9-105 and 
the drst instance decision in Macrrdllan, [ 1995] 3 AU ER 747, a 759 and Colonial Bank v Cady (1890) 15 App. 
Cas. 267. ) 
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such a trust interest is the jurisdiction of the clearer. On this basis, lex 
676 situs is Luxembourg law. 
C. lex loci actus 
The discussions of the New York DTC in the first instance decision in 
Macmillan provide clear authority that lex loci actus of settlement by 
book entry is the law of the jurisdiction of the clearer. 677 
On this basis, lex situs and lex loci actus necessarily coincide in the case 
of Computerised Bearer Securities as in the case of Traditional Bearer 
Securities. In this way, the old rules may continue to apply in the 
computerised environment, and the problem of prejudgment referred to 
in section a above is more apparent than real. 
In the Example, the issue of negotiability will be determined by 
Luxembourg law. In practice, as the approach of Luxembourg law to 
integrity of transfers generally within its clearing systems is robust. It 
was seen in chapter 3 section 7. e that, under Luxembourg laW678, the 
transferee of securities through a depository system such as Cedel is 
protected against adverse proprietary claims as effectively as if the 
security in question were a negotiable instrument. 679 
Conclusions 
As v, discussed in chapter 3, the computerisation of the bearer bond markets has 
cost negotiable status. However, under private international law, the benefits 
of negotiability may still be available in practice, particularly where the 
676 Luxembourg domestic law does not have the concept of an anglo-saxon Vfpc trust; however, the notional 
location of the trust in Luxembourg rests on English private international law. See chapter 7 section [C. 6] 
below. 
677 "... my own inclination would be to apply the lex loci actus with the result thrA the effect on Macmillan's pro- 
existing interest in the shares of ... the entries on the books of DTC --- would be governed by the law of New 
York because that is where the entries were made. " at 763,764. See also 768. 
678 Article 7 of Lhe Grand Ducal Regulation of 17 February 1971 ModiPying the Circulation of Securities 
679 Although adverse clairm are not necessarily defeated, but rather bome by the depository. 
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European international clearing systems are hwolved. This result has been 
achieved by the convergence of the conflicts rules fbr negotiable and 
computerised securities. 17he useftdness of a separate body of conflicts rules 
relating to negotiable instruments may be over. 680 
680 The discussion in this section has concerned the proprietary aspects of transactions in Computerised Bearer 
Securities. The contractual aspects of trwisactions in negotiable instruments attract different conflict rules as 
the Rome Convention is disapplied in respect of "obligations &rising under bills of exchange, cheques and 
pron-dssory notes another negotiable instruments to the extent that the obligations &rising under such other 
negotiable instruments arise out of their negotiable character" Art. 1(2)(c). However, if Cornputerised Bearer 
Securities are not negotiable, this difference drops away also. 
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Chapter 7. Cross Border Proprietary Rights: 
Taking Security and InsolvenCy685 
General 
This chapter considers the challenge presented by two important trends informing the 
global custody industry: the use of securities as collateral, and intermediation686. Market 
participants are concemed to know with certainty that their collateral is good, and that 
their assets will survive the insolvency of an intermediary. Such certainty is generally 
far from achievable and disquiet at this legal uncertainty has been expressed at senior 
levels for several years687; some jurisdictions have led the way with clarifying and 
refon-ning legislation688. However, the problem is precisely international, and national 
reform will never provide an adequate solution. 
Insolvency and the enforcement of collateral are the two chief occasions when the 
strength of proprietary claims on assets are tested. The heart of the problem is that 
different jurisdictions conceive of property in fundamentally different ways, at least where 
the property in question is intangible, unallocated, intermediated and held cross border, 
as are the interests of custody clients in their securities. This chapter will consider the 
685 
the ... claims of customers of a securities Intermediary are marked by a lack of control and knowledge and 
an almost exclusive reliance on the integrity and solvency of the intermediary... " C. W. Mooney, Beyond 
Negotiability Cardozo Law Review [19901 Vol 12,305 at 354. 
686 "The many tiers of intermediaries that are typically involved in processing a single securities transaction pose 
a challenge to the market participant that seeks to be well-informed regarding risk. " Bank for International 
Settlements, Cross Border Securities Settlement Basle, May 1994, p. 55. 
687 See the G10 Report, Cross-Border Securities Settlement (Basle, May 1995): "Choice of law and conflict of laws 
problems might create uncertainty regarding the finality of transfer, ownership 'interests or collateral rights. 
In particular, such problems might complicate the use of collateral to mitigate credit exposures arising in cross- 
border transactions. In addition, differences in bankruptcy law could result in uncertain or conflicting outcomes 
regarding the disposition of securities in the event of a counterparty's or intermediary's Insolvency. 
Predictability of outcome is essential in efforts to contain financial problems, but widely divergent legal 
frameworks make predictability hard to achieve in a cross-border context. " Recommendation 5 of the Morgan 
Guaranty Report of 1994, Cross-Border Clearance, Settlement and Custody: Beyond the G30 Recommendations, 
provides: "Each country should modernise its securities pledging laws to ... include categorical choice-of-law 
rules assuring respect of the validity of pledges at each tier of a multi-tiered holding system, including tiers 
governed by foreign laws. " 
688 In Modemising Securities Ownershii) Transfer and Pledging Laws (IBA Discussion Paper, 1996) Randall Guynn 
identifies New York. Belgium and Luxembourg as model jurisdictions for this purpose. 
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nature of the interest of the custody client under English law, before discussing the wider 
cross-border issues relating to collateral and intermediation. 
B. Nature of Property Interest 
Chapter 4 argued that the relationship between the client and the global custodian in 
respect of securities is likely to be that of beneficiary and trustee. 
Private international law as it relates to global custody is very complex. In order to 
simplify the analysis, certain assumptions will be made. The first is that both the global 
custodian and its sub-custodians offer fungible custody. 689 Secondly, fungible custody 
raises issues of allocation, discussed in chapter 5 under the term, "the Allocation 
Problem". It will be assumed that the Allocation Problem is overcome by the co- 
ownership of the conuningled property by the custody clients, under a tenancy in 
conunon that arises either under the express terms of the global custody documentation 
or by operation of law. 690 
On the assumed baseS691 the Custody Trust Asset under English domestic law is in all 
cases an interest under a trust. Because of the administrative duties of the intermediaries 
through whom the securities are held, this trust is active and not bare. As the Custody 
Trust Asset arises under a trust and by way of co-ownership, it is indirect and 
unallocated. It is, nevertheless, proprietary in the sense that it would not be defeated by 
the insolvency of the nominee, sub-custodian or depository through whom it is held. 
It should be stressed that this is merely the analysis under English domestic law, on the 
assumed basis. The treatment of the custody assets in the insolvency of a sub-custodian 
or other local entity in the global network will be determined by the local law of the 
insolvent entity, which may or may not recognise the English law position, even under 
English law sub-custody documentation. As a matter of reasonable prudence the global 
custodian should seek local legal advice as to the effect of the insolvency of a sub- 
custodian on the custody assets. The analysis in this section is not conclusive, or 
689 (i. e. that there is segregation of house positions from client positions, but that the positions of different clients 
are conuningled. ) This arrangement is, generally speaking, custsomary, although not the invariable practice. 
690 These assumptions are artificial; there will be cases where client-specific segregation is offered, and there is 
some remote risk that the Allocation Problem is not addressed in the manner outlined above. 
691 
i. e. on the assumption of co-ownership between clients under Fungible Custody. 
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appropriate for risk management, 1 is rather the basis for the anal. ysis under English 
private international law that follows, and in par-ticular the discussion of situs in the next 
section. 
C. Taking Security 
1. Generally 
This section considers the conflicts aspects of the use of securities held in global 
custody as collateral. 
Bonds and shares collateralise much international financing692, as well as the 
securities settlement systeMS693. An important growth Is derivative margins, 
and new products are being developed by the clearing systems to deliver 
securities as margin. 694 
The granting of security interests over assets held in global custody raises 
special legal challenges. The secured property often consists of a pool 
comprising securities issued in different jurisdictions. This pool is usually held 
through the intermediary clearing systems. In many cases the pool changes 
from time to time, under substitution provisions 695 and mark to market 
provisionS696 
It is important to determine which law will govem the security interest, and 
whether that law will uphold the security arrangements. This second issue may 
692 Charges over investment securities are of inu-nense Importance In international finance, mainly because of the 
marketability and ease of valuation of the collateral, and also the facility with which investment securities can 
be made available, usually with a minimum of formality and fuss - in sharp contrast to, say, mortgages of land. " 
Philip Wood, Corrivarative law of Security and Guarantees, London, Sweet & Maxwell, p. 58. 
693 'As more payment systems look to securities collateral to control credit risk in the settlement process, those 
systems also become dependent on the ability to acquire and maintain an enforceable interest in securities. " Bank 
for International Settlements, Cross-Border Securities Settlement Basle, March 1995, p 46. 
694 
i. e. as collateral for derivatives exposures. 
695 i. e. provisions that the chargee will release charged securities upon the chargor putting up substitute securities. 
696 
i. e. provision for new collateral to be called and exi I to reflect increases and isting collateral to be released 
diminutions in the value of the secured obligations. Such provisions are characteristic of derivatives margining. 
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be divided into four component parts, namely, attachment, perfection, priorities 
and enforcement. 
2. What law will govern? 
a. problem with local jurisdiction 
Suppose a Euroclear participant wishes to take security over investments 
held by another participant in Euroclear. The portfolio consists of French 
bonds. If the chargee697 is well advised, it will require the security 
interest to be perfected in accordance with the requirements of Belgian 
law. If it is cautiously advised, it will also require perfection in 
accordance with French law, on the basis that the involvement of the 
French courts may be necessary to enforce the security interest, or defend 
it against third parties698. However, such cautious advice may be harder 
to follow where the charged property consists of a mixed portfolio of 
French, Italian, Spanish, German, Honk Kong and New York bonds. 
The delay and expense of local perfection may be impracticable. It may 
be conunercially impossible in the case of derivatives margining, where 
collateral turnover may be rapid. The risk that the law of the issuer may 
govern security interests in the view of courts of competent jurisdiction 
is a major concern in international secured finance. 
b. intermediary jurisdiction 
The obvious solution to this problem would be to determine that the 
charged property, and therefore the security interest, are governed by the 
law of the intermediary clearer, and not by the law of the local issuer. 
This approach ("the Intermediary Jurisdiction Approach") informs the 
concept of a "securities entitlement" in the new Article 8 of the US 
697 In this section, "chargee" is used in the widest sense of any person to whom a security interest is granted, and 
"chargor" is used to mean any person granting a security interest, whether by way of charge, mortgage, pledge 
or otherwise. 
698 
such as the liquidator of the chargor, or other creditors, who may seek to attach the charged asset in the hands 
of the local depository of Euroclear, or even directly against the issuer. 
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Uniform Commercial Code699. It is advocated more widely in Randall 
Guynn's paper, ModerLiisi g Securitie Ownership, Transfer and PledeyiLnng sI 
IaW700 and developed in section 6 below. 
C. defence of security interest 
However, the benefit of the Intermediary Jurisdiction Approach may be 
limited in practice. It may be possible to rely on the cooperation of a 
clearing organisation in enforcing a security interest over assets held in 
the clearer and perfected in accordance with the law of the clearer's 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the danger remains that a third party wishing 
to challenge the security interest (e. g. the liquidator of the chargor or 
another creditor having a competing security interest in the same assets) 
may claim the assets in the courts of the underlying issuer, which in turn 
may make an order against the assets in the hands of the local depositary. 
The risk, of course, is that while the courts of the clearer's jurisdiction 
may adopt the Intermediary Jurisdiction Approach, the courts of the 
issuer may not. For the Intermediary Jurisdiction Approach to be 
entirely reliable, it must be adopted in every jurisdiction in which the 
clients of global custody invest. While an EC measure in this context 
would be most welcome, it would not cure the problem as investment is 
not confined to the EC. Investment in the emerging markets may 
increase the risk that security interests perfected at clearer level may be 
defeated locally 
The ability to defend a security interest at local level may depend on four 
criteria of local law: attachment, perfection, priority and enforcement 
procedure. The following sections will consider each of these in general 
701 temis 
699 Section 8-110 (Transfers) and 9-103(6) (Pledges). 
700 February 1996, Capital Markets Forum, Section on Business Law, International bar Association, p. 35. See 
also Tyson Quah, Cross Border Collateral isation Made Easy, (1996) 11 J. I. B. F. L. 117. 
701 " The process by which a security interest is made to fasten on an asset so as to be enforceable against the debtor 
as respects that asset is conveniently termed attachment. Attachment is concerned ordy with relations between 
creditor and debtor and their respective representatives. It Is to be contrasted with perfection, that is, the taking 
of any additional steps prescribed by law for giving public notice of the security interest so as to bind third 
parties. Perfection requirements are in turn to be distinguished from priority rules, i. e. rules declaring the 
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Attachment 
a. managed collateral 
Chapter 2 discussed the difference between personal and proprietary 
rights. A convenient form of shorthand is to consider personal rights as 
legal relations between persons, and proprietary rights as legal relations 
between persons and things. Attachment is the legal process whereby a 
personal right arising under the agreement to grant security is enlarged 
into a proprietary right, by notionally fixing on the charged asset. 
Attachment confers a proprietary right on the chargee. 
However, this proprietary right is less than ftill title. The chargor retains 
a residual proprietary right in the asset, which is the right to have it back 
upon discharge of the secured obligation. Under English law, this 
residual property is called the equity of redemption. Thus both the 
chargor and the chargee have concurrent proprietary interests, legally 
linking each of them to the same asset. 
Broadly speaking, an actively managed portfolio is considerably more 
profitable than an uiunanaged portfolio. If the huge volumes of securities 
that serve as collateral could not be traded in response to market changes, 
significant profits would be foregone. It is therefore often provided that 
collateral securities are not frozen, and that either the chargor or the 
chargee may deal in them. 702 The chargor is customarily permitted to 
deal in the collateral securities by substitution provisions, whereby it is 
allowed to withdraw securities from the collateral pool upon providing 
substitute securities of equal value and of a type acceptable to the 
chargee. 703 The chargee is customarily permitted to deal in the collateral 
ranking of the security interest in relation to rival claims to the asset, e. g. by a prior or subsequent 
encumbrancer. " Goode, Commercial Law, pp. 673,674. 
702 The chargee often wishes to use the collateral securities for "on-pledging" (or, in US parlance, rehypothecation), 
i. e. as collateral to third parties to secure its own obligations. US law is more comfortable with these 
arrangements than English law because of the liberal provisions of Article 9 of the UCC. 
703 For a discussion of substitution rights in relation to collateral, see Philip Wood, Comparative Law of Security 
and Guarantees, p. 63. 
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securities equivalent redelivery provisions , whereby its duv., upon the 
discharge of the secured obligation is to not to redeliver the ý-ery 
securities that were delivered to it by way of collateral, but to deliver 
securities of the same number and type. However, both substitution and 
equivalent redelivery are legally problematic. 
English law has the concept of a floating charge, whereby security may 
be given over a changing pool of assets, with the chargor retaining 
freedom to deal in the ordinary course of its business. However, floating 
charges are generally registrable704, and rank lower in priority to fixed 
charges. 705 It is possible to create a fixed charge over a changing pool 
of assets by conditioning the right of substitution of the chargor, but this 
is incompatible with an unrestricted freedom to deal. Other 
jurisdictionS706 have no concept equivalent to the floating charge; a 
security interest purportedly given over a changing collateral pool might 
simply not attach. The risk, therefore, of permitting the chargor freedom 
to deal in the collateral is that the security may be defeated, for want of 
attachment under civil law, and for want of registration under English 
law. 
For these reasons, it is more customary for the title to economic as`Kýý) 
represented by the management potential of the collateral pool to be 
conferred on the chargee, through equivalent redelivery provisions. On- 
pledging has a long history, and is customary in the United States. 
However, under English law, it raises the following problem. If the 
chargee may deliver back securities which are different from those 
provided by the chargor, and may dispose of the original securities free 
of any interest of the chargor, the chargor can retain no equity of 
redemption. If the securities it receives back are or may not be the same 
ones it put up, it has no continuing proprietary interest in them. The 
transaction is not the granting of security, but an outright transfer. 
704 Under the Company Act 1988 Section 395. In many security arrangements, the formality and publicity involved 
in registration would be commercially unacceptable. UK banks are prevented from giving floating charges by 
the Bank of England. 
705 (and are frozen on administration together with other disadvantages) 
706 
particularly civil law jurisdictions. 
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To summarise, the problem with permitting the chargor to deal is that the 
chargee's rights may not attach, the problem with permitting the Chargee 
to deal is that the chargor's rights may not persist. For ease of reference, 
these two problems together will be referred to as the "Attachment 
Problem". A security interest involves the creation of concurrent 
proprietary lnterests in the chargor and the chargee; the need for a 
proprietary interest to be linked to an asset requires the charged asset in 
effect to be frozen between them. Thus, traditional concepts of security 
will inevitably be problematic in an environment where the freezing of 
large portfolios of securities is uneconomic. 
The markets have therefore sought out ways of providing collateral 
otherwise than by way of security. The chief example is the growth of 
repurchase agreements ("repos"). Under these arrangements, collateral 
is provided by way of outright transfer, subject to contractual redelivery 
obligations. No security interest is taken, and counterparty risk is 
addressed by a set off mechanism that is triggered by default. The same 
structure is adopted in stocklending and sale and buy back arrangements. 
The phenomenal growth of the repo market in recent years is certain to 
continue, as repos provide the natural answer to the Attachment Problem 
by substituting contractual for proprietary rights. In some respects the 
Attachment Problem (which arises when security is taken) is akin to the 
Allocation ProbleM707 (which arises when proprietary rights are 
intermediated). Both derive from the need for property to inhere in 
particular assets, and both present difficulties in modem custodial practice 
where the trend is generally away from allocation and towards pooling. 
Chapter 5 considered how the Allocation Problem can be addressed by 
the concept of co-ownership. Co-ownership cannot cure the Attachment 
Problem, because of the need for collateral assets to be sold free of any 
encumbrance. The contractual set-off route adopted in repos cannot cure 
the Allocation Problem, for the simple reason that the exposures of 
investors to the intermediaries holding their securities are not matched by 
mutual obligations capable of set off. With intermediation, the exposure 
707 discussed in chapEer 5 
- 192- 
is all one way, so the concept of property is necessary to address 
insolvency risk. 
b. English law 
The English conflicts rules for the attachment of security interests may 
be summarised as follows. 
The contractual aspects of an agreement to grant security are governed 
by Rome Convention7O8. However the Rome Convention does not cover 
proprietary rights. 709 The effect of attachment of a security interest over 
the custody portfolio is to transfer to the chargee a proprietary interest in 
the portfolio. The position is likely to be governed by the non-statutory 
conflicts rules for the assignment of intangibles. 710 
While these are complex, Dice indicates that they produce the same 
result as the Rome Convention. 711 This is summarised as follows: "... the 
mutual obligations of the assignor and assignee are governed by the law 
applicable ... to the contract between them while the validity of the 
assignment and the obligations of third parties - in other words, all the 
property aspects of the transaction - are governed by the law under which 
-, 712 On this basis, while the contractual validity of the right was created. 
a security interesC13 will be determined by the governing law of the 
contract714, the attachment of a security interest to French Traditional 
708 The Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, implemented in the UK by the Contracts 
(applicable Law) Act 1990. 
709 
... since the Convention is concerned only with the law applicable to contractual obligations, property 
rights ... are not covered by these provisions. " p 10, 
Giuliano and Lagarde Report 
710 " The assignment of intangible things, such as debts, has long been one of the most intractable topics in the 
English conflict of laws. Mark Moshinsky, The Assignment of Debts in the conflict of Laws, The Law 
Quarterly Review, 109, p. 591. 
711 Volume 2, p. 979. 
712 
p 979,980 See Re Fry [19461 Ch 312. 
713 
or at least one created by contract 
714 i. e. the contract creating the security interest 
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Bearer securities will be governed by French domestic law. The la" 
governing the attachment of a security interest to such securities when 
they are immobilised in Cedel will depend upon whether the charged 
asset consists of French law bonds or a Luxembourg law interest in such 
bonds. This issue is discussed in detail in section 6 below. An 
alternative view is that the position is determined by leT situsi-15. The 
two will often coincide In practice. 
Perfection 
a. generally 
An attached security interest generally survives the insolvency of the 
chargor716 and therefore addresses credit risk. However, it may not 
address the risk the chargee may double deal, and that a third party may 
claim the charged assets, for example under a court order or pursuant to 
a sale or a subsequent security interest. In order to bind third parties, 
different systems of law prescribe certain acts of perfection, or the giving 
of public notice. 
The perfection requirements of English domestic law are few, although 
the Companies Act 1985 imposes strict registration requirements on 
corporate security interestS717. However other countries, particularly civil 
law jurisdictions, may impose expensive and time consuming formalities, 
including notarisation. 
715 . The lex situs is the basic choice of law rule for property in the conflict of laws, applying to tangible movables 
and inunovable property alike. The le-x siw has the virtue of simplicity In having the same rule apply for all 
types of property ... 
The lex situs would in general seem to provide a satisfactory and appropriate rule to govem 
the transfer of property in a debt from the assignor to the assignee. " Moshinsky, op. cit., pp. 607,609. It is 
clear that lex situs governs transfers of negotiable instruments: Alcock v Snuth [18921 Ch. 238; Embiricos v 
Anglo-Australian Bank [19051 1 K. B. 677. 
716 
assuming of course that it is a valid and enforceable security interest. This is because, as between the chargor 
(and its representatives including its liquidator) and the chargee, the security interest is proprietary and not 
merely contractual. 
717 Section 395. Breach of these requirements defeats the security interest against the liquidator or any creditor 
of the chargor, so the requirements go both to attachment and perfection. 
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Where security is taken over an international portfolio, it would often be 
impracticable to perfect in the jurisdiction of each issuer of the 
component securities. Where the collateral pool changes, so that- 
securities of any one jurisdiction may enter and leave it from time to 
time, compliance with all local perfection requirements may be out of the 
question. 
However, the risk cannot be excluded that the courts of any issuer 
jurisdiction would treat its local perfection requirements as applicable. 
The important question then is, will the chargor be exposed to the 
decision of such courts? It might either if their cooperation is required 
in enforcing the security interest, or in defending the security interest 
against the competing claims of other creditors or the liquidator of the 
718 chargor 
b. English law 
The position under English conflicts rules has been clarified in the 
Macmillan judgment. Perfection is governed by the le-x situs. 
Priorities 
generally 
Once a security interest has cleared the hurdles of attachment and 
perfection, it may then need to compete with other security interests that 
have also done so. The outcome of that competition depends on rules of 
priority Chargees may routinely take representations of no prior 
encumbrance and negative pledges against subsequent encumbrances. 
However, these may not be entirely reliable719, and the rules of priority 
will therefore be of concern. 
It would be prudent to assume that local courts may apply the rules of the 
forum to questions of priority. Where security is taken over an 
718 (see the discussion in section 2 above) 
719 Breach of representation and negative pledge will not necessarily defeat a competing interest. 
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international portfolio, it is important to seek to identify the courts in 
which the security interest may require to be defended, and to consider 
the priority rules of those jurisdictions. The issuer jurisdiction is 
obviously important, as third parties might seek to attach the charged 
assets there. 
b. English law 
Priority rules under English private international law were considered in 
chapter 6 section D above. Two different rules apply, depending on 
whether the claim of the plaintiff in the action concerns double dealing, 
or breach of fiduciary duty In the first case, where security interests in 
the same property are granted first to A and then to B, the general rule 
is to apply lexfori. 720 However, where the charged property is a debt 
or (probably) other choses in action such as an interest in a security, the 
position is less clear. There is authority that priorities are governed by 
the law governing the chose in action. 721 There is conflicting authority 
that priorities are determined by jeX SitUS722. Thus, if A charges French 
bonds held in Euroclear first to B and then to C, priorities between B and 
C will (in an English court) be determined either by French law or by 
Belgian law, depending on the view taken by the court of the nature or 
location of the asset charged. For further discussion of this question, see 
section 6 below. 
In the second case, A holds the bonds as fiduciary for B, and charges 
them to C in breach of fiduciary duty As discussed in chapter 6 section 
D above, the position is governed by the rule in Macmillan, which is that 
priorities are determined by 16x situs. 
6. Intermediary Jurisdiction Approach 
720 Ex p Melbourne (1870) L. R. 6 Ch. App. 64; Ae Tagus [19031 P. 44; The Colorado [1923] P. 102, C. A., 
Bankers Trust international Ltd. v Todd Shipyards Corp. (77ze Halcyon Isle) [ 19881 A. C. 221,230-23 1. These 
cases concern the priorities in relation to a marriage settlement, and ships. 
721 Le Feuvre v Sullivan (1855) 10 Moo P. C. 1; Kelly v Sel"n (1905] 2 Ch. 117; Republica de Guatenzala v 
Nunez, [1927] 1 K. B. 669 
722 See Re Queensland Mercantile and Agency Company quoted In footnote 48 of Moshinsicy, Assignment of Debts, 
Law Quarterly Review, 109,5911 
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Section 2 above considered the problem of taking security over international 
portfolios, and the consequent exposure to the demands of a number of different 
legal jurisdictions. It suggested that the Intermediary Jurisdiction Approach, 
whereby the charged asset is treated as being located in the jurisdiction of the 
intermediary, would help by consolidating the legal requirements for taking 
good security into those of the law of the clearer (although all courts of 
competent jurisdiction must recognise this approach before it is entirely 
reliable). This section will argue that the Intermediary Jurisdiction Approach 
is already implicit in English law, and may not require to be introduced by 
legislation. 
Section B of this chapter considered what the interest of the custody client is, 
and suggested that the English courts will characterise this interest as being, or 
as being akin to, an interest under a trust. This section will consider where it 
Is. 
a. lex situs 
This section will argue that, where securities are held by intermediary 
custodians and clearing systems, the situs of the interest held by the 
intermediary is the jurisdiction of the intermediary. Such a situation 
would be important in addressing conflict of law risk, as under many 
systems of private international law proprietary interests including 
security interests are determined byeex situs of the charged asset. Under 
English conflict rules, ler situs is also important, for a number of 
reasons. 
Firstly, jurisdiction. Broadly speaking, in matters involving European 
defendants, the English courts generally have jurisdiction in claims 
concerning a trust domiciled in England. 723 Where the defendant is 
domiciled in Scotland, Northern Ireland or outside Europe724, the English 
courts have jurisdiction over matters concerning moveable property 
723 
see chapter 6 section B. I. d. 
724 
and, in the latter case, leave for service outside the jurisdiction is granted. 
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situated in England. 725 These rules may assist in avoiding litigation in 
issuer jurisdictions. Secondly and more importantly, attachment and 
priorities may be determined by lex sitUS. 7 726 
In the English courts, lex situs will be determined in accordance with 
,, 727 English law 
b. intangibles and securities 
Attributing a location to an intangible such as an interest under a trust is 
a notional exercise. Of course, the intangibility of some securities 
predated computerisation and global custody. As discussed in chapter 3, 
traditional registered securities have always been intangible. That section 
also argued 728that securities held through computerised clearing systems 
are a fonn of registered security, the register being the database of the 
clearer. Traditionally, situs of registered securities is the location of the 
register. 729 
C. interest under a trust 
Global custody and more generally the computerisation of securities, 
involves intermediation, so that the interest of the custody client in the 
custody securities is no longer direct. Section B argued that the process 
of intermediation changes the legal nature of the client's proprietary 
interest, so that on the assumed baseS730 the Custody Trust Asset is an 
interest under a trust. The situs of such an interest must be established. 
725 
see chapter 6 sections B. 1. d and B. 2. c 
726 See sections C. 3 and C. 4 above. 
727 " In the conflict of laws the situs of a thing is ascertained by reference to the rules of the lex fori because all 
concepts signifying connecting factors must be interpreted by reference to that system. " QLtca, Volume 2, p 
923. 
728 (in section D) 
729 Picey p. 931. 
730 
on the assumption of co-ownership between clients under Fungible Custody. 
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This question was considered in the context of a trust of a portfolio of 
securities in In re 731 Cigala's Settlement Trusts . In this case, under a 
marriage settlement executed in England, a wife settled a portfolio of 
French and English securities on trust, after the death of the survivor of 
husband and wife, for their children. The trustees were English. 
Succession duty would have been payable if the property to which the 
children became entitled was English property. It was held that 
succession duty was payable. 732 The case suggests that the interposition 
of a tr-ust between underlying property and its beneficial owners may 
move the situs of that property to the location of the trustees. 
Further support for this view is provided by A. G. v Johnson733 The 
slightly simplified facts are as follows. An English domIciled testator left 
a tea estate in Assam on trust with English resident trustees. Two of the 
beneficiaries died, thereby increasing the share of the survivors. It was 
necessary to determine the situs of this increased share for taxation 
purposes. It was held that the increase did not constitute property situate 
out of the United Kingdom so that succession, estate and settlement estate 
duty were payable. The decision was based on the fact that English 
trustees stood between the beneficial owner and the underlying 
p rope rty. 734 
The theme is continued in the case of Favorke v Steinko ff. 735 English p 
trustees were directed to invest a certain sum in German Securities. The 






(1878) 7 Ch. D. 351 
See Jessel, M. R. at 355. 
[19071 2 K. B. 885 
"I think it is clear that, but for the intervention of the trustees and the special directions and powers given to 
them the property would have been situate out of the United Kingdom. (per Bray J at 893. ) 
[ 19221 1 Ch. 174 
V 
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beneficiaries were charged under the Treaty of Peace Order 1919 as 
being "property, rights and interests" in the United Kingdom "- 36 
In all of these cases, the situs of the interest of a beneficiary under a trust 
is the location of the trustee. 
d. Enforcement Procedure 
Chapter 2 considered the nature of proprietary rights. It argued that 
property is, in origin, a remedy, and that the legal nature of property is 
deeply coloured by the court procedures whereby proprietary remedies 
may be obtained. 737 It should therefore be no surprise to find that the 
basis for the above judgments is procedural. The right of the beneficiary 
in respect of the underlying property is (in the absence of breach of 
trust)738 not directly enforceable against that property. It is only 
enforceable through the trustee. 739 More generally, an important 
jurisprudential basis for the rule that proprietary rights are determined in 
accordance with ler situs, is the pragmatic consideration that the 
cooperation of the courts where the assets are located will be required for 
enforcement. In practice, the primary recourse of the custody client is 
against the trustee. These are arguments in favour of identifying lex situs 
as the jurisdiction of the trustee. 
736 See Russell J at 177. 
737 See chapter 2 section Lf 
738 (when tracing may be available to beneficiaries) 
739 '. Maak's right is a right against the trustees, a right to call on them to do their duty under the will, and, if they 
do not, to come to the Court here and ask to have the estate administered according to the trusts of the will. 
That right seems to me to be a chose in action, and a chose in action must be regarded as situate in the country 
where it is enforceable. " Favorke v Steinkopff, per Russell J at 178. This is again emphasised in A. G. v Jewish 
Colonisation Association [ 19011 1 K. B. 123: "... where property is found to be legally vested in a person subject 
to the jurisdiction of English Courts, ... the title to the beneficial interest in that property is regulated and 
capable of being enforced by the laws of England... " (per Stirling LI at 142). 
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e. Nature of Interest under a Trust 
Chapter 2 considered the difference between personal and proprietary 
rights. It argued that the question of whether a right is proprietary, 
makes little sense when considered in abstract terms, and is meaningful 
only in the context of concrete situations, the most important of which (in 
the modem era) is insolvency. It also argued that equitable interests 
arising under trusts lie on the border between personal and proprietary 
rights. Trusts comprise a broad category of legal arrangements, ranging 
from bare trusts (where the beneficiary has allocated property rights in 
the trust assets)740 to unadministered estates (where no property rights in 
favour of the beneficiary can arise because of want of allocation), and the 
right of the beneficiary is merely personal against the trustee. 741 
However, all trust interests are proprietary in the important sense that the 
beneficiaries rights are not vulnerable to the insolvency of the trustee. 
However, these rights are indirect, for (in the absence of breach of trust) 
they are not enforceable by the beneficiary directly against the trust 
assets. 742 It might be said that trust interests are proprietary in the 
trustee's insolvency, and personal in enforcement against third parties. 
All trust interests share this hybrid nature. In locating their situs with the 
trustee the cases discussed in this section, the English courts have been 
743 guided by the nature of trust interests in third party enforcement 
f. Allocated and Unallocated Interests 
This chapter has assumed Fungible Custody at the level of the sub- 
custodian, with the result that the Custody Trust Asset is unallocated. 
740 See also A. G. Hong Kong v Reid [19941 1 All ER 1, where a trust interest is held to be proprietary and 
cautionable against underlying land. 
741 See Webb v Webb [19941 3 All ER 911 for the characterisatIon of trusts interest as personal rIghts. Baker v 
Archer-Shee discusses the difference between a mere chose in action against the trustee and rights in rem against 
the underlying assets. See also Hayton, The Law of Trusts, pp. 161-163. See also Marshall v Kerr [19941 3 
All ER 106 at 119. 
742 Enforcement must generally be through the trustee as legal owner of the assets. Thus. the beneficial owner of 
shares generally cannot compel the issuer to pay the dividends to him, without joining the trustee of the shares. 
743 (Ilie English courts have also been guided by the nature of trust interest In third party enforcement in 
determining the question of jurisdiction. ) 
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This is important, as it is arguable that the rules for attributing sItus to 
an interest under a trust differ depending on whether the interest is 
allocated or unallocated. 
Lord Sudeley v Attorney General744 begins a long line of cases 
concerning the situs of another class of unallocated trust interests, namely 
interests in unadministered estates. In Lord Sudeley, an English 
domiciled testator left one quarter of his residuary estate to his wife 
absolutely His wife died domiciled in England before the husband's 
estate was fully administered or the residue ascertained. The residue 
included mortgages on real property in New Zealand. It was held that 
estate duty was payable on that part of the wife's estate referable to the 
mortgages as the property was an English asset. This was because the 
wife's interest in the residuary estate was unallocated. 745 
In this case, it was held that because the interest was not merely 
unallocated, but it was not proprietary at all but merely a personal right 
of enforcement against the trustee. 746 In this respect, the cases differ 
from Fungible Custody, under which (on the basis assumed in this 
chapter) the interest of the client is proprietary. 
Lord Sudeley was directly followed in the cases of In re Srnythe747 and 
Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Queensland) v Hugh Duncan 
Livingston748. In these cases, the interest in question also arose in an 
unadministered estate, and there was no indication that the interest in 
question was proprietary. 749 However, in the case of Baker v Archer- 
744 18971 A. C. 11 
745 
per Lord Davey at 21. 
746 .I do not think that they (the wife and her executors] have an estate, right, or interest, legal or equitable, in 
these New Zealand mortgages so as to make them assets of her estate. " per Lord Herschell at 18. See also 
Lord Davey at 2 1. 
747 In re Smythe, Leach v Leach ( 18981 1 Ch 89. 
748 [19651 A. C. 694. The reasoning in Lord Sudeley and Conunissioner of Stamp Duty (Queensland) v Livingstone 
is endorsed by Lord Browne Wilkinson in Marshall v Aerr (19941 3 WLR 299 at 312. 
749 Chapter 2 section 1-h argued that the interest under a beneficiary in an unadministered estate is merely an 
equitable chose in action and not an equitable chose in possession. 
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Shee750. the position more closely accorded xith that under Fungible 
Custody, as the case concerned an estate that had been administered. 
In this case, a US testator left foreign securities under a US trust for his 
daughter for life. The trustees were a US trust corporation. Income was 
not remitted to England but held in an account in New York. Archer- 
Shee, the husband of the daughter, was assessed to income tax on the 
income of his wife on the basis that it was income arising from foreign 
securities (which was taxable whether or not received in the UK). 
Archer-Shee argued that, because of the interposition of the trust, it was 
income from a foreign possession other than stocks and shares (which 
was only taxable to the extent it was remitted to the United Kingdom). 
The House of Lords held that the income was taxable. 751 The daughter 
was specifically entitled to the income and had an allocated interest in the 
underlying property under the terms of the trust. The Master of the Rolls 
in the lower court had relied on the principle of Lord Sudeley to hold that 
tax was not payable. However, Lord Sudeley was distinguished, because 
in this case the estate had been administered. 752 
There is obiter authority that, had the daughter's interest been proprietary 
but unallocated, the judgment would have differed. 753 Also of interest 
are the dissenting judgments of Viscount Sumner and Lord Blanesburgh, 
who argue that, even though allocated, the daughter's interest is indirect 
and therefore not the same as a direct proprietary interest in the 
underlying property. 754 The trust in question was a New York law 
750 (H. L) [19271 A. C. 844. 
751 (Viscount Sumner and Lord Blanesburgh dissenting). 
752 My Lords, with great respect to the Master of the Roils, I do not think either his own reasoning or the 
quotations he relies upon have any application to a case such as the present when, as I have already pointed out, 
we are dealing with "a definite and specific trust fund. " Per Lord Carson at 871. See also Lord Atkinson at 
862 and Lord Wrenbury at 866. 
753 
... 
had the share to which Lady Archer-Shee was entitled been a proportion only of the income or profits of 
the residue other questions would, no doubt, arise. " Per Lord Carson at 869. 
754 "All that she has is a right, in the forum of the trustee and of the trust fund, to have the trust executed in her 
favour under an order to be made for her benefit by the appropriate Court of equity, and this "possession" 
neither consists in the trust's investments or any of them nor is it situated here. It is "foreign". " Per Viscount 
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trust, and New York law was presumed to be the same as English law. 
However, further assessments to tax were made on Archer-Shee, and in 
a later case (Archer-Shee v Garland! L) he adduced expert evidence that 
New York law differed from English law in that his wife did not have an 
estate or interest in the underlying securities, but only a chose in action 
against the trustees. On this basis it was held that tax was not payable. 
These cases help to formulate the rule that the situs of trust interests 
which are unallocated but proprietary (as in Fungible Custody on the 
assumed bases), is the jurisdiction where the trustee is located 
g. situs of underlying property 
A different approach is suggested in Dicev. This approach seeks to 
distinguish between trust interests which are proprietary interests in the 
trust assets, and those which are mere choses in action against the trustee. 
(This chapter has argued that all trust interests are both of these things. ) 
Dicey argues that the rule for the situs of a trust interest differs according 
to which class it belongs to. "If the beneficiary is given a beneficial 
interest in the trust property then his interest under the trust is located in 
the country where the trust property is situated. If the beneficiary is 
given merely a right of action against the trustees then his interest under 
the trust is located where the action may be brought, i. e. at the trustees' 
place of residence. ', 756 
Only two cases are cited in support of the first part of the rule (that situs 
of the interest coincides with that of the underlying property), namely Re 
Berchtold757 and Phillipson-Stow v I. R. C758. Both of these concern the 
private international law of succession. The outcome of each case 
Sumner at 856. Again, "Her interest is merely an equitable one, and it is not an interest in the specific stocks 
and shares constituting the trust fund at all. " Per Lord Blanesburgh at 877, quoting Rowlatt J. 
755 JIL. ) [19311 A. C. 212 
756 (Rule 114 (9) at p. 933). 
757 [ 19231 1 Ch 192 
758 [19611 A. C. 727 
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depended upon whether, upon succession, an interest in land held on trus', 
for sale was movable or immovable property. In both cases such 
interests in freeholds were held to be immovable. As the scope of the 
definition of inu-novable property is extremely wide and somewhat 
arbitrary759, these cases do not provide clear authority for location of any 
proprietary interest under a trust in the jurisdiction of the underlying 
760 assets. 
A larger number of cases are cited in Dicey in support of the rule that 
situs of the trust interest coincides with that of the trustee. This chapter 
has argued that this rule is correct, and applies to all trust interests, on 
the basis of the manner in which they are enforceable. 
conclusions 
In conclusion, it is argued that lex situs of an unallocated trust interest 
such as the interest of the custody client in the Custody Trust Asset, is 
the law of the jurisdiction of the trustee. 761 In other words, the way in 
which securities are held determines not only their legal nature but also 
their legal location. 
This approach is clearly advantageous in the context of global custody, 
for there will be only one trustee (and therefore only one le--c situs). In 
contrast, identifying lex situs with the situs of the underlying assets, will 
759 ("A mortgage debt secured by land is immovable property": In re Berchtold, per Russell J, at 201) 
760 It may be proper to distinguish between movable and immovable property; the importance of the location of 
the underlying property is greater in the latter case. See D. W. M. Waters, The Law of Trusts in Canada, 1974, 
Carswell, Toronto, p. 969: "... where immoveables are concerned, the lex situs will continue to have an 
overwhelming and inevitable influence... where a trust comprises both movables and immoveables ... there is 
good reason for not giving such an influence to the lex siw ... because it should 
be a matter of importance that D 
the trust should be seen as a unit and its issues dealt with accordingly... ". 
761 Support for this view is found in Philip Wood, Comparative Law of Security and Guarantees, London, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 1995. p. 190: "The lex situs of fungible securities deposited with a custodian ought to be the office 
of the custodian where the securities account is kept". See also p. 81 
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produce a fragmented approach in the case of a mixed portfolios that are 
characteristic in global custody. 762 
However, the benefit of the approach remains limited by forum risk. 
Fonun Risk 
While the Intermediary Jurisdiction Approach may be the way forward for the 
use of custody securities as collateral, the problem remains that a forum such 
as that of the issuer of the securities may assume jurisdiction, and adopt a 
different approach. 
The difficulty of the legal position, and the conunercial imperative of using 
securities as collateral, call for a pragmatic approach. Chargees will often have 
to tolerate some measure of legal risk, and should focus upon practical issues 
relating to enforcement. Possession is of primary importance. Will the 
intermediary clearer or custodian cooperate in enforcing the security interest 
sufficiently rapidly, so that challenge at issuer level may come too late? Does 
the clearer have more than one local depositary, so that a third party claiming 
a competing right in the charged assets would be unable to identify and 
therefore attach the charged assets through the local courts? Finally, and 
subject to the need to avoid illegality, does the chargee have any assets of its 
own in the issuer jurisdiction against which adverse claims or penalties might 
be enforced? 
D. Insolvency 
1. Cash and Securities 
762 This sort of fragmented result was judicially rejected in the slightly different context of integrity of transfer. 
In the first instance judgment of Macmillan v Bishopsgare Investment Trust p1c, (No. 3) [19951 3 All ER 747. 
Millett J refers to "... cases like the present in which portfolios of securities are delivered which consist of shares 
of companies in many different countries. ... when 
it comes to considering whether any and if so what inquiries 
the recipient ought to make in order to verify the right of the transferor to deliver the portfolio, it would in my 
judgment be absurd to distinguish between the different components of the portfolio unless and until the recipient 
himself differentiates between them by attempting to perfect his security. " at 763. See also Moshinsk-y, op. 
cit., pp. 605,611 and 613. 
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Custodian insolvency is complicated by the fact that global custodial arrangements are 
intermediated and cross-border. However, this is only true in relation to the se. -urilles 
. in the custody portfolio. As discussed in chapter 6 section A. 2, custody cash balances 
are neither intermediated nor cross-border, for they are not proprietary. /63 
Where the global custodian becomes insolvent, the client's cash balances will generallý 764 
be at risk as unsecured debt. However, if a sub-custodian becomes insolvent, the client's 
cash balances will not generally 765 be affected, as the global custodian's obligation to pay 
is not conditional on its ability to recover from sub-custodians. 766 
The comments in the remainder of this section relate to custody securities. 
2. Intermediation 
The growth in cross-border investment implies greater use of intermediaries in the 
custody of securities, as the need for liaison with local issuers and tax authorities 
necessitates the use of local sub-custodians. A second reason for the growth of 
intermediation is settlement. Much of the risk and inefficiency in the securities markets 
is associated with settlement. The need to address settlement difficulties is one of the 
driving forces for innovation in the securities markets. The problem is simple. On the 
one hand, transferring securities in certain markets involves risk, expense and delay. On 
the other hand, investors need to be able to buy and sell their beneficial interests in 
securities safely, cheaply and quickly. One solution has been used again and again: the 
removal of settlement from the problematic forum of the issuer of the underlying 
securities, to the safe and convenient forum of an intermediary. Whether securities are 
763 In general, the custody cash balance represents the unsecured debt of the custodian to the client. Because the 
client's claim Is personal against the custodian and not proprietary, the client takes the custodian's credit risk. 
The legal analysis is simple, as the client does not look beyond the custodian to other persons in other 
jurisdictions in order to assert proprietary rights against them. 
764 (unless a special arrangement has been established, such as a client money trust with a third party bank, a "near 
cash" arrangement such as a Short Term Investment Fund, or comparable arrangements rendering the claim of 
the client proprietary). Following the Barings crisis, innovative work was done in developing such 
arrangements. 
765 (in the absence of contractual provision to the contrary in the global custody agreement) 
766 (although its inability to recover from sub-custodians may trigger its own insolvency). In commercial effect, 
the global custodian guarantees the cash positions with the sub-custodians. Legally, of course, it is not a 
guarantee but a primary obligation. 
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I repackaged in depositary receipt fOrm767 or immobilised in a clearing sysiem, 68, the I fundamental idea is the same. Large numbers of securities are transferred into the name 
of an intermediary institution and held by it for participating investors; transactions 
between participants are settled by amending the records of the intermediary, thereby 
avoiding the need for settlement in the local markets. One level of intermediation ma'Y 
be introduced by repackaging, another by immobilisation, and yet others by the need to 
have a lead custodian in the jurisdiction of the client, and a further custodian in the 
jurisdiction of the issuer of the underlying securities. The investor may be separated 
from the underlying securities by a chain with a significant number of links. 
However, if intermediation reduces settlement risk, it introduces risks of its own: 
investors' securities may be lost in the hands of intermediaries for a variety of reasons, 
including fraud769. However, a study of the London marketS770 has shown that losses 
of client securities in the hands of intermediaries have not been caused by fraud alone77 1, 
but by the combination of fraud and insolvenCY772. In the worst case, the assets are not 
there, and there is no-one to sue for their recovery. Both the investor's proprietary rights 
and its personal rightS773 in respect of its investment are valueless. 
Intermediary risk is the risk that custody securities in the hands of the insolvent 
intermediary may be available to its general creditors; this is a question of law. Shortfall 
risk is the risk that there is a shortfall in the intermediary's holding of custody securities; 
this is a question of fact. Sections 3 to 6 will look at intermediary risk and section 7 will 
consider shortfall risk. Sections 8 and 9 will address other risks to the custody assets on 
767 
see chapter 10 
768 
see chapter 11 
769 
... the involvement of 
intermediaries in the holding of securities and the settling of trades necessarily creates 
new legal relationships and new risks. Perhaps the most basic difference in risks is that the non-resident faces 
custody risk - the potential loss of the securities held in custody in the event that the local agent becomes 
insolvent, acts negligently or commits fraud. " Bank for International Settlements, Cross-Border Securities 
Settlement, Basle, May 1995, p. 22. 
770 Custodianship and the Protection of Client Property, London Business School, July 1994. 
771 
presumably because, provided the intermediary is solvent, there will be an enforceable obligation on the 
intermediary to make up the shortfall. 
772 
see p. 3, Custodianshiv and the Protection of Client Property 
773 (against the custodian) 
- 208- 
insobvency (liens and 11 idator's costs) 'qui 





Finally, section 10 will consider Insokency 
Chapter 2 indicated774 that the chief practical difference between personal and proprietary 
rights is that personal rights may become valueless in the insolvency of the obligor. In 
the context of custody, it is important to establish that the client enjoys proprietary rights 
in the custody securities, so that it is not exposed to the credit risk of any intermediary. 
Proprietary rights link a person to an asset. In order to be linked to the underlying 
custody securities, the client must demonstrate that its property runs through each link 
in the chain of intermediaries though which the securities are held. Its proprietary claims 
are as weak as the weakest link. 
Suppose an English investor appoints a London global custodian to hold its Italian bonds. 
The bonds are held through Euroclear, of which the global custodian is not a participant. 
This means that the custody chain will have 4 links. The investor delegates safekeeping 
to the global custodian. The global custodian sub-delegates custody to a Belgian sub- 
custodian which is a Euroclear participant. The sub-custodian delegates to Euroclear. 
Euroclear does not hold the bonds itself, but sub-delegates custody to an Italian 
depositary, which holds the bonds in its vaults. The global custody agreement is 
governed by English law. The sub-custodian agreement, Euroclear's general terms and 
conditions and the depositary agreement are governed by Belgian law. The bonds are 
governed by Italian law. 
In order for the client to own the bonds, each link in the chain must pass proprietary 
rights upwards to the next intermediary. It may be assumed that the depositary will own 
the bonds under Italian law, by virtue of possession (in the case of bearer bonds) or 
registration (in the case of registered bonds). Whether Euroclear enjoys proprietary 
rights under the depositary agreement that would be recognised in the insolvency of the 
775 depositary will depend on the terms of that agreement and Italian law . It is understood 
that the international clearers obtain the opinion of local counsel that their proprietary 
rights would survive the insolvency of a depositary. The proprietary link between 
in section 3 
on the likely assumption that the depositary's insolvency would be govemed by Italian law. 
-209- 
__6 Euroclear and its participants is supported by legislation. ' Whether the assets would 
be safe from the general creditors of the sub-custodian in its insol-vency will be 
deter-mined by the terms of the sub-custodian agreement and Belgian laW777. Finally, the 
client will be able to recover its assets in the insolvency of the global custodian if, as a 
matter of English law, they are held for it on trust. 
If any link in the chain fails, the client has only a personal claim and therefore bears the 
credit risk of the intermediary immediately above the failed linki /. Issuer (or market) -"9 
risk is compounded by intermediary risk, and the value of the investment is reduced 
accordingly. The following sections will consider reasons why a link might fail in this 
way. 
Civil law Jurisdictions 
Global custody involves intermediation, or the separation of ownership from possession 
or control. Under English law, two legal relationships permit property to be held by one 
person yet owned by another: bailment and trust. Chapter 4 argued that bailment is of 
limited relevance in the modem securities markets780, so that the concept of trusts is the 
main basis for intermediated proprietary rights under English law. 
The function of the custody chain is to cross borders. The trust is an angto-saxon 
concept, and not generally recognised in civil law jurisdictions. 781 An alternative basis 
776 Royal Decree No 62 of 10 November 1967, as amended by an Act of 7 April 1995. Similar provision is made 
for Cedel under Luxembourg law in a Grand Ducal Decree of 17 February 1971, as amended by a Decree of 
8 June 1994). 
777 
on the assumption that its insolvency is governed by Belgian law. Where local custody is provided in 
Luxembourg through a branch, the position might differ as Luxembourg law applies the insolvency rules of the 
jurisdiction of incorporation. 
778 
see chapters 4 and 5. 
779 
subject to any contractual or general law duty on the custodian to make good any losses associated with sub- 
custodian insolvency; see chapter 8. 
780 (because bailment necessarily implies tangible and allocated property) 
781 "The civil code/common law division is now an uninteresting classification, except in relation to the trust. " 
Philip Wood, Principles of International Insolvency, 1995, London, Sweet & Maxwell, p. 6. Professor Wood 
attributes the civil law rejection of trusts to the concept of false wealth. "The concept espoused 'in continental 
Europe from at least the time of Napoleon was that anybody who wanted a real right or rights in rem 
enforceable against everybody, including creditors, must not acquire it privately or secretly, but the night must 
be patent and published to the world. ... The principle root of this extraordinary 
doctrine that one person's 
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for conferring intermediated proprietary rights must therefore be identified in chose. 
jurisdictions. As noted above, the European international clearers have legislative 
support. Article 8 of the New York US uniform commercial code provides for 
proprietary rights in favour of purchasers of fungible securities held by financial 
intermediaries782. In the absence of such legislation, how will civil law jurisdictions treat 
the custody assets? The position is complicated by the fact that the choice of law of the 
contracts governing the intermediary chain is not always the law of the jurisdiction of the 
intermediary. For example, the European clearers may require their local law to govern 
their depositary agreements. Also, some English global custodians require their sub- 
custody contracts to be governed by English law. Would an intermediated proprietary 
relationship purported to be created under such contracts be recognised in a jurisdiction 
having no such concept under its local law? 
"In civil law jurisdictions.. - major problems arise because the trust concept is alien to 
their domestic law. ', 783 An English law trust may be recognised if the jurisdiction is 
bound by the Hague Trusts Convention784. "The Convention does not introduce the trust 
concept into the domestic law of countries lacking the concept ("non-trust countries"). 
... 
The Convention does make non-trust countries, like trust countries, recognise trusts of 
property as a matter of private international law, (subject to significant safeguards)., ' 7 85 
property should be taken to pay another's debts [through the non-recognition of trusts] lies in the deep objection 
in non-trust countries to false wealth or false credit based upon apparent riches, apparent possession, apparent 
assets: the principle that creditors might be misled into giving credit to the debtor on the basis of his ostensible 
wealth when in fact his assets belong to a secret third party who takes all on the debtor's insolvency. " (pp. 36, 
37) 
782 Section 8-313 (1) (d)(ij) and (iii), and 8-313(2). Of course, New York is not a cIv, l law jurisIdIction 
783 D. J. Hayton, International Recognition of Trusts, Ed. I Glasson, International Trust Laws, Chancery Law, 
London, C. 1.1 
784 The U`K, Italy, Luxembourg, United States, Canada, Australia and France have signed the treaty, the UK, Italy, 
the Netherlands, the provinces of Canada other than Ontario and Quebec and Australia have gone on to ratify 
it. Signing without more merely indicates an intention to implement in due course by legislation upon 
ratification. 
785 Glasson, op. cit., cl. 5 and 6 
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The Convention provides as follows: - 
"Such recognition shall imply, as a minimum, that the trust property constitutes 
a separate fund ... In so far as the law applicable to a trust requires or provides, 
such recognition shall imply, in particular- 
(a) that personal creditors of the tr-ustee shall have no recourse against the trust 
assets; 
(b) that the trust assets shall not form part of the trustee's estate upon his 
t786 insolvency or bankruptcy; ... 
However, certain provisions in the Convention may defeat the recognition of a trust 
arising under a contract governed by the law of a trust state, in the courts of a non-trust 
issuer jurisdiction. Article 13 may obviate the need for recognition where the underlying 
securities are issued in a non-trust state 787. Arguably, article 15 may cut across 
788 recognition in the context of insolvency (and, incidentally, taking security) 
Alternatively, the local courts may follow the approach of the Swiss Federal Court in 
Harrison v Credit Suisse securities789 790. Swiss law being the applicable law of a trust 
created by an American, it held that "it is necessary to examine to which legal institutions 
of Swiss law the legal relationship in dispute has the closest resemblance as far as its 
effects are concerned. " The court found that the trust was really a mixed contract 
depending of the law of obligations, since it contained aspects of a contract of mandate, 
786 
article 11. 
787 . No state shall be bound to recognise a trust the significant elements of which, except for the choice of the 
applicable law, the place of administration and the habitual residence of the trustee, are more closely connected 
with States which do not have the institution of the trust or the category of trust involved. " Article 13 does not 
form part of English law: the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987, which implemented the Convention, omits article 
13. 
788 "The Convention does not prevent the application of provisions of the law designated by the conflicts rules of 
the forum, in so far as these provisions cannot be derogated from by voluntary act, relating in particular to the 
following matters- 
d. the transfer of title to property and security interests in property; 
e. the protection of creditors in matters of insolvency. " 
Articles 15(l) (d) and (e) are excluded in implementing Dutch legislation so as to oust article 84 of Book 3 of 
the Dutch Civil Code, which does not recognise transfers to a person otherwise than as fully part of his 
patrimony. 
789 [ 19931 1 WLR 934. [1994] 1 WLR 452, CA. 
790 AFT 96,1970,1179 
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of an agreement to make a fiduciary transfer of propertv, of a Gift and of a contract for 
the benefit of a third party. " 791 792 
Where the Hague Convention and the principle in Harrison v Credit Suisse do not assist, 
the risk may remain that the custody assets are available to the creditors of an 
intermediary in its insolvency, unless the safekeeping arrangements clearly earmark the 
assets for the custodian's clients. 793 
Local restrictions not met 
Another source of intermediary risk is failure to comply with issuer jurisdiction 
formalities. The use of street names (or informal sub-delegations of custody to local 
brokers to escape restrictions on foreign holdings) is widespread in some far East 
jurisdictions. 794 
791 Hayton and Glasson, op. cit., C1.33. 
792 For an example of the equivalent process under English conflicts law, see Macryd1lan v Bishopsgate (No 3) 
[199613 All ER 747 at 769,770: "Legal estates and equitable interests are, of course, concepts of English law 
which may not have their counterparts in the jurisprudence of other legal systems. Where, therefore, a question 
arises whether a transaction in England and governed by English law created a legal estate or an equitable 
interest in foreign property such as shares in a foreign corporation, then recourse must be had to the foreign 
law in order to ascertain, not how the interest resulting from the transaction would be characterised by that law, 
but what rights are conferred by that law on the owner of the interest. Once the nature of the interest is known, 
its characterisation as legal or equitable must be determined in accordance with English law. The essence of 
the distinction is that a legal estate binds all the world, whereas an equitable interest binds only the transferor 
and those deriving title under him with notice of the interest. In the case of a transaction in shares in a foreign 
corporation, the essential question is whether the interest of the transferee binds the corporation. If it does not, 
it cannot be what English law would recognise as a legal interest. " 
793 "In the pure non-trust countries in the classical mould, ... the possessor of goods ... held under custodianship is 
the real owner, unless the goods are segregated and marked as belonging to another. The registered holder of 
registered securities is deemed the owner even though he is a custodian, clearing-house or nominee. The 
possessor of bearer negotiable instruments is the owner unless they are segregated and marked in the same way 
as goods belonging to another. " Philip Wood, Principles of International Insolvency, 1995, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, p. 39. "In order to avoid this result [of custody securities going to the creditors of the insolvent 
custodian], bearer securities must be bundled together and marked with the true owner's name and registered 
securities must be registered in the books of the issuer in the name of the true owner (not the custodian) or, 
sometimes, registered in the name of the custodian with an indication that they belong to third parties - many 
registration systems do not permit notice of the owners to appear on the register, mainly to avoid confusion as 
to who to pay. " (pp. 40,41) 
794 Another example is investment in Russia. Although a civil law jurisdiction, Russian law has a limited statutory 
concept of trusts. The beneficial ownership of shares by a person other than the registered holder is recognised, 
provided that a note of the beneficial holding is entered on the register of the issuer or the registered holder is 
a financial intermediary. In order to benefit from a double taxation treaty between the Russian Federation and 
Cyprus, it is customary for much western investment in Russian shares to be held through a Cyprus nominee. 
The nominee agrees to hold the shares for investors under the terms of a Cyprus trust, and opinion is taken from 
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The historic and legitimate function of global custody is to address the inefficiencies and 
risks involved in cross-border investment. However, where the custodian goes further 
and seeks to assist the client in defeating the policy requirements of the issuer's 
jurisdiction795, care should be taken. The risk is that, by seeking to make the client's 
position invisible in the issuer's jurisdiction, it is unenforceable there. The rules of 
private international law may render local enforceability Indispensable. 
6. Conuningling 
Custody securities are generally commingled in the hands of each intermediary in the 
custody chain. In other words, each intermediary will hold any particular custody 
securities in a mixed account together with other like securities held for other beneficial 
owners. As property may be loosely described as a legal relationship between persons 
and assets, the general rule is that a proprietary right can only arise in relation to 
identifiable assets. The difficulty for the investor is that it cannot identify which of the 
securities within the pooled account belong to it. Chapter 5 considered this problem ("the 
Allocation Problem") under English law. It suggested that the answer is the concept of 
co-ownership, whereby all investors having interests in the pool together co-own all the 
securities in the pool. Such co-ownership may be implied under English law, but the 
position is uncertain, and express co-ownership provision is recommended in the custody 
documentation796. In Belgium and Luxembourg, it was felt necessary to pass legislation 
confirming proprietary rights in commingled (or fungible) accounts; a similar result is 
provided by Article 8 of the New York Uniform Conu-nercial Code797. The existence 
of this legislation suggests that the position at general law is uncertain. 798 Some doubt 
must therefore arise where custody securities are commingled in jurisdictions having no 
equivalent legislation. It would be prudent for the global custodian or its clients to obtain 
Cyprus counsel that the trust is constituted in accordance with Cyprus domestic law. However, no note of the 
trust customarily appears on the register of the Russian issuer. Therefore, depending on the status of the 
registered holder, the trust may not be enforceable in Russia, and the risk must arise that creditors of the 
nominee could claim the shares through the Russian courts. Further, there may be some risk that the trust 
would be vulnerable in the Cypriot insolvency of the nominee. Although good under Cyprus domestic law, it 
would not be good under Cyprus private international law if the latter applied lex situs (i. e. Russian law) to 
transfers of beneficial interests to third parties such as the investors. 
795 
such as taxation, or restrictions on foreign ownership of securities. 
796 
see chapter 5 
797 See section 3 above. 
798 It is uncertain in common law as well as in civil law. 
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the opinion of local counsel that commingled securities will be safe in the insol-vency of 
the local sub-custodian or other intermediary. 
Shortfall and Contractual Settlement 
Even if a trust or similar arrangement is recognised in the insolvency of the intermediary, 
the client will still suffer loss if all its securities are not there. "Shortfalls in custodial 
holdings may develop for a number of reasons, including the failure of trades to settle as 
anticipated, poor accounting controls, or intentional fraud. The shortfalls may be 
temporary or long-standing. Allocation of the risk of loss from a shortfall will vary 
depending on the circumstances under which the shortfall arose. Of course, if the 
custodian is solvent, no real problems arise; it may either replace the missing securities, 
or pay damages, or both. However, if the custodian is insolvent, or the shortfall arises 
from fraud or insolvency on the part of a sub-custodian or CSD, the investor's risk of 
loss may be severe. In a cross-border context, the involvement of multiple legal 
jurisdictions and multiple settlement intermediaries increases the importance of custody 
risks and greatly complicates their analysis. ', 799 
A special risk associated with commingled accounts is that shortfalls attributable to the 
business of one client may be bome by other clients sharing the account. Where 
segregated accounts are not offered, therefore, prudent clients may wish to enquire 
whether the custodian engages in practices which heighten the risk of shortfall. An 
obvious example of such a practice is the contractual settlement of securities. Contractual 
settlement is a service offered by some global custodians in relation to cash or (more 
rarely) securities. It is agreed that, where monies or securities are due to be received 
under a trade, those assets will be credited to the client's account on the date agreed for 
settlement with the counterparty, whether or not they are actually received on that date 
by the custodian. The custodian reserves the right to reverse the credit entry if the assets 
do not arrive within a reasonable period800. Contractual settlement amounts to lending 
of cash and/or securities801. Where contractual settlement of securities is offered in 
connection with conuningled securities accounts, clear dangers arise. If 100 bonds are 
contractually settled, the client is free to sell them to a third party. If the original trade 
799 Bank for International Settlements, Cross-Border Securities Settlement Basle, May 1995, p. -10. 
800 Custodians only offer contractual settlement in markets where they are confident of settlement. 
801 (raising issues of authority to lend and borrow such assets, as well as taxation issues). 
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fails, the custodian cannot reverse the credit entry without causing a shortfall. Further, 
as the contractual settlement of securities amounts to securities lending, the question 
arises, from whom is the client borrowing? It will only be borrowing from the custodian 
if the custodian transfers new securities into the commingled account to support the 
transaction8O2. If the custodian does not do this, the client is borrowing securities from 
the other clients of the custodian, without their consent or knowledge. Under English 
law, such arrangements may involve the custodian in liability for theft. In the custodian's 
insolvency, the consequent shortfall would be handled in accordance with the equitable 
tracing rules. 
Liens 
A further risk to the custody assets is the possibility of liens or other security interests 
in favour of intermediaries in the global custody chain, such as sub-custodians and 
settlement systems. For example, if a global custodian becomes insolvent, a sub- 
custodian may enforce a lien over the client assets it holds for the global custodian in 
respect of unpaid fees. Where fungible custody is offered, one client's assets may in 
effect be charged to secure exposures referable to the business of another client. The 
SFA rulebook restricts the ability of authorised firms to permit custodial liens to be taken 
803 over client assets 
9. Liquidator's Costs 
f804 II The case of Berkeley Applegate (Investment Consultants) Lta estaý ished the princip e 
that, where the assets of the insolvent company are insufficient to meet the liquidator's 
costs in administering property held on trust by the company for its clients, the court has 
discretion to award those costs out of the trust assets. 805 
802 (as in prime brokerage. ) 
803 Rules 4.6. d and 4.7. d. The European clearers exempt participant client accounts from their security interests 
for this reason. 
804 [19881 3 All ER 71 
805 
at 76,82. 
"The authorities establish, in my judgment, a general principle that where a person seeks to enforce a claim to 
an equitable interest in property, the court has a discretion to require as a condition of giving effect to that 
equitable interest that an allowance be made for costs incurred and for skill and labour expended in connection 
with the administration of the property. It is a discretion which will be sparingly exercised. --" (at 
83). 
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This principle may pose a threat to the assets of custody clients v. here the custodian does 
not have substantial assets of its own, and where adequate records of the custody have 
not been kept, so that significant work is required to clarify the entitlements of clients. 
10. Conffict of Laws 
Cross-border insolvency raises complex legal issues. 806 However, not all of them are 
directly relevant to custody. Liquidation is the legal procedure for the collection, 
administration and distribution of the assets of the insolvent. In theory, the insolvent 
liquidation of the custodian should not affect custody assets, as these are the assets, not 
of the insolvent, but of its clients8O7. But, as indicated above, the courts of the different 
jurisdictions involved may take a different approach to the recognition of trusts and the 
allocation of shortfalls. The manner in which these differences will be handled is 
inherently unpredictable, partly because the English private international law of 
808 insolvency is uncertain , and partly because the international position is very far from 
being harmonised. 809 The following are a few very general comments on the subject. 
"Accordingly, I propose to declare that the liquidator is entitled to be paid his proper expenses and remuneration 
out of the trust assets if the assets of the company are insufficient. " (at 85). 
This principle was applied in the liquidation of TC Coombes. 
806 " Several important questions may arise when insolvency is attended by the presence of foreign elements. These 
are, first, whether the courts of England and Wales may competently exercise jurisdiction over the debtor, and 
if so, what rules of choice of law are to be applied in the circumstances. Secondly, assuming that the debtor 
is amendable to the bankruptcy jurisdiction of the English courts, whether the courts of one or more foreign 
countries may simultaneously have competence to open proceedings, and if so with what consequences. 
Thirdly, in view of the possibility that a debtor's assets, and also his liabilities, may be connected with or 
governed by the laws of a variety of different countries, whether the orders and decisions of a court in one 
jurisdiction may be effective in relation to property, and also persons, not currently within the territorial 
jurisdiction of that court. " Ian Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency, 2ed, 1996, London, Sweet & Maxwell, p. 682. 
807 As indicated in section [11, these comments relate to custody securities and not custody cash. 
808 "The relevant statutory provisions have been developed piecemeal over an extended stretch of time, and many 
of them still belong essentially to the nineteenth century in their substance, attitude and outlook. Hence, they 
belong also to an epoch when the theory and practice of private international law rested upon principles and 
doctrine which have undergone wholesale revision, often of a revolutionary nature, during the 20th century. " 
Fletcher, The Law of Insolveric , p. 
687. 
809 Lack of progress in harmonisation is perhaps due to the profound political and social differences that underlie 
the different provisions of nations' insolvency laws. 
However, within Europe some progress is being made towards harmonisation with the Bankruptcy Convention 
and the Winding Up Directive (discussed in section d below). See also the Istanbul Convention of the Council 
of Europe which seeks to achieve co-operation in cross-border insolvencies. 
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a. general principles 
i. jurisdiction 
- universality and plurality In the theory of the private international law 
of insolvency, two conflicting sets of principles determine the varying 
approach of different courts to jurisdiction. Under the principles of 
universality and unity, one set of insolvency proceedings in the 
jurisdiction of the insolvent governs the insolvent's assets worldwide. 
Under the principles of plurality and territoriality, each forum governs 
assets in its jurisdiction. In practice a compromise between the two is 
usually reached. 
Global custody is international in two senses. Firstly, the arrangements 
involve intermediaries in different jurisdictions. Secondly, the 
arrangements relate to assets in different jurisdictions. While, generally, 
local assets will be held by local intermediaries810 there will be 
circumstances where an intermediary holds international assets. 811 The 
question, therefore, arises whether the foreign assets of an insolvent 
English custodian will be subject to English or to foreign insolvency 
proceedings. Under the principles of unity and universality, the English 
courts would prevail; under the principles of plurality and territoriality, 
the foreign courts would deal with the assets. 
812 In principle, English insolvency relates to assets wherever located. 
However, this universal approach may in practice be limited by pragmatic 
difficulties of enforcement against foreign assets in circumstances where 
local creditors may assert claims against those assets under local law813. 
810 (so that, for example, French bonds are held by a French sub-custodian) 
811 For example, as between the global custodian and a French sub-custodian, the asset of the global custodian may 
be a proprietary right arising under French law, i. e. a French asset, enforceable and therefore located (for 
conflicts purposes) in France. On this basis, with a mixed portfolio, the assets held by the global custodian for 
its client may be legally located across all of the jurisdiction in which the client has invested. 
812 Section 144 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
813 "It is one thing for a legal system unilaterally to advance the claim of universal effectiveness for the insolvency 
orders pronounced by its own courts; it i's quite another thing for such judgments automatically to command that 
effectiveness interriationally. " Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency, p. 688. Local assets are only accessible 
-M- 
Moreover, while the English courts may assume jurisdiction over foreign 
assets under the universal approach, they do not necessarIly limit their 
jurisdiction over English assets of foreign companies in accordance ýk ith 
the same universal approach. 814 Because enforcement is more important 
than theory, in practice it would be prudent to assume that, in a 
custodian's insolvency, assets will be dealt with in accordance with the 
law of the jurisdiction in which the assets are located. The legal location 
of custody securities is often a nice question, as discussed in chapter 7. 
- jurisdiction of the English courts The English courts' jurisdiction to 
wind up companies depends on whether they are English registered and, 
if they are not, on whether there is a sufficient connection with the 
jurisdiction. 
English registered companies The English courts have discretionary 
jurisdiction to wind up any company registered in England815 
unregistered company (i. e. a company not registered under the 
Companies Act816. The English courts have jurisdiction to wind up an 
unregistered company if, broadly, the company has ceased business, is 
through local courts: "Therefore, whenever it transpires that property, whether movable or immovable, which 
is situate outside the jurisdiction of the forum concursus has devolved upon the trustee, or is claimable by the 
liquidator, by virtue of the order on which the proceedings are based, this consequence takes place, strictly 
speaking, by virtue of the legal rules in force in the country or countries of the sirus of the property in question: 
it is impossible both in practical terms and also in terms of the doctrine of legal sovereignty, for such an effect 
to take place in the teeth of a contrary attitude maintained by the lex situs. " ibid, p. 688. 
814 i. e. the English courts may assume jurisdiction over the liquidation of a foreign company in certain 
circumstances (see below in this section). Where it does so, its jurisdiction is not limited to an English branch 
of the company or its English assets, but in principle may extend to the whole of the company (although, if 
there is also a home-state proceeding an English court is likely to order that the English liquidation be ancillary 
i. e. territorial). Contrast this "universal approach" to the "ring fence" approach of Germany (local proceedings 
for a foriegn company confined to local branch and local assets) and the "no local proceedings" approach of 
Belgium (no local proceedings for a foreign company, but recognition of home state liquidation). 
Moreover, "[T]here is no rule of English law whereby the proprietary effects of a foreign liquidation are 
recognised as extending beyond the territorial limits of the jurisdiction in which the foreign liquidation has taken 
place. " Fletcher, op. cit. p. 763. 
815 Insolvency Act 1986 section 117. 
816 insolvency Act 1986 section 220. "Company" for this purpose is widely defined. 
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unable to pay its debts or if it is just and equitable to do so. Cise law I 
indicates that in practice the English courts will assume jurisdiction to 
wind up a foreign company if either the company at the time a petition 
is presented has assets in England or at any time has carried on business 
in England either directly or through an agent and in both cases that there 
is a reasonable possibility of benefit accruing to creditors in making the 
winding up order. 818 
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 This Act, which implements 
the Brussels and Lugano Conventions819, does not apply in respect of the 
820 winding-up of insolvent companies. 
forum non conveniens Jurisdiction may be declined in order to prevent 
injustice where another forum of competent jurisdiction is more suitable, 
as discussed in chapter 6 section B. 3. 
11. roper Law 
AIS a general rule, insolvency is governed by the law of the jurisdiction i 
in which it is conducted (let fori or lex concursus) (although there are 
important exceptions to thiS821). 
817 See Banque des Marchands de Moscou (Koupetschesky) v Kindersley (1951) Ch 112; Re Matheson Brothers 
Limited (1884) 27 Ch D 225; Tovarischestvo Manufactur Liudvig-Rabenek [19441 Ch 404; Re Asoff-Don 
Commercial Bank (1984) Ch 315; Re Companie Merabello San Nicholas S. A. (1973) Ch 75; Re Eloc Electro- 
Optiecka and Cornmunicatie BV [ 19821 Ch 43; Re a Company (No. 00359 of 1887) ("Okeanos ") [198811 Ch 
210; Re a Company (No. 003102 of 1991), e-x p. Aýckeln Finance Co Ltd [ 199 1] BCLC 5 39. 
818 (In practice it may also be necessary to show that there are no home state proceedings or that the home state 
liquidator agrees to the institution of English liquidator, or alternatively that the foreign proceedings are 
prejudicial to English creditors. ) 
819 (discussed above in chapter 6 section B. I 
820 For the Act to be disapplied on the basis of proceedings concerning winding up it is necessary that they derive 
directly from the winding up and be closely connected with the winding up proceedings: Courdian v Nadler 
[1979ý ECR 733. 
821 For exAmple, where the Luxembourg branch of a foreign entity is wound up in Luxembourg, the Luxembourg 
courts will apply the law of the jurisdiction of incorporation. 
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Under section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986, the English courts maý, 
apply foreign law if so requested by certain (mainlY) Commonwealth 
courts. 822 
iii. concurrent insolvency proceedings 
Clearly, if insolvency proceedings are also being taken out in other 
jurisdictions, some form of cooperation would have to be achieved, by 
recognition or otherwise. 823 "Therefore, whenever the assets of an 
insolvent debtor are dispersed between two or more jurisdictions the 
effectiveness and efficiency of any insolvency proceedings centred in one 
country will be dependent upon the degree of recognition and co- 
operation accorded by the laws of the other jurisdictions involved. " 824 
insolvency risk 
822 " The courts having jurisdiction in relation to insolvency law in any part of the United Kingdom shall assist the 
courts having corresponding jurisdiction in any other part of the United Kingdom or any relevant authority or 
territory. The relevant designated territories are: Channel Islands, Isle of Mann, Anguilla, Australia, Bahamas, 
Bermuda, Botswana, Canada, Cayman Islands, Falkland islands, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Republic of Ireland, 
Montserrat, New Zealand, St Helana, Turks and Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, British Virgin Islands. The court may 
apply the insolvency law "applicable to either court in relation to comparable matters falling within its 
jurisdiction" but the court "shall have regard in particular to the rules of private International law". In other 
words, the courts must have regard to the English conflicts rules applicable to bankruptcy and not slavishly 
apply the laws of the foreign bankruptcy forum... " Wood, Princivies of International Insolvency, pp. -155,256. 
"For example, the provisions in section 426(4) and (5) may enable our courts to deal in an appropriate mariner 
with property claimed by the foreign trustee or liquidator, where it is alleged that the property was the subject 
of a voidable transaction entered into by the debtor at some previous time. If, on the basis of applying English 
rules of private international law, the English court concludes that the validity of the transaction is to be 
determined according to the law of some other country, that process may be carried to its logical conclusions 
to enable the court to determine the destination of the property cur-rently located within its jurisdiction. " 
Fletcher, p. 787. 
"It is at once apparent that section 426(4) is narrower than the common law in two important regards. The 
section applies only with reference to courts in the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and 
the 17 jurisdictions thus far designated, whereas at common law the English court may recognise the authority 
of any foreign trustee, assignee, liquidator, curator, administrator etc. But, of course, section 426(4) does not 
prevent the court giving assistance to a French, Danish or American trustee. In addition, section 426(4) 
becomes relevant only following a request from a foreign court, not simply at the instance of a foreign trustee 
or liquidator. Hence if a foreign liquidator's authority to bring proceedings to enforce the corporation's rights 
is recognised at common law there will be no need for reference to the statutory procedure. " Philip Smart, 
Cross-Border Insolvency, 1991, Butterworths, London, pp. 259,260. 
823 '... most states will allow concurrent proceedings to be opened, whether an ancillary proceeding or a full 
bankruptcy ... the effect of the 
local proceedings is to allow the local jurisdiction to give effect to its own 
bankruptcy. " Wood, PrincivIes of International Insolvency, p. 242. 
82 4 Fletcher. p. 767. 
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Insolvency risk, or the risk that a local jurisdiction will not recoimise (he 
custody trust in respect of local custody assets (so that such assets are available 
to creditors of the custodian) is discussed above. Where an English cusiodian 
becomes insolvent, as a matter of English law the custody assets will be 
impressed with the custody trust wherever those assets are located-S25 
However, in practice local courts may take a territorial approach, and hence the 
need to ensure that local assets (such as claims against sub-custodians and 
depositaries) are legally robust as a matter of local law, and that local law will 
not make the custody assets available to creditors826 (or to rival insolvency 
officials where multiple insolvency proceedings are taken out). 
C. shortfall risk 
Where there is a shortfall in the pooled client account of an insolvent custodian, 
the question arises what law will govern the manner In which that shortfall is 
borne by the respective clients. If the custodial relationship is governed by 
English law and the assets are governed by foreign law827, it may be argued 
that the English tracing rules would govern the allocation of the shortfall, as 
part of the law of trusts that governs the custodial relationship wherever the 
custody assets are located. Another possibility is that the local jurisdiction treats 
the allocation of shortfalls as a procedural matter, and therefore applies its law 
as the law of the forum. In any case, the question only arises where there is 
a conflict between English and foreign law; such conflicts may be less unlikely 
as many jurisdictions "pro rate" losses among all clients, which appears to be 
the current approach of the English courts in active commingled accounts. 828 
825 This is because equity acts in personam; the jurisprudential basis of the trust is the relationship between trustee 
and beneficiary, so that the lex siw rule does not apply. Accordingly, the trust created over the assets of a 
company by a winding up order extend for foreign assets: see Fletcher, pp. 751,752. 
826 While the making of an English winding up order stays all actions by unsecured creditors against the insolvent 
company or its assets under section 130(2) of the Insolvency Act, this would not bind foreign creditors outside 
the jurisdiction. 
827 (e. g. the assets consist of debts, shares or other choses in action whose governing law is foreign) 
828 See Barlow Clowes International v V&ughan [19921 4 All ER 22. However, the pro ration adopted in this case 
may not be the invariable practice. 
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d. The European Bankruptcy Convention and Winding Lý Directive 
Two proposed European measures may be of relevance to insolvency conflict 
of laws for global custodians. The aim of both the Bankruptcy Convention and 
Winding Up Directive is to harmonise the rules relating to insolvency 
jurisdiction and choice of law within the EC. 
i. the Bankruptcy Convention 
The Convention applies to all collective insolvency procedures (i. e. 
liquidation and administration but not receivership)829. It provides that 
the courts of the state of the insolvent's "centre of main interests" ("home 
state") has jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings. The place of the 
company's registered office is rebuttably presumed to be its home 
state. 830 Secondary winding up proceedings are permitted in other 
member states only if the insolvent has a local establishment; any such 
secondary proceedings must be "ring fenced" to that local 
establishment831 and limited to assets in the second member state. 832 
These jurisdiction provisions are supported by recognition provisions. 833 
The law of the state in which proceedings are taken out governs theM834, 
and deten-nine among other things which assets are available to 
835 creditors 
However, the Convention may be of limited relevance to custody 
insolvency, for the following reasons. It does not apply (broadly) to 
829 Articles I(l) and 2(a) and Annex A. 
830 Article 3(1). 
831 Articles 3(2) and 3(3). "Establishment" is defined as "any place of operations where the debtor carries out a 
non-transitory economic activity with human means and goods. " (Article 2(g)). 
832 Article 27. 
833 Chapter H. 
834 Articles 4(1) and 28. 
835 Article 4(2)(b). This law also determines who bears the costs of liquidation (Article 4(2)(1)), this can be 
relevant to custody clients in view of the rule in Berkeley Applegate: see section (91 above. 
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banks or investment firms providing custody. S36 This may exclude most 
custodians, but not necessarily the affiliate nominees who may hold client 
assets. 
There is a carve out for third party proprietary rights (or rights in rem) 
at least in respect of assets within the EC. 837 The natural reading of this 
provision is that the validity of the custody trust will be determined under 
normal conflicts rules838. (The same is true of the validity of security 
interests). 
Custody assets not situated within a member state, the position seems to 
be governed by the general provision839 that the law of the state in which 
proceedings are taken out governs the availability of assets to the 
creditors of the insolvent (although this is limited to home state 
840 
proceedings 
836 "This Convention shall not apply to insolvency proceedings concerning insurance undertakings, credit 
institutions, investment undertakings which provide services involving the holding of funds or securities for third 
parties, or to collective investment undertakings. " Article 1(2). 
837 Article 5 provides as follows: 
(1) "The opening of insolvency proceedings shall not affect the rights in rem of creditors or third parties 
in respect of tangible or intangible, movable or immovable assets belonging to the debtor which are situated 
within the territory of another Contracting State at the time of the opening of proceedings. " 
(2) "The rights referred to in paragraph I shall in particular mean: 
(a) the right to dispose of assets or have them disposed of and to obtain satisfaction from the 
proceeds of or income from those assets, in particular by virtue of a lien or a mortgage, 
(d) a right in rem to the beneficial use of assets. " 
The wording of article 5(2)(d) is curious, but should be interpreted to include interests under trusts. 
838 (although it might be argued that the Convention does not indicate which law will determine whether clients' 
rights are rights in rem or not, posing the threat that the foreign liquidator will not be obliged to recognise the 
English law trust). 
839 (in article 4(2)(b)) 
840 Article 27. In relation to secondary proceedings, non-EC assets are outside the scope of the Convention. 
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There is a further carve out for payment systems and financial marketE 
within the EC. 841 
ii. The Winding Up Directive 
The Winding Up Directive applies to credit institutions, and is closely 
modelled on the Bankruptcy Convention. However it Is somewhat 
simpler in that no secondary proceedings are permitted. It is still in draft 
form. 
iii. timetable 
The initiative for the Convention began in the 1960s but encountered long 
delays. The unsatisfactory conflicts position following the collapse of 
BCCI in 1991 led to progress being made in the mid- 1990s. The text 
was finalised in 1995 but Britain missed the May 1996 signature deadline 
because of the beef crisis. It will come into force 6 months after the last 
signature. The ratification process will take longer. The draft of the 
Winding Up Directive is well advanced and the Directive will probably 
be made in 1997. Implementation may take a further 3 years, so that 
both measures may be in force by the new millennium. 
It is proposed that separate measures will cover the insolvency of EC 
investment firMS842, but these have not yet been published. 
841 Article 9 provides as follows: - 
(1) ... the effects of 
insolvency proceedings on the rights and obligations of the parties to a payment or 
settlement system or to a financial market shall be governed solely by the law of the Contracting State applicable 
to that system or market. 
(2) Paragraph 1 shall not preclude any action for voidness, voldability or unenforceability which may 
be taken to set aside payments or transactions under the law applicable to the relevant payment system or 
financial market. " 
842 (and insurance companies, which are also not covered by either the Bankruptcy Convention or the Winding Up 
Directive) 
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11. Insolvency Risk in Practice 
Cross border insolvency is problematic, for historical843 and political8,44 reasons. Much 
theoretical material has been written. However, in practice a pragmatic approach is 
called for. 845 If sub-custodial arrangements are supported by reasonably clean legal 
opinions, it may be unnecessary to enquire further in practice. 
Conclusions 
Conflicts of law will never be certain, and the doubts associated with the proprietary 
aspects of global custody are inexhaustible. This is particularly true where custody 
securities are used as collateral. However legal uncertainty in commercial affairs is not 
new. Commercial law has always followed practice, and legal consensus may eventually 
follow the increasing harmonisation of practice. 846 
In the meantime, risk can be managed by focus on operation controls (in particular the 
speed with which collateral can be realised). Beyond that, it may properly be bome. 
Investment business is risk business, and a measure of legal risk may be tolerated, 
provided it is understood. 
843 Firstly, civil law and (to a lesser extent) common law is still dominated by Roman law, and the operation of 
insolvency law is based on the old Justinian distinction between rights of persons and rights of things, which 
is probably obsolete in relation to an electronic product such as global custody. Secondly, law follows political 
regimes, and England has not been invaded since 1066; the trust (on which custody rests) has developed in 
anglo saxon jurisdictions, but is unknown in continental Europe. 
844 Insolvency law, and in particular jurisdictions' differing for ranking creditors, reflect differing political priorities 
(e. g. whether employees should be postponed to secured bank creditors). 
845 .. The rules of cross-border insolvency tend to establish boundaries rather than lay down rigid and detailed 
procedures to be applied in all cases, and within those boundaries the practitioner is free to work towards the 
most advantageous solution for his or her client. In addition, the need for flixibility is underlined by the broad 
range of issues hwich fall to be determined by the English court in the exercise of its discretion. " Philip Smart, 
Cross-Border Insolvency, p. vii. 
846 Offered by the growing use of central depositaries and initiatives such as G30. 
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Chapter 8. The Custodian's DutieS847 
"To describe some one as a fiduciary, without more, is meaningless. , 848 
Operational failures in the holding and administration of a portfolio of securities can cause 
significant losses to clients. Where such losses occur, global custodians may choose to make 
them good irrespective of legal liability, in order to preserve the client relationship. However, 
losses may be so great that liability would have severe consequences for the global custodian. 
Very broadly speaking, the custodian will be liable where client losses are attributable to its 
breach of duty849. Duty is the measure of potential liability. Control of levels of legal duty 
is therefore an essential part of risk management for the global custodian. 
The chief method of controlling levels of duty is the use of duty defining and limitation of 
liability clauses in the global custody contract; as indicated below, these are highly effective in 
modifying the level of duty implied by general law. Indeed, such clauses are arguably the real 
reason for the global custodian to put a global custody contract in place850. These contractual 
techniques are discussed in section B below. Section A provides the context of duty at general 
law. 
A. General Law 
1. Is the Custodian a Fiduciary? 
The interrelation of fiduciary duties and financial arrangements has been much discussed 
in recent years. 851 While fiduciary duty is a very uncertain area of law852, It Is possible 
847 This chapter focuses on fiduciary duty and liability,,, ý'For labilit; 
)or 
breach of contract or tortious liability (such Q- 
- as negligence), the general principles of the law of contracfand tort apply to the global custodian. These are 
touched on only very briefly in section F. 
848 Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (in receivership) [ 199412 All ER 806, per Lord Mustill at 82 1. 
849 For a fuller discussion, see section A below. 
850 Conversely, the practice of offering undocumented global custodian services exposes the global custodian to the 
risk of unmodified general law duties, implying cornmercially unacceptable levels of potential liability. 
851 Debate has been stimulated by a May 1992 Law Commission Consultative Paper, FIduclary Duties and 
Regulatory Rules and a subsequent Report having the same title and published in December t995 (Cm 3(j49) 
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to make the following general isations. Fiduciary relationships are relationships of special 
trust853: "The 'fiduciary' standard for its part enjoins one party to act in the interests of 
another - to act selflessly and with undivided loyalty.,. 854 The significance of fiduciar-y 
855 status here is that fiduciaries owe special implied duties to their beneficiaries 
Fiduciary duties are summarised in four basic rules: 
- the no conflict rule, 
- the no profit rule, 
the undivided loyalty rule, and 
the duty of confidentiality. 856 
852 " This area of law is highly complex, poorly delimited, and in a state of flux. This is not necessarily a criticism 
and courts and commentators have supported the current state of the subject. Some have said that attempts at 
definition are unwise or inappropriate, while others have pointed to the open-ended and prophylactic nature of 
the fiduciary concept, which necessarily defies definition. It is unclear at the present time whether the term 
"fiduciary" has generally been descriptive, providing a veil behind which individual rules and principles have 
been developed, or whether the case law evidences the steady development of the fiduciary concept towards an 
all-embracing principle. " Law Commission Consultation Paper, May 1992, pp 26,27. See also P. D. Finn, 
The Fiduciary Principle, Equitv, Fiduciaries and Trusts, ed. Youdan, 1989, Carswell, Toronto, p. 55: -The 
question I wish to raise is, simply, whether the fiduciary principle is no more than a sub-species in the law, with 
its organizing principle lying beyond it, not in It. " 
853 "Broadly speaking, a fiduciary relationship is one in which a person undertakes to act on behalf of or for the 
benefit of another, often as an intermediary with a discretion or power which affects the interests of the other 
who depends on the fiduciary for information and advice. ... in determining whether a relationship was 
fiduciary, 
and if so, the extent of the fiduciary duties, a court would look at the substance of a relationship and not merely 
its description in the contract. " Law Commission Report, pp 1,11. 
854 P. D. Finn, The Fiduciary Principle, FAuity, Fiduciaries and Trusts, ed. Youdan, 1989, Carswell, Toronto, p. 
4. 
855 More generally, in certain common law jurisdictions including England, "... to designate someone a fiduciary 
is to expose that person to the full rigour of equity both in method [for example, in reversal of the onus of 
proof, in presumptions of wrongdoing and in disregard of notions such as causation, foreseeability and 
remoteness] and in remedy [from avoidance through damages and the account of profits to the constructive trust] 
P. D. Finn, The Fiduciary Princivie, p. 2. 
856 "The exact scope of the fiduciary's obligations and the consequences of breach vary according to the particular 
circumstances but the duties may conveniently be surnmarised in the following basic rules: 
the "no conffict" rule A fiduciary must not place himself in a position where his own interest 
conflicts with that of his customer, the beneficiary. There must be a "real sensible possibility of 
conflict", 
the "no profit" rule A fiduciary must not profit from his position at the expense of his customer, 
the beneficiary; 
the "undivided loyalty rule" A fiduciary owes undivided loyalty to his customer, the beneficiary, 
not to place himself in a position where his duty towards one customer conflicts with a duty that 
he owes to another customer. A consequence of this is that a fiduciary must make available to a 
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Beyond these rules (which are derived from the gymeral duty to act in the interests of the 
beneficiary) fiduciary status does not prescribe positive duties. Thus, the partic-ular 
services that a custodian must render are determined by its agreement with its client, and 
not by implied fiduciary status. Fiduciary status does not determine the content of the 
relationship between the parties; rather it is (in essence) merely a judicial remedy for 
want of loyalty where loyalty is owed. 857 
The argument that a global custodian is not a fiduciary is considered to be untenable. 
Because of its safekeeping role, the custodian is either a trustee or a bailee. 858 A trustee 
is always a fiduciary. 859 Whether or not a bailee is a fiduciary will depend on all the 
circumstances and the terms of the bailment860. However, because the custodian role 
actively combines safekeeping with administration and settlement on behalf of the client, 
it would be prudent to assume that the global custodian is a fiduclary. 861 
customer all the information that is relevant to the customer's affairs; 
the "duty of confidentiality" A fiduciary must only use information obtained in confidence from 
his customer, the beneficiary, for the benefit of the customer and must not use it for his own 
advantage, or for the benefit of any other person. " 
Law Commission Report, pp 1,2. 
857 See Finn, The Fiduciary Principle p. 28. 
858 See chapter 3. As discussed in that chapter, trustee status is the more likely characterisation of v obal 
custodians in respect of most of their current business. 
859 '... it is possible to divide fiduciaries into two categories, status-based fiduciaries and fact-based fiduciaries. 
... 
(The latter] include people who, by virtue of their involvement in certain relationships are considered, without 
further inquiry, to be fiduciaries. Such relationships include those between trustee-beneficiary, solicitor-client, 
agent-principal, director-company, and partner-partner. " Law Commission Consultation paper, pp. 27,28. 
860 Re. - Andrabell Ltd (in liquidation), Airborne Accessories Ltd [198413 All ER 407 per Peter Gibson J. 
861 ýa "fiduciary relation" exists ... wherever the plaIntiff entrusts to 
the defendant property ... and relies on the 
defendant to deal with such property for the benefit of the plaintiff or for purposes authorised by him, and not 
otherwise ...... 
Reading v Attorney General [ 194912 K. B. 232. 
See also In re Brooke Bond & Co. Ltd. 's Trust Deed [1962] 1 Ch 357, in which a custodian trustee is held to 
be subject to the fiduciary "no profit" rule. 
See also Finn, The Fiduciary Princil)le p. 35: "In many instances property is a subject of a legal relationship 
with one party having custodial or other rights in or to that property. To the extent that party has limited or 
indeed no rights to its beneficial use and enjoyment, that person's position is incipiently 
fiduciary. - 
In a writ issued on 5 June 1992 by MGN Pension Trustees Limited against Bank of America National Trust and 
Savings Association and Credit Suisse, the trustees of the Maxwell pension fund sued Bank of America as 
custodians of the pension fund assets, asserting that they should not have settled instructions from the managers 
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I. Bailee 
The traditional legal characterisation of the custodian of securities is as bailee of the 
client. Chapter 4 argued that this characterisation may no longer appropriate. 862' 
However, there may still be cases where the global custodian is a ballee. 863 What then 
are a custodial bailee's duties at common law? 
"A bailee for reward must take reasonable care of any articles in his possession: 
B. R. S. Ltd. v Arthur V Crutchley Ltd (1968). The degree of precaution must 
be gauged according to the value of the goods, their disposability and 
portability, their vulnerability to theft, and to such other factors as the overall 
risk to them and the prevalence of crime in the vicinity. In the case of a bank 
the duty is to take such care as a reasonably prudent banker would take, in like 
circumstances, of the property of his clients". 864 
From the discussion of trustee's duties that follows, it will appear that the 
recharacterisation of the global custodian as trustee does not significantly alter the level 
of its duties, for the following reason. Although the level of duty implied at common law 
for a trustee is higher than that so implied for a bailee, the shared fiduciary status of both 
trustees and bailees imposes the same restrictions on their ability contractually to limit 
their duties. Therefore, assuming that the customary limitation clauses are included in 
the global custody agreement, the same core level of inexcludable fiduciary duty will be 
owed by the global custodian, whether as bailee or as trustee. 
3. Tnistee 
whereby the pension fund assets were lost. The writ asserted that Bank of America was a fiduciary: "In the 
premises, and by reason of the [custody] Agreement and by reason of its position as custodian of assets of the 
[pension fund], BA owed fiduciary duties to the Trustee and the (pension fund]. " (p. 25). 
862 In view of the electronic and fungible basis of modem custodial arrangements, the global custodian will in 
general hold securities as trustee. 
863 (where documents of title are physically held by custodian for a client and segregated from Instruments held for 
other clients, so that in specie redelivery is possible) 
864 Palmer, Liability of Bankers as Custodians of Clients Propertv (1979), pp. 9,10. 
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Trusteeship is "the most intense form of fiduciary relationship', 865. The level of implied 
duty imposed on a trustee is higher than that imposed on a bailee. The test for non- 
professional trustees is the level of care with which an ordinary prudent man of business 
would conduct his own affairs866. However, a higher duty of care is expected from 
professional trustees (who advertise themselves as such). The rule in Re "bterman's Will 
TrustS867 provides that the trustee holding itself out as possessing special skills and which 
is paid for its services must observe a higher standard of diligence and knowledge than 
an unpaid trustee; and will be expected to exercise a greater degree of care. This rule 
was expanded in the case of Bartlett v. Barclays Bank (No 1) 868 in which Brightman set 
the test as "the special skill and care which [the professional trustee] professes to have 
869 
Contract 
The global custody contract should contain an exhaustive list of the services that will be 
provided, and as much operational detail as possible should be included. 870 These duty 
defining clauses delimit the extent of the contractual duties of the global custodian. 
Perhaps even more importantly, limitation clauses delimit the liability of the global 
custodian who fails to perform its contractual or fiduciary duties. 871 The case law 
865 Law Commission Consultation Paper, p. 84. 
866 Speight v Gaunt (1883) 9 App. Cas. 1, per Lord Blackburn: "... as a general rule a trustee sufficiently 
discharges his duty if he takes in the managing of trust affairs all those precautions which an ordinary prudent 
man of business would take in managing similar affairs of his own. " (at 19) 
867 [19521 2 All ER 1054. per Harman J: "I do not forget that a professional trustee is expected to exercise a 
higher standard of diligence and knowledge than an unpaid trustee and that a bank which advertises itself largely 
in the public press as taking charge of administrations is under a special duty. " at 1055 
868 ( 19801 Ch 515 
869 The ordinary trustee is required "to be prudent and exercise the degree of care he would in conducting his own 
affairs but mindful, when making investment decisions, that he is dealing with another's property" while -a 
professional person, a trust corporation.... held out as an expert, will be expected to display the degree of skill 
are care and diligence such an expert would have. " Per Lord Nicholls (1995) 9 TLI 71,73 - 76. 
870 It is customary to specify detailed provisions in a service annex, which is incorporated by reference in the global 
custody agreement. 
871 While duty defining clauses specify what the client can expect, limitation clauses specify the client's recourse 
if it is disappointed. 
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eIatingt011 rn itationcIause S8 721ndicatesthatiheý 
are extremely effective, although limitation clauses are subject to certain limits. 8--, 
I. Case law 
Contract is generally effective in modifying fiduciary duty, as well as imposing particular 
restrictions on liability 
a. contract andfiduciary duty 
The position of the global custodian seeking to rely on contractual limitation 
provisions is enormously strengthened by the case of Kelly v. Cooper 
Associates874, in which it was stated875 that a fiduciary relationship arising in 
the context of a contractual deal should not change the nature of the deal. Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson quoted an earlier case876 as follows- 
"That contractual and fiduciary relationships may co-exist between the 
same parties has never been doubted. Indeed, the existence of a basic 
contractual relationship has in many situations provided a foundation for 
the erection of a fiduciary relationship. In these situations, it is the 
contractual foundation which is all important because it is the contract 
that regulates the basic rights and liabilities of the parties. The fiduciary 
relationship, if it is to exist at all, must accommodate itself to the terms 
of the contract so that it is consistent with, and conforms to them. The 
fiduciary relationship cannot be superimposed upon the contract in such 
872 It is understood that the regulatory authorities D blin and Luxembourg are cautious In their approach to 
limitation clauses. 
C 
873 As well as statutory limits indicated in section 2 below, equity imposes certain limits. For example, -Ille duty 
to act in good faith (i. e. honestly and consciously) in respect of any trust matter cannot, of course, be excluded. 
To do so would make a nonsense of the trust relationship as an obligation of confidence. - David Hayton, The 
Irreducible Core Content of Trusteeship, to be published in Oakley (ed) Contemporary Trends in Trust Law 
OUP Oct. 96. 
874 
C 
(19 (1992) 3 WLR 936. This was a Privy Council decision, on appeal from the Court of Appeal of Bermuda. The 
e co c ncerned the practices of an estate agent and its failure to notify one vendor client that it also acted for 
a vendor of an adjoining property. 
875 
obl'ter, by Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
876 Mason J in the case of Hospital Products International Pry. Lindted v. U. S. Surgical Corp (1984) 
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a way as to alter the operation which the contract was intended to ha,., -e 
according to its true construction" 
The Law Conuiiission discusses Kelly in the following tenns: - 
"It confirmed that where a fiduciary relationship arises out of a contract, 
a clearly worded duty defining or exclusion clause will circumscribe the 
877 extent of the fiduciary duties owed to the other party. " 
The Report sununarises the conditions that must be satisfied before the principle 
in Kelly may be relied upon878and draws attention to its limits. 879 
This approach was endorsed in the case of Clark Boyce v Mouat880. " 
fiduciary duty ... cannot be prayed in aid to enlarge the scope of contractual 
duties.,, 881 Similar sentiments are expressed obiter in Target Holdings Ltd v 
877 4. 
878 'Kelty will provide a solution where the following conditions are satisfied. First, the duty defining and 
exclusion clause must clearly cover the transaction in question: it will have to do so unambiguously since it will 
be subject to the contra proferentum rule of interpretation. Secondly, in those situations where the relationship 
between the firm and client has altered over time, this altered relationship will also have to be caught by the 
clause. And thirdly, it must be the substance of the relationship between the client and the firm that is covered 
by the clause and not what the parties call it. If these three conditions are satisfied, then Kelly provides a way 
of solving the problems that arise from any mismatch between fiduciary rules, regulatory rules and market 
structure. " pp. 85,86. 
879 (in relation to conflicts of interest) "However, there are three situations of conflict in which, despite Kelty, it 
will be necessary either to make appropriate provision in the contract or obtain the informed consent of the 
customer in order to avoid breaching a fiduciary duty. The first is where the firm is acting for two customers 
in the same transaction. The second is where there is a conflict between the firm's own interest and the duty 
which it owes to a customer and that conflict 'is more acute than that which arose in Kelly. ... The conflict would 
be more acute if, for example, (i) a firm has a direct beneficial interest in a transaction with a customer. such 
as where it sells its own property to a customer, -The third situation 
is where there has been "iniquity". p. 
24. 
880 (19941 1 A. C. 428. This was another Privy Council decision, on appeal from the Court of Appeal of New 
Zealand. The case concerned a claim against a solicitor; the plaintiff mortgaged her house to secure a loan to 
her son, and the solicitor acted for both of them. 
881 
per Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle, at 437. 
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Redferns. 882 However, while fiduclarY duties must conform with the contract. 
they are not entirely subsumed within it, for " .. the essence of a fiduciary 
relationship is that it creates obligations of a dIfferent character from those 
deriving from the contract Itself.,, 883 
b. limitations of liability 
There is longstanding authority that the terms of a fiduciary's appointment may 
limit its duties. 884 However, it is also clear from case law that trustees, as 
other fiduciaries, have a core minimum level of duty that cannot be excluded 
by any relieving provisions. 885 Old authority indicates that liability for gross 
negligence886 and wilful default are inexcludable887 but modem authority 
indicates that liability for negligence and even gross negligence can be excluded 
if the exclusion is clearly brought to the attention of the settlor (client). 888 
In any case, the minimum level of core duty that cannot be excluded is lower 
than that which global custodians customarily seek contractually to exclude, i. e. 
negligence and wilftil default. Any limitation clause will be restrictively 
construed by the court and any doubt or ambiguity resolved against the 
fiduciary seeking to rely on it. It may also be prudent to draw clients' attention 
882 [ 199513 WLR 352, per Lord Browne Wilkinson at 795: -But in my judgment it is important, if the trust is not 
to be rendered commercially useless, to distinguish between the basic principles of trust law and those specialist 
rules developed in relation to traditional trusts which are applicable only to such trusts and the rationale of 
which has no application to trusts of quite a different kind. " 
883 Re Goldcrop Exchange Ltd [19941 2 All ER 806 at 821. See also Henderson v Merren [19941 3 All ER 506 
at 543. 
884 See Wilkins v. Hogg (1861) ER 66 346. 
885 See Wilkins v Hogg at 348. 
886 The difference between negligence and gross negligence is indicated in Midland Bank Trustee (Jersey) Lid v 
Federated Pension Service, 21 December 1995, at 44: the trustee's conduct "was not mere negligence consisting 
of a departure from the normal standards of conduct of a paid professional trustee, but a serious, unusual and 
market departure from that standard which amounted to 'gross negligence'. 
887 In the case of Pass v. Dundas (1880) 43 L. T. 665 Bacon V. C. held that the effect of the decision in Wilkins 
v. Hogg was that an appropriate exemption clause "does protect a trustee from loss that may have been sustained 
in the course of administering the trust estate, unless you can impute to him gross negligence or personal 
misconduct". 
888 In Midland Bank Trust (Jersely) Lid v FPS (1995) the Jersey Court of Appeal held that liability for -gross 
negligence may be excluded unless prohibited by Statute. 
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to exclusion clauses prior to the execution of the custody agreement in ý: ases 
where the client is not legally represented, particularly where it is sought to 
exclude gross negligence. ý89However, provided they are adequately drafted, it 
may generally be assumed that these clauses are effective, subject to the 
comments below. 890 891 
2. Statutory Restrictions 
a. Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 ("UCTA ") 
In accordance with Section 3 of UCTA, exclusion clauses relating to business 
liability for breach of contract contained in one party's written standard terms 
of business are subject to a test of reasonableness. 
An exemption may be available as follows. Paragraph 1 of schedule I to the Act 
provides that "sections 2 to 4 of this Act do not extend to ... any contract so 
far as it relates to the creation or transfer of securities or of any right or interest 
of securities". This exclusion was designed primarily to assist brokers and not 
custodians. It does not clearly exempt the terms of the global custody 
agreement, as of course this relates to the holding and administration of 
889 .... there needs to be full frank disclosure ... so that a My informed consent can be given, because a fiduciary 
relationship exists even before the trust instrument is finally executed. " David Hayton, The Irreducible Core 
of Trusteeship, to be published in Journal of International Trust and Corporate Planning, 
890 See the unreported High Court judgment of Harman J in Galmerrow Securities 10 & Ors v Nat. West Bank PLC 
210 December 1990, in which a trust deed is considered which contained relieving provisions limiting trustee 
liability to losses resulting from its fraud and negligence. "However high a standard of skill and care is 
imposed by the general law, and I would wish to impose the highest standard on Trustee departments of major 
clearing banks, the duty has still to be defined by reference to the actual Trust deed in the case before the Court. 
In Bartlett's case (supra) no terms like those in the Trust Deed constituting the 22nd RAUT existed. " (p. 35). 
This view is endorsed by the Law Commission: "We stated in the consultation paper that a fiduciary could not 
exclude liability for fraud, deliberate breach of duty and, possible, gross negligence. Beyond that, our provision 
view was that, in general, no restriction operated as a matter of fiduciary law to prevent a fiduciary from 
contracting out of or modifying his fiduciary duties, particularly where no prior fiduciary relationship existed 
and the contract sought to define the duties of the parties. " Law Commission Report No 236, December 1995, 
Cm 3049, Fiduciary Duties and Regulatory rules, p. 11. 
891 Compare the position in Jersey, clarified in the recent decision of the Jersey Court of Appeal in Midland Bank 
Trustee (Jersey) Limited and Others v Federated Pension Services 21 December 1995, This case confirmed that 
higher standards are required from professional than non-professional trustees and that limitation clauses may 
be valid if they comply with statutory restrictions (Article 26(9) of the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 as amended 
prohibits exclusions of liability for fraud, wilful misconduct or gross negligence). Limitation clauses will be 
construed against the trustee). 
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securities as well as their transfer. However. this exemption may protect 
settlement side of the global custody service. 892 
To the extent that the exemption is not available, the custodian's limitation 
clauses are subject to a statutory reasonableness test. 893 It might be argued that 
this test is satisfied in cases where terms in question are in market standard 
form. 894 
b. Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994.895 
These regulations apply (in addition to UCTA) to terms which have not been 
individually negotiated, in contracts for the supply of goods or services by 
businesses to consumers. For this purpose, a consumer is a natural person (i. e. 
not a company or, probably, partnerships or unincorporated associations) who 
is acting for purposes which are "outside his business". Thus, terms in standard 
form global custody contracts with high net worth individuals who are not 
involved in investment business may be prima facie caught. 
The Regulations imposes requirements of fairness and plain English. 
I Partictdar Clauses 
Certain additional exclusions are customary in global custody agreements. Precisely what 
is included depends on the concerns and negotiating strengths of the parties. The 
following are important examples. 
a. force majeure 
892 'Me view that UCTA applies to a limitation cla in some circumstances and not others may be supported by 
the case of Micklefield v. S. A. C Technolo 
7 
(Z99 )' I All ER 275. In this case the court emphasised that the 
exception applies to "any contract insofar as it relates to the creation or transfer of securities"es. " at 281 
893 This is defined in Section 11 as the requirement "that the term shall have been a fair and reasonable one to be 
included having regard to the circumstances which were, or ought reasonably to have been, known to or in the 
contemplation of the parties when the contract was made". 
894 Section 2(2) of UCTA subjects exclusions of liability for negligence to the reasonableness test. It is fairly 
unusual for custodians to seek to exclude liability for negligence. 
895 These came into force on 1.7-95, implementing the EC Directive on Unfalr Terms in Consumer Contracts 
(93/13/EEC). 
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The global custodian's ability to discharge its duties may be particularl,, - 
vulnerable to computer failure. Force majeure clauses (excusing performance 
where it is rendered impossible or impracticable) are very important. However, 
they cannot substitute practical measures such as disaster recovery systems and 
insurance. 
b. consequential damages 
In view of the judgment in Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns896 it is important for 
fiduciaries contractually to exclude liability for consequential damages, such 
provision must, however, be brought clearly to the attention of clients. 
Liability for Third Parties 
The global custodian is at the centre of a communications and service network. When 
losses occur to a client's portfolio, they will often be attributable, not to the global 
custodian itself, but to a third party. This section will consider two topical issues, I 
namely the liability of the global custodian in respect of sub-custodian default and 
fraudulent instructions from managers. 
1. LiabWty for Sub-Custodians897 
One of the most commercially sensitive issues facing the global custodian is the 
extent to which it should stand behind its sub-custodians. 
Many clients mistakenly believe that the law imposes strict liability upon 
custodians for the defaults of their delegates, but this is far from true. Where 
the sub-custodian is a nominee or close associate of the global custodian, it may 
be unrealistic for the global custodian to expect to escape liability898 However, 
896 (19951 3 All ER 785, per Lord Browne Wilkinson at 794,798: "... the common law rules of remoteness of 
damages and causation do not apply ... 
The plaintiffs actual loss as a consequence of the breach is to be assessed 
with the full benefit of hindsight. Foreseeability is not a concern in assessing compensation... " 
897 The power to sub-delegate safekeeping should be expressly reserved in the global custody agreement: 'At 
present there is no general power to put trust investments into the name of a nominee otherwise than under 
section 7 of the Trustee Act 1925" (which relates to bearer securities). Law Reform Committee. Twenty-Third 
Report, The Powers and Duties of Trustees, p. 39. 
898 This posItIon is reflected in the SIB's proposals in its Custody Rev iew 
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for independent sub-custodians, liability is much more limited. The Trustee Act 
1925 contains important relieving provisions in respect of liability for third 
parties. 
Section 30(l) limits liability for sub-custodians to the personal wilful default of 
trustee custodians. 899 The term "wilful default" has been the subject of much 
debate. The term appeared in the statutory precursors to section 30900, in 
which it was construed as meaning want of common prudence or negligence. 901 
However, a narrow interpretation was given in Re Vickery9O2 where the term 
was held to mean conscious breach of duty or recklessness as to whether there 
was breach of duty. 903 This narrow interpretation has been criticised9O4 and in 
the later case of Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co 905 Brightman U held wilful 
default to cover "a passive breach of trust, an omission to do something which, 
as a prudent trustee, he ought to have done. " Therefore it would be prudent 
to take wilful default for this purpose to mean lack of ordinary prudence. On 
this basis, to escape liability under this section for third party losses, the global 
custodian must show ordinary prudence in the appointment and supervision of 
its global custodial network. 
899 "A trustee shall be chargeable only for money and securities actually received by him notwithstanding his 
signing any receipt for the sake of conformity, and shall be answerable and accountable only for his own acts, 
receipts, neglects, or defaults, and not for those of any trustee, nor for any banker, broker, or other person with 
whom any trust money or securities may be deposited, nor for the insufficiency or deficiency of any securities, 
nor for any other loss, unless the same happens through his own wilful default". 
900 Section 31 of the Law of Property Amendment Act 1859 and section 24 of the Trustee Act 1893. 
901 Underwood v Stevens (1816) 1 mer 712, Re Brier, (1884) 26 Ch D 238,243; Re Chapman [18961 2 Ch 763, 
776; Speight v Gaunt (1883) 9 App Cas 1,13-15,22-23. These references are given in paragraph 2.1.6 of 
Trust Law Commission, Collective Delegation of Trustees' Powers and Duties, internal paper of the Trust Law 
Commission, October 1995. See also Underhill and Hayton p. 623 
902 (1931) 1 Ch 572 
903 The term was held to mean "... either a consciousness of negligence or breach of duty or recklessness in the 
performance of a duty. " Per Maugham J at 584. The narrower interpretation was followed by Hoffmann J in 
Steele v Wellcome Twtees Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 167,174. 
904 It will shortly be seen that the traditional equitable meaning of "wilful default" extends to negligent conduct 
and such traditional meaning should have applied in section 30. " Collective Delegation of Trustees' Powers 
and Duties, op. cit., paragraph 4.1.5. See also Underhill and Hayton, p. 623 
905 [ 19801 Ch 515,546 
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Section 23(l) permits the appointment of agents, and exempts the trustee from 
liability from agents' default if employed In good faith. 906 Again, cylobal 0 
custodians should be cautious in relying on this provision in the light of Barilett 
07. - -er, v. Barclays, as its ten-ris may be construed strictly against them9 Moreov 
it applies to the defaults of a trustee's agents. In characteristic global custodial 
arrangements, the sub-custodians are not agents but principals. 908 Moreover, 
the prudent interpretation of this sub-section is that it relates only to O'carious 
liability 909 and does not affect the personal liability of the custodian, which 
remains governed by section 30 
A., ccordingly, the position implied by statute is probably that the global 
custodian is liable for losses caused by sub-custodian default, only where the 
loss is due to the failure of the global custodian to use ordinary prudence in 
appointing and supervising the sub-custodian, or where the loss is otherwise due 
to the global custodian's negligence (or, possibly, gross negligence) or wilful 
default. This assumes that the appointment of the sub-custodian was authorised 
by the terrns of the global custody agreement; if it was not, it is unlikely that 
the global custodian will escape strict liability 
Global custodians should, therefore, take care in the initial choice of the 
members of their network, and in reviewing that choice from time to time. 
Criteria should include all matters affecting the safety of client assets, including 
906 "Trustees or personal representatives may, instead of acting personally, employ and pay an agent, whether a 
solicitor, banker, stockbroker, or other person, to transact any business or do any act required to be transacted 
or done in the execution of the trust, or the administration of the testator's or intestate's estate, including the 
receipt and payment of the money, and shall be entitled to be allowed and paid all charges and expenses so 
incurred, and shall not be responsible for the default of any such agent if employed in good faith". 
907 See Law Reform Committee Twenty-Third Report, Cmnd 8733, p. 36: "We think that the standard of care 
presently found in section 23(l) is not stringent enough. " See also Underhill and Hayton at pp. 623,624. 
908 Any agency between the global custodian sub-custodians is avoided, in order to prevent a direct contractual 
relationship between the third parties and the global custody clients, which might in turn undermine the 
com. mercial position of the global custodian. 
909 Contrast the wording of section 23(2), which relates to personal liability. The interpretation that section 23(l) 
is limited to vicarious liability accords with the pre-1925 position under the general law: -Before the Trustee 
Act 1925, while trustees were vicariously liable for the acts of unauthorised agents (and still are), it was clear 
that trustees who were authorised to delegate the carrying out of specific tasks to an agent were not vicariously 
liable for the acts of that agent but could be personally liable for their own acts in failing to select or supervise 
the agent with good faith and common prudence. " Collective Delegation of Trustees' Powers and Duties 
internal paper of the Trust Law Committee, October 1995, paragraph 4.1.1. See Fry v Tapson (1884) Ch D 
268 and Re Brier, (1884) 26 Ch D 238, per Lord Selborne LC at 243. 
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local custodial and administrative arrangements and staff controls. These should 
be considered in the light of local law and market practice. In particular, the 
global custodian should consider the impact of local insolvency law on its ability 
to recover client assets in the event of the third party's Insolvency. Delegation 
by third parties should be carefully controlled9lo. 
Global custodians sometimes take indemnities from sub-custodians. However, 
the usefulness of any such indemnity might be limited for the following reasons. 
The major risk associated with sub-custodians may be their credit risk, their 
insolvency would clearly affect the enforceability of an indemnity issued by 
them. Moreover, if the global custodian's exposure is due to its breach of duty, 
an indemnity in respect of it may be enforceable, as discussed in section F. 4 
below. 
2. Fraudulent Instructions 
An important potential exposure to the custodian is the arrangement, customary 
in pensions business, where instructions come not from the client, but from a 
fund manager. 
a. Bank America Wit 
Following the Maxwell scandal, the pension trustees sued Bank America 
as custodian for implementing the manager's instructions to make the free 
deliveries that led to the loss of the pension assets. Bank America has 
now settled the claim. It was not disputed that the instructions were 
technically valid. 911 The basis for the claim was that the custodian's 
suspicions should have been raised and, as a fiduciary, it should have 
reviewed the instructions and enquired into the circumstances surrounding 
them. This claim raises the suggestion that the custodian's duties may 
910 Under the general rule, delegatus non potest delegare, the custodian must act personally and delegation and sub- 
delegation are not permitted. unless expressly provided for in the global custody contract, on the basis that the 
client is deemed to have chosen the custodian personally to carry out its duties. 
For US clients, sub-delegation of custody of pension assets is restricted by regulations made under section 
404(b) of ERISA and sub-delegation of custody of mutual fund assets by rule 17(f)(5) of the Investment 
Companies Act 1940. 
911 (Although it may be argued that fraudulent instructions cannot be valid instructions under a custody contract) 
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extend to oversight of the manager, or even co-management. 912 As the 
claim was settled out of court, these issues have not been judicially 
clarified. 
The suggestion that the custodian is obliged to vet manager's instructions 
is worrying for the custodian. Firstly, it is contractually obliged to obey 
instructions, so that any obligation to decline to obey certal I ions n nstruct 
might put in breach of contract913. Secondly, in view of the high level 
of automation that is increasingly customary in settlement operations, any 
duty to review or subjectively appraise particular instructions may be 
impractical to discharge. In any case, the staff involved in settlement 
may be trained for administrative duties, and not in a position to exercise 
judgments as to the propriety of instructions. 
There are strong arguments that the custodian is not under a general duty 
to review manager's instructions, 914 as follows. 
Galmerrow 
The unreported case of Galmerrow Securities Limited & Others v 
National V*stminster Bank PLC (1990) considered the position of the 
trustee of an unauthorised unit trust scheme. Mr Justice Harman noted 
that the trust deed conferred exclusive power of and responsibility for 
management on the managers. "Plainly these terms are inconsistent with 
912 The writ alleged that a number of terms were implied into the custody agreement, including the following: 
"... (5) that BA would immediately inform the Trustees and if necessary each of the directors 
thereof of any instructions that it received in relation to the funds, which might involve risks 
to the assets under their management or alter the nature of their rights and duties and/or 
their performance thereof or which were abnormal, suspicious or otherwise out of the 
ordinary. 
(6) that RA would not deal with the funds and securities that it held in any way which put them 
at risk or allowed them to be stolen or used for improper purposes or lost to the MGPS... 
p. 27 
913 As delayed settlement may put the manager into default and also prevent it from taking advantage Of investment 
opportunities, damages may be significant. 
914 (although it can be liable for dishonest assistance in breach of fiduciary duty: Royal Brunei Airlines (19951 3 
All ER 97) 
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Nat West as Trustee exercising a general supervision over the choice of 
property.,, 915 On this basis, the trustee was held not to be liable for 
losses attributable to bad management. 
C. Goode Report 
During September 1993 the Pension Law Review Committee, chaired by 
Professor Roy Goode, published its report on pension law reform. There 
is a section discussing the custody of pension assets and the desirability 
of using a custodian independent of the sponsor and the manager. 916 The 
report concludes as follows "... whilst recognising the value of 
custodianship services, we do not consider that it would be right to 
require trustees ... to place pension funds assets with independent 
custodians', 917. Part of the basis for this conclusion is "... the fact that 
the custodian exercises ministerial rather than managerial functions and 
has no duty to investigate the propriety of instructions given to it, which 
appear to be in order, unless it has specifically undertaken a monitoring 
function"918. "The use of custodians may well give the semblance of 
protection without the reality". 919 
conclusions 
Contractual provisions should be included in the global custody 
agreement confirming the ability to assume that technically valid 
instructions are in order and that there is no duty of oversight of the 
manager. However, it would be prudent for global custodians to assume 
915 
p. 25. 
916 This is of course a crucial issue, as the success of custodians in the years ahead may depend on their ability to 




p. 367. "The custodian will wish to see the provisions of the trust deed relating to the trustees' investment 
powers. When dealing with a fund manager the custodian should also verify the authority given to the fund 
manager, and, where that authority does not come direct from the trustees as a whole but from individual 
trustees or from a third party, the source of their power to confer that authority. But when these steps have 
been taken, the custodian is free to act on its instructions in the absence of circumstances putting it on enquiry 
that something may be amiss. " p. 368. 
919 p. 369. 
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that they may not escape liability for acting on evidently fraudulent 
instructions, and for this reason may consider implementing controls that 
920 alert them to free deliveries or possibly large transfers Timely 
transaction reports to clients may also address risk. 
D. Secret Profits 
Section A. I above indicated that, as a fiduciary, the global custodian is generally not 
permitted to profit from Its position at the expense of the client. One aspect of this Is that 
the custodian cannot be remunerated unless fees are expressly agreed with the client9", 
although there is an implied right to recover reasonable expenses. 922 Another aspect of 
the rule is that in general no profit to the custodian indirectly derived from its service to 
the client can be retained. While this rule can be modified by the informed consent of 
the client, any "secret profits,, 923 must be accounted for to the client. 924 
Downward competitive pressure has reduced custodian fees to minimal levels, and the 
significant profits associated with global custody are no longer fee based, but derived 
from "cross selling". The global custodian may undertake discretionary stocklending of 
the clients' portfolios, and provide foreign exchange and derivative services, retaining 
significant profits in each case. These profits are not always expressly disclosed. 
Many custodians take a middle course, and include provision in the global custody 
contract giving general advance disclosures relating to cross selling and associated profits. 
920 Because the contractual provision may not be wholly enforceable, care should be taken to ensure that "partial 
invalidity" boilerplate is also included (i. e. provision that, if any part of the agreement is invalid, the remainder 
will remain in effect). 
921 ýA trustee, even one rendering services of a professional nature, cannot charge for those services unless the trust 
instrument expressly so provides or a court authorises remuneration. " Law Reform Committee, Twenty-thir 
Revort, The Powers and Duties of Trustees), Cmnd. 8733, October 1982, p. 1. 
922 "A trustee may reimburse himself or pay or discharge out of the trust premises all expenses incurred in or about 
the execution of the trusts or powers. ": section 30(2) of the Trustee Act 1925. Express provision is still 
customary, in order to avoid argument as to what is reasonable, and to specify "flat rate" expenses such as 
transaction charges which are a reasonable estimate of the custodian's expenses, to obviate the need to 
demonstrate actual disbursements equal to the charge. 
923 (i. e. profits to which the client has not informedly consented) 
924 See In re Brooke Bond Trust Deed [1962] 1 Ch 357. See also Bray v Ford (1986): The trustee is under a duty 
not to place himself in a position where his trusteeship duties and his personal interests may possible conflict. 
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In its Consultation paper925 the Law Commission casts doubt on such general advances 
disclosures, arguing that in order to establish informed client consent, a much higher 
level of detail than was customary, was necessary. 926 However, in its subsequent 
report927 the Law Commission is more robust. It argues that Kelly permits firms to rely 
928 on advance disclosures 
However, some clients who are trustees may fear that general advance consent may 
involve them in breach of trust to their beneficiaries. 929 Further, a note of caution is 
sounded by the case of Glynwill Investments NV v nomson McKinnon Futures Ltd930, 
where a foreign exchange dealer was held liable for breach of fiduciary duty, and was not 
able to rely on contractual provision which did not accord with the commercial realities' 
of its client business. 931 
The prudent approach would be to treat profits from cross selling in the same way as 
custody fees, and assume that they may only be retained if expressly detailed in the global 
custody agreement. 
E. Conflicts of Interest 
925 Fiduciary Duties and Regulatory Rule , May 1992 
926 
p. 128 
927 December 1995 
928 "We now believe that a sufficiently precise general advanced disclosure made in a contract will be effective 
provided that the contract clearly delimits the fiduciary duties owed to the customer and displaces the obligation 
to make full disclosure of all material facts, and the customer has not been misled as to the nature of the 
relationship between the parties. " p. 47. 
929 See Hayton, Developing the Law of Trusts for the Twenty-First Century (1900) 106 LQR 87,89. 
930 13 February 1992 (Unreported, Tuckey QQ. 
931 . This case also considered the extent to which the contract can determine the scope of fiduciary duties. The 
defendant finn was a foreign exchange dealer. It acted for the plaintiff in currency transaction, charging a 
commission and also, in some cases, taking a mark-up on the price at which it had bought in the market. It 
did not disclose the mark-up to the plaintiff. The plaintiff contended that the defendant was acting as its agent 
and was therefore liable to account for the mark-up. The defendant claimed that it was acting, as the contract 
between it and the plaintiff specified, as principal. However, the deputy judge concluded that in the light of 
the other evidence, including the agreement of conunission and the market order method used by the plaintiffs, 
the trading relationship was one of principal and agent. The plaintiff was therefore entitled to recover the 
amount of the mark-up from the defendant. " Law Commission Report, pp. 29,30. 
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A trustee is under a duty not to place itself in a position where its trusteeship duties and 
its personal interest may possibly conflict. 932 An important and growing function of 
custody securities is collateral. For reasons of administrative convenience933custodians 
are often asked to act in two capacities, both as custodian for their clients and as 
collateral trustee for their client's secured creditors. 934 The arrangement may be 
documented by one tri-party contract. 935 
Section A. 1. above referred to the undivided loyalty rule, which prevents the fiduciary 
from placing itself in a position where its duty towards one customer conflicts with Its 
duty to another. Clearly, to be acting as fiduciary for the parties on both sides of a 
security interest involves such a conflict. The general rule that fiduciary duties can be 
modified by informed contractual consent, and that commercial contractual terms prevail 
over fiduciary duty, should be treated with some caution in this context. Careful drafting 
may adequately address the conflict in circumstances where the custodian has no 
discretionary powers or duties in relation to the security interest, but is merely obliged 
to act on the express instructions of the chargee. However, where it has any 
discretionary powers in relation to the management or enforcement of collateral on behalf 
of the chargee, its position may be untenable. 
E Consequences of Breach of Duty 
In order successfully to sue a global custodian, a client must to establish liability. Apart 
from criminal liability, there are very broadly three general categories of civil liability 
under English law. These are, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract and tortious 
liability (negligence). 936 
932 Bray v Ford [18961 A. C. 44 
933 (and because the transfer of securities can involve delay, expense and tax) 
934 In other words, the client both places its securities with the custodian, and charges them to the creditor, and 
the creditor appoints the custodian to act on its behalf in relation to the administration and enforcement of the 
charge. 
935 (to which the client, the secured creditor and the custodian are parties) 
936 These are the traditional heads of liability. A possible additional head is unjust enrichment. See, for example, 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington Borough Council (19941 1 WLR 938. qowever, this 
additional head of liability is fairly speculative at the time of writing. 
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1. Breach of Fiduciary Duty937 
Very broadly speaking, a custodian incurs liability to the client where it is in 
breach of its fiduciary duties to the client and this breach results in loss to the 
client. The measure of this liability is to make good such loss. 938. Remote or 
unforeseeable damages are not excluded939, but there must be some causal 
connection between the breach of duty and the loss to establish liability 940 
Liability is subject to contractual or statutory relieving provisions. 
Statutory relief is in theory available under section 61 of the Trustee Act 1925, 
where the custodian has acted honestly and reasonably and ought fairly to be 
937 The discussion of liability that follows assumes that the custodian is a trustee. Broadly similar general principles 
govern the liability of a bailee. 
938 This is essentially akin to the position at conunon law. See Target Holdings v Redferns (19951 3 All ER 785, 
per Lord Browne Wilkinson at 792: "At common law there are two principles fundamental to the award of 
damages. First, that the defendant's wrongful act must cause the damage complained of. Second, that the 
plaintiff is to be put 'in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which 
he is now getting his compensation or reparation'... Although, as will appear, in many ways equity approaches 
liability for making good a breach of trust from a different starting point, in my judgment those two principles 
are applicable as much in equity as at common law. " 
939 Nor is there any duty on the plaintiff to mitigate its losses by litigation: see Target, at 799, quoting from the 
judgment of Hoffmann U Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd (in liq) v Marwell (No 2) [19941 1 All ER 
261: "... it is sound law that a plaintiff is not required to engage in hazardous litigation in order to mitigate his 
loss. " 
940 See Target, per Lord Browne Wilkinson at 794. "Even if the immediate cause of the loss is the dishonesty or 
failure of a third party, the trustee is liable to make good that loss to the trust estate if, but for the breach, such 
loss would not have occurred. ... 
Thus the common law rues of remoteness of damages an causation do not 
apply. However, there does have to be some causal connection between the breach of trust and the loss to the 
trust estate for which compensation is recoverable, viz the fact that the loss would not have occurred but for 
the breach. " 
In Target the issue was breach of an equitable duty of care and not breach of core fiduciary duty. This latter 
issues is considered in the following cases. 
The insistence on some causal connection alters the earlier rule that loss flowing from non-disclosure by a 
fiduciary attracts strict liability (Brickenden v London and Loan Savings Co (19341 3 DLR 465 at 469). 
However, in respects of active misrepresentations, liability remains strict: Bristol and West Building Society and 
May May & Merrimans [19961 2 All ER 801. 
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941 excused. However, it is considered unlikely that such relief would be 
granted to a professional trustee such as a global custodian. 94-1 
A custody client may have remedies against parties other than the global 
custodian in certain circumstances. Equitable tracing may be available. In 
addition a custody client may be able to sue persons holding or having held 
their custody assets as constructive trustees 943, and (even where the defendant 
does and has not held the assets) there may be liability for dishonest 
assistance. 944 (This concept may impose liability on a fund manager who, for 
example, co-operates with a custodian in settling a purchase of securities into 
941 " 61. If it appears to the court that a trustee, whether appointed by the court or otherwise, 'is or may be 
personally liable for any breach of trust, whether the transaction alleged to be a breach of trust occurred before 
or after the commencement of this Act, but has acted honestly and reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused 
for the breach of trust and for omitting to obtain the directions fro the court In the matter in which he committed 
such breach, then the courts may relieve him either wholly or partly from personal liability for the same. " 
Similar provisions in relation to company directors are contained in section 727 of the Companies Act 1985 
(directors etc). 
942 'Although there is no doubt about the court's jurisdiction to grant relief under section 61 to a trustee who is 
remunerated, there appears from the cases to be a market reluctance to do so. " Law Commission Report, 
Fiduciary Duties and Regulatory Rule , December 1995, p. 95 
The 23rd Report of the Law Reform Committee looked at the whole question of the powers and duties of 
trustees and considered the issue of whether it was desirable to incorporate the distinction between professional 
and voluntary trustees into statute. It concluded that this was not necessary, stating that Section 61 was an 
adequate statutory provision to allow this difference to be recognised. The courts would be far more likely to 
give relief to a voluntary trustee under Section 61 than to a professional Trustee. 
943 'A constructive trust of property is a trust imposed by equity in respect of property on proof of a variety of 
special circumstances ... where equity considers 
it unconscionable for the owner of particular property to hold 
it purely for his own benefit. It confers a proprietary right on the plaintiff ... 
It is now apparent that a 
constructive trust is a remedial institution which equity imposes to preclude the retention or assertion of 
beneficial ownership of property ... to the extent that such retention or assertion would 
be contrary to some 
principle of equity. " a J. Hayton, Underhill and Hayton, Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees, l5ed, 
Butterworths, London, 1995, pp. 42,43. 
The case of Brinks Ltd v Abu-Saleh and Others (No 3) (Times 23 October 1995) considered the decision in 
Brunei; confirmed that in order for a person to be liable in equity as an accessory to a breach of trust it was 
necessary for him to have given the relevant assistance in the knowledge of the existence of the trust or, at least, 
of the facts giving rise to the trust. Mr Justice Rimer "considered Royal Brunei Airlines, in particular p 76E, 
and said that he did not consider that the Privy Council intended to suggest that an accessory could be made 
accountable to the beneficiaries as a constructive trustee regardless of whether he had any knowledge of the 
existence of the trust. " 
944 See Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan [19951 3 All ER 97, per Lord Nicholls at 109: -A liability in equity to make 
good resulting loss attaches to a person who dishonestly procures or assists in a breach of trust or fiduciary 
obligation. It is not necessary that, in addition, the trustee or fiduciary was acting dishonestly... ". Unlike I in 
the criminal law, dishonesty for this purpose is an objective standard: see 105,106. 
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a street name, if it knows that such an arrangement is in breach of the terms ef 
the custody agreement. ) 
Negligence 
"Negligence as a tort is the breach of a legal duty to take care which results in 
damage, undesired by the defendant, to the plaintiff.,, 945 
The measure of damages for negligence or other torts is the award which is 
necessary to put the plaintiff back into the position it would have been in had 
the tort never occurred (i. e. it is retrospective)946 
There are limits to the ability to recover damages for economic loss in 
negligence. 947 
The relationship between negligence and breach of fiduciary duty is dikussed 
by Lord Browne Winkinson in Henderson v Merrett948. Liability in negligence 
is derived from fiduciary duties of care. The two heads of liability cannot be 
claimed as alternatives, for the tortious and fiduciary duties of care are in 
essence the same. 949 The judgment extends the principle in Kelly v Cooper to 
tortious liability: just as fiduciary duties may be limited and determined by 
contract, so tortious duties may be so limited and determined-950 
945 Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 14ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1994, p. 78. 
946 " The basic principle for the measure of damages in tort.. is that there should be restitutio, in integrum. Apart 
from the special cases we have considered, "where any injury is to be compensated by damages, in settling the 
sum of money to be given for reparation of damages you should as nearly as possible get at that sum of money 
which will put the party who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been 
in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or reparation" [Livingstone 
v Ravvyards Coal Co. (1880) 5 App CAs 25,39 per Lord Blackburn]". Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 14ed, 
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1994, p. 645. 
947 See Hedley Býme v Heller (1964] A. C. 465. A huge literature has been written on this topic. 
948 [19941 3 All ER 506 at 543 
949 At 543 
950 At 544 
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However, contractual and tortious liability can be concurrent. 951 
3. Breach of Contract 
"Damages for a breach of contract committed by the defendant are a 
compensation to the plaintiff for the damage, loss or injury he has suffered 
through that breach. He is, as far as money can do it, to be placed in the same 
position as if the contract had been performed. ', 952 In other words, the 
approach is prospective (in contrast with the retrospective approach for 
assessing tortious damages). 
Compliance with a contractual duty is not a defence to liability for breach of 
fiduciary duty, where the two conflict. Hence the importance, for example, of 
modifying the fiduciary duty of disclosure of all relevant information to one 
client, in view of the contractual and fiduciary duties of confidentiality to 
another client. 
4. Nexus 
Where a custody client suffers loss due to the default of a sub-custodian, its 
ability to recover damages (whether for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of 
contract or negligence) will depend on its ability to demonstrate that it is in a 
direct relationship with the defendant. 953 Such relationships can be established 
between the client and the global custodian, but no liability may arise there 
because the global custodian is not at fault (unless it was in breach of its duty 
of care in appointing or supervising the sub-custodian). There may be fault at 
sub-custodian level, but no liability, because no relationship on which to 
establish duty owed to the client. In an intermediated product such as global 
custody, the client has no direct nexus with the sub-delegates responsible for 
losses; therefore duty and fault may be unlikely to coincide in the same person, 
the client is more exposed that in a service where there is no sub-delegation. 
951 See Henderson v Merren and White v Jones [19951 1 All ER 691 at 730. 
952 Chitty on Contracts, 27ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1994, p. 1198. 
953 Because, under English law, fiduciary duties only arise where there is a relationship of special trust, contractual 
duties ordy arise where there is privity of contract, and negligence can only be established where duties of care 
are owed. 
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5. Indemnities for Breach of Duty 
Where a manager wishes the global custodian to act in breach of its duties to 
its client (for example by appointing a sub-custodian in a jurisdiction where it 
cannot prudently do so) the manager may offer the global custodian an 
indemnity in respect of the global custodian's exposure for that breach. The 
global custodian should treat this with caution, as such an indemnity may be 
unenforceable. 954 
954 See Chittv on Contracts, 27 ed. 1994, London, Sweet 
& Maxwell, Vol. 1, p. 868. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusions 
The computerisation of global custody has cut across traditional legal analysis. Computerised 
securities cannot be negotiable instr-uments (chapter 3). The lack of a tangible and allocated 
subject matter takes custody beyond the scope of bailment (chapter 40) 
This work has considered this problem and has suggested that the solution to it comes from two 
sources. Firstly, conflict of laws: as global custody operates cross-border, some of the 
problems posed by computerisation under English domestic law are cured by private 
international law. These include questions of integrity of transfer, formalities of transfer and 
negotiability (chapter 6). 
Secondly and more importantly, the law of trusts. Equity succeeds (where the common law and 
the law merchant fail) in meeting many challenges posed by computerised custody. These 
include the achievement of divided ownership without possession (chapter 4) and without 
individual allocation (chapter 5). The enormous commercial value of the law of trusts rests 
partly on its synergy with the rules of private international law: the latter's emphasis on lex situs 
and the former's ability to place the situs of certain trusts with the trustee (chapter 7). 
The importance of equity in solving the legal problems of global custody accords with the 
argument that, through electronic custody, bearer securities have become registered securities 
which, traditionally, are equitable (chapter 3). Both developments reflect the historic role of 
equity in permitting commercial law to adapt to developments in commercial practice where the 
common law is too inflexible. (chapter 3) 
It is appropriate that the computerisation (and therefore the dematerialisation) of custody 
securities should take us into the realms of equity, for equitable property has been described as 
if it were itself a species of dematerialisation. 955 
It is also appropriate that equity should support the modem global custodian, because of the 
obstinacy of equity in resisting the distinction between personal and proprietary rights. This 
955 duplicating the corporeal world with an incorporeal shadow. "We are to speak of the rights of ... cetuis que 
trust.... [They] had an "estate", not in the land, but in "the use". This may be "An estate in fee simple, an 
estate for life, an estate in remainder" and so forth. We might say that "the use" is turned into an incorporeal 
thing, an incorporeal piece of land; and in this incorporeal thing you may have all those rights, those "estates", 
which you could have in a real, tangible piece of land. " Maitland 
Selected Essays, Cambridge University Press, 
1936, Trust and Corporation, pp. 164,165. Equally the doctrine of equitable tracing "converted the 'trust fund' 
into an incorporeal thing, capable of being 'invested' in 
different ways. " p. 172. 
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distinction has been fundamental in Western property law since Justinian. 956 However. an 
interest under a trust resists it (chapter 7). 957 
In an electronic environment, where rights in securities are held through multi-tiered, fun2lble 
958 and intangible arrangements, the assertion of a right in rem is almost fanciful. In this 
context, the only functional importance of the concept of property is avoidance of intermediary 
insolvency risk, and the trust achieves this. In its failure to take the ancient point that personal 
and proprietary rights are fundamentally different, equity anticipated computers. 
Equity, then, provides the appropriate jurisprudential base for global custody. However, the 
day to day legal needs of global custodians and their clients are more practical than theoretical. 
A pragmatic approach to the enforcement of security interests in custody securities is essential 
(chapter 7). Above all, the drafting of the global custody contract is the most important factor 
in defining the duties and liabilities of the custodian (chapter 8). More broadly, the role of 
jurisprudence in global custody and generally in commercial law must be understood. Although 
expressed in terms of abstract principles, conunercial law is not theoretical philosophy and an 
abstract approach will not take one far (chapter 2). Commercial law is a pragmatic technique 
for resolving concrete disputes. It follows events, in two senses. Firstly, legal theory is 
derived from the facts of the cases that make up commercial law. It is not an a pn . on . 
discipline, and the correct direction for legal reasoning is "bottom up" rather than "top 
down. "959 It follows, secondly, that commercial law adapts well to changes in commercial 
practice. 
Moreover, the commercial and financial markets have always been able to tolerate a large 
measure of legal uncertainty. Just as the commercial revolution of the late middle ages was able 
to take place without a common law concept of assignable debt, and the industrial revolution 
956 The distinction organises the layout of Justinian's Institutes, Blackstone's Commentaries and Dicey's The 
Conflict of Laws alike. 
957 " [The trust] was made by men who had no Roman law as explained by medieval commentators in the innermost 
fibres of their minds. " Maitland, Selected Essays, Cambridge University Press, 1936, The Unincorporated 
Body, p. 130. 
958 '... the fact remains that modem securities markets have moved so far beyond the movement of pieces of 
negotiable paper that the property law construct is inadequate and unworkable. " C. W. Mooney, Beyond 
Negotiability, Cardozo Law Review, [19901 Vol 12,305 at 303. In this article, which informed the revised 
draft 8 of the UCC, Professor Mooney suggests a securities law based not on property but on priority. 
959 " Also it is to be remembered that the making of grand theories is not and never has been our ýtrong point. " 
Maitland, Selected Essays, Cambridge University Press, 1936, Trust and Corporation pp. 218,219. 
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took place without developed company law (chapter 3), so the computer revolution of the late 
20th century has not been, and did not need to be preceded by a full legal account of itself. 
The complete legal account of computerisation in general, and of global custody in particular, 
will follow financial practice. This work has suggested a direction in which, in this jurisdiction, 
it may develop. 
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